The War in Vietnam: Rolling Thunder Operation Design Case Study

Strategic Context and Goals

The United States’ involvement in the military conflict in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s occurred because of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, two massively powerful states that were fighting to exert their sphere of influence on a global scale at the time. As the communist regime began to strengthen in Vietnam, along with the threat that the entire country might become united under a communist leader, the United States felt compelled to intervene. The entire situation was complex from a strategic point of view because the ultimate goal of the leadership in countries worldwide was to avoid the eruption of another world war. Thus, any state gaining new allies and seeking to spread its political ideology was immediately perceived as a global threat as well as an aggressor attempting to establish world domination.

To weaken the developing communist regime in Vietnam, US leadership created a complex military operation known as Rolling Thunder.¹ The plan for this operation involved conducting a series of bombings against vital strategic and infrastructure targets in North Vietnam, where the communist regime was in place.² The aerial attacks were anticipated to slow down and weaken the communist leaders of North Vietnam by showing them that they would pay a devastating price for continuing their effort to unite the country under a communist ruler.

The Operation Design

Rolling Thunder was known as one of the most significant failures in terms of warfare for the civilian and military leadership during the Vietnam War. The operation was designed by such conflict-based theories as “graduated escalation” and “flexible response.”³ However, despite the thorough planning and resources involved, the operation never managed to achieve the planners’ anticipated results. This failure was mainly caused by the fact that neither of the aforementioned principles (flexibility and gradual escalation) was followed properly. As a result, the use of aerial power did not produce the desired response from the leadership of North Vietnam.

Another significant part of the operational design was a strategic analysis of the enemy’s capacity and will to withstand attacks.⁴ In turn, errors in analysis led to inadequate expectations and flawed planning. Moreover, from the beginning, several different groups of military and civilian leaders were engaged in the operation as commanders. Based on their differences in views, vision, and training, the leaders began to disagree. Consequently, the development of the operation was heavily influenced by the differing aims resulting from the leaders’ perspectives. Also, it is important to notice that, according to the design for accountability in Rolling Thunder, the military leaders who operated directly in Vietnam or who had a clear idea of the events that were unraveling in the war zone had to answer to and were strictly controlled by civilian leaders who remained in the United States, in the White House and congressional halls.

The Course of Action and Choices

As mentioned previously, the selected course of action for Rolling Thunder was a lengthy and sustained series of airstrikes aimed at vital strategic targets in North Vietnam and Laos. The bombings were mainly focused on what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh trail, an essential logistical system that provided supplies for the army of North Vietnam.⁵ President Lyndon Johnson, the leader of the United States at the time, saw the entire campaign as a way to negotiate peace with North Vietnam. In practical terms, his vision was based on the idea that the airstrikes that were part of Rolling Thunder and other air warfare operations would pressure North Vietnam to give up its positions and motivate South Vietnam to fight communism and corruption.⁶ President Johnson was convinced that airstrikes were the best choice of means and strategy for an operation dedicated to establishing American will in the region.

The other option for the United States in terms of conducting military operations in North Vietnam was an engagement in intense on-land warfare and an assault on the enemy’s territories.⁷ However, the major problem with this solution was an increased possibility of a response from three allies—two of them powerful—of North Vietnam: the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Should these allies be provoked, a confrontation could easily grow into a massive military conflict of a global character—an unwanted scenario for the United States. As a result, US leaders focused on what they perceived as a faster way to compel the government of North Vietnam to surrender or abandon their plans without disrupting any domestic campaigns.

Assumptions of the Leaders

One of the main assumptions made by the United States government, as well as many of the military leaders who were operating in Vietnam, concerned the military might, capacity, and will of their enemy. In particular, US leaders were convinced that in conducting warfare in Vietnam, their forces faced a much weaker and less-capable adversary. As a result, the leaders did not give much consideration to the operation in terms of a potential strategic response on the part of North Vietnam or its endurance. Initially, Rolling Thunder was planned to span less than 30 days; however, the decision was made to extend the operation, and in the end, it lasted three months.⁸ In reality, the US leaders’ estimations and expectations turned out to be wrong as the overall military campaign continued for years without bringing any successful results.

Based on the failure of Rolling Thunder to achieve any of the essential elements of a successful airstrike operation, it is possible to conclude that an inappropriate perception of the enemy’s military capacity led to mistakes. In other words, such critical-for-success components as flexibility, the element of surprise, and the gradual concentration of forces heavily depended on assumptions made about the enemy’s power and ability to withstand attacks. Initially underestimating the military forces of North Vietnam later jeopardized the sophistication of plans.

Factors Considered during Operation Planning

In the planning of Rolling Thunder, the condition of North Vietnam’s allies (as mentioned, the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea) was taken into account as an important factor impacting the scale of attacks, meaning the operation had to be carried out in a way that would not provoke the allies to become involved. Also, US leadership was convinced that the logistics of the planned airstrikes had been properly taken into consideration and corresponded with the potential movements and strategies of enemy forces. In effect, the entire campaign pursued political rather than military goals.⁹

Consequently, political and social realities in all the involved states were taken into account as well. Specifically, attempting to avoid provocation that could lead to the engagement of more countries in the conflict, the military and civilian leaders in charge of the operation had to make decisions, some of which included the use of foreign military bases (in Thailand, for example) and the schedule of attacks while the leaders of allied states visited the capital of North Vietnam.

The weather was another important factor to consider because Rolling Thunder began during the onset of the region’s monsoon season, making it impossible for airplanes to navigate the sky over Vietnam. Furthermore, following a strategy based on a gradual escalation of attacks, President Johnson reviewed several first strikes known as operations Flaming Dart I and II. Seeing the resulting lack of success and the overall minor damage done to the enemy, the US president decided to move on to a more vigorous phase that would involve launching larger strikes.

Execution of the Operation and Key Decisions

As the number and magnitude of airstrikes on various targets in North Vietnam rose, US leadership decided to reduce the publicity of their actions to avoid the negative response they feared from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China and to present US military operations as necessary but not extraordinary measures.¹⁰ Another key decision that took place during the increased concentration of airstrikes was aimed at significant changes in the purpose of the overall campaign. To be more precise, the initial goal of Rolling Thunder was to demonstrate US intentions to support South Vietnam and curb the military effort of North Vietnam. Over time, US authorities decided that their key goal should be to cut supplies and reinforcements for North Vietnam to pressure its leaders into peace negotiations.¹¹

Restricting the scale of air warfare became the first reason that US leadership began to experience disagreement. Specifically, since the operation initially revolved around achieving political goals through military action, two groups of authorities were involved. Military leaders operating in Vietnam saw that the enemy was managing to absorb the airstrikes and quickly recuperate. As a result, they expressed criticism of the intentionally limited scale of attacks. The civilian leaders, however, were more afraid of provoking additional international conflicts than they were motivated to stop the expansion of North Vietnam southward.¹² Therefore, the decision to increase airstrikes to achieve the desired level of impact was never made, and the entire operation failed to proceed as planned.

Key Factors that Contributed to Operation Failure

Operation Rolling Thunder is known as one of the most massive aerial bombing campaigns in the history of warfare. However, regardless of its length, might, and the number of people and amount of combat equipment involved, the operation was a huge failure. Initially, the planners of Rolling Thunder were optimistic about its course, but in the end, most of their prospects and calculations contained critical errors that influenced the success of the operation.

The major factor affecting the planning of the operation was the US authorities’ flawed understanding of their enemy. In terms of military capacity and the will to fight, North Vietnam was perceived as a weak rival having limited resources, a foe that would be defeated quickly and easily. The American leaders focused on the belief that the mere initiation of military action in the territory of Vietnam would allow the US government to compel the communist leaders to give up and end their expansion to the south. As a result, the first airstrikes were relatively minor and had almost no impact. The following increase in the magnitude and frequency of strikes had to be hidden from the public eye due to the US leaders’ desire to avoid the escalation of armed conflict. However, the increased might of attacks also failed to bring results.

The dissent that followed multiple restrictions of military actions divided the US authorities in charge of Rolling Thunder into two groups: those who advocated for a more aggressive military effort and those who opposed such an effort due to political pressures. The leaders had the final say in the operation exerted their control from afar and lacked the appropriate practical knowledge and military training. Due to these key factors, Rolling Thunder continued for two-and-a-half years instead of the earlier-anticipated three months.

The Failure to Meet the Strategic Objectives

Operation Rolling Thunder’s strategic objectives were never met. The operation consumed numerous resources. It lasted much longer than expected and resulted not only in the loss of military significance for the United States but also damaged the reputation of its leaders as the protectors of democratic values and freedoms in general. From the beginning, the engagement of the American forces in the war and the initiation of the airstrikes that made up Rolling Thunder led to multiple public and policy-related protests all around the world.

Convinced that their plan was going to succeed in curbing the aggression of North Vietnam and its communist expansion to the south, US authorities continued the operation past its original termination date. Seeing that its impact was less than anticipated, the authorities were forced to introduce changes throughout Rolling Thunder. However, due to the political nature and purposes of the operation, its targets, structure, and magnitude were severely restricted. Furthermore, the enemy’s forces and military capacity were significantly underestimated. As a result, North Vietnam was able to absorb the airstrikes with minor losses while continuing its expansion.

The Balance of Ends, Ways, and Means

The desired outcomes of the operation—its ends—aimed at achieving the capitulation of North Vietnamese forces and stimulating the South Vietnamese authorities to fight the communist regime to their north. The ways involved in Rolling Thunder included the actions carried out to achieve the aforementioned goals. Finally, it means included the resources available during the operation. Analyzing the balance of the three elements, it is possible to conclude that the operation’s ends and means were mostly balanced as the US had much military power and could break the course of events in Vietnam. However, the ways of this operation were its major limitation as to how Rolling Thunder was conducted led to its lack of political and military impact.

Most importantly, US military and civilian leaders were aware of the restrictions of the means from the time of the planning stages of the operation. However, this knowledge did not stop them from executing the plan due to the major underestimation of North Vietnam’s readiness to withstand a military confrontation against an opponent as mighty as the United States. In their planning for the potential outcomes of Rolling Thunder, the American leaders failed to take into account the fact that their enemy might successfully predict the political pressure the US would face and the degree to which a negative response could restrict their military actions.

Bibliography

Frankum, Ronald Bruce. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964-1975. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

Polmar, Norman, and Edward J. Marolda. Naval Air War: The Rolling Thunder Campaign. Washington: Department of the Navy, 2015.

Van Staaveren, Jacob. Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam 1965–1966. Washington: United States Air Force, 2002.

White, Duglas M. “Rolling Thunder to Linebacker: U.S. Fixed Wing Survivability over North Vietnam.” MA thesis, United States Naval Academy, 2014.

Wilson, Stephen W. “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder.” Air Power History 48 (2001): 40-47.

Footnotes

1. Duglas M. White, “Rolling Thunder to Linebacker: U.S. Fixed Wing Survivability over North Vietnam” (MA thesis, United States Naval Academy, 2014), 9.
2. Norman Polmar and Edward J. Marolda, Naval Air War: The Rolling Thunder Campaign (Washington: Department of the Navy, 2015), 1.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Stephen W. Wilson, “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder,” Air Power History 48 (2001): 42.
7. Polmar and Marolda, Naval Air War, 1.
8. Wilson, Taking Clodfelter One Step Further, 43.
9. Jacob Van Staaveren, Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam 1965–1966 (Washington: United States Air Force, 2002), 24.
10. Ronald Bruce Frankum, Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964-1975 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 24.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 25.