Introduction
The DoD claims that the security of the political economies in western countries is under the menace of transnational organized crime. This has emerged as the main issue in the key international forums like the Council of Europe, industrial countries in G7/8 elite, and the United Nations’ agenda over the previous decade. In fact, both international and national safety faces an increasing and significant danger modeled by the TOC. This renders unswerving consequences to the steadiness of the economy, democratic organizations, facilities of public health, as well as the well-being of the public. Apart from the intensifying criminal systems, the transnational organized crime results into the emergence of threats that possess destabilizing and explosive effects as an outcome of their diversified activities. However, this has seen several priority policies put in place by the President to combat the transnational organized crime networks that stance a deliberate danger to the United States and to the American populace.
The United States and other countries have pulled apart the tallies of criminal establishments globally for decades. Therefore, this paper deliberates on the key policy objectives and priority actions listed in the Presidents strategy to combat transnational organized crime. The paper further discusses how these priorities are nested by the DoD’s counternarcotic approach. It also tries to suggest a change in the policies to address what is reflected as a solitary narcotic hazard to the stability of the economy and security of United States. Finally, it vindicates and expound on the writers key policy change position centered on the objectives of learning.
The key policy objectives and priority actions in the president’s strategy to combat TOCs
The President’s strategy sets out five main policy objectives, which are predominant to curb the TOC. These policy objectives are consistent with respect to the priorities and visualization of the National Security Strategy. The first objective is to safeguard Americans and their associates from exploitation by the transnational criminal networks, violence, and mischief. The opening precedence revolves around the affluence, defense, and wellbeing of American cohort states’ populace as well as the US inhabitants. This strategy targets the networks that carry serious intimidation to the security and safety of citizens (DoD 2011, 5-28). These networks include those that pursue to coerce and terrorize through deeds corresponding to murder, torture as well as those that carryout abductions for extortion and ransom. In addition, other networks entail those who rob American societies of their affluence, distribute and sell counterfeit, tainted, plus substandard products and those that traffic human specifically children and women, weaponries, and prohibited drugs.
The second aim in the Presidential approach in the proposal of combating intercontinental structured felony is to abet cohort states in severing country felony associations, halt the corruptive supremacy of large-scale unlawful set-ups and to underline intelligibility and control. To fight the coercions to supremacy allied to flux and sleaze produced by the intercontinental structured felony, the United States calls for proficient, steadfast, and enthusiastic collaborators (Fijnaut, 2000, 119-127). The approach would back distant allies in endorsing global ethics; support successful and justifiable wellbeing of the community, protection, and integrity foundations; and develop obligatory capacities to trounce large-scale drug and terrorism threats. Besides, it will aspire to severe associations that are strategically powerful that form between TOC networks and foreign intelligence amenities other than that between TOC and other countries (Adam and Gill 2002, 245-270).
The third policy is to defend American fiscal structure and deliberate marketplaces from abuse and incursion of TOC and to split the worldwide unlawful networks fiscal command. It is possible for the transnational organized crime to put the legitimate businesses at a disadvantaged distinctive competition and mess up the economic activities through violence, swindle, and bribery. Thus, this strategy aim at protecting the United States financial systems and strategic markets and to expose TOC’s criminal activities veiled behind legitimate fronts (NSS 2011, 1-38). Moreover, it will sever the TOC’s right of entry to financial systems and attack the financial underpinnings of the transnational criminals at the top.
In the fourth policy, by way of thwarting the deeds that further scandalous bombing, grudging them of their facilitating assets, and marking their roads, it intends to conquer global unlawful associations that create acute fear to universal defenses. The approach will work on the sect’s systems that pose greater danger to the security, safety, and the interest of United States national security by targeting, disrupting, and conquering the networks of TOC (Fazey, 2007, 755-780). These targets will include transnational criminal gangs involve in trafficking sensitive documents, human, armaments, cash in bulk, illicit drugs, and other illegal imports. Additionally, the strategy pursues to deprive the terrorists and criminals of their critical infrastructure and prevent their group efforts (DoD 2011, 5-28).
The final strategy aims at defeating the transnational organized crime by building private public partnership, multilateral, and international consensus. It involves designing new-fangled affiliations with non-governmental parties, universal humanity, scholastic humankind, sponsorship, and businesses. Conversely, it will instigate legal set-ups to battle the scandalous drug associations and make certain the journalists sovereignty to permit for the publicity of tribulations wreaked by the TOC. Besides, it will further international norms against sponsoring crime by expanding and deepening information, cooperation, and understanding within internal and foreign agencies and institutions (NSS 2011, 1-38).
Similarly, several priority actions are in place by the Presidential strategy to combat transnational organized crime. The first action should be to take a shared responsibility for organized transnational crime. All efforts to disrupt TOC must begin at home by acknowledging and working within the boundaries, to combat causes emanating to empower and fuel TOC. The second action aims at sharing information and enhancing intelligence analysis, counterintelligence, and assemblage of TOC. The third precedence is to shield the planned souks and fiscal coordination alongside international structured felonies. Since these transnational criminals are sophisticated and entrepreneurial, it threatens the free markets thus, destabilizes the international economy (Fazey, 2007, 755-780).
The other priority action is to make stronger the prosecutions, investigations, and interdiction. The action helps at the tribunal, territorial, local, state, and federal levels to work in collaboration while targeting TOC networks through setting objectives and priorities to augment agencies to law enforcements. The fifth action is to disrupt the drug trafficking and the expedition of other threats form the transnational organized crime. Technological developments in the recent years have empowered TOC to engage in planning, coordinating, and perpetrating schemes with increased anonymity and mobility in unlawful activities and drug trafficking (DoD 2011, 5-28). Finally, a priority action aims at building partnerships, corporation, and international capacity. The President included this in his strategies since combating transnational organized crime needs criminal justice aptitudes, effective enforcement of the law, and political commitment on an international basis.
How DoD’s Counternarcotics strategy nests these priorities
The president has listed numerous priority actions in the nation strategy intended to combat the transnational organized crimes. However, the department of defense has managed to nest most of these priorities in the counternarcotics strategy (Shelley, 2005, 101-112). Often, the strategy intends to reduce substantially the flow of drugs proceeds, illicit drugs, as well as the allied violence instruments. In its counternarcotics strategy, the DoD objectively nests various key priorities. These are as discussed bellow.
The DoD enhances the capabilities of the intelligence in detecting and eradicating incidences of drug trafficking and consumption. To realize this, the DoD facilitates the sharing of information and intelligence in the drug trafficking operational environments by expanding the border control initiatives. The DoD usually works according to the policies and laws intended to assimilate and improve the flow of pertinent intelligence in a timely manner. It analyses, processes and shares info with foreign governments, tribal, local, state, and federal agencies that aim at detecting, protecting, and disbanding the transiting of illicit drugs and allied threat weapons (Adam and Gill 2002, 245-270).
The DoD in its counternarcotics strategy aims at dismantling and disrupting the organizations formed purposely to assist in drug trafficking. For instance, the DoD often disables, nexus the activities and actors, as well as possibly disrupts the drug trafficking activities and drug markets within and outside national borders. In fact, the DoD supports the operations concepts established by the state to fully enhance the counternarcotics incorporation into the general counterinsurgency campaigns in drug trafficking areas. For example, the DoD incorporates a budget in their counternarcotics strategy to support the global plan meant to prevent, investigate, interdict, boost intelligence, and treat or assist the domestic addicts (Fazey, 2007, 755-780).
The DoD enhances the corporation of the United States with South and Central America, along with Mexico with respect to joint efforts to counterdrug trafficking. The DoD supports governments to establish the operations concepts intended to synchronize and interdict the efforts geared towards transmitting illicit weapons and bulk cash to Mexico, Peru, and Colombia from the US (Shelley, 2005, 101-112).
On the other hand, the DoD inspects and sanction all the narcotics connected gadgets, returns from narcotics, and the existing narcotics amid docks, at the entrance of harbors, as well as in the naval and space domains. To realize this, the DoD has enhanced the counterdrug technologies intended to interdict drug traffickers and detect the drugs on transits. Besides, the DoD ensures that all laws suits relating to the smuggling and transportation of weaponry, mass cash, currency filtering, and narcotics trafficking are impeached. For instance, the DoD targets and attacks the structured criminal organizations via persecutions and efficient investigations. All the financiers and organized drug trafficking networks or cartels are also traced and disbanded by the DoD while the responsible people are investigated and prosecuted (Fazey, 2007, 755-780).
Revising policies to address the narcotics threat to the security and the US economic stability
Drug trafficking and the allied criminal activities have continuously intensified and left the spillover effects in the United States as well as along the Colombian, and Mexican borders. Most of these countrys governments appear unable to manage successfully incidences of drug operations either in their localities or in the borders. Hence, because of the increase in drug cartels activities, the economies have been destabilized creating favorable milieu for terrorists to gain access into the countries and launch assaulting attacks within the United States and its environs.
The national strategy for the United States intended to cope with incidents of narcotics trafficking and allied organizations are based on four fundamental documents: The 2010 National Security Strategy devised by the president, the 2009 Merida Initiative, the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy of 2009, and the National Drug Control Strategy of 2009. Whereas the implemented strategies seem apparently comprehensive, accessible, and clear, the policy equation only lacks a comprehensively updated counterdrug plan from the DoD. This policy plan should be intended to apply efficiently the resources available in the department of defense in order to affect the present setting that supports the state strategies.
A change to the policies to address the narcotics threat to the security and economic stability of the U.S. is desirable. The initiatives and policy strategies adopted by the US administration to counter drug trafficking threats appear to be too limited or narrowly focused. In fact, the DoD policy strategy intended to counternarcotics trafficking should be revised. However, the changed counternarcotics policy strategy should not be bilateral. For instance, since drug trafficking is a transnational threat to all global economies, it cannot be overcome merely through enhancing the Mexican and Colombian administrations alongside their defense forces only (Fijnaut, 2000, 119-127). The drug trafficking organizations frequently increase their associations with other transnational organized criminal networks to utilize the capabilities and resources they hardly possess. Thus, it is advisable that the counternarcotics policy should be revised to allow the U.S. to design identical associations with different partner states not just to leverage abilities and extra resources, but also to strengthen the legality of the counternarcotics actions.
In the current counternarcotics strategy, there are no measures indicating the efforts intended to put states ahead of the drug trafficking organizations with respect to operations and planning. Hence, the counternarcotics policy adopted by DoD ought to be revised to look beyond the Mexican, Colombian, and U.S. borders. Indeed, the policy should influence all the abilities and accessible resources possessed by the neighboring nations and complemented with those proffered by the department of defense. The revised policy version should underline the importance of agility and response solutions to drug trafficking to allow the US and the concerned nations stay ahead of the drug trafficking organizations (Adam and Gill 2002, 245-270).
Conclusion
The DTOs have been posing particular pressure to most nations including the US. First, the long-term and successful nature of the DTOs has recognized Colombia and Mexico as the direct shipment zones for different kinds of narcotics into the US. Second, the DTOs have the capacities to transfer various goods and people athwart the boundaries into the neighboring countries as well as the United States. In fact, DTOs settle individuals and deliver narcotics in concealed and recognized, but safe residential homes giving the non-state actors and organized terrorist groups the chances to mount attacks in the United States. Finally, the levels of corruption, intimidation, and violence have intensified along the Colombian, Mexican, and the US boundaries targeting the security forces and state administrations at every level.
These activities destabilize the state governments and pose significant threats to the citizens. However, the governments in countries such as Mexico and Colombia materialize to be unable to protect their citizens and secure the borders against drug traffickers and terrorists. In the United States, the costs incurred in treating drug addicts and countering the illicit drugs operations is very high. In most cases, the general living standards, rates of crimes and the whole economy is negatively affected. In the recent past, the president-implemented strategy to combat transnational organized crime, which lists several priority actions and key policy objectives. Some of the policies however need revision.
Reference List
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Fijnaut, Cyrille. 2000. Transnational Crime and the Role of the United Nations in its Containment through International Cooperation: A Challenge for the 21st Century. The European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice 8, no.2: 119-127.
NSS. 2011. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. Washington D.C: The White House Press.
Shelley, Louise. 2005. The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, xi, no.2: 101-112.