The given case analysis will focus on the Uri Snow Storm in Texas, which happened from February 13, 2021, to February 17, 2021. The Winter Storm had impacted the whole territory of the United States, yet the most damage was done to the State of Texas and Houston city in particular (TDEM, 2022). Besides the high levels of snow, freezing, and extreme icicle, the city had experienced the biggest lighting outage in the history of the United States. The case shows that the state HSEM was critical in ensuring collaboration among agencies, such as ERCOT, but the response was highly self-reliant with minimal involvement of the federal resources, such as FEMA.
The emergency management steps were taken in six major areas by the Homeland Security and Emergency Management(HSEM), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). These included transportation, health, medical, shelter, water, food, as well as leadership and coordination (Austin-Travis County, 2021). It is important to note that the Uri Snow Storm was not a regular emergency because it was significant within the overlapping emergency framework. The emergency management was taken in four steps. Firstly, the warning and notification phase was activated, where “On February 11, Austin Energy published a news release offering cold weather tips and advising customers of the upcoming weather and possible power outages” (Austin-Travis County, 2021, p. 9). This is followed by notifications through a Winter Storm Watch about freezing rains, sleet, and snow (Austin-Travis County, 2021). In other words, the public was thoroughly informed about the upcoming crisis and how to prepare for these stressful events.
Secondly, the activation phase of emergency management was initiated. It is reported that “the State of Texas issued a Disaster Declaration, and the City and County activated Cold Weather Sheltering Plans for cold-weather overnight shelters and warming centers” (Austin-Travis County, 2021, p. 9). The latter was accompanied by community mobilization, especially among the most vulnerable. Due to large-scale power outages, the warming centers were quickly redesigned from short-term shelters to more long-term sustaining ones (Austin-Travis County, 2021). Therefore, the management showed miscalculations about the duration of the storm, but the center adaptation was immediate.
Thirdly, the response phase has activated a state of emergency declared by both the city and county. Documents state: “during the initial 48 hours of the response, the need for shelter space outpaced adherence to COVID-19 social distancing requirements. On February 15, 2021, the number of residents without electricity grew to over 200,000” (Austin-Travis County, 2021, p. 10). The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) was mandated to shut down the supply of power to the majority of its consumers for four consecutive days in order to prevent the collapse of the power grid (Austin-Travis County, 2021). Austin Water was experiencing with water supply, which is why it asked to boil the water for further drinking. The local government purchased “one million gallons of drinking water and began distributing water, and later food, at locations throughout the City and County” (Austin-Travis County, 2021, p. 11). The President issued a Federal Disaster Declaration to further strengthen the support networks for the impacted populations (Austin-Travis County, 2021). The impact of the storm was severe on a multitude of fronts.
Fourthly, the emergency management initiated the recovery transition phase. The shelters and warming centers were demobilized, and Austin Water lifted the boiling water notice completely. The State of Emergency ended on February 21, 2021, which left the only problem (Austin-Travis County, 2021). The latter was the repair and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, which included plumbing systems, pipelines, power grids, and water delivery networks (Austin-Travis County, 2021). The key agent in all of these processes was the ERCOT, which kept its active efforts due to COVID-19.
The interagency collaboration theory that can be applied to this scenario is the Common Pool Resources framework. It states that “specific patterns of interaction include the history of previous relationships, the presence of one or more champions, and legal and contractual interaction” (Ward et al., 2018, p. 855). It applies by showing that agencies interact through history, leadership, and legal connections. For the former, the Texan government was historically distant and less reliant on the federal government, which shows how the majority of emergency response actions were carried out in a self-sufficient manner. The leadership of the emergency management was run primarily by the ERCOT with strong collaborative support from the City and County. Lastly, the legal connections were most prominent with Austin Water, which shut down its delivery systems completely to prioritize the water distribution towards the affected areas.
The agencies that responded to the emergency were the Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The communication and interaction of these agencies determined the effectiveness of emergency resolution in a critical situation. The connection between agencies was caused by the complexity of the issue. Due to the winter storm and cold wave, the power grids were not able to sustain the needed energy levels and failed, which caused a massive outage.
Thus, the effectiveness of interactions and collaborations between different government agencies was unified and united. This was partly driven by the desire to contain the response to the state itself without excessive reliance on the federal government. Although the latter was inevitably involved in the process, the majority of efforts and resources were coming from the local government itself. The advantage of such a localized response is speed and responsiveness since it implies less bureaucracy, but it constrained the scale of the emergency management’s capabilities. In other words, if FEMA was involved more, the response would be larger in scale but slower.
The agencies communicated as a single task force under the leadership of the ERCOT with the support of the local government. Communication was especially critical during the first notification phase, where the public needed to be informed and prepared for coming crises. The interagency collaboration was achieved through self-reliance and localized response. For example, the water shortage was accompanied by an immediate reallocation of water toward affected areas (Austin-Travis County, 2021). The recommendation is to have a strong leadership enforced on all key parties. In addition, communication needs not to be hindered by excessive bureaucracy.
References
Austin-Travis County. (2021). Winter storm Uri after-action report & improvement plan technical report[PDF document].
TDEM. (2022). Winter storm Uri.
Ward, K. D., Varda, D. M., Epstein, D., & Lane, B. (2018). Institutional factors and processes in interagency collaboration: The case of FEMA corps. American Review of Public Administration, 48(8), 852-871.