Introduction
Due to the supremacy of the United States’ conventional forces and its advanced and superior weaponry, few adversaries will intentionally pursue a confrontation with it. Therefore, future enemies who would like to engage the USA militarily will resort to using asymmetric warfare which involves cheap weapons and some strategies aimed at weakening the U.S. military resolve. The employment of such irregular strategies by the enemies will allow them to impede the employment of conventional military capabilities. The US opponents in Afghanistan and Iraq resolved to use these techniques because insurgents were aware that they could not match the U.S. military power in a conventional confrontation.
After assessing the changes in military warfare, the policy-makers in the US decided to change tactics so that they could use other irregular methods to defeat the adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the unmatched success of the Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the combatant commanders and the senior army officers are unwilling to use asymmetrical warfare. This paper aims to understand why senior military officers are reluctant to adopt unconventional warfare during military engagements.
The Research Problem
The new environment of operation that the USA military faces are due to the challenges of unconventional warfare. Irregular military confrontations are imperative for the opponents of the USA and it is the main factor in the threats the country will face in the future. The genesis of asymmetric warfare is challenging the military superiority of the USA because it is a new field in which the Special Forces do not have much experience. The joint military of the USA formulated a plan of maintaining unique and superior capabilities as they prepare to face any potential military threat whether irregular or regular.
The military capability will force the opponents of the USA to use unconventional techniques such as ambushes because no enemy will dare face the USA military conventionally because they cannot engage on equal terms. Before determining missions and roles and even suggesting strategies, a keen look must be made at the threat posed by the adversary to make the right decisions. Their approaches, motivations, and the various methods they use to hit their targets must be studied. The USA Military has found it difficult to use asymmetrical techniques due to its sophisticated superiority. The army does not use a single component in its strategy but rather an amalgamation of systems.
Irregular warfare employs techniques that the USA Special Forces are not traditionally used to in combats. The unconventional military battles rely on methods such as ambushes which the special forces are not well-trained. The opponents of the USA may decide to fight in challenging environments such as big cities or jungles where the USA forces will be at a disadvantage because they are not used to such methods. The USA forces are restricted by military rules of engagement from fighting in areas where there are large populations such as big cities.
Unconventional warfare thrives in the environment of simplicity where low-technology and low-cost weapons are used and not in complex superior militaries such as the USA forces. It is therefore difficult for the United States forces to degrade themselves to such levels to fight the enemies. All these reasons have made the USA’s senior military commanders reluctant to adopt asymmetrical warfare. To address this problem, the following primary research question will guide the study: Will the USA Army Special Forces be required to redefine their doctrine, mission, organization, and training as a result of the ever-changing roles facilitated by the unconventional risky environment?
Literature Review
Throughout history there are several examples of enemies who have tried to take advantage of their opponents in military confrontations. Irregular warfare mainly exists when there is a lack of resources to wage conventional warfare and when the adversary cannot match the military superiority of the opponent. The analysis of the relevant literature will show whether the unconventional warfare tactics were conducted for the above reasons and whether they were successful. Augustus who was the Roman Emperor in 9 A.D. decided to make Germany a Roman province directly controlled by the governor appointed by the emperor. The agricultural resources and their strategic place made it attractive to advance the prosperity of the empire. However, the Teutonic tribes were not ready to accept their territory to be under the Roman Empire.
The Teutonic tribes who were warriors by nature vehemently opposed the domination of the Roman Empire, and their leaders and the prince from the tribe of Cherusci secretly organized the Teutonic tribes to resist the Roman occupation. Unluckily for the Romans, they thought that Arminius, who was the Teutonic tribe’s leader was on their side. They even gave him Roman citizenship and promoted him to the position of a Roman Knight. He decided to employ the deception method in the whole period when they were organizing to confront the Romans. Arminius planned to ambush the Romans by deceptively reporting to the emperor that there was a rebellion amongst the Teutonic tribes. Varus, who was the Roman leader, decided to gather his forces and match to face the rebellion either to smash the resistance or force them into submission.
Arminius even misleadingly escorted them as they marched to the North to face the Teutonic resistance. He planned to lay an ambush in an enclosed area along the Teutoburg Forest where he knew his forces would inflict maximum causalities on the Roman forces. The combination of the knowledge of how the Romans were planning to attack and the disinformation plan gave his forces an advantage. Since his force was smaller and not well-equipped as the Romans, his attack was to be unconventional. He had organized his forces in a non-linear manner and the un-ideal environment for the Romans gives them an advantage. The Roman military strength, equipment, and superior training were negated by this meticulous planning by Arminius. The Roman forces found themselves in a disadvantaged position where they were vulnerable in unfamiliar terrain rendering them unable to attack.
The Teutons with knowledge of ambushing techniques dug trenches and built walls to seal the escape routes. Additionally, the whole area was covered with massive forests making the Romans helpless. The savages while screaming and shouting appeared from the bushes and descended on the Roman Forces. The Romans were overrun and most of them were killed. The unconventional tactics proved successful in annihilating a very powerful Roman army.
Theoretical Framework
This study will employ the Theory of Special Forces which considers the field dangerous. The USA has reached the third stage of the Special Forces and these special units are involved in complex missions internationally to ensure that there is global peace. The theory will be used to design new ways in which the United States can decisively deal with the emerging issues of unconventional warfare. It will try to show that the Special Force’s transformation into asymmetrical warfare is not dangerous but mandatory. The study hypothesizes that asymmetrical warfare is the most relevant in achieving objectives and strategy if conducted within the specific principles. To test the hypothesis, military officers and policymakers of both gender in the USA will be interviewed.
Research Design
To test the hypothesis of this study, primary and secondary data will be used. The supporting information will be obtained through designed questionnaires and surveys which will be given to the subjects that meet the eligibility criteria for this study. A total of 180 people will be interviewed through surveys and questionnaires. The respondents must be above 23 years of age and they should be either serving in the Special Forces or retired. The government policymakers will also be interviewed; they should be either serving or retired. The ratio of females to males in the study will be 70:30. To make this qualitative study of the highest integrity and reduce bias, the subjects will be selected randomly and the sample size will be enough to give a true picture of the issue.
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