Many parts in the book by Ronald Spector, the author of After Tet, explain the American strategic culture in Vietnam War. In his book, Spector makes it clear that the United States has never been involved in any war similar to that in Vietnam.
In this war, collaboration between the United States and South Vietnam contributed to the fact that both armies worked synchronously in order to stop the arrival of North Vietnamese Rebels into South Vietnam. At this point, the author highlights the strategic culture of America regarding the war pinpointing that America donated $2.5 billion to France in the first phase of the Vietnam War.
Spector further emphasizes that the involvement of the United States in both phases of the Vietnam War was due to Harry Truman, the then president of the United States, who did not support communism, but adhered to the policy he had himself invented.
In fact, three other presidents after Truman’s presidency including Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, continued to support Truman’s policy of not supporting communism. Nevertheless, France lost the war, and Vietnam was divided into the South and North.
In addition, it is a common strategic culture for the United States to take its troops to battlegrounds; so, the Vietnam War was not an exception. In the book After Tet, the reader gets to know that over 540,000 American troops had been fighting in South Vietnam by 1969. Unfortunately, the war did not end, and the United States performed its renowned culture by slowly withdrawing its forces.
Interestingly, America realized that it was losing the war and its interests in Vietnam which is why it announced a cease-fire in 1973. On the other hand, the United States is known for convincing heads of states to pursue their interests in times of war being the strategy implemented when Dwight Eisenhower sent military advisers and civilians to Ngo Diem persuading him not to participate in the nationwide elections.
Since the United States did not support communism, it malevolently convinced Ngo Diem to support the same Idea.
Moreover, the nature of supporting interests but not individuals in war becomes evident when the reader becomes clear about President John Kennedy’ actions regarding the Vietnamese Buddhists. It is also evident that Kennedy supported and advised Diem in all matters related to governance.
However, Diem ignored Kennedy when he raided Buddhists’ temples. President Kennedy then transferred his support to generals of South Vietnam, which eventually led to the capture and demise of Diem.
Conversely, it is imperative to note that the United States’ government uses threats as a desperate measure during wars. This strategy was used by President Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War when the destroyer Maddox of the United States was attacked by torpedo boats of North Vietnam. Consequently, President Lyndon promised severe consequences to North Vietnam if they were to repeat a similar attack.
Two days after the president’s statement, Spector noted that another attack had occurred. As expected, President Lyndon did nothing close to what he had promised to do. Instead, he went ahead and promoted instant air strikes in North Vietnam.
Also, he besieged the congress to empower him so that he could counter any armed attack on the United States. It is obvious his actions did not meet the ‘severe consequences’ he intimidated, but only acted to perpetrate a strategic culture that is characteristic of the United States (Spector, 1993).
Reference List
Spector, H. (1993). After Tet. Albany, New York: Macmillan.