The wartime conferences of World War II were genuinely significant in deciding the strategy undertaken by the Allies but also helped shape the world order during and in the aftermath of the world. During World War I, despite countries being in tight-knit alliances, leaders did not actively communicate, and each nation was fighting for its interests and battles. At the Casablanca meeting in January 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt committed to fighting the Axis powers until unconditional surrender. At this point, General Frank Maxwell Andrews was established as the commander of the European theater for Western forces. At the Egypt conference, China was designated as a theater commander with Chiang Kai-shek at the helm. This particular conference led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to later strategize and divide the Pacific theater into three significant areas of operations, allowing for better comprehensive action against the Japanese.
The primary conference, which included the Big 3, joined by Stalin, was in Tehran at the end of 1943. The leaders devised a military strategy to be implemented against Germany and Japan. As the war was slowly wearing down the Axis Powers, this collaboration and strategic planning allowed the allies to develop a means to end the war in their favor. At this conference, it was decided that the US and the UK would open a second front on the Atlantic coast, pressuring Germany from the West, while the USSR committed to opening a second front against Japan (Weinberg 2005, p. 788). This unified action helped to strategically distribute forces and pressure the Axis powers into retreat on all fronts as they lacked the cohesion and support among one another that could be seen among the Allies. Later conferences, such as Yalta in 1945, were focused on strategic elements of ending the war and deciding on the post-war world order in Europe and punishments for the Axis Powers. Despite some disagreements, it allowed the allies to stay on the same page and effectively negotiate the surrender treaty with Germany as a unified front. Therefore, Marshall’s observation was justified in highlighting the significant strategic benefits stemming from these wartime conferences throughout WWII.
Reference
Weinberg, Gerhard L. 2005. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.