In a globalized world, the ability to cohabit and the need to respect one another seems to be more prominent than ever. Nevertheless, the lack of understanding or willingness to reasonably accommodate an individual’s religious beliefs – if they do not threaten others’ safety and freedoms – is an issue that frequently arises. In the case of Ms. Djarra, who used to work at a fast-food restaurant, the necessity to wear a headscarf during Ramadan led to disagreements with her manager, Mr. Johnson, and ultimately dismissal. Given that Ms. Djarra occupied a customer-facing position, the headscarf provoked several instances of patrons addressing pejorative and discriminative words to the employee. The plaintiff claims that the headscarf did not hinder her work performance. In contrast, Mr. Johnson’s position stems from the idea that the piece of clothing contradicted company policies and put the employee at risk. Therefore, the case concerns freedom of religious expression at a workplace and the extent to which an organization should accommodate it.
Primarily, the case can be addressed using the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The document became a cornerstone for labor rights since it prohibits discrimination at a workplace based on religion, ethnicity, sex, et cetera (Langvardt, 2019). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act centers specifically on the issue and is valid in the private sector as well. It applies to an array of work‑related moves and activities such as recruitment, job assignment, dismissals, and pay (Langvardt, 2019). Under the act, no person can be discriminated against because of the characteristics mentioned earlier. Employees have the right to wear pieces of clothing of religious nature and groom themselves according to their spiritual beliefs if it does not directly interfere with the work by diminishing performance or compromising safety. EEOC enforces the title; still, it is used in private claims in many instances, which applies to Ms. Djarra’s case (Langvardt, 2019). Therefore, Title VII is the foundation on which the case rests and in line with which should be resolved.
In order to determine whether Mr. Johnson discriminated against Ms. Djarra based on religion, it should be established whether his reasons to prohibit wearing the headscarf were mealy pretexts. According to Title VII, the employee could not have been expected to abstain from practicing her religion (Langvardt, 2019). Even though the plaintiff clarified the need to wear the item during Ramadan, the defendant did not yield. Mr. Johnson declared that the garment frequently caused aggression towards the employee, potentially jeopardizing her well-being. Nonetheless, Ms. Djarra claims that the remarks were mostly innocuous, did not present a danger, and she is used to dealing with negativity caused by expressions of her religious beliefs. The dimensions of the security issue are contradictory, and the efforts to eliminate it were not made. Furthermore, other staff members were allowed to wear, for example, Christian symbols under their uniform, whereas the plaintiff’s proposal to put a visor, also a part of the uniform, over the headscarf was rejected. Given that Mr. Johnson’s concerns were remediable, it can be concluded that firing Ms. Djarra is an instance of religious discrimination.
Mr. Johnson’s unwillingness to compromise and adjust to the plaintiff’s needs aggravates the case. Title VII serves to guarantee that employers reasonably accommodate to religious traditions of their workers, excluding situations when they create undue hardship (Langvardt, 2019). Several changes were possible to avoid Ms. Djarra’s firing. For instance, Mr. Johnson offered the plaintiff a month off during Ramadan without pay, which did not suit Ms. Djarra, as her financial situation did not allow her to stay without income during the period. Another option was transferring the employee to the kitchen or a position that did not involve direct contact with clients. This change could have resolved Mr. Johnson’s preoccupation with the employee’s safety and appeased the fear of losing patrons due to Ms. Djarra’s appearance. Such changes as job reassignments and internal transfers are supported by Title VII, but Mr. Johnson opted for firing the employee instead. Considering that discussion of alternatives did not occur and that Mr. Johnson’s final proposal seems somewhat limited, the plaintiff was not offered reasonable accommodations.
Several possibilities to award the damages exit if Ms. Djarra wins the case. The defendant’s decision to terminate the employment contract resulted in Ms. Djarra’s inability to find a job for several weeks, and thus a lost wage. The amount of compensation depends on how much the plaintiff would have earned if the discrimination based on her religious beliefs had not taken place (Langvardt, 2019). Since it is stated by both parties that Ms. Djarra was an exemplary employee, the likelihood of her losing the job if not for the situation resulting in the suit is diminished. This conclusion leads to the need to compensate Ms. Djarra’s lost wage fully. Ms. Djarra could also recover compensatory damage due to emotional distress caused by the situation and following unemployment (Langvardt, 2019). Other alternative remedies in the plaintiff’s case could include frequently practiced reinstatement and payment of benefits (Langvardt, 2019). Since Ms. Djarra expressed her appreciation and fondness for work in McFaddies and Mr. Johnson recognized her as a capable worker, reinstatement and lost wage payment seem like an adequate option.
Religious discrimination and reasonable accommodation are two central notions for the case. According to Langvardt (2019), “the EEOC’s interpretive guidance directs employers to use a “problem solving approach” to identify reasonable accommodations in consultation with the employee” (p. 1483). Although the statement addresses issues of employees with disabilities, the necessity for the problem-solving approach also applies to workers whose religious practices may not align with an organization’s policies or dress-code. The scope of reasonable accommodations or potential undue hardship (additional significant difficulties or expenditures) should be determined depending on each individual case (Langvardt, 2019). Hence, it is required that an employer adjusts the working conditions so that an employee can practice their religion provided that it does not cause considerable damage.
It can be concluded that the case under consideration appears to be a common example of unintentional religious discrimination, where the defendant failed to acknowledge that organizational policies are subordinate to the law. Ms. Djarra’s stance stems from her right to practice religious beliefs and the argument that wearing a headscarf is its part that does not interfere with the working process enough to cause undue hardship. Consequently, Mr. Johnson did not ensure reasonable accommodations that were feasible, for instance, by changing the plaintiff’s workplace to McFaddies’ kitchen. In cases of religious discrimination, just compensation for caused damage should occur; in the considered case, it would be reinstatement and lost wage payment.
Reference
Langvardt, A. (2019). Business law (17th ed.). McGraw-Hill Education.