Introduction
The future combat system (FCS) was seen as the best initiative for the Army’s first full-spectrum modernization that was waited for in nearly four decades. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) introduced it in October 1999 and was aimed at changing the legal forces of divisions to lighter objective forces. It was a product of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed since the previous systems deployment capabilities were slow and placed the combats in extreme danger due to the time the combat took to establish a base (The future of FCS, n.d.). Moreover, the once praised systems-of systems have been checked with major challenges and arguments.
Flaws
The major arguments against FCS are based on the amount of money that the program uses ($90 billion) and its design of fighting against a conventional force that may not be real. FCS was designed to equip the troops with manned vehicles and unmanned systems and the use of a fast and flexible attacking system, as well as other battlefield gear (Future of Combat System, 2006). These were the four major components of FCS. The report of the defense acquisitions by GAO (2007) established that the FCS program was developed through a short time frame and there were immature technologies involved at the start. This made it to be complex systems-of-systems.
Inadequate expertise for the information network system development and inadequate personnel were some of the challenges, leading to contracting of other partners to FCS (GAO, 2008, p. 1). This means that the system lacked the basics of initiatives yet it went on. The Lead System Integrator worked as the partner in the FCS program when it was initiated, however, takes the management role. This mutual management of the FCS makes the army and LSI flexible but gives a potential risk when the army has to take a long-term overview of the program (White Paper, n.d.).
Policy break
The FCS has been left loose by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the army continues to deviate from the policy of weapon systems acquisitions. The FCS program has seen the same office allow the army to use its costs estimates rather than independent higher estimates in the budgets request. This FCS contract has also been criticized on the basis that it allows the contractor to have the best inputs with no guarantee of success.
As the report predicts the costs of FCS through a critical design review, estimates of over 80% to cover the costs and an extra 80% in fees translated to profits. This means that the FCS may prove expensive to the American taxpayer. With the establishment of the FCS being a shake-up from the foundation then the whole system may cease from being a system-of-systems to being a flop and huge failure (Cavallaro, 2009). This will see huge investments from the government go down the drain.
Conclusion
Without a solid foundation, any process is deemed to fall. This is not good news especially when the US plans to increase its combat troops to terrorist zones and areas of weapons of mass destruction. The future of the FCS remains uncertain especially with the mumbling of the people. The sustainability of the system must therefore be planned on a long term basis so that the levels of the network (applications, services, transport, and standards) work mutually and progressively. The secretary of Defense should be involved in the strict supervision of the FCS so that its future is guaranteed.
References
Cavallaro, G. (2009). “Panel to discuss new ground combat vehicle”. Army Times (Army Times Publishing Company). Web.
Future of Combat System. (2006). Lead Systems Integrator, Logistics Requirements and Readiness IPT. System Development and Demonstration Phase. Data Product DP025.
GAO. (2008). Defense Acquisitions: 2009 is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future Combat System. Report to Congress Committees.
GAO. (2007). Role of Lead Systems Integrator on Future Combat Systems Program Poses Oversight Challenges. A report to congressional committees.
The future of FCS. (n.d.). F100 Paper 104.
White Paper. (n.d.). Fcs-14-1-1. PDF.