Introduction
Alexander the Great is probably the world’s first famous tactician. Born in 356 BC in Pella, the capital of Macedonia, the only son of King Philip II of Macedonia and Queen Olympias, Alexander was given the best of all worlds. Philip was, himself, a tremendously successful warrior and military leader, and he spent a good deal of his time educating his son on the intricacies of warfare. As an adolescent, Alexander was privately tutored by the Greek academician Aristotle, instilling in him a strong interest in rhetoric, literature, philosophy, science and medicine.
By the time he was 16, Alexander was trusted by his father to rule Macedonia as regent while Philip left to invade Thrace. When a neighboring tribe thought to threaten Macedonia following Philip’s departure, Alexander put together his own fighting forces and led them against the tribe, quickly defeating them and claiming their stronghold as his own for Macedonia (Alexander of Macedon, 2003).
By the time he was 18, Alexander had been given a prestigious post in his father’s army as they invaded Greece together. “At the Battle of Chaeronea the Greeks were defeated and Alexander displayed his bravery by destroying the elite Greek force, the Theban Secret Band. Some ancient historians recorded that the Macedonians won the battle thanks to his bravery” (Alexander of Macedon, 2003).
However, following this victory, Philip decided to take on a new wife and upset the family household. Suggestions were made that Philip was in search of a legitimate Macedonian son creating a rift between father and son that may have contributed to Philip’s murder. The motivation for this murder has never been fully established, with speculations ranging from the murderer having harbored a grudge against the older king to a conspiracy between Alexander, his mother and the young man to eliminate Philip before he could move against Alexander.
Upon inheriting the throne, Alexander moved quickly to prevent any other opposition by ruthlessly killing all those who opposed him and establishing himself as the unquestioned rule of Macedonia (Alexander of Macedon, 2003). It wasn’t until his battles in Asia Minor that his brilliance as a tactician truly became clear.
Biography
Upon inheriting his father’s army and kingdom at the age of 20, Alexander quickly secured his position at home, gathered up his fighting men and pursued his father’s vision of conquering all of Asia Minor. His invasion into Persia went largely unmet until he reached the Grancius River, which would be his first major battle as king and put to the test his tactical abilities. At the Grancius River, Alexander’s forces confronted a Persian force at least twice their number holding the higher ground of the river bank and backed by Greek mercenaries. The Persians, not familiar with the integrated forces of the Greeks or the new fighting styles they had developed, had deployed themselves in a tight defensive position that Alexander immediately recognized as limiting to their particular advantages.
For example, the tight formation precluded any kind of true maneuvering by their lighter and more agile horses while their weaponry was more suited to throwing rather than the sharp, heavy stabbing that could be accomplished by his own cavalry’s sarissa (Mixter, 1997). In addition, the deployment suggested a lack of integration between the Persian cavalry and the Greek mercenary infantry, meaning the cavalry would be depended upon as the first and most trusted line of attack. Rather than waiting overnight to engage in battle as he was advised, Alexander ordered his cavalry to attack before the Persians realized their tactical blunder.
The initial charge was met with predictable ferocity and suffered heavy losses as a result, but it was successful in upsetting the Persian’s left-flank, pulling the cavalry out of their defensive positions and leaving gaps through which Alexander’s remaining forces quickly attacked. According to Arrian, “though the fighting was on horseback, it was more like an infantry battle, horse entangled with horse, man with man in the struggle, the Macedonians trying to push the Perians once and for all from the bank and force them on to the level ground, the Persians trying to bar their landing and thrust them back again into the river” (1967: 49).
At the same time, Alexander’s right-wing entered the river and attacked from yet another angle. “The Persians were now being roughly handled from all quarters; they and their horses were struck in the face with lances [sarissas], they were being pushed back by the cavalry, and were suffering heavily from the light troops, who had intermingled with the cavalry” (Arrian, 1967: 51). Only after the battle was fully engaged did Alexander’s left-wing enter the river and join the fight, adding fresh troops to fill in any gaps left in Alexander’s forces as a result of the fighting.
The center of the fighting took place around Alexander and his elite cavalry, drawing the attention of most of the Persian leaders as they each took their turn attempting to kill the Macedonian leader. However, each of these was killed or badly wounded in turn and the entire center quickly collapsed. Once this occurred, both wings of the Persian forces fled the battle, only saved from Alexander’s pursuit by the Greek infantry that remained behind (Mixter, 1997).
The battle of Issus in 333 BC was Alexander’s first direct encounter with the great Persian king Darius III. The actual site of the battle has been identified as having occurred on the banks of the Pinarus River on the southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea (Hammond, 1980). As in many later battles, Alexander’s army was vastly outnumbered. Estimates indicate that Alexander had an army of approximately 75,000 while he was facing a force of more than 600,000 (Arrian, 1967: 155).
Darius was the first to the battlefield after having murdered the sick and wounded men Alexander had left behind in hospitals in Issus and took up a strong defensive position along the northern bank of the river. Meanwhile, Alexander and his healthy forces had undertaken a forced march to Myriandrus where he had been informed Darius lay in wait for him (Fuller, 1964: 154). The return march to the Pinarus valley left much of his army footsore and tired with a potentially long and difficult battle against superior forces immediately ahead of them.
Initially, upon discovering Darius along the Pinarus River, Alexander had the Thessalian cavalry positioned on his right flank, but moved them to meet with Darius’ better troops already positioned to meet with Alexander’s left. Alexander also took the brilliant initiative of holding back a special reserve force, which was the first time this had been done in battle and would prove definitive in the ensuing struggle (Arrian, 1967: 155).
Although the two armies were deployed into the field, battle wasn’t engaged immediately as Alexander’s forces stopped beyond arrow range and Darius wasn’t giving up his strong defensive position. In trying to meet with the Persians, Alexander ordered his right wing to go out in advance of the Persian’s left-center, which happened to be approximately the location where Darius himself had taken position (Montross, 1960: 26).
This was the first minor victory of the battle as the Persians quickly gave way to Alexander’s forces. However, Alexander’s strength, the central phalanx, had lost some of its cohesion as it crossed the Pinarus, which opened up a gap in the right flank enabling Darius’ Greek mercenaries to push forward (Montross, 1960: 26). These mercenaries managed to drive a deep wedge into the right center of Alexander’s army; however, because Alexander’s right-flank forces had managed to quickly rout the left flank of Darius’ forces, they were able to redirect toward the center and threaten Darius himself (Arrian, 1967: 163-165).
At the same time, Alexander’s reserve cavalry was able to swing in behind the advancing Greek mercenaries, effectively boxing them into a hopeless position (Green, 1991: 231). Darius’ forces moved to meet the attack of Alexander’s right-flank, but Darius himself fled the field. Without their leader, the Persian forces also broke and retreated.
This might have been the only battle waged between Darius and Alexander but for two important factors. First, the Greek mercenaries that had plunged themselves deep into the center of Alexander’s Macedonian phalanx refused to surrender. These soldiers continued to fight viciously against the closing sides of Alexander’s cavalry forces until all but 10,000 were slain or wounded (Montross, 1960: 26). This severely reduced the number of men Alexander had free to pursue the fleeing Darius. The second factor was the condition of Alexander’s forces. Alexander’s army was already exhausted from their various marches and subsequent battle.
They could not give chase for too far a distance. The Persians suffered their heaviest losses during this retreat, losing 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry all totaled, but Alexander’s pursuing force was not able to capture the fleeing Darius (Arrian, 1967: 165). Despite the overwhelming odds, Alexander’s forces suffered only 450 dead, but had approximately 4,500 wounded (Green, 1991: 162). This established him as a brilliant tactician and made his enemies much more careful about how they faced him in the future.
Alexander next faced Darius during the battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, two years after Issus. Like Issus, Alexander’s much smaller force of, by now approximately 7,000 was able to defeat the much larger force of Darius III. Darius’ numbers are uncertain, having been reported (and recognized as erroneous) to have been as high as 40,000-200,000 cavalry and 200,000-1 million infantry (Badian, 2001).
Regardless of the total, however, it is certain that Darius had a vastly larger army than what Alexander brought to the field and had prepared himself to meet Alexander after being defeated by him two years earlier. The site of the battle had been hand-picked by Darius as well and his forces had arrived on the scene in plenty of time to carefully winnow over the field of battle, ensuring it was level enough for the efficient operation of Darius’ scythed chariots and cavalry. Darius had thus been in position for several days prior to Alexander’s arrival and had even taken steps to entice the Macedonian to the ‘correct’ field of battle (Badian, 2001).
Because the actual battleground has never been conclusively identified, it is also difficult to determine the various geographic elements that might have come into play. However, understanding that the field had been made clear for the smooth operation of chariots suggests there were few geographic impediments to movement. Additional generalities about the battle suggest that perhaps Alexander’s army was forced to fight with the sun in their eyes, which would have been an intelligent tactical decision on the part of Darius and well in keeping with other evidence of forethought on Darius’ part (Badian, 2001).
From accounts of the battle, two facts remain clear – first, that Alexander’s army was vastly outnumbered on a field selected to give primary benefit to Darius’ larger army and second, that Darius’ army was large enough to overlap Alexander’s flanks, thus seemingly promising a quick and easy victory for Darius.
As with many details of this period in time, the battle tactics are greatly confused by conflicting reports and subsequent analyses. History makes it clear, though, that Alexander’s tactics succeeded in throwing off Darius’ well-laid plans. Acknowledging that he was facing much greater numbers and with no where safe to retreat or rest his flanks, Alexander devised a modified front. Described in much more detail by Devine (1975), this front more appropriately resembled a trapezoidal square. “At both ends of the Macedonian front were placed flank-guards, drawn back from it en echelon.
Because of the necessity of maintaining tactical flexibility, the angle at which these flank-guards were drawn back could not have been too great. It was probably something like 45 degrees” (Devine, 1975: 375). These flank-guards adopted a roughly wedge-shaped arrangement comprised of both infantry and cavalry that presented the possibility of three potential lines which could be quickly adapted and changed to meet the circumstances as they arose. Forming the center of Alexander’s front was the greatly feared Macedonian phalanx, against which even Darius did not dare to send his best forces (Devine, 1975: 378) while the rear of the line remained relatively weak.
Precipitating the battle was Alexander’s oblique movement to the right, which threatened to have him leaving the prepared battlefield and force conflict in some less advantageous spot for Darius while at the same time outflanking Darius’ army on the left. This forced Darius to launch his chariots and best cavalry units to the left to prevent the motion. In doing so, a gap was created in Darius’ center enabling the Macedonian cavalry to move in and Alexander’s phalanx to make a full frontal assault. This placed Darius himself in great personal danger and forced him to flee the field to avoid death or capture (Badian, 2001).
Alexander gave chase, leaving holes in the Macedonian line that enabled Persian and Indian troops to penetrate to the rear and the field camp, but they opted for plunder rather than attack until news of Darius’ flight reached them. At this point, the demoralized soldiers fled with Alexander’s Thessalian cavalry decimating their numbers along the way. “The remains of the Persian left were caught by Alexander and his cavalry on their return from the unsuccessful pursuit of Darius. There followed perhaps the fiercest fighting of the whole battle, but in the end the Persians were killed or dispersed” (Badian, 2001). The great army of Darius had disintegrated into its constituent parts which Alexander was then able to subdue individually.
Through his various battles in Asia Minor, Alexander proved his tactical brilliance. He was able to quickly assess the deployment of his opponents and determine their greatest weaknesses. He was then able to utilize this knowledge with his highly flexible and integrated army to exploit these weaknesses. At the same time, his flexibility and knowledge enabled him to change battle tactics at a moment’s notice if necessary to shear up flagging resources, respond to unexpected incursions or to take advantage of sudden openings on the enemy’s front.
Because of his rapid ability to change tactics and adapt his battle plans to the given situation, Alexander was able to achieve victory in the face of what, for many others, would have been certain defeat. In most instances, he was facing numbers that vastly outweighed his own in enemy territory in which they held the stronger defensive position.
While Alexander’s bravery and boldness in placing himself within the thick of the attack was undoubtedly a rallying call for his soldiers and his after battle compassion and concern earned him yet greater respect and admiration, it was primarily because of his innovative approach to war, clearing his mind of fixed ideas and adapting the plan to suit the purpose, that led to his many victories throughout Asia Minor and into India.
Only when his exhausted army was called upon to fight the massive beasts called elephants did his forces finally refuse to fight and call for a return home. While attempting to rebuild his army, Alexander fell ill and died at Babylon in 323 BC.
References
“Alexander of Macedon.” (2003). Alexander the Great. History of Macedon. Web.
Arrian (Lucius Flavius Arrianus Xenophon). (1967). Arrian: History of Alexander and Indica 1. Trans. E. Iliff Robson. Cambridge: Harvard.
Badian, Ernst. (2001). “The Battle of Gaugamela.” The History of Iran. Iran Chamber Society. Web.
Devine, A.M. (1975). “Grand Tactics at Gaugamela.” Phoenix. Vol. 29, N. 4: 374-385.
Fuller, John Frederick Charles. (1960). Generalship of Alexander the Great. Rahway, New Jersey: Quinn & Boden.
Green, Peter. (1991). Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B. C. : A Historical Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hammond, Nicholas G. J. (1980). Alexander the Great: King, Commander, and Statesman. New Jersey: Noyes.
Montross, Lynn. (1960). War through the Ages. New York: Harper & Brothers.