Callard, in her article, argues that although initial anger might be reasonable, people tend to view unending disproportionate revenge as paradigmatically irrational (para 3). After analyzing her discussions, I shall argue that she provides satisfactory and compelling arguments concerning questions about anger and rationality and those emotions are how people do morality.
In developing her case for the need to understand unending disproportionate revenge as paradigmatically irrational, Callard reveals that people have been debating the wrong issue. For example, the academic debate explains that people would be morally better if they could eliminate anger completely. The second corner of the debate stands for people who conceive of anger in such a way that it is considered a valuable part of an individual’s moral repertoire. Further, the concern is found in the fact that there are some major drawbacks of anger, including the tendency to cling to another’s anger, refuting attempts to reconcile, apologize, or restitute, and the tendency to exact revenge in a way that hurts. For Callard, all this is determined by sentimentalists’ philosophy, in which emotions are how people do morality.
According to Callard, the great moral sensibility makes us view continuous uneven disproportionate requite as paradigmatically irrational despite the fact that the initial anger might be reasonable. The great moral sensibility entails the dynamic interaction of things making up that people are moral, based on abilities, self-understandings, values, self-awareness, and perceptual propensities.
The difficult question that Callard answers for us is about the fact that people tend to draw grudge-bearing and rancorous assumptions from premises concerning moral facts about wrongdoing and injustice. Callard believes human beings should not easily dismiss vengeful and grudge-bearing conclusions as a psychological tic. She holds these perceptions by offering her insights. She notes that the Argument for Grudges and that for Revenge links all premises involving moral facts about moral injustice and wrongdoing to specific conclusions, suggesting that people’s reasoning is valid (Callard para 8). However, we should purify morality in order to purify anger. This emphasis on the Argument for Grudge and Argument for Revenge on the dramatic situation of anger is important in understanding Callard’s point of view that revenge aims to undo or reverse another person’s actions.
Callard’s philosophical views on anger are further developed when she reflects on the question of the difference between the Argument for Grudges and the Argument for Revenge. She writes, “It is not easy to separate the idea that anger is a moral sense from the thought that people should embrace anger as a mechanism of moral responsibility without approving vengeance or holding on to grudges” (para 29). Callard’s solution is not to make her arguments conclude everything about anger; objections are possible. She aims to illustrate that a case or a conclusion that grudges and vengeance are rational should be made after considering objections. Contained in the simple reasoning and naĂŻve formulations of academic and other philosophical debates, Callard claims that morally righteous anger provides grounds for revenge and violence.
In her piece, Callard brings the discussion to the level of detail. She warns against abandoning the anthropological distance and acknowledges that people should not climb outside their moral theory. In most cases, we see a crisis as bankruptcy, but we must assess its cause. At the same time, Callard draws on Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy that anger is an intrinsically mistaken attitude (Callard para 6). Callard support Nussbaum’s belief that anger is destructive and an injustice in which individuals should focus on preventing similar events that cause anger from occurring in the future. Callard’s article emphasizes the need to use all means, including external forces to limit anger in a perfectly just system.
Callard’s view of the psychology of anger is an exact depiction of stoicism and Buddhism. Although Callard does not support the academic debate on this issue, it is identifiable that she emphasizes the role of stoicism and Buddhism, which emphasizes contemplation of anger’s consequences, and how it contorts our face and morals people value too much. Stoicism acknowledges that anger is unnatural and ugly because it makes us abandon reasoning (Thomason 89).
Similarly, Buddhism teachings hold that anger can never be justified. Still, people can also try to cultivate a loving aspect toward all human beings free of selfish attachments. Based on the teachings and depictions of stoicism and Buddhism, Callard clearly illustrates that there is no need to enlighten people to eliminate all aspects of anger or fury because it leads to emotions that cause harm, damage, and violence.
As for the plausibility of Callard’s view, I believe that it is overly demanding. It seems more plausible to hold that anger implicates people in moral corruption. The modern thinker, including Callard, holds that emotions should not have a role in morality. Underlying her argument is the implicit moral theory that when injustice is continued, we feel it, and our anger increases. According to Thomason, when injustice is done to a human being, it is the most crucial time we can easily lose self-respect and harm others (89). At that time, we tend to be focused on fighting to quell the anger and decide what effort we must put into repressing and suppressing the fury. The sincerity of Callard is outstanding. She notifies us that failure not to let the anger get away and allow us to have logical conclusion may lead to a loss of self-respect and, most importantly, moral footing. Through logical inferences, we limit the anger that is in ourselves under all circumstances.
While I think that Callard’s arguments provide the best description of the morally corrupting aspect of behavior we have held for so long, I do not think it completely let me confront the issue more deeply. Interestingly, Callard’s article draws us into the conversation. Her arguments invite me to reflect on my experiences more deeply and emotionally. My basic point of view is that anger is equated to the desire for revenge because it is conceived with an intense immediacy and is naturally felt, bringing to the bodily and emotional resonances of the feelings. It may disguise itself in other ways, such as nervousness, over-friendliness, politeness, and reluctance.
I believe that most people make their anger known openly and immediately for others to take action. It comes in the form of a more conspicuous emotional state. Silva claims that anger, in some instances, is an important, valuable moral-emotional tool that is constitutive of the painful realization that negative emotions such as regret and remorse have been activated (14). In other words, the morals humans aspire have been altered or damaged. In any case, I feel that feelings of anger or fury are unnecessary to justify wrongdoing or cause harm to others. It is always morally desirable that we try to overcome anger, get over it or feel less of it as much as possible to recognize wrongdoing without anger.
Works Cited
Callard, Agnes. “The Philosophy of Anger.” Boston Review (2020). Web.
Silva, Laura. “Anger and its desires.” European Journal of Philosophy 29.4 (2021): 1-21.
Thomason, Krista Karbowski. “The moral necessity of anger.” (2020). Web.