Aristotelian Defense of Justice: Strengths and Weaknesses Research Paper

Introduction

In the long and complicated history of ideas and philosophy, there has never been one true definition of justice. It is evident that justice has remained one of the most prominent issues in modern philosophy and ethics as well since hundreds of intellectuals worldwide provide their own insightful contributions to the global discussion. The final goal is to capture the essence of what is just. This paper focuses on the Greek perspective on justice in order to examine Aristotle’s theories regarding the concept of justice. In simple terms, according to the Greek school of thought, justice is the ultimate virtue of one’s soul, which makes injustice the most feared vice. Unlike Plato, Aristotle has not pondered on a clear definition of justice, instead arguing that there can be no debates about the haecceity of the concept. He has popularized the idea that justice is a relational virtue. Thus, justice for some may not look the same as justice for others. While some criticize the very foundation of Aristotelian defense of justice by attacking him for equating justice to virtue, others raise alarm due to the philosopher’s controversial approach to justice, which supports existing institutions of inequality. The intent of this paper is to analyze the arguments for and against Aristotelian defense of justice and how his followers defend it.

Background: The Most Important Facts about Aristotle

Aristotle remains one of the most influential thought leaders even though it has been millennia since he died. He was born in Thrace in 382 BC and took massive inspiration from Plato¹. These influences are exceptionally important to highlight as they relate to the concept of justice. Akin to his teacher, Aristotle believed justice should serve as the primary foundation of any state. The absence of a cohesive justice system in a state would eventually lead to chaos and collapse. Aristotelian justice theory is also connected to the philosopher’s discussions on the purpose of life. While every being might have its own aim, a person’s mission is to reach abundant happiness, which is the basis for Aristotle’s arguments even in relation to justice as an integral part of an individual’s life.

Aristotle’s Theory of Justice

The first aspect of Aristotelian defense of justice, which is crucial to discuss, is the fact that, according to the philosopher, justice is relative to others. An act or the state of events is considered just if the relative values of the “negative” outcome (something given) fully correspond with the “positive” outcome (something received). Aristotle argues that justice is closely tied to the concept of the common interest. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics explain his ethical system and the conceptualization of Justice by Aristotle developed as a result of his existing moral attitudes.² Simply put, according to the philosopher, justice is a moral virtue. The paper will first provide a concise definition of “virtue” in order to then further investigate Aristotelian theory of justice.

Moral virtue is truly one of the most fascinating aspects of a person’s moral system. The definition reads “a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as determined by reason”.³ Virtue is essentially a mean, which helps one to distinguish between two extremes. For instance, a good quality such as bravery may present itself in different ways. Virtue allows to determine who is careless (too brave) and who is a coward (not brave enough).

Furthermore, it is important to note that Aristotle’s premises in Books I and II indicate that the mean of justice can only be determined by reason. According to the philosopher, reason refers to “the function (ergon) of man, thus understood as its distinctive characteristic in respect to other beings in nature”.⁴ This definition implies that an individual’s happiness is only possible if they apply reason in their acts and decisions. The end of an action initiated by a human should be the exercise of good reason. Therefore, a truly good virtue has one specific characteristic – it is in accordance with reason.

Thus, according to Aristotelian beliefs, justice is a virtue. The fact that it “corresponds to the habit or trained faculty of abiding to laws” justifies such a definition (Pardo). However, it is important to acknowledge that justice is a unique kind of virtue, which manifests itself in relation to others. People rarely make a distinction between justice and equality, so they morph into one. As a result, justice becomes a thing, which cannot exist not in relation to persons. This implies that justice is a product of collective community efforts as each member of the community has a set of unwritten obligations to treat fellow members in a just manner.

While on the one hand, justice is coextensive with virtue, it can be coextensive with gain on the other. People often use justice and fairness as synonyms, which is not wrong since justice is coextensive with virtue, which is coextensive with gain, which implies that someone often gains only at the expense of others. This foundation of justice can also be regarded as a mean. There are two extremes: gaining too much of what is good/losing too much of what is bad and gaining too much of what is bad/losing too much of what is good.⁵ Both are scenarios where an individual is treated unfairly, making them the same yet opposite.

Unwritten obligations imposed through social pressure in relation to such concepts as fairness and equality soon become legal contracts such as laws, which Aristotle regards as the foundation of a just society. The philosopher argues that no political state can survive long-term without a constitution, which would contain numerous clearly defined obligations, laws, rights, and so on. According to Aristotle, in the realm of politics, justice has two primary dimensions: distributive justice and corrective justice.⁶ Distributive justice is based on the concept of political and social privileges. It implies that those with a higher status or making a greater contribution to society deserve more, so it is just for them to claim more. Corrective justice refers to the type of justice dealing with voluntary transactions, either commercial or not. Aristotle’s theory of justice clearly posits that people should be treated in accordance to their capabilities, birth rights, social status, and other similar aspects. Thus, according to Aristotle, an effective state is only possible if its citizens treat equals as equals and unequals as unequals. Freedom is often cited as one of the more controversial factors, which would determine Aristotle’s attitude towards a person and them deserving of fairness or equality.

What Critics Get Wrong about Aristotelian Interpretation of Justice

Based on the explanatory passages above, it is evident that the foundation behind Aristotelian defense of justice as a moral virtue and a mean is logical. However, throughout the years, the scholarly community has produced a number of critics of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, particularly the philosopher’s theory of justice. While certain researchers and writers focus on the tautology behind Aristotle’s arguments, others provide evidence as to how Aristotle’s definition of justice can be applied only to reinforce an existing moral system. A German scholar Hans Kelsen has managed to critique Aristotle’s theory of justice on both fronts, which is why the fallacies in his interpretation of Aristotle’s work will become the basis for this paper. Kelsen’s arguments are typical of other critics of Aristotle, which is why his seminal work “Was ist Gerechtigkelt” is going to be the focus of the intended discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Aristotelian defense of justice.

Firstly, it is crucial to decipher what it is exactly Kelsen believes Aristotle aims to do when attempting to define justice. According to Kelsen and various other critics, Aristotle’s ethical writings attempt to develop a scientific method of establishing what the virtues are. Kelsen then criticizes Aristotle’s attempt at equating justice to a mean through a geometrical analogy. Therefore, if the end goal is to clearly determine what “justice” is in exact circumstances, Aristotelian theory fails.

The reason for such a conclusion is that Aristotle’s “definition” is of no practical use as it implies that any virtue can be determined if the extremes are already known, which they are not. In the case of virtues, the extremes are vices, which cannot be defined simply by looking in a dictionary. There is no clear definition of what “cowardliness” is and what it implies. In order for Aristotle’s mathematic-geometrical method of deciding what is just and unjust to work, the vices must be defined with the utmost clarity. However, in Aristotle’s work, the vices are simply “traditional morals of its time”.⁷ Thus, Kelsen attacks the very foundation of Aristotle’s theory by demonstrating that its general aspect fails. Aristotle’s defense of justice is impractical as it entails that the virtues and vices are determined exclusively by the moral and legal regulations of Ancient Greece, without a mere hint at a scientific method.

Apart from questioning the general aspect of Aristotle’s theory, critics make counter-arguments in relation to specifically to the case of virtue justice. In line with Kelsen’s aforementioned deductions, if Aristotelian ethical theory is applied to the virtue of justice, one has to take what is unjust for granted. Due to Aristotle’s method failing at determining the extremes needed to define the mean, the concepts and examples of just and unjust acts are dictated by the social and legal law of the time. This leads to a seemingly logical conclusion: Aristotelian defense of justice only justifies the existing moral codes of Ancient Greece instead of providing an answer as to what is truly just or unjust. Thus, it is apparent that the main flaws of Aristotle’s arguments identified by critics are their tautology and the fact that they are only useful as methods of reinforcing and strengthening a given set of moral conceptions in a particular State at a particular time.

It is clear that any of the logical fallacies in Aristotle’s work highlighted by Kelsen are based on his own interpretation of Aristotelian theory. Therefore, to answer whether Kelsen is right in his attack on the general aspect of Aristotle’s theory, it is crucial to examine Kelsen’s intentions. Again, Kelsen serves as an example of a vast array of authors who dedicate their writings to disproving Aristotle’s arguments. The conclusion of Kelsen’s book claims that although Aristotle (Plato and Jesus as well) cannot provide a clear definition of justice, neither can he. Thus, he is satisfied with “his own” conception of justice since he believes none of the prominent thinkers he mentions in his work can offer an absolute method of determining what is just. In simple terms, a “relative” concept is enough, instead of accepting an all-encompassing one.

It is important to note how this interpretation of justice Kelsen already has is in line with his criticism of Aristotle. It goes along with his paradigmatic theory of Law, “which rests on purity, understood as autonomy and separation regarding other fields of knowledge, including morals”.⁸ The disproval of Aristotelian defense of justice, which implies that justice is, in fact, an empty concept, presented by Kelsen as the conclusion seems to be indeed rather convenient. It reinforces “the need for a theory of law that exists in itself, without having to reach out to unfathomable ideas, such as justice”.⁹ It is obvious that disproving Aristotle’s theory of justice would allow Kelsen to prove his own theory of law.

As a result, it becomes clear that Kelsen’s counter-arguments are at least partially affected by the straw man fallacy. This logical fallacy implies that a critic might misinterpret someone’s argument on purpose to make it easier to attack it. For instance, there is reason to believe that Kelsen misinterprets the main goal of Aristotle’s theory. He claims that Aristotle attempts to provide a scientific-mathematical mental model of determining what is just and applying this definition to real-life moral problems requiring solutions. This misunderstanding, other intentional or not, becomes the foundation of Kelsen’s criticism. He claims that the general aspect of Aristotelian theory is flawed since it does not reach its primary goal. On the one hand, Kelsen’s counter-arguments based around this assumption are logically consistent yet I’d the foundation is wrong, as the arguments formed from it deserve little to no attention as their credibility is undeniably questionable.

In actuality, Aristotle’s work contains no evidence that the philosopher’s intention was to provide an operational scientific-mathematical method of defining justice. Aristotle simply states that he will “inquire about justice and injustice” in Book V.¹⁰ In addition, he claims that he will “try to insert justice into the system he outlined before, finding how it can be a mean and what are its extremes”.¹¹ None of these statements found in Nicomachean Ethics support Kelsen’s claim that the main goal was to present an operational method of defining what is and is not just. In fact, when focusing on discussing individual virtues, Aristotle notes that the usefulness of his study may be merely in providing the foundation for making correct inquiries about the human character and applying the mesotes(means)-formula to virtues in a case-by-case way.¹² It becomes apparent that Kelsen’s interpretation of Aristotle’s intent is wrong.

Some might argue that although Aristotle makes no claim, he intends to provide an operational method of defining justice in Book V, there are mentions of such intention in other aspects of the work. It is certainly true that the field of ethics is practical and requires more than a theoretical framework for determining virtues. Thus, as an ethical study Aristotle claims it to be, Nicomachean Ethics aims to be more than speculative and theoretical. Its usefulness lies in the fact that it should be able to provide practical insights as to how men can be good and display just behaviors. This seems to be in line with Kelsen’s understanding of Aristotle’s theory’s goal.

However, passages of the book cited above prove that Aristotle has no intent to develop a scientific-mathematical method of determining what is just. In fact, he claims that it is impossible to do so “for all inquiries in matter of practice must be “in outline only, not scientifically exact”, especially in the study of specific cases (such as justice)”.¹³ Thus, Kelsen’s claim that the goal of Aristotle’s theory is to provide an operational method is not only improbable, but it stands directly in opposition to Aristotle’s claims. It makes Kelsen’s interpretation incoherent with the contents of Nicomachean Ethics, the main source used by him to disprove Aristotle’s arguments.

The fact that Kelsen misinterprets the goal of Aristotle’s theory demonstrates that the entirety of his criticism is unfounded. Since the premise for Kelsen’s arguments is proven to be false, his line of reasoning does no longer have any foundation. However, it is important to look deeper and explore some of the counterarguments Kelsen, as well as many other critics, highlights in his work. Firstly, he claims that Aristotelian defense of justice is tautological. He questions whether Aristotle’s study on moral virtues can provide any useful insights in regard to human character and the nature of justice. Then, he makes a conclusion that it cannot. This paper attempts to demonstrate that Aristotelian definition is not tautological as it does, in fact, manage to present new useful insights in the field of ethics, moral virtues, and philosophy.

In order to understand how Aristotle’s work is of value and useful, it is crucial to examine the concept of justice in more detail. If justice has the characteristics of a moral virtue, it entails a habit or trained faculty. Aristotle tries to show that “being virtuous and knowing what virtues are two very different things”.¹⁴ This means that even if an individual has an understanding and knowledge of what justice is exactly, they will not necessarily act justly as the act itself requires more than knowing the definition of justice – the virtue of justice as well.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s work outlines clear categories of justice, which are exceptionally useful to conceptualize legal relations. It is crucial to know exactly the category to apply to human relationships as it leads to serious consequences. For instance, legal relations in civil law are regulated almost entirely by justice in transactions, or corrective justice. However, distributive justice can be applied in cases concerning civil law as well. A great example is the State’s liability for wrongdoing initiated by its employees. In this case, State is defined as “the collective group of tax paying citizens”.¹⁵ In such a scenario, if an agent of the State causes tort to a third arty, the State is partially responsible and has to give reparations to the affected individual or organization. Justice in transactions cannot describe why State is held partially responsible, which is why justice in distributions has to be applied. Subjecting the State to a fraction of the financial burden protects individual rights. The justification for that is the fact that “otherwise an action of the State (through one of its agents) would reduce the total amount of goods of one of its citizens, who, acting faultlessly, does nothing to deserve such harm”.¹⁶ The solution lies, for example, in the society paying for the reparations, which increases taxes, yet keeps the individual proportions of harm on the same level.

When Aristotle examines specific virtues, it is apparent that he applies them while being limited to the traditional moral laws of his environment. Ancient Greece is vastly different from modern-day Europe or the United States. Thus, critics argue that Aristotle’s defense of justice is not only controversial, but impossible to apply to contemporary issues. Indeed, Aristotle praises wealthy men who lay their reaches before gods in tombs or on sacred lands. He justifies slavery and further notes that those subjected to enslavement are mere tools much alike to a plow or a hammer. According to El Nabolsy, Aristotle is “committed to there being a large population of individuals whose enslavement is just”.¹⁷ Similarly, applying his own definition of the virtue of justice, he justifies women’s social and political subordination.¹⁸ This leads to confusion as to how Aristotle’s theory of justice can be right if it can justify such a horror as the denial of basic rights to people on the basis of their biological characteristics or social standing exclusively.

It is crucial to acknowledge that while Aristotle’s application of his theory may be controversial and outdated, it should have no effect on whether his arguments are correct. As the philosopher mentions himself, the theory’s applications have to be consistent with the traditional morals of the time and place. Contemporary morals of the majority of the regions in the world dictate that slavery is extremely wrong, and Aristotle’s justice theory can be applied to explain why enslavement is unjust. While his arguments are applied rather conservatively to demonstrate the readers real-life examples, this does not disqualify them. In fact, it can be argued that Aristotle could not have provided different examples. Prado expertly notes that of the philosopher wanted to show the usefulness and practicality of his theory, “he had to show that it could efficiently describe what his contemporaries perceived as moral virtue”.¹⁹ It would be rather difficult to convince anyone of the value of his work if he provided examples, which were foreign to his contemporaries in Ancient Greece. Therefore, the use of such examples serves a limited purpose and should have no effect on the validity of Aristotle’s arguments about moral virtue and justice, in particular.

Another factor that proves the usefulness of Aristotle’s theory is of empirical nature. Although Aristotelian definitions have been irrelevant in the millennia following his death, they have gone through a Renaissance of sorts during the medieval times. Throughout the centuries that followed, Aristotle’s work has been undeniably influential. It is important to note that many thought leaders of the past millennia have used Aristotle’s categorization of justice and applied the concepts of distributive and corrective justice to their communities. Nicomachean Ethics has been extremely impactful on the field of moral philosophy, particularly in the West.

One of Aristotle’s followers, of which there are many, is John Rawl who has dedicated a big part of his work to developing the notion of justice in distribution. According to Rawl, Aristotelian definitions can be used to explain how exactly an individual’s entitlements to certain advantages and gains are derived from “social institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they give rise”.²⁰ Rawl’s comments further prove that Aristotle’s defense of justice is not tautological. Prado notes that Aristotelian theory “creates important distinctions to helps us think concrete problems involving justice and fairness”.²¹ Thus, it can be applied to formulate clear solutions to ethical and legal problems.

Despite that, it is crucial to recognize that a counter-argument implying that Aristotle’s mesotes-formula provides no determination as to what is fair remains valid. In order for a judge in the court room to determine whether a crime has been committed, they have to know the law. Thus, two extremes have to be known prior to making a judgement on where the center line is. According to the Aristotelian theory, justice is a virtue, which is a mean with two extremes, yet the philosopher does not provide any definition as to what these extremes are. However, the fact that this counter-argument manages to highlight the actual weakness of Aristotle’s argument and is not based on some logical fallacy does not mean that the philosopher’s defense of justice is entirely wrong. Rather, it demonstrates that one of Aristotle’s points is not as useful as others.

Nonetheless, there is a solution to this issue. Aristotle has mentioned that to determine the mean, it is necessary to use the right reason, which in relation to the acts of justice, is the virtue of prudence. Despite this comment, it is evident that there is no definite solution to finding the mean between two non-defined extremes. This point can be used to restore some of the validity Kelsen’s critic might have.

Although one can use prudence to identify the mean on a case-by-case basis, this solution might be considered tautological as well. In this case, it is crucial to acknowledge that “the problem lies in the fact that reading Aristotle’s account of the mesotes-formula as a way to improve his theory of justice is exactly the opposite of its function”.²² It is possible that Aristotle dedicates a couple of passages to discussing justice as a mean only to strengthen his argument that justice is indeed a moral virtue. Therefore, there is no need for the philosopher to define these extremes as he only needs their mere existence to further prove that justice is a virtue. Thus, it is important to recognize the mesotes-formula as simply another justification of Aristotle’s hypothesis presented in Book II. After all, justice is, in fact, a form of mean, which is one of the characteristics of a moral virtue, even though there is no definite way to define the two extremes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Aristotle’s defense of justice is based on strong arguments, which are both logically consistent and exceptionally applicable. As critics try to disprove the Aristotelian study of justice presented by the philosopher in Book V of Nicomachean Ethics, they often misread Aristotle’s theory. The paper chooses Hans Kelsen to be an example of how such critiques are founded on misinterpretations. The reason for that is the fact that Kelsen offers a complex series of counterarguments, instead of attacking just the general aspect of Aristotle’s theory. While Kelsen claims that Aristotle’s goal in his defense of justice is to develop an operational method of determining what justice is, he is incorrect. Nowhere in the book does it mention that this is the author’s intent. In fact, this statement is incoherent with Aristotle’s own interpretation of moral philosophy.

Another disputable counter-argument is that Aristotle’s theory is not practical. However, it is apparent that Aristotelian definition and categorization of justice influence the way philosophers and the general public think about moral issues and their solutions. For instance, Aristotle’s defense of justice can help to explain why being virtuous and knowing the definitions of virtues are not the same. The distinction between distributive and corrective justice, the explanation of which Aristotle provides in his work, can impact modern-day scenarios such as those related to tort and reparations, for example. While Aristotle indeed reinforces the morals of his time, his approach is justified by the need to convince his contemporaries of the applicability of his theory. One weakness in Aristotle’s argument is the fact that the mesotes-formula fails to provide a solution to a given problem since there are no clear definitions of extremes to clearly determine the mean. This paper offers a hypothesis that Aristotle mentions the mesotes-formula simply to reinstate his arguments regarding the moral virtue, rather than to reinforce his theory of justice.

Bibliography

Aspan, Henry, and Muhammad Ali Adnan. “Several Perspectives on the Relationship between Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, and Law.” EPRA International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 7, no. 8(2021):363-67. doi:10.36713/epra2013

Berry, Matthew. “The Natural Part of Political Justice in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no.1(2020): 1-20. doi:10.5840/epoche2020108167

El Nabolsy, Zeyad. “Aristotle on Natural Slavery: An Analysis Using the Marxist Concept of Ideology.” Science & Society 83, no. 2(2019): 244-267. doi:10.1521/siso.2019.83.2.244

Geeraets, Vincent. “Ideology, Doping and the Spirit of Sport, Sport.” Ethics and Philosophy 12, no. 3((2018)): 255-271, doi:10.1080/17511321.2017.1351483

Kelsen, Hans. Was ist Gerechtigkeit. 2nd ed. Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1999.

Perez-Garzon, Carlos Andrés. “Unveiling the Meaning of Social Justice in Colombia.” Mexican Law Review 10, no. 2(2018): 27-66. doi:10.22201/iij.24485306e.2018.20.11892.

Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303

Sharma, Sharada Devi. “Biology as Destiny in Gender Inequality.” Research Nepal Journal of Development Studies 4, no. 1(2021): 127–134. doi:10.3126/rnjds.v4i1.38044

Footnotes

1. Aspan, Henry, and Muhammad Ali Adnan. “Several Perspectives on the Relationship between Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, and Law.” EPRA International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 7, no. 8(2021):363-67. doi:10.36713/epra2013
2. Berry, Matthew. “The Natural Part of Political Justice in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no.1(2020): 1-20. doi:10.5840/epoche2020108167
3. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
4. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
5. Geeraets, Vincent. “Ideology, Doping and the Spirit of Sport, Sport.” Ethics and Philosophy 12, no. 3((2018)): 255-271. doi:10.1080/17511321.2017.1351483
6. Perez-Garzon, Carlos Andrés. “Unveiling the Meaning of Social Justice in Colombia.” Mexican Law Review 10, no. 2(2018): 27-66. doi:10.22201/iij.24485306e.2018.20.11892.
7. Kelsen, Hans. Was ist Gerechtigkeit. 2nd ed. Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1999.
8. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
9. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
10. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.”, 62.
11. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.”, 62.
12. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
13. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.”, 62.
14. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
15. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
16. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
17. El Nabolsy, Zeyad. “Aristotle on Natural Slavery: An Analysis Using the Marxist Concept of Ideology.” Science & Society 83, no. 2(2019): 244-267. doi:10.1521/siso.2019.83.2.244
18. Sharma, Sharada Devi. “Biology as Destiny in Gender Inequality.” Research Nepal Journal of Development Studies 4, no. 1(2021): 127–134. doi:10.3126/rnjds.v4i1.38044
19. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
20. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
21. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303
22. Prado, Arthur Cristóvão. “A Reply to Kelsen’s Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Justice.” Praxis Filosófica 48, (2019): 53-67. doi:10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7303