Army’s and Marine Corps’ Pursuit of Long-Range Precision Strike Capabilities Essay

Introduction

In the United States (U.S.), national security and foreign policy are two critical areas that different stakeholders and leaders should take seriously. Over the years, new shifts have emerged in the manner in which the relevant departments or services invest and purchase equipment for sustaining wars. This essay describes how the Marine Corps and the U.S. army pursue long-range precision strike capabilities that expose the presence of sub-optimal investment decision-making processes.

Sub-Optimal Investment

Currently, the U.S. government promotes a procurement process that is characterized by unique flaws and gaps. For instance, those in leadership tend to place “their parochial interests above the national interest” (1). The outcome is that the relevant departments acquire different weapons at overpriced values. Such acquisitions also tend to be for the wrong political unrests or wars. Over the years, the Department of Defense (DoD) allows different Services to engage in ordering and purchasing processes that are informed by the recorded demands. The Secretary of Defense (SOD) will not rely on the available opportunities to determine what needs to be purchased or not.

The reason why such a model exists is that the government and the relevant agencies intend to pursue long-range strike capabilities. The purchasing power is supposed to allow the services to make informed decisions ad purchase the right arsenal and weapons that resonate with the demands of the intended conflict. Unfortunately, such a move has been observed to manifest the sub-optimal investment decision-making process that makes it impossible for the country’s DoD to achieve most of its aims (2). Following the events of the Cold War and its aftermath, it has occurred that more erroneous purchasing continues to be made, thereby making it impossible for the government to pursue its goals diligently.

To address this issue, Secretary Gates made some changes that would ensure that the process of acquiring firearms resonated with the interests of the nation. The secretary was keen to consider some of the best approaches and initiatives that would ensure that Services did not primarily focus on their selfish interests. The ultimate aim was to promote and pass budgets that offered a reflection of programs that were of national significance while getting rid of those that appeared to support the goals of each organization. The government has a duty to empower the Secretary to be in total control of the budgeting process (3). The end result would be a position to offer interventions that are politically neutral and characterized by reduced risks.

Similarly, Sapolsky and Gholz appear to offer similar thoughts by explaining how the latest move to block mergers has led to numerous problems (4). For instance, the Services are empowered in such a way that they continue to acquire materials and resources that match the interests of their respective segments. The authors believe that the decision to allow such agencies or departments to source collectively would only affect their capability to acquire cost-effective, sustainable, ad innovative weapons that can help win wars both regionally and globally. The article goes further to support the fact that there is a unique fear of merging different agencies since such a decision will have negative consequences.

From this description, it would be agreeable that the U.S. is characterized by Services that make their independent decisions. The end result is that an unhealthy inter-service competition has emerged that makes it impossible for the government to achieve its security objectives. The model is also inappropriate since it is to blame for the costly nature of the procurement processes put in place (5). More of the roles and procedures appear to overlap, thereby affecting the recorded gains in the military sector. Some critics have gone further to explain how the move to allow different Services to order their weapons independently has resulted in a unique form of bureaucracy (6). The end result is that most of the departments eventually acquire weapons that are inappropriate or incapable of supporting the targeted war efforts.

Finally, the inter-service competition Sapolsky and Gholz push for can be identified as inappropriate and unhealthy. When each Service identifies ad acquires its equipment, chances are high that it will only be focusing on its organizational goals (7). The country will be at stake since national interests will lose meaning (8). These developments will also reduce room for continuous innovation and improvement, thereby making it impossible for the agencies to collaborate during turbulent times and deliver timely results (9). These emerging issues explain why proper measures are needed to address the dangers of the sup-optimal investment decisions being made by different Services.

Conclusion

The above discussion has revealed that different Services in the U.S. pursue long-range strike capabilities in an effort to deliver the intended goals. Unfortunately, the analysis has revealed how such a model results in sub-optimal investment decisions that put organizational interests first while ignoring international goals. A paradigm shift would be needed to address such issues and focus on the best approaches to promote a healthy purchasing strategy.

References

Burgess, Richard R. “Expeditionary Warfare Director: Marines Will Be Sinking Ships in Future War.” Sea Power, 2020.

Cooper, Jim, and Russell Rumbaugh. “Real Acquisition Forum.” JFQ 55, no. 4 (2009): 59-65.

Sapolsky, Harvey M., and Eugene Gholz. “The Defense Monopoly.” Regulation 22, no. 3 (1999): 40-43.

Pierce, Terry C. “Jointness is Killing Naval Innovation.” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings; Annapolis 127, no. 10 (2001): 68-71.

Trimble, Steve. “Competition for U.S. Long-Range Strike Mission Heats Up.” Aviation Week, 2020.

Footnotes

1. Jim Cooper and Russell Rumbaugh, “Real Acquisition Forum,” JFQ 55, no. 4 (2009): 59.
2. Cooper and Rumbaugh, “Real Acquistion,” 59.
3. Ibid., 61.
4. Ibid., 62.
5. Harvey M. Sapolsky and Eugene Gholz, “The Defense Monopoly,” Regulation 22, no. 3 (1999): 40.
6. Sapolsky and Gholz, “The Defense,” 42.
7. Richard R. Burgess, “Expeditionary Warfare Director: Marines Will Be Sinking Ships in Future War,” Sea Power, 2020.
8. Steve Trimble, “Competition for U.S. Long-Range Strike Mission Heats Up,” Aviation Week, 2020.
9. Terry C. Pierce, “Jointness is Killing Naval Innovation,” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings; Annapolis 127, no. 10 (2001): 68-71.