Attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan and Sustaining Peace Enforcement Mission in Nagorno-Karabakh Essay

Product 1

• This product recommends COA 1(US Heavy)
• The Guidance while hinting that COA 2 will give more legitimacy does not rule out COA 1.
• Analysis by me suggests that COA1 has better chances of succeeding than COA 2. You can take a call and choose either one. COA 2 slides follow after slide Product 2

Overview Explanation

• The UN Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VI of UN Charter has failed to keep peace in N-K, prompting the promulgation of UNSCR 4466 that authorizes the establishment of an international force for Peace Enforcement Mission in N-K under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
• Belligerence of Ahurastan points towards a possible attack by AH forces on friendly country of Azerbaijan.
• Main Task – PEO Mission in N-K complicated by additional task to Deter and Defend Ahurastan.
• While each of the players has their own interests in mind which leads to a possible ‘Balkans’ type of situation in the Caspian AOR, the danger posed by fundamentalist Ahurastan and its proxy ally, the SAPA in invading Azerbaijan has to be countered by all means possible.
• This can be done by using the most optimum force levels available with the Multinational National Forces backed by UNSCR 4466 under which force can be used to enforce peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
• Russia considers itself as the pre-eminent power in the region and its alliance with Armenia puts it in an adversarial position w.r.t Azerbaijan. Russia may be looking forward to the situation in the Caspian AOR to ‘do a Afghanistan on US’ and regain its primacy in the Caspian Sea region. Thus despite inclusion of Russian forces in the MNF, a Russian ‘Double Game’ is very much possible. However, Russian involvement is a must to limit its option of playing the adversary.
• The Azeri government has a hard time convincing its Muslim population of the need for US presence in their country for enforcing the PEO mission in N-K. Our operational plans must cater for Azeri sensitivities.
• Armenia is itching to break the ceasefire deal and would like to capitalize on any opportunity to enter the N-K region and thus needs to be kept under check.
• The Free Karabakh Movement aims to establish freedom for N-K and thus needs to be kept under control.
• Georgia is a key but reluctant ally whose ports (Poti & Batumi) are crucial for our build up and logistics. Actions taken by own forces in support of the mission must not endanger US-Georgia ties.

Analysis of INT SUM 010700

• Increased interest of local and religious leaders in US troop movements.
• This could possibly be an intelligence gathering mission by Ahurastani proxies which may lead to asymmetric attacks on US Forces.
• Ahurastani Brigade-sized exercise continues along the Iranian border. May be a prelude to attack on Azerbaijan. Nations have previously used this ruse of converting an ‘exercise’ into an actual attack.
• Attacks by SAPA insurgents. Harassing attacks by SAPA insurgents have a coherent aim – disruption of Humanitarian Assistance and causing turmoil in the refugee camps thereby making conditions favorable for an open revolt by the discontented populace.
• Ahurastani appear to be responding to US Presence in Azerbaijan. This could be misplaced optimistic assessment. The Ahurastan Is may be cloaking their intentions to capitalize on ‘surprise’. Own forces should be prepared for the worst case scenario of an all out attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan.
• Information Warfare by Fundamentalist Ahurastan forces. The Ahurastani may well have a sophisticated plan for carrying out perception management and information warfare. Own forces need to have a counter IW plan that includes hard and soft kill measures.

Analysis of INT SUM 011900

• SAPA insurgents preparing plans to kill or kidnap own forces. Own FPM will have to be beefed up, HUMINT and TECHINT crucial.
• Ahurastani Brigades in TAA. This points to a real possibility of an impending attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan. Need for a preplanned air interdiction package is considered imperative, which can be put into action if required.
• Georgian organized gangs obstructing logistics. Need for full spectrum FPM. This may also include ‘adjustment’ of tariff payable to organized gangs to buy peace and allow smooth supply. If adjustments do not work, full spectrum FPM required to keep LOCs open. FPM have to be coordinated with full support of the Georgian government as at no stage should own forces be accused of infringing Georgian sovereignty.
• Ahurastan SOF and Div RACON elements participating in exercises. This could be a step up the escalator ladder for an impending attack by Ahurastan forces.
• SAPA insurgents plan to destabilize refugee camps. Need for a stabilization force in the camps to ensure security

Analysis of INT SUM 031900

• SAPA insurgents clearly gather info on own forces. Own FPM will have to be beefed up.
• SAPA letter discussing possible chemical attacks on own forces. Though a review of weather summaries point that chemical attacks will be wind dependant, own FPM needs to include BC protection and inoculation of own troops.
• Ahurastani Divs moving from Home locations to the Front. One more step up the escalator ladder. Div sized formations converging on the front requires suitable counter plans including Preemptive Strike plan.
• Hepatitis C in Refugee camps. Need for Camp hygiene, NGO involvement, epidemic control, coordination of CA teams with NGOs is crucial.
• SAPA insurgents plan to use refugee camps as safety zones. Need to weed out SAPA insurgents from refugee camps, need for HUMINT, TECHINT and clear orders for targeting ‘enemies’.
• Comments on Request For Joint Planning and Training Exercise(1of2)

Azerbaijan forces request targeting info, int concerning SAPA insurgents in the refugee camps. Int data being provided by own forces must be ‘hard’ intel with focus on specifics to aid Azerbaijanis ‘weed’ out insurgents while at the same time ensuring that the ‘weeding’ out process does not become a genocide.

Int on members of Fundamentalist Political Party Movement. This needs to be filtered with care as the Fundamentalist Political Party in Azerbaijan is a ‘bonafide’ party and any hasty ‘heavy handedness’ by Azerbaijanis might spark off a wide array of political unrest.

Comments on Request For Joint Planning and Training Exercise(2of2)

Azerbaijan forces request joint planning and training with US forces to prepare for a coordinated strike against SAPA insurgents inside the refugee camps.

While Joint training can be agreed to, coordinated strikes inside refugee camps involving US troops has wider international ramifications. In all such operations, US forces must go by the dictum of ‘plausible deniability’. Hence it would be more prudent to involve US forces only in training and planning and not direct participation in attacking SAPA insurgents inside refugee camps. Should US forces be involved in direct operations inside refugee camps, such operations must be covert ops offering full deniability.

Decision Brief Part IV Implications

With over six state and non-state actors involved, each with a different agenda and interests, the situation in the Caspian AOR is likely to assume ‘Balkan’ proportions. The US thus must have a clear exit strategy should the end results in the PEO mission not succeed.

In such situations, PEO missions can easily deteriorate into a civil war. Plans, force level structuring and logistics must cater for a long drawn out deployment that could stretch into many years. A time frame of about five to ten years would be likely extent for such PEO missions.

The likelihood of PEO converting into a proxy war with Russia in the opposing side is a possibility. Russia has not forgotten what the US did to it in Afghanistan and may seek this opportunity to get even and regain its primacy in the Caspian Sea region.

The MNF contains fragile partners, if Russia proceeds with its agenda, others may follow suit and break away and thus legitimacy and credibility of a UN sanctioned MNF may come into question.

PEO mission as complex as this has every possibility in resulting in large scale collateral damage with insurgents using innocent civilians as human shields, partner nations employing different yardsticks of operational parameters and agendas driving their definition of the ‘enemy’ as also the ‘fog of war’ that may result in wrong targeting.

Own casualties are likely to increase as the PEO mission becomes ‘hot’ since PEO missions have no clearly defined ‘enemy’ there is a need for the MNF to go into the territories to stabilize the area. Operating from safe bases and sanitized zones will not serve the purpose as TECHINT and HUMINT will have to be supported by traditional foot patrols and area domination techniques.

Known Facts From Current INTSUM and OPORD(1of3)

• JTF Caspian is at C + 90 in its deployment – false-As per INTSUM today is Nov 3 2012, that makes JTF Caspian at C + 54 in its deployment.
• US Forces must come from within the theater – false-While most of the forces would come from EUCOM, naval assets and assets from Marines and the USAF would be apportioned from outside the theatre including TRANSCOM assets.
• Troop levels in N-K to increase from 6K to 15 K – True -The UNSCR 4466 has authorized increase of troop level in N-K from 6K to 15 K.
• US TRANSCOM assets are available –True
• JTF Caspian requirements IAW EUCOM CONPLAN is not changed – False – JTF Caspian requirements IAW EUCOM CONPLAN has changed as the entire situation has changed from deployment of UN Force under Chapter VI to MNF under Chapter VII with a deteriorating situation arising out of possibility of a conventional attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan as also PEO mission in N-K.

Known Facts From Current INTSUM and OPORD(2of3)

• AZ moving 1 Div to N-K border – False – As per OPSUM Azeri Defense Plan The 15th and 16th Mechanized brigade will continue to defend along the Nagorno-Karabakh border along the UN zone of separation boundary.
• SAPA Bn operates in the region- false – As per special report on insurgency, SAPA military component operates as ‘fronts’ which is roughly equal to regiment and ‘columns/regions’ which are roughly equal to a bn. The estimated strength of the military component is approximately six battalions with two to three companies each. The companies range in size from 50 to 100 men.
• N-K Airspace has been violated by Ahurastan – True

– On 01 Sept 2012. Ahurastanian reconnaissance aircraft begin to violate Azerbaijan’s airspace.

– On 05 Sept 2012 : An Ahurastanian recon aircraft is shot down in AZ.(Scenario ref book

Known Facts From Current INTSUM and OPORD(3of3)

SAPA posing as FKM and attacking NKR and UN troops –

True-SAPA posing as FKM had carried out attacks in the past and killed a Belgian UN peacekeeper.

Insurgent activities continues and will increase – True -SAPA continues to disrupt supply lines to deny supplies from reaching the refugee camps to sow dissatisfaction amongst the inmates. (INTSUM).

• Russia is sympathetic to NKR and Ahurastan – False – Russia is allied to Armenia who are opposed to Azerbaijan with whom they have had dispute over N-K. Azerbaijan was previously aligned with Russia but the relationship had soured. Russia’s relations with N-K are not good because of their friendly relations with Armenia.

Assumptions and Thoughts(1of2)

• 15 K troop level is sufficient to execute UNSCR 4466 – False-To carry out PEO mission in N-K with just 15K troops may prove to be impossible considering the wide range of contrasting tasks that are at hand. If the mission was just to carry out HA and enforce peace under asymmetric conditions, 15 K would have possibly sufficed. However, to prepare for the possibility of a conventional attack on Azerbaijan from Ahurastan, may prove the requirement of greater force levels. If one were to consider just the SAPA military force approximating 2000 and were to take even a modest figure of 1:5 (for a counterinsurgency force), the requirement for just counterinsurgency would be 10,000 troops leaving only 5,000 to deal with the conventional threat which does not add up to the minimum of 1:3 conventional superiority required. The terrain in the N-K region is mountainous and thus the ratio for a counterinsurgency operation may even become as high as 1:20.
• JTF Caspian is a USTRANSCOM Priority – False – USTRANSCOM is a service provider to all commands. Priority is decided by the DoD.

Assumptions and Thoughts(2of2)

• UN Transitional Government Authority is lead for non-military affairs

– Fuzzy – According to Para 8 of UNSCR 4466 the resolution “Requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the United Nations international security coalition forces to ensure that the new security force operates under unified command and control and acts towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner”.

– Para 12 (g) states that “Protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities”.

– While Para 8 makes it ambiguous, Para 12 (g) affirms that the transitional government would look after non military affairs. The explanation is that the UNSCR anticipates a number of situations where the MNF would be involved directly with nonmilitary affairs too in discharging their duties.

Constraints and Restraints(1of6)

• Challenges to Force Integration, C2 and Domestic Public Support

– Differing national interests, Different operating philosophies of participating nation’s contingent would make integration difficult.

– Integration with NATO countries would not be a problem. However, it would be a major concern integrating non NATO partners such as Russia where there is no hardware, software and protocol compatibility.

– C2 would be complicated.

– Domestic public support both at home and in the region of deployment is a challenge as the rationale for committing own troops in a far off theater would be difficult to ‘sell’ to own people.

– In the area of deployment, N-K is basically a Muslim dominated populace as is Azerbaijan who have a long standing distrust of ‘Christian forces’.

Constraints and Restraints(2of6)

• N-K PEO mission is a separate and distinct operation from JTF Caspian and requires separate C2

– Theoretically, this statement is correct.

– However, both the PEO mission, ensuring international HA as well as preventing a conventional attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan including asymmetric attacks all occur in the same theater, involving the same key players and are interconnected which requires a single C2.

– The spatial dimensions of the Caspian AOR is too restricted to allow two separate C2 to coexist and operate efficiently.

Constraints and Restraints(3of6)

• Players are belligerents not necessarily enemies
• Belligerents are people or nation that act in a hostile manner such as carrying out war or are engaged in war.
• A state of belligerency may also exist between a recognized state and rebel forces.
• In the Current situation most players are belligerents as each of them have carried out hostile acts against at least one other.
• Rebel forces in this case the SAPA and the FKM have not been granted the right to be recognized as belligerents and thus can best be termed as non-state actors/insurgent groups.
• States/ entities recognized as Belligerents can be called as enemies and members of their armed forces as enemy combatants which gives them certain rights under the Geneva conventions. However, those groups without recognition as belligerents are termed unlawful combatants not authorized POW status under Geneva Conventions. SAPA and FKM rebels come under this category.

Constraints and Restraints(4of6)

• No UN Log support exists in the theater– This would require its own forces to build and secure own log support across the theater.
• Only 4 CA(Teams) in theater – Wholly inadequate as over 14 refugee camps exist over the Caspian AOR where coordination would be required between NGOs, interim administration and camp directors.

Constraints and Restraints(5of6)

• Extended and Limited Ground LOCs– Would slow down ground force deployment in the AOR. Would be difficult to protect and would thus require cooperation of allies such as Georgian authorities to ensure safety of the lines of communication from Poti to Tbilisi to N-K.
• Refugee/ IDP Movement– Ahurastani build up along the border is triggering a vast exodus of refugees from South to North towards the refugee camps located in Central Azerbaijan and N-K area. This would further clog the few roads available for own forces movement. It would also lead to overcrowding of refugee camps which could lead to camp riots. Harassing attacks by SAPA on logistics supplies to refugee camp would further aggravate the situation. Thus refugee movement needs to be controlled, managed and handled with care.

Constraints and Restraints(6of6)

• UN lead for HA operations– increases C2 problems. Restricts own choice of tactics to be used for ensuring success of HA operations. Has to be done under UN rules.
• Limited HN Communications infrastructure for ITV & Requisitioning – Will limit tempo of HA operations, will require to be augmented by own sources.
• Limited HN Fresh Water sources – Supply of water to refugee camps will have to be calculated to arrive at the optimum number of refugees that each camp can sustain. How much can own forces supply needs calculation. Overpopulation will lead to water scarcity, disease and law and order problems.

How key players might present risk to success of PEO mission in N-K

• Russia considers itself as the preeminent power in the region having once ruled the entire region in the erstwhile soviet era, might play a double game. Russia’s close alliance with Armenia which has reluctantly agreed to the cease fire in N-K may find active support once again to sabotage the peace process. Russia may not like the close friendly ties of Azerbaijan with the US and may try to destabilize Azerbaijan just to get even with the US. Russia may even provide covert support to Ahurastan to aid its struggle with the US which it sees as an intruder in its ‘backyard’.
• Japan’s main interest in the Caspian sea region is the oil. Japan is likely to take sides with whichever party that can ensure its oil interests in the region. Thus Japanese aims may not coincide with the overall aim of the MNF.
• Georgia is another key player whose status as an ally of the US is crucial since the ports of Poti and Batumi are the main points of origin for the logistics chain. Georgia is also required to keep a check on the Georgian criminal gangs operating in its territory extracting a toll on the HA supplies.
• Azerbaijan itself a Muslim country may find it difficult as the time goes by, to convince its restive population the need for allowing the continued presence of Christian forces for the stability of their country.
• Armenia is itching to break the ceasefire deal and would like to capitalize on any opportunity to enter the N-K region and thus needs to be kept under check.
• Ahurastan may aim to unite Ahurastan and Azerbaijan into an Islamic state and thus control its oil.

Campaign Concept

• W.r.t. Ahurastan Deter First, Defend if Deterrence fails – lead by US forces
• Stop destabilizing of DP camps by assisting NGOs & HN in DP camps in coordination with coalition partners
• Minimize refugee flow from South Azerbaijan to North
• Use PSYOPS and CA to counter Ahurastan/ SAPA propaganda & recruitment in the camps
• Ensure stability of alliances with key players

COA 1

Advantages of COA 1

• COA 1 does provide immediate response to N-K situation.
• It would simplify C2 as only a few coalition partners are involved.
• 80% Commonality of logistics would make it easier to supply and sustain.
• Undoubtedly, COA1 gives us sufficient overmatch over the adversary and help stabilize N-K faster.

Disadvantages of COA 1

• Would be perceived as yet another example of US extra-regional hegemony.
• Would take longer to deploy as larger number of forces are involved.
• Would increase human and financial costs to own country disproportionately larger than other key players.
• May increase Anti-US sentiment globally especially in the Muslim World.

COA 2

Advantages of COA 2

• Provide legitimacy to UNSCR 4466.
• Would reduce possible ‘double game’ by key players who would have been otherwise left out in the COA 1 force structure.
• Would be faster to deploy since the force levels are lesser.
• Would reduce US footprint in the operation and thus prevent reinforcing the image of a ‘hegemon’.

Disadvantages of COA 2

• Would complicate C2 as larger number of countries are involved.
• May not sustain the entire duration of the operation as individual partners may pull out citing national interests or inability to sustain the financial and human drain caused by the operations.
• National interests of participating countries might interfere with the successful execution of the entire operation.
• Disparate voices may eventually lead to failure which would reflect on US capabilities as well.

COA 1

• Suitability – will achieve the ‘Mission’, will achieve end result compatible with Commander’s Intent.
• Feasibility – Resources for COA 1 are sufficient. Would be easy to coordinate, execute and allow best use of forces throughout the operation, sufficient overmatch w.r.t the enemy.
• Acceptability – Losses to own forces may increase considering the US heavy deployment but these losses outweigh the greater chance of success. However, this course of action has lower acceptability from coalition partners and world opinion. Own political leadership may prefer larger involvement of coalition partners.

COA 2

• Suitability – May achieve the ‘Mission’, May achieve end result compatible with Commander’s Intent.
• Feasibility – Resources for COA 2 are lesser than COA 1. Would be difficult to coordinate, execute and may not allow best use of forces throughout the operation, insufficient overmatch w.r.t the enemy.
• Acceptability – Losses to own forces may decrease considering the coalition heavy deployment. This course of action has higher acceptability from coalition partners and world opinion. Own Political leadership would prefer larger number of coalition partners.

Which of the two COA would you recommend and why?

• COA1 is the recommended COA that holds promise of success.
• COA 1 allows the US freedom of action and freedom to mold and phase the operations as it wants.
• COA 1 simplifies C2.
• COA 1 gives greater force levels, with superior firepower than COA 2.
• COA1 allows US the flexibility to more easily requisition greater forces as and when required.
• Lesser the partners lesser the complications that might arise out of differing national interests at a later stage.
• COA 1 makes it easier for the US to take proactive steps such as preemptive action should the need arise.

Which of the two COA would you recommend and why?

• COA1 simplifies logistics supply.
• COA 1 simplifies communication requirements as commonality of equipment is available for around 80% of the force.
• US credibility will be maintained as COA 1 has greater chances of success than COA 2 where disparate interests and ‘staying power’ might lead to failure.

End Result

COA 1 will enhance US control over Eurasia and thus control over its oil thereby ensuring our energy security in the long run as well continued US global pre-eminence.

Emerging COAs(out of COA1)

• COA #3. US Forces deploy for deter/defend against Ahurastani forces, coalition partners deploy for PEO mission.

– Advantages – Sufficient forces for deterrence as well as defending Azerbaijan would be available.

– Disadvantages – Force levels of other coalition partners too less to effectively carry out PEO mission. Would reduce own influence in Azerbaijan

Emerging COAs(out of COA1)

• COA #4. Coalition partners deploy for deter/defend against Ahurastan forces, US forces deploy for PEO mission.

– Advantages – Would help us concentrate on main task i.e PEO mission.

– Disadvantages – Force levels of other coalition partners too less to effectively deter/ defend against Ahurastan forces.

Emerging COAs(out of COA1)

• COA #5. US Heavy Forces deploy for deter/defend against Ahurastani forces, Other US forces & coalition forces deploy for PEO mission.

– Advantages – Would give us the best mix and optimum use of available force levels and firepower to address both PEO mission and help us concentrate on main task i.e PEO mission as well as deter/defend against Ahurastan.

– Disadvantages – Own casualties are likely to be higher.

COA 1 SUGGESTED MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS

• US Heavy formations to be poised along the Azeri-Ahurastan border aligned with Azeri OPPLAN

– Effect – Visible presence of US heavy formations would deter Ahurastani armored thrust into Azerbaijan

• US Air Power Demonstration in the Caspian Sea

– Effect – Serve as a deterrent to Ahurastan Air Force

• Pre-Planned Air Interdiction Package

– Effect – To be initiated at first sign of hostilities by Ahurastan to defend Azerbaijan

• Coalition partners deployed to guard supply lines and key points such as Poti-Tbilisi-Ganja-AZ MSR, Baku, and refugee camp management

– Effect – will leave US forces to concentrate on key mission tasks more efficiently

• Overall HA mission to rest with US

– Effect – Will ensure own national interests are safeguarded

Nov 2009

COA 1 SUGGESTED MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS

MSR SECURITY IN COORD WITH GEORGIA

AZ

AR N-K

AZ

LEGEND

MIL EX

MIL EX

AH DIVISION

AH DIVISION

AHURASTAN

COALITION PARTNERS FOR MSR SECURITY

US + COALITION FORCES

AIRPOWER DEMO

US HEAVY FORMATIONS

Other Emerging COAs: (In case we go Pre-emptive)

• Though the settings state that own government is not likely to allow preemptive strikes on Ahurastan, the options for such a course must be discussed irrespective of the fact that the present dispensation believes in multilateralism.
• It must not be forgotten that our policy of extra-regional hegemony has served us well since the beginning of Cold war and has helped us defeat the Soviet Union and has kept our enemies at bay.
• It must also not be forgotten that our unilateralist actions w.r.t ‘War on Terror’ have prevented even a single attack from taking place on Continental US since 9/11.
• Preemption as a course of action has been practiced successfully by the US in the past and is a credible war winning strategy. The next six COAs are based on variations of the preemption strategies both overt and covert.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #6. US Heavy carrying out overt preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan,enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, international community would resist, degrade US global image, make more enemies in the Muslim World, Russia may pull out of the coalition.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #7. Coalition heavy carrying out overt preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan, provide legitimacy to the proactive act, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, degrade US global image, make more enemies in the Muslim World, Russia may pull out of the coalition.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #8. US heavy carrying out covert preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan, Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #9. Coalition heavy carrying out covert preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan,Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #10. US heavy carrying out covert decapitation strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s leadership from the scene, Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, Be a short term success, as new more hardened leadership may replace those neutralized, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #11. Coalition heavy carrying out covert decapitation strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s leadership from the scene, Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all missions by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, Be a short term success, as new more hardened leadership may replace those neutralized, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Force Protection(1of 1)

• Present environment unstable where following risks exist

– Disruption and extraction of ‘toll’ on HA supplies along Poti-Tbilisi-Azerbaijan MSR by Georgian criminal gangs.

– Attacks by SAPA insurgents on own forces possible including chemical attacks.

– SAPA insurgents disrupting HA supplies from reaching refugee camps.

– SAPA insurgents creating disgruntlement amongst refugees.

– SAPA insurgents using refugee camps as staging posts and recruitment centers.

– SAPA insurgents carrying out attacks against VAs and VPs.

Force Protection(2 of 2)

• Future environment increasing instability with risks as follows

– Security situation likely to deteriorate further in the AO.

– Conflict between SAPA insurgents, FKM and N-K may spark a civil war in which Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ahurastan, Georgia Abkhazia are all involved.

– SAPA insurgents and FKM may use civilian populations as human shields.

– Refugee camps may become breeding grounds for more SAPA insurgents, anti US feelings may be heightened.

– Large influx of refugees from South to North Azerbaijan likely.

Force Protection – Guidance to Subordinates

• Liaise with Georgian authorities to ensure safety of HA supplies from disruption by Georgian criminal gangs OR strike a deal with Georgian criminal gangs to allow the supplies to go through.
• At the same time, employ FPM along MSR in coord with Georgian auth inside Georgian territory and organic FPM outside Georgian territory.
• FPM of own forces to be enhanced including BC protection.
• Security of refugee camps to be enhanced.
• Use of special forces recommended for ‘targeted killings’ of insurgents.
• Use PSYOPS and CA to counter insurgent propaganda in refugee camps.

NGO Requests (1 of 3)

The NGO liaison informs us that the critical crane system at their dock(in Poti) is broken down and there are no parts available in Georgia to repair it. The crane is American made and the manufacturer still manufactures the part.

– Action Required – Arrange for spares to be airlifted from America using TRANSCOM assets or allow use of own crane at Poti for unloading NGO HA supplies.

– Issues – Funding for flight, spares. (As per US Ambassador to Azerbaijan guidance US forces are authorized to provide HA support upto $50,000 without ambassador’s approval for food water and warming items. Emergency building materials are authorized upto $ 80,000. Any items other than these would require the express permission of the ambassador). While flight can be dovetailed with ‘operational’ schedule, the funding for spares will have to be worked out.

– Effects –Will slow down own logistics build up. If crane not available to NGOs, will slow down HA reaching refugee camps that may lead to food shortages at camps leading to law and order problems.

– Risks – Slow down of own logistics build up in case our crane loaned to NGOs.

– End State – Better NGO-Mil coordination enhancing overall mission. effectiveness.

NGO Requests (2 of 3)

• NGO Support Agency Azerbaijan requests that 50,000 doses of hepatitis vaccination serum & 50,000 related items to administer vaccinations are required for treating hepatitis patients

– Action Required – Arrange for items ex-US/ Source from EUROCOM jurisdiction/ Source from coalition partners.

– Use TRANSCOM assets or own integral air assets to move items from outside theatre to Azerbaijan.

– Provide for security of the items.

– Issues – Funding (As per US Ambassador to Azerbaijan guidance US forces are authorized to provide HA support upto $50,000 without ambassador’s approval for food water and warming items. Emergency building materials are authorized upto $ 80,000. Any items other than these would require the express permission of the ambassador).

– Effects – Will enhance Own image amongst Azeris, Provide PA teams. opportunity to spread positive propaganda amongst target audience.

– Risks – No escalation of risk to own forces as security in the AOR is one of the tasks of the JTF Caspian.

– End State – Enhance State-State relations thereby enhance own national interests in AO.

NGO Requests (3 of 3)

Azerbaijan, requests support from nurses and doctors within 48 hours to vaccinate 10,000 refugees in three different camps located throughout Azerbaijan.

– Action Required – Determine numbers of doctors and nurses required, determine how many can be spared, if unable to spare where to requisition additional personnel from in-theater, ex-theater, coalition partners.

– Use TRANSCOM assets or own integral air assets to move personnel from outside /in theatre to Azerbaijan.

– Provide for security for personnel.

– Issues – Funding (As per US Ambassador to Azerbaijan guidance US forces are authorized to provide HA support upto $50,000 without ambassador’s approval for food water and warming items. Emergency building materials are authorized upto $ 80,000. Any items other than these would require the express permission of the ambassador)

– Effects – Will enhance Own image amongst Azeris, Provide PA teams opportunity to spread positive propaganda amongst target audience.

– Risks – Availability of medical personnel for own troops needs to be weighed. Options to make good loss of medical personnel due to enemy fire while working in refugee camps needs to be factored.

– End State – Enhance State-State relations thereby enhance own national interests in AO.

OFDA

• FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY OFDA FOR ACTIONS THAT ARE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED AND APPROVED BY OFDA. OFDA WILL NOT, REPEAT, WILL NOT REIMBURSE FOR UNREQUESTED SERVICES.

Int Requirements

• TECHINT on Ahurastani dispositions along the border and airbases.
• HUMINT & TECHINT on Ahurastani leadership.
• TECHINT on Ahurastani naval assets on their possible use in asymmetric attacks.
• Int on SAPA & FKM insurgents.
• Int on SAPA insurgents inside DP camps.
• Int on Georgian Gangs.

Product 2

• This product recommends COA 2(Coalition Heavy)
• This alternative has been developed as discussed in case you wish to choose this as the best COA.

Overview Explanation

• The UN Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VI of UN Charter has failed to keep peace in N-K, prompting the promulgation of UNSCR 4466 that authorizes the establishment of an international force for Peace Enforcement Mission in N-K under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
• Belligerence of Ahurastan points towards a possible attack by AH forces on friendly country of Azerbaijan.
• Main Task – PEO Mission in N-K complicated by additional task to Deter and Defend Ahurastan.
• While each of the players has their own interests in mind which leads to a possible ‘Balkans’ type of situation in the Caspian AOR, the danger posed by fundamentalist Ahurastan and its proxy ally, the SAPA in invading Azerbaijan has to be countered by all means possible.
• This can be done by using the most optimum force levels available with the Multinational National Forces backed by UNSCR 4466 under which force can be used to enforce peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
• Russia considers itself as the pre-eminent power in the region and its alliance with Armenia puts it in adversarial position w.r.t Azerbaijan. Russia may be looking forward to the situation in the Caspian AOR to ‘do a Afghanistan on US’ and regain its primacy in the Caspian Sea region. Thus despite inclusion of Russian forces in the MNF, a Russian ‘Double Game’ is very much possible. However, Russian involvement is a must to limit its option of playing the adversary.
• The Azeri government has a hard time convincing its Muslim population of the need for US presence in their country for enforcing the PEO mission in N-K. Our operational plans must cater for Azeri sensitivities.
• Armenia is itching to break the ceasefire deal and would like to capitalize on any opportunity to enter the N-K region and thus needs to be kept under check.
• The Free Karabakh Movement aims to establish freedom for N-K and thus needs to be kept under control.
• Georgia is a key but reluctant ally whose ports (Poti & Batumi) are crucial for our build up and logistics. Actions taken by own forces in support of the mission must not endanger US-Georgia ties.

Analysis of INTSUM 010700

• Increased interest of local and religious leaders in US troop movements.

This could possibly be intelligence gathering mission by Ahurastani proxies which may lead to asymmetric attacks on US Forces.

• Ahurastani Brigade sized exercise continues along the Iranian border. May be a prelude to attack on Azerbaijan. Nations have previously used this ruse of converting an ‘exercise’ into an actual attack.
• Attacks by SAPA insurgents. Harassing attacks by SAPA insurgents have a coherent aim – disruption of Humanitarian Assistance and causing turmoil in the refugee camps thereby making conditions favorable for an open revolt by the discontented populace.
• Ahurastani appear to be responding to US Presence in Azerbaijan. This could be misplaced optimistic assessment. The Ahurastanis may be cloaking their intentions to capitalize on ‘surprise’. Own forces should be prepared for the worst case scenario of an all out attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan.
• Information Warfare by Fundamentalist Ahurastan forces. The Ahurastani may well have a sophisticated plan for carrying out perception management and information warfare. Own forces need to have a counter IW plan that includes hard and soft kill measures.

Analysis of INTSUM 011900

• SAPA insurgents preparing plans to kill or kidnap own forces. Own FPM will have to be beefed up, HUMINT and TECHINT crucial.
• Ahurastani Brigades in TAA. This points to a real possibility of an impending attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan. Need for a preplanned air interdiction package is considered imperative, which can be put into action if required.
• Georgian organized gangs obstructing logistics. Need for full spectrum FPM. This may also include ‘adjustment’ of tariff payable to organized gangs to buy peace and allow smooth supply. If adjustments do not work, full spectrum FPM required to keep LOCs open. FPM have to be coordinated with full support of the Georgian government as at no stage should own forces be accused of infringing Georgian sovereignty.
• Ahurastani SOF and Div RACON elements participating in exercises. This could be a step up the escalatory ladder for an impending attack by Ahurastani forces.
• SAPA insurgents plan to destabilize refugee camps. Need for a stabilization force in the camps to ensure security.

Analysis of INTSUM 031900

• SAPA insurgents clearly gathering info on own forces. Own FPM will have to be beefed up.
• SAPA letter discussing possible chemical attacks on own forces. Though a review of weather summaries point that chemical attacks will be wind dependant, own FPM needs to include BC protection and inoculation of own troops.
• Ahurastani Divs moving from Home locations to the Front. One more step up the escalatory ladder. Div sized formations converging on the front requires suitable counter plans including Preemptive Strike plan.
• Hepatitis C in Refugee camps. Need for Camp hygiene, NGO involvement, epidemic control, coordination of CA teams with NGOs is crucial.
• SAPA insurgents plan to use refugee camps as safety zones. Need to weed out SAPA insurgents from refugee camps, need for HUMINT, TECHINT and clear orders for targeting ‘enemies’.

Comments on Request For Joint Planning and Training Exercise(1of2)

Azerbaijan forces request targeting info, int concerning SAPA insurgents in the refugee camps. Int data being provided by own forces must be ‘hard’ intel with focus on specifics to aid Azerbaijanis ‘weed’ out insurgents while at the same time ensuring that the ‘weeding’ out process does not become a genocide.

Int on members of Fundamentalist Political Party Movement. This needs to be filtered with care as the Fundamentalist Political Party in Azerbaijan is a ‘bonafide’ party and any hasty ‘heavy handedness’ by Azerbaijanis might spark off a wide array of political unrest.

Comments on Request For Joint Planning and Training Exercise(2of2)

• Azerbaijan forces request joint planning and training with US forces to prepare for a coordinated strike against SAPA insurgents inside the refugee camps.

While Joint training can be agreed to, coordinated strikes inside refugee camps involving US troops has wider international ramifications. In all such operations, US forces must go by the dictum of ‘plausible deniability’. Hence it would be more prudent to involve US forces only in training and planning and not direct participation in attacking SAPA insurgents inside refugee camps. Should US forces be involved in direct operations inside refugee camps, such operations must be covert ops offering full deniability.

Decision Brief Part IV Implications

With over six state and non-state actors involved, each with a different agenda and interests, the situation in the Caspian AOR is likely to assume ‘Balkan’ proportions. The US thus must have a clear exit strategy should the end results in the PEO mission not succeed.

In such situations, PEO missions can easily deteriorate into a civil war. Plans, force level structuring and logistics must cater for a long drawn out deployment that could stretch into many years. A time frame of about five to ten years would be likely extent for such PEO missions.

The likelihood of PEO converting into a proxy war with Russia in the opposing side is a possibility. Russia has not forgotten what the US did to it in Afghanistan and may seek this opportunity to get even and regain its primacy in the Caspian Sea region.

The MNF contains fragile partners, if Russia proceeds with its agenda, others may follow suit and break away and thus legitimacy and credibility of a UN sanctioned MNF may come into question. The US must put in extra effort to ensure the unity of the coalition.

PEO mission as complex as this has every possibility in resulting in large scale collateral damage with insurgents using innocent civilians as human shields, partner nations employing different yardsticks of operational parameters and agendas driving their definition of the ‘enemy’ as also the ‘fog of war’ that may result in wrong targeting.

Own casualties are likely to increase as the PEO mission becomes ‘hot’ since PEO missions have no clearly defined ‘enemy’ there is a need is for the MNF to go into the territories to stabilize the area. Operating from safe bases and sanitized zones will not serve the purpose as TECHINT and HUMINT will have to be supported by traditional foot patrols and area domination techniques.

Known Facts From Current INTSUM and OPORD(1of3)

• JTF Caspian is at C + 90 in its deployment – false-As per INTSUM today is Nov 3 2012, that makes JTF Caspian at C + 54 in its deployment.
• US Forces must come from within the theater – false-While most of the forces would come from EUCOM, naval assets and assets from Marines and the USAF would be apportioned from outside the theatre including TRANSCOM assets.
• Troop levels in N-K to increase from 6K to 15 K – True -The UNSCR 4466 has authorized increase of troop level in N-K from 6K to 15 K.
• US TRANSCOM assets are available –True.
• JTF Caspian requirements IAW EUCOM CONPLAN is not changed – False – JTF Caspian requirements IAW EUCOM CONPLAN has changed as the entire situation has changed from deployment of UN Force under Chapter VI to MNF under Chapter VII with a deteriorating situation arising out of possibility of a conventional attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan as also PEO mission in N-K.

Known Facts From Current INTSUM and OPORD(2of3)

• AZ moving 1 Div to N-K border – False – As per OPSUM Azeri Defense Plan The 15th and 16th Mechanized brigade will continue to defend along the Nagorno-Karabakh border along the UN zone of separation boundary.
• SAPA Bn operates in the region- false – As per special report on insurgency, SAPA military component operates as ‘fronts’ which is roughly equal to regiment and ‘columns/regions’ which are roughly equal to a bn. The estimated strength of the military component is approximately six battalions with two to three companies each. The companies range in size from 50 to 100 men.
• N-K Airspace has been violated by Ahurastan – True.

– On 01 Sept 2012. Ahurastanian reconnaissance aircraft begin to violate Azerbaijan’s airspace.

– On 05 Sept 2012 : An Ahurastanian recon aircraft is shot down in AZ.(Scenario ref book)

Known Facts From Current INTSUM and OPORD(3of3)

SAPA posing as FKM and attacking NKR and UN troops –

True-SAPA posing as FKM had carried out attacks in the past and killed a Belgian UN peacekeeper.

Insurgent activities continues and will increase – True -SAPA continues to disrupt supply lines to deny supplies from reaching the refugee camps to sow dissatisfaction amongst the inmates. (INTSUM).

• Russia is sympathetic to NKR and Ahurastan – False – Russia is allied to Armenia who are opposed to Azerbaijan with whom they have had dispute over N-K. Azerbaijan was previously aligned with Russia but the relationship had soured. Russia’s relations with N-K are not good because of their friendly relations with Armenia.

Assumptions and Thoughts(1of2)

• 15 K troop level is sufficient to execute UNSCR 4466 – False-To carry out PEO mission in N-K with just 15K troops may prove to be impossible considering the wide range of contrasting tasks that are at hand. If the mission was just to carry out HA and enforce peace under asymmetric conditions, 15 K would have possibly sufficed. However, to prepare for the possibility of a conventional attack on Azerbaijan from Ahurastan, may prove the requirement of greater force levels. If one were to consider just the SAPA military force approximating 2000 and were to take even a modest figure of 1:5 (for a counterinsurgency force), the requirement for just counterinsurgency would be 10,000 troops leaving only 5,000 to deal with the conventional threat which does not add up to the minimum of 1:3 conventional superiority required. The terrain in the N-K region is mountainous and thus the ratio for a counterinsurgency operation may even become as high as 1:20.
• JTF Caspian is a USTRANSCOM Priority – False – USTRANSCOM is a service provider to all commands. Priority is decided by the DoD.

Assumptions and Thoughts(2of2)

• UN Transitional Government Authority is lead for non-military affairs

– Fuzzy – According to Para 8 of UNSCR 4466 the resolution “Requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the United Nations international security coalition forces to ensure that the new security force operates under unified command and control and acts towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner”.

– Para 12 (g) states that “Protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Transitional Government and of police authorities”.

– While Para 8 makes it ambiguous, Para 12 (g) affirms that the transitional government would look after non military affairs. The explanation is that the UNSCR anticipates a number of situations where the MNF would be involved directly with nonmilitary affairs too in discharging their duties.

Constraints and Restraints(1of6)

• Challenges to Force Integration, C2 and Domestic Public Support

– Differing national interests, Different operating philosophies of participating nation’s contingent would make integration difficult.

– Integration with NATO countries would not be a problem. However, it would be a major concern integrating non NATO partners such as Russia where there is no hardware, software and protocol compatibility.

– C2 would be complicated.

– Domestic public support both at home and in the region of deployment is a challenge as the rationale for committing own troops in a far off theater would be difficult to ‘sell’ to own people.

– In the area of deployment, N-K is basically a Muslim dominated populace as is Azerbaijan who have a long standing distrust of ‘Christian forces’.

Constraints and Restraints(2of6)

• N-K PEO mission is a separate and distinct operation from JTF Caspian and requires separate C2

– Theoretically, this statement is correct.

– However, both the PEO mission, ensuring international HA as well as preventing a conventional attack by Ahurastan on Azerbaijan including asymmetric attacks all occur in the same theater, involving the same key players and are interconnected which requires a single C2.

– The spatial dimensions of the Caspian AOR is too restricted to allow two separate C2 to coexist and operate efficiently.

Constraints and Restraints(3of6)

• Players are belligerents not necessarily enemies
• Belligerents are people or nation that act in a hostile manner such as carrying out war or are engaged in war.
• A state of belligerency may also exist between a recognized state and rebel forces.
• In the Current situation most players are belligerents as each of them have carried out hostile acts against at least one other.
• Rebel forces in this case the SAPA and the FKM have not been granted the right to be recognized as belligerents and thus can best be termed as non state actors/insurgent groups.
• States/ entities recognized as Belligerents can be called as enemies and members of the their armed forces as enemy combatants which gives them certain rights under the Geneva conventions. However, those groups without recognition as belligerents are termed unlawful combatants not authorized POW status under Geneva Conventions. SAPA and FKM rebels come under this category.

Constraints and Restraints(4of6)

• No UN Log support exists in theater– This would require own forces to build and secure own log support across the theater.
• Only 4 CA(Teams) in theater – Wholly inadequate as over 14 refugee camps exist over the Caspian AOR where coordination would be required between NGOs, interim administration and camp directors.

Constraints and Restraints(5of6)

• Extended and Limited Ground LOCs– Would slow down ground force deployment in the AOR. Would be difficult to protect and would thus require cooperation of allies such as Georgian authorities to ensure safety of the lines of the communication from Poti to Tbilisi to N-K.
• Refugee/ IDP Movement– Ahurastani build up along the border is triggering a vast exodus of refugees from South to North towards the refugee camps located in Central Azerbaijan and N-K area. This would further clog the few roads available for own forces movement. It would also lead to overcrowding of refugee camps which could lead to camp riots. Harassing attacks by SAPA on logistics supplies to refugee camp would further aggravate the situation. Thus refugee movement needs to be controlled, managed and handled with care.

Constraints and Restraints(6of6)

• UN lead for HA operations– increases C2 problems. Restricts own choice of tactics to be used for ensuring success of HA operations. Has to be done under UN rules.
• Limited HN Communications infrastructure for ITV & Requisitioning – Will limit tempo of HA operations, will require to be augmented by own sources.
• Limited HN Fresh Water sources – Supply of water to refugee camps will have to be calculated to arrive at the optimum number of refugees that each camp can sustain. How much can own forces supply needs calculation. Overpopulation will lead to water scarcity, disease and law and order problems.

How key players might present risk to success of PEO mission in N-K

• Russia considers itself as the preeminent power in the region having once ruled the entire region in the erstwhile soviet era, might play a double game. Russia’s close alliance with Armenia which has reluctantly agreed to the cease fire in N-K may find active support once again to sabotage the peace process. Russia may not like the close friendly ties of Azerbaijan with US and may try to destabilize Azerbaijan just to get even with the US. Russia may even provide covert support to Ahurastan to aid its struggle with the US which it sees as an intruder in its ‘backyard’.
• Japan’s main interest in the Caspian sea region is the oil. Japan is likely to take sides with whichever party that can ensure its oil interests in the region. Thus Japanese aims may not coincide with the overall aim of the MNF.
• Georgia is another key player whose status as an ally of the US is crucial since the ports of Poti and Batumi are the main points of origin for the logistics chain. Georgia is also required to keep a check on the Georgian criminal gangs operating in its territory extracting a toll on the HA supplies.
• Azerbaijan itself a Muslim country may find it difficult as the time goes by, to convince its restive population the need for allowing the continued presence of Christian forces for the stability of their country.
• Armenia is itching to break the ceasefire deal and would like to capitalize on any opportunity to enter the N-K region and thus needs to be kept under check.
• Ahurastan may aim to unite Ahurastan and Azerbaijan into an Islamic state and thus control its oil.

Campaign Concept

• W.r.t. Ahurastan Deter First, Defend if Deterrence fails – lead by US forces.
• Stop destabilizing of DP camps by assisting NGOs & HN in DP camps in coordination with coalition partners.
• Minimize refugee flow from South Azerbaijan to North.
• Use PSYOPS and CA to counter Ahurastan/ SAPA propaganda & Recruitment in the camps.
• Ensure stability of alliances with key players.

COA 1

Advantages of COA 1

• COA 1 does provide immediate response to N-K situation.
• It would simplify C2 as only a few coalition partners are involved.
• 80% Commonality of logistics would make it easier to supply and sustain.
• Undoubtedly, COA1 gives us sufficient overmatch over the adversary and help stabilize N-K faster.

COA 2

Advantages of COA 2

• Provide legitimacy to UNSCR 4466.
• Would reduce possible ‘double game’ by key players who would have been otherwise left out in the COA 1 force structure.
• Would be faster to deploy since the force levels are lesser.
• Would reduce US footprint in the operation and thus prevent reinforcing the image of a ‘hegemon’.

Disadvantages of COA 1

• Would be perceived as yet another example of US extra-regional hegemony.
• Would take longer to deploy as larger number of forces are involved.
• Would increase human and financial costs to own country disproportionately larger than other key players.
• May increase Anti-US sentiment globally especially in the Muslim World.

Disadvantages of COA 2

• Would complicate C2 as larger number of countries are involved.
• May not sustain the entire duration of the operation as individual partners may pull out citing national interests or inability to sustain the financial and human drain caused by the operations.
• National interests of participating countries might interfere with the successful execution of the entire operation.
• Disparate voices may eventually lead to failure which would reflect on US capabilities as well.

COA 1

• Suitability – will achieve the ‘Mission’, will achieve end result compatible with Commander’s Intent.
• Feasibility – Resources for COA 1 are sufficient. Would be easy to coordinate, execute and allow best use of forces throughout the operation, sufficient overmatch w.r.t the enemy.
• Acceptability – Losses to own forces may increase considering the US heavy deployment but these losses outweigh the greater chance of success. However, this course of action has lower acceptability from coalition partners and world opinion. Own political leadership may prefer larger involvement of coalition partners.

COA 2

• Suitability – Could achieve the ‘Mission’, Could achieve end result compatible with Commander’s Intent.
• Feasibility – Resources for COA 2 are lesser than COA 1. Would be difficult to coordinate, execute and may not allow best use of forces throughout the operation, insufficient overmatch w.r.t the enemy.
• Acceptability – Losses to own forces may decrease considering the coalition heavy deployment. This course of action has higher acceptability from coalition partners and world opinion. Own Political leadership would prefer larger number of coalition partners.

Which of the two COA would you recommend and why?

• COA2 is the recommended COA because the prime assumption is that own political leadership would prefer larger number of stakeholders to give legitimacy to UNSCR 4466.
• COA 2 will improve American global image and is likely to accrue geostrategic advantage in the long run.
• COA 2 will be easier to ‘sell’ to domestic audience.
• Congress is likely to have lesser objections as the operation can be projected as a UN mission and not American intervention.
• COA 2 will reduce own casualties as lesser number of own troops are available in the theater.
• COA 2 will reduce the cost burden on own forces.
• COA 2 will make it easier for US forces to hand over non critical tasks to coalition partners thus have more quality troops available for core operations.

End Result

COA 2 will enhance US acceptability globally and at the same ensure US control over Eurasia and thus control over its oil thereby ensuring our energy security in the long run as well continued US global pre-eminence.

Emerging COAs(out of COA 2)

• COA #3. US Forces deploy for deter/defend against Ahurastani forces, coalition partners deploy for PEO mission.

– Advantages – Sufficient forces for deterrence as well as defending Azerbaijan would be available.

– Disadvantages – Force levels of other coalition partners too less to effectively carry out PEO mission. Would reduce own influence in Azerbaijan

Emerging COAs(out of COA 2)

• COA #4. Coalition partners deploy for deter/defend against Ahurastani forces, US forces deploy for PEO mission.

– Advantages – Would help us concentrate on main task i.e PEO mission.

– Disadvantages – Force levels of other coalition partners too less to effectively deter/ defend against Ahurastan forces.

Emerging COAs(out of COA 2)

• COA #5. US Heavy Forces deploy for deter/defend against Ahurastani forces, Other US forces & coalition forces deploy for PEO mission.

– Advantages – Would Give us the best mix and optimum use of available force levels and firepower to address both PEO mission and help us concentrate on main task i.e PEO mission as well as deter/defend against Ahurastan.

– Disadvantages – Own casualties are likely to be higher.

COA 2 SUGGESTED MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS

• US Heavy formations to be poised along the Azeri-Ahurastan border aligned with Azeri OPPLAN

– Effect – Visible presence of US heavy formations would deter Ahurastani armored thrust into Azerbaijan

• US Air Power Demonstration in the Caspian Sea

– Effect – Serve as a deterrent to Ahurastan Air Force

• Pre-Planned Air Interdiction Package

– Effect – To be initiated at first sign of hostilities by Ahurastan to defend Azerbaijan

• Coalition partners deployed to guard supply lines and key points such as Poti-Tbilisi-Ganja-AZ MSR, Baku, refugee camp management and PEO duties within N-K

– Effect – will leave US forces to concentrate on key mission tasks more efficiently

• Overall HA mission shared with Coalition Partners

– Effect – Will allow best compromise for safeguarding own national interests

Nov 2009

COA 2 SUGGESTED MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS

MSR SECURITY IN COORD WITH GEORGIA

AZ

AR N-K

AZ

LEGEND

MIL EX

MIL EX

AH DIVISION

AH DIVISION

AHURASTAN

COALITION PARTNERS FOR MSR SECURITY

US + COALITION FORCES

AIRPOWER DEMO

US HEAVY FORMATIONS

Other Emerging COAs: (In case we go Pre-emptive)

• Though the settings state that own government is not likely to allow preemptive strikes on Ahurastan, the options for such a course must be discussed irrespective of the fact that the present dispensation believes in multilateralism.
• It must not be forgotten that our policy of extra-regional hegemony has served us well since the beginning of Cold war and has helped us defeat the Soviet Union and has kept our enemies at bay.
• It must also not be forgotten that our unilateralist actions w.r.t ‘War on Terror’ have prevented even a single attack from taking place on Continental US since 9/11.
• Preemption as a course of action has been practiced successfully by the US in the past and is a credible war winning strategy. The next six COAs are based on variations of the preemption strategies both overt and covert.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #6. US Heavy carrying out overt preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan,enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, international community would resist, degrade US global image, make more enemies in the Muslim World, Russia may pull out of the coalition

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #7. Coalition heavy carrying out overt preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan, provide legitimacy to the proactive act, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, degrade US global image, make more enemies in the Muslim World, Russia may pull out of the coalition.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #8. US heavy carrying out covert preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan, Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #9. Coalition heavy carrying out covert preemptive strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s ability to threaten Azerbaijan,Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #10. US heavy carrying out covert decapitation strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s leadership from the scene, Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, Be a short term success, as new more hardened leadership may replace those neutralized, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Other Emerging COAs

• COA #11. Coalition heavy carrying out covert decapitation strikes on Ahurastan , PEO mission by other constituents.

– Advantages – Surprise will maximize effectiveness of the action, remove Ahurastan’s leadership from the scene, Stealth will prevent international outcry, enable successful outcome to over all mission by own forces.

– Disadvantages – Own government may not approve such a course of action, other coalition partners may not agree, Be a short term success, as new more hardened leadership may replace those neutralized, degrade US global image if found out , make more enemies in the Muslim World.

Force Protection(1of2)

• Present environment unstable where following risks exist

– Disruption and extraction of ‘toll’ on HA supplies along Poti-Tbilisi-Azerbaijan MSR by Georgian criminal gangs.

– Attacks by SAPA insurgents on own forces possible including chemical attacks.

– SAPA insurgents disrupting HA supplies from reaching refugee camps.

– SAPA insurgents creating disgruntlement amongst refugees.

– SAPA insurgents using refugee camps as staging posts and recruitment centers.

– SAPA insurgents carrying out attacks against VAs and VPs.

Force Protection(2of2)

• Future environment increasing instability with risks as follows

– Security situation likely to deteriorate further in the AO.

– Conflict between SAPA insurgents, FKM and N-K may spark a civil war in which Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ahurastan, Georgia Abkhazia are all involved.

– SAPA insurgents and FKM may use civilian populations as human shields.

– Refugee camps may become breeding grounds for more SAPA insurgents, anti US feelings may be heightened.

– Large influx of refugees from South to North Azerbaijan likely.

Force Protection – Guidance to Subordinates

• Liaise with Georgian authorities to ensure safety of HA supplies from disruption by Georgian criminal gangs OR strike a deal with Georgian criminal gangs to allow the supplies to go through.
• At the same time, employ FPM along MSR in coord with Georgian auth inside Georgian territory and organic FPM outside Georgian territory.
• FPM of own forces to be enhanced including BC protection.
• Security of refugee camps to be enhanced.
• Use of special forces recommended for ‘targeted killings’ of insurgents
• Use PSYOPS and CA to counter insurgent propaganda in refugee camps.

NGO Requests (1 of 3)

The NGO liaison informs us that the critical crane system at their dock(in Poti) is broken down and there are no parts available in Georgia to repair it. The crane is American made and the manufacturer still manufactures the part.

– Action Required – Arrange for spares to be airlifted from America using TRANSCOM assets or allow use of own crane at Poti for unloading NGO HA supplies.

– Issues – Funding for flight, spares. (As per US Ambassador to Azerbaijan guidance US forces are authorized to provide HA support upto $50,000 without ambassador’s approval for food water and warming items. Emergency building materials are authorized upto $ 80,000. Any items other than these would require the express permission of the ambassador). While flight can be dovetailed with ‘operational’ schedule, the funding for spares will have to be worked out.

– Effects –Will slow down own logistics build up. If crane not available to NGOs, will slow down HA reaching refugee camps that may lead to food shortages at camps leading to law and order problems.

– Risks – Slow down of own logistics build up in case our crane loaned to NGOs.

– End State – Better NGO-Mil coordination enhancing overall mission. effectiveness.

NGO Requests (2 of 3)

• NGO Support Agency Azerbaijan requests that 50,000 doses of hepatitis vaccination serum & 50,000 related items to administer vaccinations are required for treating hepatitis patients

– Action Required – Arrange for items ex-US/ Source from EUROCOM jurisdiction/ Source from coalition partners.

– Use TRANSCOM assets or own integral air assets to move items from outside theatre to Azerbaijan.

– Provide for security of the items.

– Issues – Funding (As per US Ambassador to Azerbaijan guidance US forces are authorized to provide HA support upto $50,000 without ambassador’s approval for food water and warming items. Emergency building materials are authorized upto $ 80,000. Any items other than these would require the express permission of the ambassador).

– Effects – Will enhance Own image amongst Azeris, Provide PA teams. opportunity to spread positive propaganda amongst the target audience.

– Risks – No escalation of risk to own forces as security in the AOR is one of the tasks of the JTF Caspian.

– End State – Enhance State-State relations thereby enhance own national interests in AO.

NGO Requests (3 of 3)

Azerbaijan, requests support from nurses and doctors within 48 hours to vaccinate 10,000 refugees in three different camps located throughout Azerbaijan.

– Action Required – Determine numbers of doctors and nurses required, determine how many can be spared, if unable to spare where to requisition additional personnel from in-theater, ex-theater, coalition partners.

– Use TRANSCOM assets or own integral air assets to move personnel from outside /in theatre to Azerbaijan.

– Provide for security for personnel.

– Issues – Funding (As per US Ambassador to Azerbaijan guidance US forces are authorized to provide HA support upto $50,000 without ambassador’s approval for food water and warming items. Emergency building materials are authorized upto $ 80,000. Any items other than these would require the express permission of the ambassador)

– Effects – Will enhance Own image amongst Azeris, Provide PA teams opportunity to spread positive propaganda amongst target audience.

– Risks – Availability of medical personnel for own troops needs to be weighed. Options to make good loss of medical personnel due to enemy fire while working in refugee camps needs to be factored.

– End State – Enhance State-State relations thereby enhance own national interests in AO.

OFDA

• FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY OFDA FOR ACTIONS THAT ARE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED AND APPROVED BY OFDA. OFDA WILL NOT, REPEAT, WILL NOT REIMBURSE FOR UNREQUESTED SERVICES.

Int Requirements

• TECHINT on Ahurastani dispositions along the border and airbases.
• HUMINT & TECHINT on Ahurastani leadership.
• TECHINT on Ahurastani naval assets in their possible use in asymmetric attacks.
• Int on SAPA & FKM insurgents.
• Int on SAPA insurgents inside DP camps.
• Int on Georgian Gangs.