Introduction
The invoking of realism as a framework often happens in the description of the relationship between China and Japan. However, realism fails to account for the tensions caused by China’s attempts to change international norms, making constructivism the best theoretical framework for explaining relations between the two nations. The imperatives are for self-help. The need for a balance of power serves as an important factor cited for shaping regional relations in East Asia. Realist theorists foresee the danger of conflict over the balance of power. Meanwhile, liberal theorists see that there is a growing opportunity for economic integration. They hope that integration will lead to shared values (Dunne, 2001).
This paper presents a case of China and Japan’s relationship. It shall invoke realism, but also counter its argument with evidence showing the emergence of constructivism in the relationship between the two countries. China views Japan as a significant other. Its relations with Japan follow a unique cultural relationship that includes aspects of anthropology, sociology, and cross-cultural psychology. The Chinese have a cultural policy called “guanxi,” which drives all social interactions within and outside its borders. An important consideration to make here is that states are social actors. They cannot just operate within the confines of material interests. It is possible to bring out the constructivist scholarship in discussing the international relations and disputes of Sino-Japanese affairs through an emphasis on the concept of identity.
Despite the use of the logic of power and self-help as reasons to explain the Southeast Asia situation, which then points toward realism, there is an alternative explanation that constructivism can offer. Many countries in the ASEAN region, especially the founding nations, have dispersed from the strict nature of balance-of-power politics. They are using regional codes of conduct, which centre on norms. As such, the relationship between China and Japan continues to follow the new structure and exhibit changes that can no longer fit in the realism paradigm for international relations in Asia (Busse, 1999).
Methodology
In order to examine the research question, the theories of realism and constructivism will become the anchors of the paper’s discussion. This assignment relies on qualitative data obtained from secondary sources related to the main keywords of China, international relations, Japan, realism, and constructivism. In commenting on realism, the paper will invoke scholarship ideas on realism theory and constructivism theory. Besides, it will also highlight the theory of liberalism as another competing theoretical perspective to strengthen the claim of superiority for the constructivist framework. The focus of the analysis will be the Japan-China international relations.
History will also be a major component presented as part of the discussion. The paper looks at the role of the past and the present, as well as evidence of the past in the present motivations of the respective countries. The appearance of various historical facts brings out an explanation of identity formation (Wendt, 1992). In this regard, the paper will have a constructivist cultural approach, which brings out Asian values in the context of understanding both realism and constructivism.
Theoretical framework
Realism’s failure to take into account constructivist arguments ignores potential flashpoints for war. This paper will show how realism has many shortcomings. The new paradigm of constructivism is helping to correct most errors of realists. This will be evident in the discussion and analysis of the relations between China and Japan. For realists, the anarchy and the distribution of relative power is the driver of the world’s politics (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001).
A counterargument from the constructivism perspective is that this sort of structural realism does not cater to the intersubjectively shared ideas, which create and modify behavior. The ideas lead to the formation of identities and discovery or exercise of the interests of the actors in a particular relationship (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001). A debate on realism and constructivist puts the status quo and the future at loggerhead. The first school of thought concentrates on past happenings while the second one seeks to explain new happenings and possibilities in international relations.
According to John Mearsheimer, offensive realists can also have a modern outlook where the great powers will continue manipulating world politics in an anarchical world system, and at the same time, all states have an offensive military capability (Mearsheimer, 2003). According to him, states always doubt the intentions of others, their reactions, and actions are all about survival, and this drives their rational actions (Taliaferro, 2001). On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz founded the defensive neorealism thought where states operate in an anarchical structure of the international system as motivated parties that want to attain security through moderation and reserved politics (Waltz, 1979).
Dynamics between Japan and China
According to a description by Swantrom and Edstrom (2015), the relationship between Japan and China has always been one of mistrust and animosity. There have been cases of violent conflict, despite the existence of three decades of bilateral relations. The relations between the two countries have been improving since the assumption of Shinzo Abe to the office of Prime Minister in Japan in 2006 (Swantrom & Edstrom, 2015). Recent tensions between Japan and China have been about uninhabited islands and rocks located in the East China Sea, where the two countries have different names for the islands. According to the Japanese, the islands are Senkaku, while the Chinese call them Diaoyu. Both countries rely on historical attachment to claim ownership of the islands (Swantrom & Edstrom, 2015).
Realism
China’s offensive posture
Recent news reports, such as Roy (2013), show that China is playing offense in its international relationship with matters concerning its claimed territories in the East China Sea, which points to an offensive realist perspective championed by John Mearsheimer (Taliaferro, 2001). In addition to matching and reacting to the actions of other powers present in the area with their military operations, international relations analysis shows China as having a policy in place that will increase its claim over the disputed territory. Although it has not been overly expressive of its intentions, China appears to wait for an opportunity for provocation by other powers claiming the territory.
It goes against the common agreement by all claimants passed in 2002, which called for restraint when conducting activities that complicated or escalated disputes. The aim of the agreement was to promote peace and stability (Roy, 2015). China has established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) as part of its extension of its maritime territory. Meanwhile, Japan opts to seek allies to balance the threat posed by China, and it has been less confrontational (China-Japan relations, 2015).
Japan’s defensive posture
Japan has tried to engage Russia so that it balances the powerful threat of China. Rather than attack China, Japan behaves rationally to maximize its influence and achieve security with a hegemony status in line with defensive neorealism perspectives (Whiteman, 2012). In the late 2000s, the focus on international relations by the prime ministers of Japan was with closer security cooperation within a number of democracies. Notably, the plan excluded the participation of China. Other than its military relationships with the US, Japan made an agreement with Australia to expand their bilateral defense cooperation. The agreement did not mention China. However, for the Chinese, this was an example of a US-Europe NATO alliance in the Asian region. The exclusion of China was a military threat to China (Roy, 2013).
China’s limitless potential, as it seems, will continue to augment its rapid rate of economic and technological growth. Consequently, China will become a dominant nation in the region as a prompt to maintain its security. A question of whether Tokyo would give up balancing against China for an opportunity to accommodate China brings out many proposals. Historically, Japan preferred dominant powers like the Anglo-Americans before the Pacific War (Roy, China is playing offense, not defense, in the South China Sea, 2015). It moved on to prefer the United States. In the past, Japan tried to become its regional hegemony through military conquest, but that failed and was devastating for Japan (Roy, 2015). Therefore, it is unlikely that Japan will abandon its defensive posture of seeking alliances to balance the power of China.
Charismatic leaders: Abe and Xi
The path to international relations taken by Japan and China has been a product of charismatic leadership of Abe and Xi, respectively. In his first term, Abe managed to revive Japan’s economy and, most importantly, gave the people of Japan a sense of nationhood. The Japanese can now think of their position in the world, both economically and socially. In addition, they consider this as part of their identity, which drives their international relations. Unlike other colorless politicians that voters in Japan know, Abe is charismatic and nationalistic. He is also popular with locals because of his pragmatic attitude. Rather than just play along with the existing policies, the leader hops around the Japanese bureaucracy that is mostly inactive. Through Abe, Japan has been able to say what it thinks of the world (Whiteman, 2012).
The charismatic nature of the Japanese leaders is an important consideration for Sino-Japanese relations. Domestic factors act as constraints for policymakers to realize their international relations’ objectives (Hughes, 2008). The same case is applicable to China. Xi Jiping has been promoting nationalist ideas vigorously. His party has used the opportunity to exploit anti-Japanese nationalism. However, the party under Xi leadership has been quick to repress the sentiments before they get out of hand (Ekman & Pajon, 2015). As a result, China has been able to avoid an overly offensive appearance towards Japan, which keeps Japan guessing.
Constructivism & biggest flashpoints in Japan China relations
The sentiments held by the Japanese and the Chinese about each other and their present tussle over ownership of the islands indicate a never-ending mixed relationship. Each country is defending its national identity and seeking to cultivate new norms (Roy, 2013). Evidence from policy directions and diplomatic opinions of Japan indicate that balancing China’s power is important. Japan will go on to maintain strong economic cooperation with China to safeguard its soft position. Meanwhile, it continues to cultivate a hard position in increasing its cooperation with additional partners in the region. Roy (2013) indicates that Funabashi Yoichi, a renowned Japanese commentator on foreign affairs, has been calling for constructive Japan-China relations.
Differing political structures and ideals
In the China Communist Party (CCP) politics, political capital comes from resisting Japan. Since the secession of Taiwan in 1895, Japan has figured prominently in the legitimacy of the CCP. The historical significance of opposing Japan as part of the ideology of CCP extends to today. Part of the evidence appears in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands’ situation. Despite China’s willingness to get the islands handed over in 1997, Japan had gone ahead and constructed a lighthouse in 1996.
This caused civilian opposition within mainland China. Activists in China claimed that no compromise would be possible or tolerated in the case. The tiny nature of the territory would not be a reason for relentlessness on principle (Hughes, 2008). In China, the ruling party gains its legitimacy from the participation in the struggle for national independence, resistance to foreign intervention, and commitment to building socialism (Diamond, 2013).
In the case of Japan, nationalism is an important part of the growing friction between the two countries. Japan has a one-party democracy that allows it to pursue nationalist politics unimpeded. With the separation of powers, the national government divides the power to legislative, judicial, and executive organs. The emperor remains the symbol of the state and the unity of the Japanese citizens (Governmental structure: Changing with the times, 2014). Although Japan does not have a political party that can out rightly express sentiments against China, claims of nationalism serve as motivators for fighting external aggression towards any symbolic or actual element of Japanese identity.
Conflicting views of what constitutes an apology for historical issues
According to social psychologists, an apology is an act that belittles the offender’s works to restore the collective self-esteem of the offended (Funakoshi, 2012). Japan made an apology to the people of Korea about the suffering they underwent during the Japanese colonial rule (Gries, 2004). The Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, and the South Korean President, Kim Dac-Jung, jointly delivered the statement. South Korea’s leader responded with sincere acceptance on behalf of South Korea. When Jiang Zemin of China visited Tokyo a month later, the expectation was high that China too would get an apology. In the end, Japan used “deep remorse,” instead of “heartfelt apologies” that Chinese diplomats expected as the main wording of its statement of the wrongs committed against the Chinese (Gries, 2004). Currently, China feels that Japan has never formally apologized.
The Anti-Japanese sentiment is still high in the country because Japan is not admitting its past mistakes. On the other hand, Japan has made many attempts to express its apology. According to the Chinese, all these attempts have been insincere (Funakoshi, 2012). Such is the case of China not submitting to expectations of realism, where it would abide by Japan’s dominant power.
Maritime law: China’s violations and differing norms
The present case for the country is that state-owned firms are in charge of most of the maritime activities by China (The new masters and commanders, 2013). One of their purposes is to become the dominant power hoarders. China’s maritime interests are not surprising, given that the country is a major player in exports worldwide. The country has a fifth of the world’s container freights. It controls the fleet with its state-owned shipping lines (The new masters and commanders, 2013). As it expands, China seeks to displace Japanese and Korean firms in the business. However, expansion in shipping and the ports industry has become a source of diplomatic tensions (The new masters and commanders, 2013). Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have entered into territorial disputes with China because of its growing assertiveness. On its part, China claims it is defending its territorial integrity.
Japan purchased some of the disputed islands from their private owners in 2012 (Lee, 2013). China interpreted the action as an offending gesture. In return, it increased its surveillance patrols with naval enforcement fleets. Japan was displeased by China’s actions regarding the use of the Islands. For Japan, the norm has been following a realist perspective of maritime policy. The country followed a conservative approach when handling its maritime disputes, preferring to avoid direct methods (Lee, 2013). This is clearly not the case for China.
The establishment of international treaties of peace, such as the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), appears in China as a strategy to keep it from acquiring power to match that of developed nations. China has been keen to expand its definitions and considerations for what it considers exclusive economic zones, while other countries continue to abide by the limitations of the UNCLOS. This puts much of China’s actions out of the accepted rules (Bentley, 2013).
Different views of territorial sovereignty come into play here as well. For instance, China follows an interpretation of the UNCLOS, which grants island territories the ability to generate their maritime zones. Thus, the collective area claimed by the islands adds up to the claim of sovereignty that China is seeking for the adjacent waters. However, from the onset, the claim is problematic. China is in dispute with Japan for the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Bentley, 2013).
Constructing new norms of international business that do not benefit Japan
It has been China’s interest to change the norms. The Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, backed by China, aims to finance infrastructure projects in Asia. Many traditional allies of the US have signed up with the bank, except Japan. Japan says there is no need to move hastily. It has opted to retain its trustworthy relationship with the US. The belief is that China is going to use the bank as a means of changing norms similar to the works and policy directions of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. There is also the likelihood of the bank being a foreign policy tool for China and allied members. The new norms do not defend the hegemony status of Japan economically and politically (Dreyer, 2015).
Limitations
There is no single structure for particular nations to follow when creating constructivism-based policies. Challenges of cooperation with established governing bodies, such as the UNCLOS are hard to address with this approach. Allowing China to proceed with its military expansion and economic development at the expense of its neighbor states will present a balance of power problems. Policymakers following the constructivist approach are trying to avoid the imbalance, but it appears inevitable.
Critique of theories
China turned to realism and became obsessed with economic growth. The realist perspective made the country go slow on the pressing issues, such as the issue of the disputed islands. Under the theory, the growth of the military might of China is supposed to add to its economic power to compel other states to agree to its policies. On the other hand, Japan has capitalized on rebuilding ties with the US and concentrating on national security (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996). The US relationship has also brought a force of realism. Nevertheless, realism fails to address the gap in the national identity gap, especially in bilateral relationships. On local politics, leaders face a demand for restoration of national pride and relenting on confrontational approaches to international disputes. This does not go well in both the case of Abe of Japan and Xi of China. It shows that a constructivist approach that caters to national identities is better than the realist approach.
The Japanese foreign policy seems to be stable since the end of World War II, as the countries rely on its economic power to drive international relations in Asia. Nevertheless, it has been concerned about the increase in China’s military power. Japan is also anxious about external security threats. Its national identity is becoming independent from western influences that were dominant due to its relationship with the United States. In fact, Japan appears willing to disagree with the US interests in East Asia affairs. From the basic approach of realism, Japan ought to accept the situation as it is and then come up with strategies for dealing with it. However, such is not the case, as emerging evidence shows the development of a new identity for the country.
Aftermath
Japan’s relationship with China will continue to be murky. Many people in China do not know about Japan’s attempted apologies because they are not accessing international news. Meanwhile, their ideologies continue to shape China’s domestic political agenda, which affects its international position and outlook. On the other hand, Japan is waking up to realize that its economic strength continues to face attack from China’s domination, and the same situation is emerging for its military power in the region.
Conclusion
The paper shows differing elements of realism and constructive. In the realism perspectives, thoughts of John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz are included as a proponent of offensive and defensive realism, respectively. In addition, there is a breakdown of constructivism as part of the paper’s theoretical framework. In looking at realism, the paper presents China’s offensive posture and Japan’s defensive posture. It also highlights the leadership of the respective countries to explain motivations for international relations. Moreover, the paper also brings out the constructivism discussion by highlighting several situations in the affair of China and Japan relationships.
They include their differing political structures and ideas. There is also a special case of apology where each country holds its view, and there is a case of violation of maritime law. While discussing the flashpoints, the paper also brings out the construction of new norms in the region by China as it develops its dominant power position. There are limitations brought out about constructivism being vague, in addition to a critique of realism in its failure to account for China’s action. The use of non-confrontational approaches to safeguarding each country’s claims for hegemony status will push them to embrace additional defensive approaches. However, it is unlikely that there will be an outright provocation. Both countries are strictly following a two-sided policy framework. National identity will play a major role in the future of the two countries’ relationships laying the foundation of more constructivist approaches for international relations in Asia.
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