Introduction
In the world, there are different forms of regimes. The most notable ones are democracy and authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian regime is based on either one-party or one-man rule. In China, one party – Chinese Communist Party (CCP) orchestrates the authoritarian regime. The CCP came to power in 1949 with promises of democracy and liberal constitution. However, after taking control of the country, the CCP leader, Mao Zedong shifted towards an authoritarian rule.
Today, CCP has considerably maintained the authoritarian leadership introduced by Mao Zedong. The ideologies of CCP rule China through policymaking and their implementation. The regime considers itself as a form of democracy on grounds that it serves the people, rules at their interests, and many Chinese citizens accept it. Considerably, CCP promotes leadership competence, carries out political succession in an orderly manner, recruits popular support, and generates effective public policies. The authority of authoritarian rule has never been questioned as rights protection movements of petitioners, bloggers, lawyers, journalists and other civil society organizations such as religious groups continue to keep a low profile to avoid oppression.
Mainly, CCP resists any attempts to negotiate with the society as equal partners because it considers such acts as negating the leadership of the CCP and the entire socialist system. In particular, the regime is willing to change so long as it stays in power but unwilling to relax the ban on autonomous political forces. This paper reviews the authoritarian rule under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China’s political, social, and economic perspectives.
Authoritarian Crisis, Cultural Revolution, and Tiananmen Square Protests
In China, the crisis of authoritarianism reached its dramatic heights in the spring of 1989 when students calling for democracy carried out protests in Tiananmen Square. The Chinese government flaunted its power by massacring its citizens and deceitfully pretending that the nonviolent demonstrators were indeed “hooligans” and ‘thugs” and that most of the casualties were heavily armed soldiers. The events leading to the Tiananmen Square protests can be traced back to Mao Zedong regime when he shifted from democracy to authoritarian rule. Notably, the disaster of Mao’s rule and hostility towards formal education made the national experience a shortage of training individuals. Further, Maoist system brought Cultural Revolution, which led to a loss of an entire generation. Pye points out that the decades of hardships and unmatched sacrifices amounted to nothing, as China’s per capita income was equal to that of Tanzania and Somalia.
After Mao, Deng Xiaoping regime engaged itself in desperate efforts to transform the economy. At the time, 80 percent of the Chinese population was living in rural areas, with peasants still relying on skillful farming. China could have carried out initial agricultural reforms with ease; however, the shortage of technically trained individuals and the gross neglect of infrastructure made reforms hard to implement. As a result, in 1988, the Chinese economy started to falter, the price reform mired, the leadership became adrift, the inflation emerged, corruption activities increased, and professors realized that they were earning less than cab drivers and waiters.
At that time, the students realized that China was in trouble. Worse still, the Chinese leadership held two sides of modern skills. Although it sent tens of thousands of students abroad, the government also set wage differentials whose ratio between technically skilled labor and manual labor was unfavorable for skilled workers during the Mao years. Since Tiananmen event, the Chinese government started punishing students in ways that will eventually affect the future development of the country.
According to Pye, “the turmoil of Cultural Revolution in China and the subsequent crisis of legitimacy … have been central features of traditional Chinese political culture.” Although Deng Xiaoping regime had the will of carrying out economic reforms, “the ten years of disaster” made them extremely hesitant about liberalizing the political system. As a result, Deng Xiaoping failed to offer a political vision for China and in the mid-1980s. Notably, Deng Xiaoping failed to offer a political vision for China and as such, in the mid-1980s there was an increasingly acute crisis of legitimacy based on shameless corruption and the spirit of crass materialization. In the end, the economy continued to deteriorate. In effect, the false idea of Deng’s that political stagnation could provide a healthy environment for economic development led to the dissolution and frustration for concerned people – citizens, students, and leaders themselves.
Social Organizations and Chinese Community Party (CCP) Control
Under the CCP, China does not advocate for a free society that organizes and articulates its interests. Instead, Chinese government advocates for the society to be restricted and its activities restrained by the state. Since the 1980s, the state and CCP continue to influence main groups in the society by binding them into their affiliated organizations. To hinder any form of mass opposition, the state extended its organization, coordination, and supervision as possible. According to Saich, “this move by the state from insulation from society to integration within it can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent a plurality of definitions arising by revising the structure of the regime and the state’s relationship to society.”
In this sense, the aim of the state is to thwart or limit the emergence of a possibility of political-ideological definitions. Notably, the tendency to thwart organizational pluralism is based on the fear of probable social unrest and the opposition created by the reforms. Specifically, the state has a consistent fear that organizations will act as safe havens for groups participating in political activities or representing the interests of displeased peasants and workers. Again, the Chinese government is afraid of events of Asian Financial Crisis, which saw several authoritarian regimes face challenges of street demonstrations.
Further, the state does not want to encounter challenges associated with the society holding the government and its leaders more accountable. For instance, the fall of Indonesian leader Suharto during Asian Financial Crisis brought concerns to the Chinese government, which in turn ordered the media to downplay the coverage of the events. Further, the leaders are afraid of developments in other parts of Asia that might lead to the internal questioning of the wisdom of using development strategy that depends on market forces in the economy combined with centralized power structures.
In spite of Chinese restrictive aspect on social organizations, displeased groups are still forming such organizations. Notably, numerous underground groups associated with workers have emerged with names such as Anti-Unemployment Group and Anti-Hunger League. On a daily basis, go-slows, strikes, rural unrests, and sit-ins are common among these underground groups. These groups and their respective events are causing concerns to the authorities that some dissident and underground religious movements have officially registered as cultural or sporting events to avoid detection.
Internet Censorship, Monitoring, and Manipulation
The statements made by the government demonstrate the internet is vital and dangerous. Notably, the 2010 government white paper, “The Internet in China” noted that rapid, nationwide expansion of the internet and mobile device penetration is a strategic priority. The Chinese government considers the internet as requisite for poverty alleviation, education, and efficient conveyance of government information and services to the public. Further, China’s development of a vibrant, indigenous internet and telecommunication sector is indispensable for its long-term global economic competitiveness.
On the other hand, China considers the Internet as dangerous. In this regard, the government deploys authoritarian practices to manage its use. MacKinnon regards Chinese citizens “as residents of a networked authoritarian society.” Notably, hundreds of million people use the internet for fun, freedom and without much fear from the government like a decade ago. However, the government continues to monitor the activities of the people on the internet. Further, the government censors and manipulates online conversations to an extent that no individual can organize a feasible opposition movement. The number of indictments and arrests on charges of endangering state security in terms of political, ethnic and religious dissent increased by more than twofold in 2008 for the second period of three years.
The Chinese people are not aware of such trends due to the presence of information gap that makes it hard for many people to see the need for having a political change. MacKinnon asserts that, “the system does not control all of the people all of the time, but it is effective enough that even most of China’s best and brightest are not aware of the extent to which their understanding of their own country – let alone the broader world – is being blinkered and manipulated.” For instance, when a documentary crew from the US showed university students in Beijing an iconic 1989 photo of a man standing in front of a tank in Tiananmen Square, the students were unable to recognize the man or the event, despite their universities having high-speed internet access.
Tibet and Quest for Autonomy
The quest for self-rule in Tibet demonstrates the authoritarian aspect of China. According to Davis, the situation in Tibet demonstrates one of the most persistent and difficult human rights problems across the globe. Although Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama fled the region in 1959, the Tibetan government-in-exile based in Dharamsala (India) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government have not managed to resolve the issue. The issue is aggravated by the fact that Chinese officials consider Tibetans loyalty to Dalai Lama as a huge threat as he can marshal impressive popular support from his followers. The quest for autonomy by Tibetans is based on promoting their conditions relating to social, cultural, economic, and political life, as well as promoting both human rights and democracy.
Progress has been made in negotiations. The Dalai Lama official representatives pursue genuine autonomy while PRC official representatives pursue sovereignty over Tibet. As such, PRC lacks the political will to reconcile these issues relating to Tibetans. Notably, when Tibetan leaders shifted from sovereign independence to seeking genuine autonomy, the Chinese official responded by insisting on their current national minority policies, thus taking comfort in actual of control of Tibet by China as a fait accompli as well achieved by the state. According to Davis, “these policies incorporate a form of top-down Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule that makes genuine local autonomy difficult to achieve.” Based on government, the assertion of sovereignty on Tibet constitutes a matter of important national interest and as such Beijing shows little concern for Tibetans during negotiations.
Conclusion
Since CCP came into power in 1949, it has maintained an authoritarian rule in China. The degree of authoritarian government in China has been demonstrated by numerous acts and events such as Tiananmen Square protests, the Tibet autonomy quest, internet censorship, the control of social organizations, and oppression of rights protection movements. Notably, the Chinese regime does not advocate for a free society. As such, the state controls, coordinates, organizes, and supervises social organizations to prevent or reduce the emergence of political ideologies that are against CCP ideologies. About the internet, the Chinese government censors, manipulates and monitors online conversations to ensure that no individual can organize a feasible opposition movement.
In a different vein, the Chinese government does not accommodate demonstrations. The Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 is an example of how Chinese reacts to demonstrations. Notably, the number of indictment and arrests continues to increase as the government persists in taking into custody and charging individuals on political, ethnic, and religious dissent grounds. Finally, the Chinese government continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to negotiate with Dalai Lama, the Tibetan leader. Although Tibetans’ quest for autonomy is based on social, cultural, economic, and political life as well as human rights and democracy, the Chinese government only cares about its sovereignty over Tibet.
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