Introduction
Syria is situated in the Western Asia. Its neighbouring countries are Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel. The country is home to diverse cultural and religious communities. Currently, the country is experiencing conflicts between the government soldiers and the rebels (Habeeb 2012).
The conflicts began in the year 2011. It is alleged that the conflicts were initiated by the Arab Spring demonstrations in the Middle East (Fortna & Huang 2012). The continuing conflict does not offer an opportunity for future democratisation.
From the start, the protests were met with resistances from Bashar al-Assad’s administration (Fortna & Huang 2012). To stop the demonstrations, the government reacted with fierce suppressions.
The fight progressively transformed from prominent demonstrations to a fortified uprising after years of military blockades. The fortified opposition is comprised of a number of groups, which were established during the Arab Uprising. The groups include Free Syrian Army, Islamic Front, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State of Iraq.
By August 2013, Bashar al-Assad’s administration was in command of around 35% of the nation’s territory and 61% of the Syrian populace (Olimat 2013). As of March 2015, it was estimated that the conflict had led to the death of up to 300,000 individuals. International organisations have blamed Bashar al-Assad’s administration, ISIS, and other antagonistic groups of extreme human rights abuses (Romano & Gurses 2014).
As such, chemicals weapons have been used severally in the war. Bashar al-Assad’s administration is reported to be accountable for the bulk of civilian fatalities. Similarly, tens of thousands of opposition members and demonstrators have been taken captive by the government law enforcers. There are intelligences of torture in government penitentiaries.
Literature review
Heydemann asserts that as the fourth anniversary of Syrian conflict draws nearer, the promises of future democratisation that fuelled the war have regressed (Heydemann 2013). According to Heydemann, a number of Arab nations experienced momentous mass demonstration movements starting from the year 2011.
Heydemann believes that among the countries involved in the conflict Tunisia alone appears likely to yield a joined democracy in the predictable future. In Syria, the conflicts have exposed the troubles of overpowering the persistent institutional and communal legacies of dictatorial rule. Similarly, the conflicts have exposed the unexpected extents to which dictatorial governments will go to endure their leadership.
Dabashi believes that in Syria any likelihood that the demonstrators might oust the Assad’s administration and start a shift to democracy was snuffed at the start of the conflicts (Dabashi 2012). The opportunity for future democratisation was extinguished by the government’s fierce suppression and then by the nation’s decline into a ruthless and progressive religious civil conflict.
By April this year, it was estimated that the conflict had led to the death of up to 310,000 individuals. International organisations have blamed Bashar al-Assad’s administration, ISIS, and other antagonistic groups of extreme human rights abuses. UN officials believe that the conflict in Syria has led to foulest humanitarian catastrophe ever since the Rwanda conflict in the year1994.
Joshi 2013 suggests that the democratic ambitions of the activists who demonstrated on roads and public squares throughout the country at the start of the conflict were among the war’s first victims (Joshi 2013). Joshi asserts that if democracy being a result of the revolution was always indeterminate, democratic forecasts have been ruthlessly crippled by the damage of civil war and the progressive disintegration of the Syrian people.
Joshi indicates that studies illustrate that nations evolving from ethno-sectarian conflicts are likely to be among the least probable to democratise when war ends. During such situations, post-conflict democratisation miscarries far more regularly than it prospers. According to him, more than half of all nations that undergo through conflicts decline into war after a period of intervening ceasefire.
McCaffrey suggests that in Syria democratic projections seem unwelcoming because of the damaging impacts of civil war (McCaffrey 2012). The war has reduced the potentials for democratic transformation. The war has also offered the drive for a process of dictatorial reformation, which has enhanced Assad government’s capability to endure demonstrations, suppress a fortified rebellion, and counterattack international sanctions.
Despite the collapse of a number of government organisations due to fortified battle, it should be noted that the war has obligated the Assad government to restructure its social base, stiffen its reliance on international dictatorial networks, get used to its styles of financial governance, and reform its army and security apparatus (McCaffrey 2012).
Though the product of the present war cannot be foretold with certainty, these adaptations are probable to affect how the country will be managed when the conflict ends.
Jarstad asserts that the Assad’s regime has strengthened its political affiliations with Russia and China since the start of the conflict (Jarstad 2014). Because Russia and China have authoritarian regimes, their relationship with Assad’s administration offers the Syrian government with sources of direct martial and monetary sustenance.
Their relationship also offers a set of law and diplomatic experts who will side with the government in international institutions. The two countries are trying to shield the Assad regime from the impact of United Nations backed sanctions (Jarstad 2014).
The sanctions had the ability to obstruct the capability of its major dictatorial allies to offer the government with vital aid. Based on the emerging alliances, it is apparent that an opportunity for future democratisation in Syria is bleak.
Haerens and Zott indicate that as the Assad government extents its dependency on dictatorial associates, it continues to be secluded by Western countries and international administrations that embrace democracy (Haerens & Zott 2013). Through this, the country will continue to be further entrenched in relations that lessen the chances to moderate its dictatorial acts.
The adaptations represent a postponement of previous approaches of dictatorial advancement, but with a denser, armed, religious, exclusionary, and oppressive core. If the current government survives the conflict, the war will offer a chance to authoritarian allies like Russia and China to have an influence over the standings of an ultimate political settlement.
Through this, the chances of democratising Syria will be diminished. Generally, the conflict in the Middle East will enhance the interdependence of dictatorial governments in the region reducing the prospects of democracy in the region.
Conceptual approach
With respect to democratic theories, Lipset’s thesis asserts that certain conditions must be met for democracy to thrive (Stepan & Linz 2013). The conditions are economic growths illustrated by urbanisation, prosperity, and education. In this regard, for a democratic government to survive it must meet the above conditions. The conditions can only be met through progressive economic developments.
The conditions foster fairness with respect to socio-political relations and economic relations. As such, the difference between the rich and the poor is wider in poorer countries. Similarly, the income difference between skilled and semi-skilled labourers is wider in such countries.
In this respect, poor nations are less likely to be democratic compared to developed nations. Therefore, through modernisation the above social conditions can be addressed. By doing so, conditions that boost democracy are created.
Currently, the conflict in Syria has led to a decline in economic growth. The conflict has also affected education and health services. Therefore, the conditions necessary for the establishment of democracy are absent in the present day Syria.
If the war stops in the near future, the government in control will be required to first track economic developments if it needs to establish a democratic society. If the government fails to initiate development progress, the country’s prospects for a democratic society will be lost.
Equally, other democratic theories suggest that in some ways religion plays a role in suppressing democracy (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch 2009). The above has been witnessed in countries with religious conflicts.
Therefore, because the Syrian society has been divided into religious groups by the conflict the possibility for a democratic society in the near future has been reduced (Fortna & Huang 2012). When the conflicts end, a government that respects all religions should be established. Similarly, the state should be separated from religion for democracy to thrive.
Personal view
According to me, the on-going conflicts in the country do not offer an opportunity for future democratisation. I believe that the chance for future democratisation was stubbed out by the Assad administration’s fierce suppression and by the nation’s decline into a ruthless and progressive religious civil conflict.
If the demonstrators had succeeded in removing Assad from power at the start of the Arab Spring, the country could have been in a better place to institutionalise democracy. However, I believe the conflict has offered the drive for a development of dictatorial reformation, which has enhanced Assad government’s capability to endure demonstrations, suppress a fortified rebellion, and counterattack international sanctions.
As indicated earlier, I also believe that as the Assad government extents its dependency on dictatorial associates, it continues to be secluded by Western countries and international administrations that embrace democracy. The western countries had a better chance of enhancing democracy in Syria if they had assisted the rebels in removing Assad from power.
I believe that the failure of the western nations has enabled Assad to seek financial and military support from China and Russia. Because of this, the country will continue to be further entrenched in relations that lessen the chances to moderate its dictatorial acts.
If the Assad’s government survives the conflict, the war will offer a chance to authoritarian allies like Russia and China to have an influence over the standings of an ultimate political settlement.
Similarly, I believe that Syria will not achieve a democratic society in the near future because the conflicts have reduced the conditions necessary for democracy to thrive. The conditions foster fairness with respect to socio-political relations and economic relations.
When the war stops in the future, the government in control should enhance economic developments for it to boost a democratic society. In this respect, the continuing conflict does not offer an opportunity for future democratisation.
References
Dabashi, H 2012, The Arab spring, Zed Books, London.
Fortna, V. and Huang, R 2012, ‘Democratisation after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise 1’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 4, pp.801-808.
Habeeb, W 2012, The Middle East in turmoil, Greenwood, Santa Barbara, Calif.
Haerens, M. and Zott, L 2013, The Arab Spring, Greenhaven Press, Detroit.
Heydemann, S 2013, ‘Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism.’ Journal of Democracy, vol. 24, no. 4, pp.59-73.
Jarstad, A 2014, ‘Costly democracy: peacebuilding and democratisation after war’, Democratisation, vol. 21, no. 7, pp.1351-1352.
Joshi, M 2013. ‘Inclusive institutions and stability of transition toward democracy in post-civil war states’. Democratisation, vol. 20, no. 4, pp.743-770.
McCaffrey, P 2012, The Arab Spring. H.W. Wilson, Ipswich, Mass.
Olimat, M 2013, Arab Spring and Arab Women. Taylor and Francis Pub, Hoboken.
Romano, D. and Gurses, M 2014, Conflict, democratisation, and the Kurds in the Middle East, Taylor and Francis Pub, Hoboken
Stepan, A. and Linz, J 2013, ‘Democratisation theory and the Arab Spring’. Journal of Democracy, vol. 24, no. 4, pp.15-30.
Wucherpfennig, J. and Deutsch, F 2009. ‘Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited’. Living Reviews in Democracy, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 1-8.