Critical realism is a philosophical approach to understanding science. It is one of several types of philosophical realism and forms of realism advocated within social science, such as analytic realism and subtle realism. It contrasts forms of empiricism and positivism, seeing science as identifying causal relationships (Rundell et al., 2005). In contrast to positivism’s dogmatic and empiricist epistemological basis, critical realism argues that science must be constructed from an explicit ontology (Benton & Craib, 2001). Critical realism is said to be a broad basis for social research. However, it can be considered as such only when combined with other approaches.
This is because each concept is in its own way biased on the one hand, and on the other, carries with it a high potential for cognitive, social wisdom. At the same time, this potential cannot be called absolute. Critical realism is an attractive base for sociological research because its discourse is based on causal connections (Vandenberghe, 2009). At the same time, it seeks the advantages of realism in the social sciences, especially in sociology. This is proved by the fact that realism as a philosophical metatheory is an appropriate philosophy for the social sciences (Benton, 1981). In fact, it is the first valid philosophy of the social sciences. Particular attention is paid to sociology as the subject of realism’s metatheoretical interests. Traditional philosophy of science, including positivism and empiricism, did not deal with the social sciences because it believed that they were not sciences (Outhwaite, 1987). Against this background, the main goal of critical realism is to reconstruct the rules of empirical scientific practice in social cognition.
It is worth identifying the main differences between critical realism, positivism, and empiricism in this context. The main difference between positivism and empiricism is that positivism claims that all authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge. In contrast, empiricism claims that the sensory experience of perception is the source of all knowledge. Positivism and empiricism are two interrelated philosophical theories. Positivism describes the nature of knowledge, the testing of knowledge by scientific methods. On the other hand, empiricism describes the source and origin of knowledge (Harré, 1972). In addition, it is essential to note that positivism is built on the theory of empiricism. Positivism is the kind of epistemological position that has long since lost all influence in the philosophy of science and is currently not supported in its pure form by anyone.
According to positivists, scientific knowledge is empirical, derived from experience, based on what is directly given. Only those judgments that can either be directly reduced to protocol propositions or deduced from them by logical operations are scientific (Danermark et al., 2001). In contrast, critical realism asserts that it is not the statement confirmed by experience that can be considered scientific (Sayer, 2000). The thesis for which the conditions for its refutation, or falsification, have been proposed. The process of scientific cognition, according to realism, is a way of rejecting false hypotheses as a result of experimental tests.
The primary efforts of the realist critique of positivist and empirical metatheory are directed against their tendency to reduce ontology to gnoseology and both, ultimately, to methodology. This is because this ontological relation between structure and action is not just a matter of methods (Collier, 1994). The two dimensions can and should be analytically divorced, as proven by successful research using such a system. Thus, critical realism is a reasonable basis for sociological research. However, the social sciences require multiple methodological approaches no less than the natural sciences (Laudan, 1996). The merits of such systems can only be judged by the practice of the sciences and the extent to which they enrich understanding of the social world. Therefore, it can be claimed that critical realism as a metatheoretical position creates the possibility of rational debate. Consequently, combined with other theoretical approaches, it can serve as an objective basis for sociological science.
References
Benton, T. (1981). Realism and social science. Radical philosophy 27(1), 13–21.
Benton, T., & Craib, I. (2001). Philosophy of social science: The philosophical foundations of social science. Palgrave.
Collier, A. (1994). Critical realism. Verso.
Danermark, B., Ekström, M., Jakobsen, L. & Karlsson, J. C. (2001). Explaining society: Critical realism in the social sciences. Routledge.
Harré, R. (1972). The philosophies of science. Oxford University Press.
Laudan, L. (1996). Beyond positivism and relativism. Westview.
Outhwaite, W. (1987). New philosophies of social science: Realism, hermeneutics and critical theory. Macmillan.
Rundell, J., Petherbridge, D., Bryant, J., Hewitt, J. and Smith, J. (2005). Contemporary perspectives in critical and social philosophy. Brill.
Sayer, A. (2000). Key features of critical realism in practice: a brief outline. In realism and social science (pp. 10-28). SAGE Publications.
Vandenberghe, F. (2009) Realism in One Country? Journal of critical realism, 8(2), 203-232. 10.1558/jocr.v8i2.203