Introduction
The article discusses the findings of a public inquiry that was made into three major disasters in order to reveal the development process of major intelligence failures. The report explores the common causal features in the three disasters and discusses them in detail. These features include failure to change organizational beliefs, distracting decoy phenomena, failure to address external complaints, poor information handling, regulations compromise, minimization of risk, and aggravation of hazards by external factors. The inquiries listed these factors as part of the incubation period of the three disasters. The inquiry conducted through investigations, discusses the three cases in detail, and offers recommendations for effective cultural readjustment.
Foresight and Its Failure
It is very difficult to predict disasters in large organizations because of the complexity of tasks and processes that are pursued daily in the attainment of goals and objectives. This is worsened by lack of clear criteria to determine when the goals and objectives are achieved. In any organizations, disasters occur due to lack of sufficient resources to avert them or lack of foresight. Some disasters are unpredictable and therefore, unavoidable. However, large-scale organizational disasters can be avoided through foresight and proper disaster planning. There are six stages in the sequence of events that are evident with a failure of foresight. In stage 1, there are certain accepted beliefs regarding the world and the various hazards that exist, as well as associated norms that are practices through organizational laws and policies.
Stage II is the incubation period in which several events that that are at odds with accepted beliefs go unnoticed for a long period of time. In stage III, the consequences of ignoring the hazards appear and force the organization to evaluate its perceptions regarding accepted beliefs. Stage IV is characterized by the collapse of cultural precautions toward changing accepted beliefs. The effects of this shift are evident throughout the organization. In stage V, the organization tries to avoid complete collapse by making necessary changes and adjustments. The last stage (VI) is characterized by a full cultural readjustment that results from the findings of an inquiry conducted to evaluate the disaster. The organization adjusts its beliefs and precautionary norms to match the newly acquired view of the world and its hazards. All disasters and subsequent mitigation efforts fall under the aforementioned six steps.
Observed Patterns
Major casual features
The inquiry revealed that in the Aberfan, Hixon, and Summerland cases, the disasters were initiated by lack of unity in the handling of complex and ill-structured organizational challenges. At Aberfan, the problem was improper management of the pit and its subsidiary activities while at Hixon, the problem was the introduction of a new type of level crossing that was highly ineffective. At Summerland, the problem was the construction of a leisure centre that involved different design teams. The article addresses the major causal factors but does not create a clear connection between them that can be used to give recommendations to fit disaster planning and management in the three industries.
Similarities
These disasters had several similarities that include rigid cultural and institutional perceptions and beliefs, the decoy problem, organizational exclusivity, information difficulties, involvement of strangers, disregard for existing regulations, and minimization of emergent danger. The three aforementioned organizations had rigid cultural and institutional beliefs that inhibited the accurate perception of the possibility of disaster. Their cultural beliefs had created collective blindness to collective issues that resulted in disaster. In the three organizations, the actions taken to address problems when they were firs identified distracted the organization from the real problems that led to the disasters.
The source of danger acted as the decoy that distracted the organizations from addressing the ill-structured problems that caused the disasters. Two of the organizations ignored complaints from external sources that had identified the dangers that led to the disasters. Information difficulties such as dissemination of wrong or misleading information, irrelevant messages, and ambiguity contributed to the disasters. The involvement of untrained personnel in Hixon and Summerland cases contributed to the disasters because the individuals were unknowledgeable on the proper handling of hazardous processes. Employees also ignored existing regulations by considering them irrelevant to current situations. Finally, individuals in all the three cases evaluated emergent danger as negligible and therefore, gave it time to develop. When the danger became imminent, employees did not work toward addressing it but focused their time and energy on finding scapegoats.
Analysis
The inquiry reports revealed that many disasters because of poor responses during stage II of the disaster development process when failures of foresight develop. During that stage, several events go unnoticed or misunderstood because of rigid organizational cultures, difficulties in handling information in dangerous situations, and violations of precautions because of the unwillingness to abdicate organizational beliefs and norms. The article explores the disasters vaguely because the author disregards the complexity of events and decisions that led to the disasters. In addition, he disregards the fact that disasters happen due to the interplay between organizational and personal factors. Finally, the article does not provide recommendations that organizations can implement to prevent foresight failure and avoid the occurrence of such disasters.
Discussion Questions
- How could the disasters have been avoided by the management teams of the three companies?
- What role does proper problem structuring play in disaster avoidance?