The military career of Dwight David Eisenhower was closely connected with the development of the American state and international relations during the first half of the 20th century and till the end of the 1960s. Eisenhower was a five=start general of the US army, the heist possible rank of all rimes. In spite of the unique personality and charisma of Eisenhower, there are different historical accounts of his personality and military leadership and policy. In their works, C D’este, M. Korda, and K. Davis propose different views and opinions of the military leadership of Eisenhower and develop different interpretations of key events in his military career. Thus, all historians agree that Eisenhower’s military career was the interplay of design and chance.
The military career of Eisenhower lasted for forty years and involved active military service in the army. The first steps in their military career were made in 1911 when he was enrolled in Military Academy at West Point. After his graduation in 1916, he served in Texas and Georgia. Since earlier years of his career, he recognized that the military leader should possess authority and influence to administer and direct military and other defense forces, that the modern military leader may exercise “constitutional dictator” authority in the interests of national security, and that providing for the common protection means more than provisions for armed forces and demands the development of broad command and control machinery to judge and assess all major security issues. In the book, Eisenhower: a Soldiers Life D’Este creates an image of Eisenhower as both policies and a military leader. He comments on the qualities of leadership that Eisenhower had developed by the 1940s. In contrast to other historians, D’Este calls Eisenhower an “accidental soldier” as he “1910-1916 committed to becoming a lawyer and set his sights on the University of Michigan ”. Thus, D’Este admires his personal beliefs and principles which helped him to develop a military talent and enter West Point. The exercise of this power as military commander shows that the balance in discerning and governing the course of national security was finally realized by Eisenhower.
Korda and Davis create a positive image of the early years of a military career and omit such personality traits as indecision and hesitancy. Korda underlines that Eisenhower had a personal vitality and try that impressed everyone who came into personal contact with him. Additionally to the charisma, there was a presence, a sense that Eisenhower had the entire business under control and knew exactly where he was headed. Davis describes his as not an especially large man but underlines that Eisenhower dominated a room when he walked, in, and Eisenhower’s expression, whether breaking into his broad, irresistible smile or reflecting a more somber mood, expressed better than any jokes or comments his feelings and attitude. All historians agree that Eisenhower had a fiery temper which he always tries to keep under control, especially in public.
The first success came during World War I when Eisenhower received the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In the book, Soldier of Democracy Davis underlines that the feeling Eisenhower projected was one of self-confidence. His mind worked rapidly, but he was most at home working on practical issues that could be broken down into their components and dealt with methodically. Eisenhower hated theorizing and left speculation to others. Eisenhower’s most effective personal trait was the honesty he radiated. His frankness and candor dispelled suspicion, and he delighted in charming over potentially hostile people. Eisenhower’s greatest gift was his natural ability in public relations and communication.
Davis describes that in 1924, Eisenhower was appointed executive officer and had a chance to work with General Fox Conner. This period of time was very important in his career, as h studies military strategies and tactics of war. Thus, his inability to accept critical reamers was but another side of Eisenhower’s personality to be liked by everyone. In the army, with its strong hierarchical command system, Eisenhower was protected from critical comments. Thus, he rapidly found that political life was diverse, and he reacted carefully, always trying to avoid controversial questions that might make him the object of attack. Eisenhower’s well-known reputation gained so suddenly late in life, reinforced his prudence, and made him overly protective of his reputation.
During World War I, despite repeated and legitimate requests for duty overseas, Eisenhower’s talent for teaching and organization kept him in America. In the 1920s, he met General Fox Connor purely by accident through George Patton; it was Connor who organized for Eisenhower to serve with him in Panama and, in the long lonely days at that region, supervise an exhaustive program of reading in both military history and the literature. For Eisenhower, these months were more important than graduate courses that helped him infinitely in the future. It is important to note that Eisenhower’s service as Douglas MacArthur’s chief of staff (during1930s) both in Washington and the Philippines, continued his education in a very different way. During World War I, commanding American armies in Europe, Eisenhower went out of his approach to cultivate reporters, aware that they were the eyes through which the community viewed the war.
Between the two world wars, there were no significant changes in Eisenhower’s military career. During this period of time, Eisenhower’s outlook on the world grew directly from his individuality. Just as Eisenhower believed that common sense and goodwill could solve almost all difficulties between individuals, he felt that communities and states could exist in agreement despite their differences combined with a floating optimism, set him at odds with those soldiers and commanders who believed that the United States was locked in a fight for survival with the Soviet Union. The conflict with the Russians, which Eisenhower inherited from Truman, was an issue to be tried to solve, not an all-consuming movement against the forces of wickedness. Eisenhower had the ability to stand apart from the passions of the moment and to assess the broader problems of each situation. In his subjective memoir, Eisenhower was overwhelmed by the concepts of reprisal and liberation. He joined these problems in with his belief that control could lead to eventual American liquidation.
World War II opened new opportunities and chances for the leader. Eisenhower’s succeeding experience in Europe during World War II justified Marshall’s decision. Eisenhower quickly emerged as the main manager with a special flair for alliance warfare. Eisenhower realized the significance of establishing a full partnership with the British, impressing on his fellow Americans the necessity to avoid nationalistic resistance, and he insisted on including British officers at all the levels of the Army. Eisenhower’s hidden talent for political diplomacy enabled him to handle the persistent requirements of Winston Churchill and the constant claims of Charles de Gaulle, and still keep General Marshall and President Roosevelt pleased that Eisenhower was not sacrificing American interests in the cause of Allied unity.
In contrast to other historical, Davis states that Eisenhower’s concern for popular support also indicates one of his most obvious weaknesses, a sensitivity to critical remarks. In his first chief military operation, the landings in North Africa in 1942, Davis authorized the infamous deal with Admiral Jean Darlan to keep the French army from opposing the American and British military. When this action aroused a storm of cynical comments in the USA, Eisenhower could not realize why military commanders did not understand he acted only to save human lives. In frustration, Davis tried to arrange for the flight of his leading critics to North Africa so that he could tackle them face-to-face and convince them of the rightness of his decision.
D’este, Korda, and Davis agree that the next important step was the Korean War issue showed that Eisenhower was still willing to exploit overseas policy for political aims. When the war first broke out in June 1950, Eisenhower staunchly backed Truman’s decision to fight, and he stood behind the President when he removed General MacArthur. The deadlock in Korea had made the war more and more unpopular by 1952, and even though other Republicans came at Truman’s policy, Eisenhower remained faithful. After Eisenhower’s crucial victory at the polls over Adlai Stevenson, most critics assumed that one of his first actions as President-elect would be to appoint John Foster Dulles as secretary of state. Thus, Eisenhower delayed the appointment for several weeks while he prepared the field. For a while, Eisenhower considered offering the position to another leader, John J. McCloy, a leading member of the international policy establishment and former American High Commissioner to Germany.. Following D’Este, it was a very important political and strategic step that helped Eisenhower to maintain positive relations with other countries and continue his own political strategies. Eisenhower finally settled on Dulles, partly out of his admiration for his knowledge and professional expertise in foreign policy and partly because Eisenhower knew that the appointment would please the Taft. There is much in the relationship of the two political leaders, though, which does not fit this simple picture. From the outset, Dulles was insecure in his relations with Eisenhower. The military tactics were that Eisenhower kept a set of independent international-policy advisers on hand at the White House. From the outset of his administration, he moved to revive the National Security Council and thereby ensure his continuing control over all major foreign policy decisions.
It was a military step to create the N.S.C. (1947) in order to manage diplomatic and military policy, thus this institution had never achieved its full potential under President Truman. He had met with the statutory members, who included the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the director of civil defense, and the head of the CIA, rarely, preferring to arrive at his main decisions by himself. The starting point of the President’s policy was his strong belief that Indochina was very important to the security of the USA. The geographical area was significant for many reasons. Indochina was rich in raw materials like tin and rubber; its geographical location placed it at the crossroads of Southeast Asia; its millions of people deserved to live in freedom, not Communist power.
A further year of a military career was connected with the Cold war era and international relations with Europe and the USSR. As Commander in Chief, then, Eisenhower presided over the development and implementation of military and security doctrines and strategies that were straight concerned with the readiness and use of armed forces in diplomatic and national security problems. Eisenhower’s administration was committed to the primary policy assumption and purpose to avoid direct U.S. involvement in declared or undeclared wars and military conflicts. The 1953 Atoms for Peace and the 1955 Open Skies proposals were two important diplomatic issues that represented a step toward mutual relations with the USSR since they proposed bilateral and multilateral pacts on military control and the “peaceful” uses of scientific (nuclear) facts “A central asset of both the American and the British intelligence agencies, and in view of the secrecy surrounding Soviet nuclear missile and bomber capabilities, were surely a justified and necessary precaution against a surprise attack”.
As a President, Eisenhower had earned a name as the capable Supreme Allied Commander in particular through his unique organizational and diplomatic abilities in military decisions. As President and Commander in Chief, Eisenhower set out to develop a reliable, elaborate, and reutilized command organization for defense and national security issues over which he, as President and Commander in Chief, would supervise. Above all, the 1958 restructuring confirmed the command powers of the Commander in Chief and recognized the foundations for executive command power that would be considerably enlarged by Eisenhower’s successors. After the 1958 restructuring, improved civilian control was in effect (including military powers for the Secretary of Defense), operational commands were introduced; and the senior military leaders began to perform as corporate-team advisers subordinate to the senior national leadership (Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, for instance, initiated the tradition of attending the weekly JCS meetings), and the CJCS was strengthened and became a functional military “Deputy Commander in Chief.” Eisenhower introduced a radically new policy, “healthier balance” in civil-military relations than his direct successors, though, because he did not encourage civilian “overcontrol” that would spoil effective command and control.
D’este, Korda, and Davis agree that the great achievement was that Eisenhower institutionalized supreme national control over the organization, preparedness, and utilization of defense and other national security forces. the uniqueness and charisma of Eisenhower are that as a professional soldier he was able to motivate and delegate the civilian population, improve the desirability capabilities of executive command and control. President Eisenhower invoked and improved the National Security Act beyond its new ambitions and initiated an innovative, comprehensive national command and military control system. In spite of some differences in their interpretations and evaluations of Eisenhower, all historians agree that Eisenhower’s strategy to institutionalize operative control by the subordination and integration of the “military factor” in national security issues through two major defense strategies and the creation of a White House-directed policy network for security issues is unique and alarming.
References
D’este, C. Eisenhower: a Soldiers Life. Henry Holt and Co.; 1st edition, 2002.
Korda, M. IKE: an American Hero. HarperCollins; Reprint edition, 2007.
Davis, K. Soldier of Democracy; A Biography of Dwight Eisenhower. Smithmark Publishers, 1995.