Ethnic Conflict in Somalia Analysis Report

Background History

The underpinning of ideological political thought is very thin in the case of Somalia, rescue attempts have been made. Some observers have opted simply to replace political ideology with other motivations for which the fighters enter the battlefield. Steven Metz, for example, has distinguished two new types of guerrilla insurgency: spiritual and commercial. (Metz, 1994, p. 72) Spiritual insurgency is concerned with problems in the process of modernisation and lack of justice. This form of insurgency is, according to Metz, linked to its predecessor of revolutionary insurgency because it is aimed at a regime or the national state – but this has already been found problematic. Commercial insurgency is said to be new and concerned with the acquisition of wealth; personal wealth especially is the defining factor of this kind of insurgency. Initially the confrontations with the Somali government army took place in the open field or in urban terrain. (Drysdale, 1995, p. 34) Subsequently, major confrontations took place between rival faction leaders, with heavy shelling and bombardments with high-calibre guns in and around the major towns, such as Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.

Somalia and Its Ethnic Group Evaluation

The world today is composed of over a hundred and ninety-two nations. Unfortunately, a considerable amount of them are plagued with conflict. Whether it is with one another, within themselves, or with both, everything should be done to get them out of their struggles. Somalia is one such nation that has been torn apart and suffered in because of being victim to internal and external problems. All international decrees and laws state Somalia to be a unified nation from its independence, but regrettably this is not so in reality. The basis of Somali conflict are found in its oppression under foreign rule, the rise of ethnic nationalism at its independence, extreme loyalty of Somali citizens to their clans, and Somalia’s lack of true and balanced leadership. With the study of Somali history, future leaders and diplomats can better understand how conflicts flooded to the surface. By learning past issues, it is possible to understand how to prevent and protect the citizens from such disasters in the future.

Ethnically and culturally, Somalia is pretty much a homogeneous country, only having a few scattered minorities along the coastline working in cities and farming in the south. Due to their shared characteristics and settled lifestyles, clans or large groups of followers begin to emerge. These clans have controlling effect over people’s lives and they grow up accepting it because it is all they have. (Bolton, 1994, p. 59)

The dictatorship aftermaths cannot be overlooked in causing eruption of ethnic lava in Somalia. As Scott observes, “The dream of Greater Somalia was resurrected by Mohamed Siad Barre, the dictator who came to power in a military coup in 1969. He hid the mystery of his iron-fisted rule behind dark glasses.” (Scott, 2000, p.12) Not only this, but in power intoxication, “ruthless in every way, Barre maintained his stranglehold by tight control of the army and security services and-though attacking the cancer of tribalism in public-by quietly playing clans off one another.” (Scott, 2000, p.12)

Discussing multiethnic and multi religious differences and their results in various geographical location, Martin Meredith opines, “Wars between people of differing religions, races, tribes, or ethnicities are particularly hard to end, since people who feel they are fighting for their very survival are not amenable to compromise.” (Martin, 1999, p.49) Besides this, if we further elaborate this point, it transpires that throwing light on new wars or post-modern conflicts; Kaldor also evaluates the phenomenon in these words, “With regard to the zone of peace, the proponents of Democratic Peace are claiming that war has been ruled out as a means of conflict among democracies. Instead, in the zone of conflict the occurrence of various forms of intra-state war led a number of scholars to claim to have observed the arrival of new wars or post-modern conflicts (Kaldor 2007, p.119).

The scenario appeared in such condition like this:

• More and more of the opposition movements became clan based
• The government began to increase its retaliations against the clans it felt were hostile to its cause.
• Siyaad Barre’s government missed precious time in which it could have begun a peaceful reconciliation processes.
• The internal war between the government and the opposition movement caused great death and destruction in Somalia.
• It even began making immense amounts Somali refugees to flee to neighbouring countries.
• Siyaad Barre created a situation in which the citizens of the nation again returned to its deep division based on clan families.

In connection to this, categorising ethnic conflicts and consequent riots prevalent contemporarily in the global politics, Martin offers the following conclusion, “Except for Spain and Britain, most nations driven by ethnic conflict are underdeveloped, with weak courts. In Rwanda, Hutu killers specifically targeted judges to ensure justice could never occur. Furthermore, judges are just as susceptible to ethnic biases as anyone else, and it may be impossible to get unprejudiced trials.” (Martin, 2005, p. 352)

International Involvement in The Somalis’ Scenario

NGO s and international peacekeeping agencies became active to get resolved the Somali crisis. A few steps taken included:

• The Security Council included Somalia on its agenda for the first time on 23 January 1992, after being prompted by a request from the Prime Minister of Somalia and the representative of Somalia at the United Nations.
• That same day, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 733. The resolution called on all states to immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise.
• The resolution also called for a cease-fire and action on a political settlement, and called on all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
• An arms embargo was a traditional and, given the Somalia situation, understandable first response to the conflict. It was also clearly a step without any hope of implementation and as such it represented a very minimal response.
• The cease-fire agreement included provisions for a UN role in monitoring the cease-fire arrangements.
• On 17 March 1992, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 746. The resolution approves the secretary-general’s proposal to send a technical team to Somalia to develop a plan for a UN monitoring mechanism and for the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid.
• The delivery of humanitarian aid was becoming ever more difficult as deliveries were increasingly hijacked by armed gangs.

The Security Council opted for the fourth option and unanimously approved Resolution 794 on 3 December 1992. In the resolution, the Security Council states that, “the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” (Farrell, 1995, p. 200) The Security Council then, inter alia, acting under Chapter VII, authorizes “the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” (Crocker, 1995, p. 6) The resolution also emphasizes the Security Council’s determination to “restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of political settlement.” But the driving force behind the Security Council actions and the operation it authorized was the humanitarian crisis.

As a result of these circumstances, Security Council members agreed with the secretary-general’s conclusion that “the Security Council had no alternative but to decide to adopt more forceful measures to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia.” (S/24868, 30 November 1992 in Howe, 1995, 50) The mission, titled Unified Task Force (UNITAF), established a unified command under U.S. leadership, but did not operate under the UN flag or use the traditional peacekeepers’ blue helmets. The Security Council resolution established an ad hoc commission of Security Council members to monitor the implementation of the resolution on behalf of the Security Council and invited the secretary-general to attach a “small Operational liaison staff to the field headquarters of the unified command. Because the operation was under the command of the United States, not the secretary-general, on behalf of the Security Council, technically this operation does not qualify as a peace enforcement operation” (Menkhaus, 1994, p. 154).

Throwing light on the prevailing circumstances, Drysdale observes, “Rhetorical burdens on the Bush Administration were thus positioned within this transitional era of American foreign policy” (Drysdale, 1994. p.33). In principle, the military objectives of the mission are driven by the mandate of the mission with the former serving the latter. In practice, however, this distinction was difficult to implement in the context of a broad assistance mandate aimed at facilitating political reconciliation and nation-building. Ideally, the disarmament provisions would be carried out voluntarily. Given the ongoing conflict and lack of political progress, this proved to be very much an ideal. For those on the receiving end, therefore, it was the same entity coercively enforcing weapons inspections and seizures, and later arresting people, on the one hand, and facilitating political reconciliation on the other. This encouraged a perception within Somalia that the “United Nations was working to enforce a political solution on the country. Indeed, what was happening was a shift towards using military methods to bring about political results” (Chopra, 1995, p. 23).

External Factors: Neighbouring States’ Role

Muslim youths generally in Africa and especially in Somalia, facing unemployment and lost educational opportunities, are likely to challenge religious and secular leadership for a share of power and economic benefits. The historical precedents—frequently cited by young militants today—are the nineteenth-century jihadists who changed the political face of West Africa, led by young leaders who attacked their elders and political leaders for theological impurity and corruption. Osama bin Laden has come to be another attraction, through his skilled manipulation of the media and through his violent challenge to what he regards as American militarism and materialism, supposedly in the name of Islam. Conspicuously absent from bin Laden and other Islamists was any political program beyond a nostalgic appeal to a golden past that never was.

Western political and economic interests are unlikely to face a united Islamist presence in Africa. Divisions within the community will tend to neutralize political extremism and place the more sweeping aspects of the Islamist agenda, including Islamic statehood, on hold for the time being. Although Islam can provide a bridge between competing ethnic groups and offer advantages in forming unified states in Africa, this is unlikely to be the case. Islam has proved unable to produce unity in countries strongly divided by kinship and warlord ambitions. Somali nationalism has the advantage of linguistic, social, and cultural uniformity—of which Islam is a vital component—yet is unable to overcome rivalries between kinship groups.

The 600,000 Somalis of Kenya’s north-eastern province, ethnically and linguistically a part of Somalia but now in Kenya because of the vagaries of colonial partitioning, engaged in a lengthy, violent, and unsuccessful secessionist struggle. (Nehemia, 2000, p. 89) Part of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in British colonial times, the Somalis, mostly camel herders or cow herders— who claimed descent from the tribe of the Prophet Mohammed—stood by the results of a 1959 referendum, when their province voted to leave Kenya and become part of Somalia. After 1963, ethnic Somalis practiced guerrilla warfare in a vain attempt to break away from Kenya, resulting in brutal clashes with security forces for the next four years.

Governmental resources have been minimally allocated to the region, even though the Somali population is nominally represented in the cabinet and Parliament as recipients of the government’s patronage to various ethnic groups (Quinn, 2000, p. 223). The region is far behind the rest of the country. Illiteracy is at 87% in one district, infant mortality is several times higher than the national average, (Rosander, 2000, p. 70) and female genital mutilation remains a widespread practice. A contentious issue has been government demands that ethnic Somalis produce two forms of valid identification to receive passports. Muslims say that this is discrimination; the government claims it is to deter illegal immigration (Holger, 1995, p. 92).

As far as the tactics of wars are concerned, Mary Kaldor submits her opinion in the following words, “The conventional conception of war as a large-scale violent showdown between states for the attainment of mutually exclusive political aims thus loses its utility and gives way to a more complex analysis of violent conflict as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights” (Kaldor 2007, p. 121). Illustrating the above mentioned opinion, for example, in attempt to reaffirm his power, Siyaad Barre’s put into effect some reforms with effective intentions. These reforms included allowing a multi-party system, adopting a new constitution, and calling for elections. However, the opposition parties did not fall for this attempt and therefore continued to fight. “In early 1992, when the fighting and the chaos got out of control, Siyaad Barre fled the country” (Clark, 1993, p. 114). Unfortunately, Somalia’s suffering did not stop with the ousting of Barre’s dictatorship. The deep rivalry between the clans led to even more turmoil and civil war.

In such situation, media played a significant role as Shawcross has pointed out, “The rising politics of propagated human rights was announced by journalists requesting the West to employ its military power to prevent humanitarian loss around the globe; it was afterward celebrated by a generation of mainstreamed human rights activists” (Shawcross, 2000, p.78). Offering certain glimpses of dismal Horn Africa, Toggia et al. note that: “To marginalized indigenous groups, the crisis materializes itself as social experiences of terror. Contemporary social life in the Horn region is generally a state-orchestrated experience that terrorizes the majority of the people” (Toggia et al. 2001: p.65).

As soon as Siyaad Barre was ousted, one of the factions of the United Somali Congress formed an interim government without the consent of the other opposition parties. Ali Mahdi Mohammed led this particular faction and it concentrated mostly in the south. It then became even further divided when General Mohammed Farah Aideed challenged the right of interim government. General Mohammed Farah Aideed was a prominent military wing leader in the United Somali Congress. In retaliation for the formation of the governments in the southern region, the Somali National Movement declared the northern region independent and called it the Somaliland Republic. “The country was now lacking a true leader and even a government, inevitably leading to endless violence and chaos throughout the country” (Bryden, 1995, p.147).

The methods of fighting forces in developing states, such as in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia, are characterised by the apparent absence of an operational plan and the concentration on seemingly tactical confrontations of short duration. Before the period of the Cold War, guerrilla tactics had been a tried and tested method of waging war (Asprey, 1994, p. 122). Guerrilla tactics here is a concept that emphasises the concentration of the fighters on the weaknesses of the opponent, while avoiding its strength. In this perspective it is as old as the phenomenon of war itself (Sun, 1993, p.56). However, this description of guerrilla tactics as the concentration on the enemy’s weaknesses and avoiding its strong points invites confusion.

Looting and plunder have also been prominent features of recent wars, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In these conflicts, in which such aspects featured prominently, a close link between the armed forces and business undertakings has been noted (Alex, 1996, p.12). There are states in which war and economics are extremely tightly knit (Ellis, 1999, p. 289). Looting during warfare can become institutionalised, especially when no alternatives are found to maintain the armed forces. In Somalia there were examples of traders and rebel leaders co-operating. Some traders had an interest in maintaining high food prices. They asked fighters to fire at ships bringing food aid into the country in order to prevent food being unloaded, which could bring down the prices on the market. When the shortage of food drove up the prices on the market, more wanted to share in the profit and therefore the number of attacks rose.

Looting food in the case of Somalia significantly contributed to starvation. The famine in Somalia was in the first place caused by the war that plagued the country (Alex, 1997, p. 98). The forces of nature, such as drought, that occurred at the same time in Somalia then contributed to famine. Natural disasters do not necessarily lead to famine. Human actions are largely responsible for the outbreak of such a calamity (Jean, 1995, p. 11). War or lack of government control, for example, can be the reason for the population not being able to obtain food. Even when drought occurs, the mechanisms of exchange and trade can assure that food is available, especially when traders see that their goods will be in demand. Starvation is the result of actively withholding food from groups of people. For the Somali rebel groups, control over food became a war-fighting instrument. The control over aid strengthened the warring side, and it weakened the opponent when food provision among its forces was hampered.

The growing restlessness in Somalia led to the formation of many other opposition parties based on clan loyalties. Dissidents from the Isaaq clans of north-western Somalia formed the Somali National Movement in London. They later found a base in Ethiopia from which launched guerrilla raids into Somalia. “In 1989, the Hawiye clans in central Somalia formed their own opposition movement called the United Somali Congress. The United Somali Congress also created its own guerrilla bases in Ethiopia” (Samatar, 1995, p.634).

Current Status

In Somalia, chasing out the president in 1990-91 required a large number of fighters. When important operations focused on urban centres, these could not be taken by stealth alone. The recruitment of a large number of fighters did not prove problematic for the factions. Local and regional opposition to the Somali regime initially proved a fruitful force for the war leaders to appeal to. (Prunier, 1996, 113) Using a favourable season, when the cattle herders could leave the cattle in the care of youngsters, and a favourable location, such as areas with a history of dissidence, also helped recruit fighters. Appeals to clan identity contributed to the formation of the Somali armed factions, even though factions were not always clearly clan organisations. Exploiting such factors, the factions could recruit a large number of fighters.

Undoubtedly, the conflict affected the country and the region adversely. Some glimpses of the consequences are reported hereunder:

• The conflict in Somalia has left over 30,000 people dead as a direct result of the conflict and about 300,000 as a result of famine. (Samatar, 1995, 630)
• The number of people displaced is about 600,000. (Samatar, 1995, 630)
• The socio-economic consequences of the conflict include the spread of cholera, malnutrition and starvation, and the destruction of government institutions and the social and economic infrastructure.
• The continued deterioration of political relations among the warring factions has had a corresponding effect on security. Indeed, the potential for a generalized outbreak of hostilities still exists in Somalia.

Viewing all this, large scale preventive action is, therefore, required to stop this from happening.

Solutions

About thirteen years later, on January 28th 2004, Somalia shocked the world when their country finally announced they were attempting to take a much needed step in the right direction. Their thirteen leaders held a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, where they eventually agreed to create a charter that would allow establishment of a new government. With the help of Kenya, Uganda, and other local countries, the new government’s intent was to encompass the entire population and focus on working as a whole, no longer fighting against one another. UN Secretary General Annan encouraged Somali leaders to build on the progress achieved and swiftly conclude the Somali National Reconciliation Conference with the establishment of an inclusive government.

The Secretary-General praised the work of Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki, Uganda President Yoweri Museveni, other leaders of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and international supporters of the Somali peace process for their perseverance. Having other countries involved that are currently either successful or striving in the right direction, is exactly what was needed to keep the bloodshed between clans from going too far. There is no telling how long it will be until there is peace between peace all thirteen warlords. They have yet to approach the issue of determining who gets what power which, for more than a decade ago, relied on weapons to settle their differences.

The field of conflict geography yields particularly interesting insights. The capital is often the special focus of armed interactions. In historical perspective, the capital in many African states has had strong binding powers. Lack of physical control over the hinterland for varying reasons, among others lack of interest or excessive expense, meant that the capital functioned to bind the state together during both colonial times and in the post-colonial era. (Herbst, 2000, 54) In the case of Somalia, the fiercest fighting, the use of heavy weapons and consequently the greatest destruction have been witnessed in Mogadishu and other large towns in the south of the country. They can be identified as important centres of gravity in the armed interactions of the warring parties, not only in their focus but also in the time and energy invested in the confrontations over these objectives.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been instrumental in focusing the attention of the international community on the tragedy unfolding in that country from the beginning. It has supported efforts, especially those of the United Nations, aimed at finding a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the crisis. In its own modest way, the OAU has strived to promote understanding and to narrow the differences among the Somali factions. A tripartite mission visited Somalia in May 1995 and reported that there had been no substantial movement in the direction of launching a process of peace and reconciliation and a broad-based government at the national level. The mission observed that the absence of a common position among the factions continued to remain an important obstacle to an all-inclusive process of national reconciliation.

During its fifth session in December 1995, the Central Organ recommended that another mission be dispatched by the OAU to determine the situation inside Somalia and to engage the various factions in further dialogue. The Central Organ called upon the OAU Chairman and Secretary-General, in cooperation with other regional organizations, notably the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference, to continue efforts toward finding a lasting solution to the Somalian crisis.

In order to solve ethnic conflict issue in Somalia, De Maio presented five hypotheses relating to socio-psychological solution for successful third party intervention. These are:

1. Commitment Intervention is more successful when third parties demonstrate credible commitments to the groups in conflict that they will enforce and uphold the terms of the peace settlement.
2. Incentives Intervention in ethnic civil conflicts is more successful when third parties use appropriate incentives in the negotiation, settlement, and peace-building phases.
3. Preventive Diplomacy Intervention that comes before the fighting starts has a greater likelihood of success than action taken once violence has erupted.
4. Negotiators Intervention is more successful when it employs highly respected negotiators.
5. Consent and Perceptions of Peace Intervention is more successful in managing ethnic wars when the third parties encourage warring groups to consent to peace and to perceive that the conflict should be managed by non violent means.” (Temple, 2004, web source)

Somalia as a nation has suffered through a great deal of devastation. It has been ruled by foreign powers. It has experienced and been failed by democracy. The Somali people have been controlled by socialism and dictatorships. Worst of all it has been failed by its own leaders. The leaders of each clan have pitted its members against each other instead of working together for peace. As a nation, Somalia is more ethnically similar then most African nations and yet the leaders cannot see that.

Clan life constituted the heart of Somali society at the beginning of its history and unfortunately it still is the predominant political force in the country. The key challenge facing modern Somalia today is the same as it was in the past. The question still remains how to unify a country whose people give greater loyalty to their ancestry than to the survival of the nation as a whole. Unfortunately history has shown us that the only time the clans put aside their differences are when they are the aggressors in a conflict against an outside force. Today more then ever, Somalia needs a true leader who can put aside his clan interests for the interests of the nation as a whole. This leader needs to be strong; goal oriented, and of course must be credible among all the clans. Until such a leader emerges Somalia will continue to be plagued with violence, starvation, and death.

References

1. Alex de Waal, ‘Contemporary Warfare in Africa: Changing Context and Changing Strategies’, IDS Bulletin, 27, 3 (1996), pp. 6-16.
2. Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, Oxford: James Currey, 1997. 95-98
3. Asprey, Robert: War in the Shadows: The Classic History of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Persia to the Present, London: Little Brown, 1994. 120-25
4. Bolton, John R. “Wrong Turn in Somalia.” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994):56-66.
5. Bryden, Matthew. “Somalia: The Wages of Failure.” Current History (1995):145-151.
6. Chopra, Jarat, Age Eknes, and Toralv Nordb. Fighting for Hope in Somalia. Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations, no. 6. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995. 21-25
7. Clark, Jeffrey. “Debacle in Somalia.” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 (1993):109-123.
8. Crocker, Chester A. “The Lessons of Somalia, Not Everything Went Wrong.” Foreign Affairs (1995):2-8.
9. Drysdale, John. Whatever Happened to Somalia. London: Haan Associates, 1994. 32-34
10. Ellis, Stephen: The Mask of Anarchy, London: Hurst, 1999, p. 289
11. Farrell, Theo. “Sliding into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine.” International Peacekeeping 2, no. 2 (1995):194-214.
12. Herbst, Jeffrey State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. pp. 48-74.
13. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle. Religion and Politics in East Africa: The Period Since Independence, ed. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995. 92
14. Howe, Jonathon T. “The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement.” Washington Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1995):49-62.
15. Jean Drèze, Amartya Sen, and Athar Hussein (eds), The Political Economy of Hunger, Entitlement and Well-Being, Oxford: Clarendon, 1995. 10-12
16. Kaldor, Mary: 2007: New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Second Edition. Stanford University Press; 2 edition (2007) 119-23
17. Martin Meredith, 1999: Coming to Terms: South Africa’s Search for Truth: Tina Rosenberg; Public Affairs, p.49
18. Martin Meredith: (2005): The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence: Free Press; 350-52
19. Menkhaus, Ken. “Getting out vs. Getting through: U.S. and U.N. Policies in Somalia.” Middle East Policy3, no. 1 (1994):146-162.
20. Metz, Stephen ‘Insurgency after the Cold War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies,5,1 (1994), pp. 63-82.
21. Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels.. ed.” In The History of Islam in Africa, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000. 89
22. Prunier, Gérard ‘A Candid View of the Somali National Movement’, Horn of Africa, (1996), pp. p. 113.
23. Quinn, Frederick. The French Overseas Empire. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000. 219-24
24. Rosander, Eva Evers, and David Westerlund, eds. African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters Between Sufis and Islamists. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000.
25. Samatar, Abdi Ismail. “Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention.” Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 4 (1995):625-641.
26. Scott Peterson; 2000: Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda a Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa: Routledge. p.11-12
27. Shawcross, William Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers and a World of Endless Conflict (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). P.78
28. Sun-Tzu, The Art of War, Ware: Wordsworth, 1993. 55-58
29. Temple Cooley, 2004: Confronting Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Towards a Theoretical Framework of the Conditions for Successful Third Party Intervention.
30. Toggia, E, Lauderdale, R and Zegeye, A. (2001) Crisis and Terror in the Horn of Africa Burlington, VT: Ashgate, Dartmouth. 64-68