The American Civil War of 1861-1865 was the hardest and bloodiest conflict that the United States fought up to that date. Its long campaigns and fierce battles brought forth tested military leaders who came to be the embodiment of the American military art during this period. The two most notable of those were, without a doubt, Ulysses S. Grant on the Union side and Robert E. Lee on the Confederate side.
Both lived throughout the greater part of the 19th century, and both rose to particular military prominence by the middle of the Civil War. They made major contributions to the period as military commanders – Lee leading the Army of Northern Virginia and Grant commanding various forces in the Western theater and then the Army of the Potomac. It begs the legitimate question of who of these two was ultimately the best general of the American Civil War. Research indicates that Lee was a better tactician, but Grant superseded him in operational art and strategy alike and, hence, was superior to Lee as a military leader.
Generally speaking, Grant and Lee received different treatment in the annals of American history. In Grant’s case, the political atmosphere of the war and the following decades ensured that his military career would be under consistent and unfavorable scrutiny. Being a staunch Republican, Grant was often criticized for his operations by those of Democratic leanings, and this politically-motivated scrutiny only intensified during his tenure as the US President. As a result, the 19th-century historiography coined the image of Grant as an unimaginative butcher who won through sheer numbers rather than any military talent. While contemporary historians are rethinking this interpretation, it still lingers and can affect the general’s perception for the worse.
On the other hand, Lee became an icon for the Lost Cause myth and, as such, was lionized and glorified as the epitome of Southern manhood and military genius. As a consequence, he was as likely to be praised for his military performance as Grant was to be criticized. External political influences impacted the images of both generals – Lee’s to the better and Grant’s to the worse – and it is necessary to see through them.
The first logical step is to compare Grant and Lee’s grasp of tactics – that is, the ability to win a given battle. Lee’s tactical style emphasized maneuver, envelopment, and the combination of premeditated defense and vigorous counterattack when the moment was ripe. The prime example of his tactical competence was the Second Battle of Manassas of August 29-30, 1862, when Lee’s army withstood the initial assault of the Union forces and then routed them with a flanking counterattack. One may agree with John Hennessy calling it the “ultimate case study in the Army of Northern Virginia at its best.”
Grant, though, is not as known for his tactical acumen. The battles he commanded often degraded into frontal engagements with heavy casualties on both sides and were sometimes poorly prepared. An example would be the Battle of Shiloh of April 6-7 of 1862, when Grant neglected to entrench and defended and counterattacked frontally with scarcely an attempt to flank. While it is arguable whether Grant’s tactical performance was due to the personal shortcomings of lack of capable subordinates like Jackson and Longstreet, he was still a less accomplished tactician than Lee.
Next to tactics, one should evaluate the two generals’ command of operational art or the ability to continuously direct the effort of their forces throughout a campaign to the achievement of an intermediate strategic goal. As an operator, Grant possessed a laudable focus on his goal and tenacity in achieving it. He began his Overland campaign of 1864 with a clear focus on the operational goal of crippling Lee’s army and besieging Richmond. Ever conscious of this goal, he pushed onward, despite the heavy casualties Lee inflicted on him, and succeeded in reducing the latter to the state when his army was surrounded and starving.
This ability to persistently pursue a goal set for a campaign was the hallmark of Grant’s blunt but undeniably effective operational style.
Lee could demonstrate the same tenacity and focus in his operations. An example would be the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, when he forced General McClellan to retreat and evacuate in a series of determined, if not always successful, assaults.
However, he was not always that focused, as demonstrated by the Gettysburg campaign. If, as Lee’s posthumously published autobiography claims, the goal of the operation was to defeat the Union in a pitched battle, he should have used Stuart’s cavalry for reconnaissance rather a sweeping raid. If the goal was to put the army on a better logistical footing and amass supplies for it, then Lee’s commitment on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg was an over-commitment and a clear example of sunk cost fallacy. Given that, one may agree with Reardon that Lee’s Gettysburg campaign was characterized by “the lack of clear specifics.” Hence, one may consider Grant a more focused and goal-oriented operator than Lee.
Finally, it is also necessary to discuss the general’s understanding of strategy or the ability to view and plan war in its entirety – and, in this respect, Sherman was clearly the superior one. His plan of the 1864 offensive, including the Overland Campaign and Sherman’s March to the Sea to simultaneously defeat Confederate forces around Richmond and Atlanta, is an example of bold yet sound strategic thinking.
Conversely, Lee was not as adept at viewing the war strategically. In 1863, after his victory at Chancellorsville earned him some breathing space, Lee had an opportunity to reinforce the West and possibly prevent the Union capture of Vicksburg. However, he opted in favor of the Gettysburg campaign, essentially dooming the Confederacy the West and sacrificing strategic concerns for the operational expediency of fighting on a familiar theater against a weakened enemy. Considering this, there is no doubt that Grant was a better strategist than Lee.
As one can see, Grant comes superior in his comparison to Lee as a military leader. Admittedly, he was not as capable a tactician as Lee, although less experienced troops and the initial lack of competent subordinates likely contributed to his poorer performance in this department. However, his operations always had a clear focus, while Lee was not perfectly consistent in this respect. Finally, Grant always kept the strategic picture in his mind and planned his actions accordingly, while Lee’s choice in favor of the Gettysburg campaign indicates his tendency to sacrifice strategic considerations for better operational prospects. Since strategic and operational mastery is ultimately more important in winning the war than tactical excellence, one may conclude that Grant and not Lee was the best general of the American Civil War.
Bibliography
Fitzgerald, Sean. “Challenging the ‘Butcher’ Reputation: General Grant’s Strategy in the Overland Campaign.”. 2021. Web.
Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. Web.
Hennessy, John. “The Second Bull Run Campaign.” In The Cambridge History of the American Civil War, vol. 1: Military Affairs, edited by Aaron S. Dean, 120-140. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019.
Hulsman, John C. To Dare More Boldly: The Audacious Story of Political Risk. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2018.
Johnson, David A. Battle of Wills: Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and the Last Year of the Civil War. New York: Prometheus Books, 2016. EBook.
Lewis, Aaron. “The Confederate Triumvirate: Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, and the Makings of the Lost Cause, 1863-1940.” PhD diss., University of South Florida, 2020.
Long, A. L. Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, His Military and Personal History Including the Large Amount of Information Hitherto Unpublished. New York: J. M. Stoddart & Company, 1887.
Reardon, Carol. “The Gettysburg Campaign.” In The Cambridge History of the American Civil War, vol. 1: Military Affairs, edited by Aaron S. Dean, 223-245. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019.