Introduction
The phenomena related to military conflicts are considerably diverse, enveloping the areas of social, cultural, and economic endeavors. In general, war is understood as hostilities between two contending parties, the outcomes of which cannot be predetermined due to similar military power of the involved sides and the corresponding surrounding conditions. Various theories have been suggested to explain the war tactics between multiple nations, groups, and other hostile parties. A pertinent theory has been suggested by Antoine Henry Jomini, who focused on the characteristics of military encounters and suggested four maxims to achieve the positive results of such conflicts. Jomini’s theoretical principles have tremendously impacted the military tactics used since 1815, providing the army generals with specific strategies that were successfully used during the American Civil War, securing positive outcomes.
The Jomini Theory Exemplified by American Civil War
Theoretical Grounds
The military theory suggested by Antoine Jomini is one of the well-recognized approaches to army tactics, which remained especially popular during the 19th century. Based on the systematization of Napoleon’s strategies that granted him numerous victories, Jomini’s principles perfectly aligned with the contemporary expectations regarding military tactics. The four maxims devised by the military theorist incorporated the idea that an encounter could be controlled, thus securing a necessary result for the party implementing the suggested tactic.
The First Maxim
The method of conducting military operations introduced by Jomini hinges on four succinct strategies that should be implemented during the confrontations. The first maxim advises maneuvering the army in order to deploy it on strategic points of a theater of war, attempting to compromise the enemy’s communications but preserve one’s own lines. This idea focuses on the principles of mass and security, stating that it is essential to concentrate the military power at a specific place and time while simultaneously ensuring the safety of the controlled ground. From this perspective, it is also imperative to define the theater of war, the area where the confrontations would occur.
The approach to Bull Run led by General Irvin McDowell is an excellent representation of the first maxim, where the target locations and the decisive points were clarified during the initial planning. McDowell intended to threaten the entrenched confederate forces along the rail system connecting Manassas and Richmond, establishing the base of operations across the river at Alexandria. Therefore, the decisive points were marked, and the battleground area was created according to Jomini’s theoretical suggestions.
The Second Maxim
The second maxim of Jomini’s theory also incorporates the concepts of mass and security, additionally focusing on offense and maneuver principles. Arguing that it is crucial to quickly maneuver and engage fractions of the enemy’s army with the majority of one’s own, Jomini proposes that swift changes of the troops’ locations could benefit the battle outcomes. It is necessary to attack the parts of the enemies forces in a fashion that ensures one’s superiority in numbers. In this regard, while the other party remains at a disadvantage, the troops are bound to quickly perform the necessary task, maintaining flexibility and using the available initiative.
The utilization of this maxim is exceptionally evident in the battle at Chancellorsville, which consisted of the confrontation between the forces of Generals Robert Lee and Joseph Hooker. General Lee excellently executed the second maxim by maneuvering the available troops and separating them into smaller divisions. Although the commander slightly deviated from the recommendation to incorporate the majority of the army in these maneuvers, the overall idea represented the impact of Jomini’s teachings on the warfare methods utilized. Moreover, it should be noted that commander Hooker also attempted to use similar techniques to trap Lee’s troops. Nevertheless, the decision to halt the offense negatively affected the flexibility of the army, resulting in the failure of the initial plan. Altogether, it can be observed that Jomini’s principles of war, especially the second maxim, tremendously benefited the forces of General Lee during the battle at Chancellorsville.
The Third Maxim
The third maxim suggested by Jomini contains the previously discussed concepts of decisive points and mass, focusing on the most pertinent areas of the enemy’s lines. The theorist recommends throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point or upon on that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. While implementing this approach, it is imperative to highlight the areas that would be harmed the most by a concentrated attack, causing the opponent to suffer significant losses or even retreat from the battlefield.
An illustrative example of this technique is the battle on the Chattanooga between the forces of General William Sherman and General Joseph Johnston, who represented the Union and the Confederates, respectively. During this encounter, Sherman implemented the third maxim, directing his troops towards the established decisive points that were of tremendous importance for both the enemy and the Union, namely the Confederates’ right flank. By maneuvering the forces and establishing a threat for Johnston’s flank, Sherman was able to force the Confederates to retreat in order to protect their communication lines. These efforts proved to be highly useful for the Union, as their enemy withdrew from the theater of war in an attempt to prevent further losses.
The Fourth Maxim
The final fourth maxim is centered around the concept of economy and proper timing, aiming to balance the maneuvers and the attacks on decisive points to accomplish maximum efficiency. Jomini argues that it is essential to arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy. Therefore, rather than targeting the significant or weak locations only, the commanders should also launch supportive attacks or preserve the efforts.
A depiction of this principle can be observed in the battle at Gettysburg when the Confederate forces under the command of General Robert Lee fought Union soldiers led by General George Meade. Although the confederates attempted to advance the union positions, Meade implemented a defensive strategy focused on hindering the progress of Lee’s troops. Appropriate use of reinforcements that were positioned at particular locations during the battle allowed the Union to save their resources and energy, capturing initiative after Brigade General George Pickett’s failed assault. Securing the current locations and waiting for the appropriate attack moment became a tremendous advantage for General Meade, resulting in the Confederates’ retreat.
Conclusion
To conclude, it is evident that the military theory of four maxims introduced by Antoine Jomini has remarkably influenced the methods used by military professionals over the course of the American Civil War. Since 1815 multiple generals and commanders consulted Jomini’s theoretical principles in order to ensure their success on the battlefield and secure victory over the opponent. The approach to Bull Run, the battles at Chancellorvillesville, Chattanooga, and Gettysburg perfectly illustrate how the incorporation of the suggested approaches into their tactics elicited positive outcomes for the commander’s forces. As the theory addresses the basic ideas behind successful war encounters and provides a thorough overview of useful strategies, it can also be beneficial for the military professionals in the current age. Jomini’s maxims contain the most prominent elements that contribute to the success of both defensive and offensive campaigns, useful for improving the plans created by modern-day experts.
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