Introduction
The rapid spread of digital technologies and new ways of communication has made modern society more connected than ever before. As a result, the national states of the world received an opportunity to utilize the means of global communication for positive branding and self-promotion. In particular, China has made a decisive attempt to establish itself as a new global power and share its messages and values across the planet. A smart approach to global communications played a significant role in current Chinese success. In the end, China was able to gain a considerable amount of soft power and rise to prominence in international affairs despite being an authoritarian state in the world of liberal democracies.
Global Communications and China’s Discursive Power
China has one significant disadvantage compared to English-speaking countries when it comes to global communications — a limited geographical spread of the Chinese language. By July 2015, 97,89% of people exposed to the Chinese language lived only in two states: China and Malaysia (Constantinescu, 2015). Therefore, Chinese can be considered a major world language only due to the number of speakers. In terms of geographical spread, the Chinese language is inferior to English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and even Russian (Constantinescu, 2015). As a result, Chinese authorities had to promote their ideas through different channels of influence.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese officials have actively urged for changes in contemporary political discourse. In 2003 professor Zheng Bijian, an Executive Vice President of the Central Party School, announced the idea of China’s “peaceful rise” (Zhao, 2016). In the following year, President Hu Jintao proclaimed “sticking to the road of peaceful rise” as the “highest national principle” (Zhao, 2016). The same demeanor transferred to Chinese political scholars, who left their country two options: becoming a part of the Western world or establishing its own discourse (Zhao, 2016). China has chosen to create its own destiny; now, it had to develop the necessary means of communication.
To promote its newly-established independent discourse, China developed a system of global communications in which Chinese authorities prioritized media over public diplomacy. Starting from 2002, China encouraged the implementation of “go out” policies for radio and television (Zhao, 2016). For example, China Radio International started broadcasting around the world in 43 languages, and China Central Television (CCTV) established 392 channels in 141 countries and regions (Zhao, 2016). In addition, Chinese diplomatic agencies started using Twitter to develop their public diplomacy network and reach a global audience (Huang & Wang, 2019). Overall, Chinese authorities succeeded at utilizing global communications for delivering the message about China’s peaceful rise and non-interventionist political stance.
Chinese Soft Power in South Asia: Contestation between China and India
After establishing its intentions to rise peacefully, China had to apply that statement to the practice of international relations. India, a highly-populated and rapidly-developing neighboring country, emerged as a logical contender against the Chinese influence in South Asia. Unlike India, which had an advantage in the shape of pluralistic democracy and Gandhi’s legacy, China had to utilize global communications extensively to improve its image. For instance, China increased its public diplomacy budget, offered humanitarian aid on multiple occasions, and imported its language and culture via the network of Confucius Institutes (Hazarika & Mishra, 2016). In addition, China constantly enhanced communications with countries located in the South Asian region. For example, China provided Bangladesh with 70 different scholarships, organized regular diplomatic campaigns in Nepal, heavily cooperated with Pakistan, and supported Sri Lanka politically and economically (Hazarika & Mishra, 2016). Most importantly, Chinese success in communication with South Asian countries was based on the provision of support without a demand for reforms (Hazarika & Mishra, 2016). As a result, China was able to overcome the possible bias towards its authoritarian regime by proving its non-interventionism in the internal affairs of other countries.
However, China did not limit itself to communication on political and economic levels. The Chinese authorities have also accumulated a significant potential for cultural communication. Most notably, China utilized academic exchange programs and invitation of foreign students to improve the country’s image abroad. According to Shah et al. (2017), the number of foreign students in China has increased from 36,000 in 2000 to at least 377,054 in 2014. In addition, at least 459,800 Chinese students went to study abroad in 2014, which created a solid base for positive cultural exchange and subsequent improvement of China’s image worldwide (Shah et al., 2017). In comparison, in 2012, around 250,000 Indian students studied abroad, while only 33,151 foreign students came to study in India (Shah et al., 2017). Overall, China demonstrated a comparative advantage over India in regard to global communications and soft power stemming from them. A cohesive strategy combined with unconditional support to South Asian countries allowed China to beat the attractiveness of Indian democracy.
Chinese Global Communications and Soft Power in Africa
Another example of China’s global communications effectiveness can be found in Chinese relations with African countries. While economic assistance and investments in the economies of the developing African states were vital, a significant part of Chinese success should be credited to the media. Firstly, China organized exchange programs for African and Chinese journalists, with an emphasis on African journalists obtaining a positive image of China (Jiang et al., 2016). Secondly, China dedicated a large amount of resources to support African information infrastructure. In addition, China expanded its own media, such as CCTV, China Radio International, and Xinhua news agency, into the African media landscape (Jiang et al., 2016). Nowadays, CCTV’s African headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, provides coverage of African news and contemporary issues in a way, beneficial for Chinese interests. Finally, StarTimes, the largest digital TV system integrator in China, managed to become a provider of digital TV services in several African countries, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zambia (Rønning, 2016). Due to these steps, China gained an evident informational advantage in Africa and could effectively use it to sway African countries in political or economic matters.
Overall, an expansion in African mass media and communications provided important benefits for the Chinese cause and added to growing China’s influence. Most importantly, continent-wide coverage could effectively alleviate criticism towards China present in Western media. Moreover, China could utilize CCTV and Xinhua to establish its own narrative, different from the Western news agenda. Whether Chinese expansion in Africa is well-intentioned, purely pragmatic, or something in between, one outcome is certain: China effectively utilized global communications and established a strong presence for the foreseeable future.
The “Hijacking” of Soft Power
The recent Chinese advancements have raised concerns among certain scholars who blame China for abusing soft power and global communications in its self-serving interests. For instance, Walker (2016) strongly criticized China for being “among the world’s most politically repressive states”, censoring the Internet, and disrupting Western democracies. While some points of Walker’s criticism are valid, and the Chinese regime can hardly be called democratic, an attempt to blame a country for the effective use of global communications seems heavily biased.
After the Cold War, Western liberal democracies have enjoyed dominance in global communications and soft power. When China declared its ambitions to enter the game as an equal player, the West felt a threat for its superiority. Rather than trying to offer the developing countries something new and set an agenda that would be more attractive than the Chinese one, Western democracies unilaterally proclaimed themselves as the world’s elite. According to Walker (2016), “Western powers hoped to coax the autocracies toward meaningful political reform… but in an unanticipated twist the authoritarian regimes have turned the tables on the democracies”. In one sentence, the author managed to indulgently patronize authoritarian regimes and blame them for betraying the high hopes of the Western world. With such an attitude, it is hardly surprising that many developing countries support China, which has its flaws but at least is not self-righteous and judgmental.
Conclusion
After plotting a course for the “peaceful rise” at the beginning of the 21st century, China effectively utilized global communications to transmit its soft power. In South Asia, China currently managed to win the struggle for leadership against India, despite the democratic appeal of the latter. Chinese media successfully expanded into Africa, creating a solid foothold for China in the face of developing countries of the region. Due to these facts, Western democracies often criticize China for being an authoritarian state that abuses global communications and soft power. While that criticism is partially correct, most of it still comes from the self-proclaimed moral superiority and inability to beat China in the field of global communications and soft power.
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