The Islamic society has deeply rooted beliefs and teachings concerning governance, which have contributed to the recently witnessed uprising in the horns of Africa. For instance, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903–79), an ideologist of global Islamism held that all Muslims have the right to rule or constitute the executive system of government and, at the same time, have the right to depose the same government (Haqqani 6).
This practice infiltrated into the entire Muslim community such that attempts by governments of the day to alter traditional Islamic systems frequently meet violent opposition, as witnessed in Egypt during the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi. The first popularly elected president lost power after twelve months in office due to lack of patience among Muslims.
In Egypt, The Muslim Brotherhood participated in social activism and constantly criticized westernization as ways of alleviating suffering among their citizens. Hosni Mubarak’s government had adopted the economic front, which made most Egyptians extremely poor (Haqqani 8).
This group entered the political scene and convinced Egyptians that there was need to adopt a system that will include them in governance and address economic challenges. They did little to alleviate citizens from poverty when they assumed power. Their inability to fulfill the promises contributed to lose of power after one year of their election into office.
In addition, the Egyptian society remained divided on the appropriate system to use in governance, and, surprisingly, gave little attention to it, as they shifted their focus to electing new leaders (Bryant par. 4).
The failure to address the desired governance system increased the political crisis and polarized the country further since the secular system implied that Muslims came to power, but Islam as a religion failed to capture power. Clearly, Islamists inability to address the desired system of governance also led to their unsuccessful control of power.
The Muslim Brotherhood, after assuming power started experiencing ideological and generational fractures, which the group failed to address effectively thus causing internal wrangles and eventually lose of power. Even though political Islam in the Middle East nations struggles to forge unity, there are large gaps in issues that needed urgent redress.
In the Egyptian context, Islamist came to power with high promises to salvage the weakened economy and heal the political rifts; however, President Morsi went on to alienate his foot-soldier and concentrated in snatching control of all Egypt’s institutions.
The government’s inability to foster strong collaboration with Islamist allies and the army resulted in alienation of the Islamist government. This move exposed their weakness for criticism from different groups.
Apart from facing a formidable opposition, the Islamists lacked experience in governance such that when they took power, they sent delegation on more than 200 international visits to familiarize themselves with other management systems. Since the group had been working in secret, lack of transparency emerged in their governance, thus proving disadvantageous for the ruling party (Bryant par. 11).
Suspicion and mistrusts among the Brotherhood also played part in the fall of the movement. For example, Morsi went on to amend the constitution so that he could be above the judicial review during the transition period. This he did without involving his opponents, who viewed it as an act of immunity and grabbing power unjustifiably.
In addition, the Islamists did not eliminate all elements of Mubarak’s regime; for instance, felool, which went on to undermine publicly the Brotherhood that did not concentrate on reforming the state at the time, thus resulting in their ouster. A government that received majority votes did not succeed in power mostly due to their failure to apply wide governance tactics in managing their internal affairs.
Works Cited
Bryant, Christa. “Who’s to blame for the Islamists’ fall?” The Christian Science Monitor. N.p., 8 Aug. 2013. Web.
Haqqani, Husain. “Islamists and Democracy: Cautions from Pakistan.” Journal of Democracy 24.2 (2013): 1-11. Print.