In 1980, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act was passed by the Congress; within the Act, judiciary discipline measures were outlined (Hall & Feldmeier, 2012). Ever since it was passed, the Act has become a point of controversy, which is the primary product of the concerns about the constitutionality of it and whether the Act can be deployed as a means of elimination of unwanted judges. The following paper addresses the Act from the perspective of its constitutionality, the measures applicable to judges caught in misconduct and the terms of judges’ removal, as well as the terms of appointment.
To fully understand the nature of the controversy over the 1980 Act, it is worth determining whether the Act is constitutional or not. There are several factors that indicate the non-constitutionality of it. Firstly, under the 1980 Act, a complaint against a judge can be put forward by any individual. In addition, the Act does not have any sine qua non conditions except that the judge should be an effective court administrator. The description of prejudicial conduct also appears evasive, as well as the standards for behavior that might be deemed ethical or unethical. Also, the Act does not fall under the category of case or controversy as per Article III. In the Bergen v. Edenfield case, it was ruled that the procedures of case reassignment, sanctions, and impeachment are for the council to decide on, not the court (Joseph B. Bergen, n.d.). Thus, the constitutional nature of this Act can be cast doubt upon. Rather, the Act consists of internal administrative procedures that facilitate more efficient regulation of the judges’ conduct.
An Article II judge is the one involved in unethical behavior. Such behavior implies treason, bribery, and, possibly, crimes of political nature as well as crimes committed repeatedly, as established in Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States (Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, n.d.). In the same case, Judge Hastings argued for the unconstitutionality of repeated reassignment of cases from judges such as him. Although his objections were denied Hastings’ point was that the only constitutionally justified disciplinary measure would be impeachment. In reality, the Act does not determine any prerequisites to remove judges from their positions, instead allowing the cases to be reassigned, thus depriving judges of their primary authority. Whether such deprivation meets the Constitution’s intentions is arguable. The Framers of the Constitution regarded impeachment as the maxim of the judges’ reprimand. Apart from that, no other disciplinary or sanctioning methods were intended for federal judges. The Act successfully leaves the Constitution’s intention behind, although, as it can be seen from Hastings v. Judicial Conference case, the constitutionality of it is legitimized (Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, n.d.).
The Constitution provides the Congress with some authority in regulating judicial conduct. On the other hand, Article II presumes that the Congress in itself is limited in terms of its authority in removing judges. Article III, in turn, serves as a limit to the executive power of removal, as outlined in the 1980 Act, although the Congress is capable of imposing disciplinary measures over indicted judges (Remus, 2012). Still, the Congress is capable of enforcing legislations to process complaints filed against federal judges. The primary reason of such congressional authority is the diversity of standards as inscribed in the Article II and III. It is stated, thus, that civil officials of the US other than federal judges are less likely to be impeached since the standard for their impeachment is lower. Such discrepancy gives the Congress the ability to intrude into the judicial independence without violating their constitutional power over Federal judges. The intrusion, subsequently, might include passing the judges’ cases over to the Supreme Court as well as other courts that the Congress creates (Remus, 2012).
The current state of affairs makes it possible to assume there are particular groups of judges that are authorized to sanction their peers and lower-rank judges. The indicted judges and the judges who evaluate the filed claims may – and often do – belong to the same circuits. Such situation means that federal judges are appointed to life for making decisions over their peers, which may result in biased and prejudicial decisions. At the same time, appointing federal judges for “good behavior,” and the vagueness of the very notion of such behavior, increases the possibility of politically-based interventions into the judicial conduct. In other words, a judge might be disciplines as politically unwanted. If the judges are elected within fixed periods of time, it would increase their security from political pressure. Also, a fixed service term would make sure the judge composition is constantly rejuvenated. The electoral expenditures might be a serious disadvantage of such system but it would prevent the interventions and the judges themselves from politically biased conduct.
To conclude, the 1980 Act is highly controversial due to its doubtful constitutionality and the judiciary insecurity that it results in. Although impeachment is addressed by the means of this Act, it allows for federal judges to be deprived of their primary function simultaneously ignoring the idea that the Constitution intends.
References
Hall, D. E., & Feldmeier, J. (2012). Constitutional Law: Governmental Powers and Individual Freedoms (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.
Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, 593 F. Supp. 1371 (D.D.C. 1984)(n.d.). Web.
Joseph B. Bergen, Plaintiff-appellant, v. B. Avant Edenfield, Defendant-appellee, 701 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1981). (n.d.). Web.
Remus, D. A. (2012). The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct Regulation. Yale Law & Policy Review, 31(1), 33-78.