Until the past few years, Latin America was a world apart from most North Americans. The Latin American population has undergone dramatic changes during the XX century, but it still remains a developing part of the world. In other words, variations of structural-functional and conflict theory are apparent in Latin America. Various historical processes are rationalized implicitly or explicitly in various religious and political ideologies. In the intervening years arose a new phase based on neoliberal economic policies oriented to a world-system with a trend toward democratic regimes, at least on the surface (Abel and Lewis 23).
One common thread running through these phases is the need to protect economic elites, even though the expanding urban working and middle classes seek a more comprehensive distribution of income. Other pressures of change include the revolution in mass media and communication and a growing social conscience among religious communities. The paper will describe and compare Latin women and Latin men from two historical periods: the 1960s-1970s and the present-day population.
The demography of Latin America is unique in the world. Not only its rapid growth but also its socioeconomic advance will make the area even more important in the international power structure. During the 1960s-1970s, there was a great divergence in population concentration and growth, the burgeoning population of Middle America and most of South America, including Brazil.
There was a sharp demarcation between urban and rural populations, with an unprecedented migration taking place from the rural hinterland to the city (Chant, 93). An age profile distinctly differed from Europe and the United States, there were a majority of persons under 22 years old, and a comparative scarcity of the aged. This preponderance of the young or economically dependent was a factor making for slow economic growth.
The present-day situation is marked by rapid population growth. For instance, In 1990, and Latin America occupies 15 percent of the total area of the inhabited continents of the world. With a density well less than that of the world average, it is little wonder that overpopulation was not a major source of concern until the 1970s. Latin America’s rate of growth was, until the 1960s, leading the world (Chant, 76).
Currently, the annual growth rate is 1.9; only Africa is higher. The number of young people entering the fertility cycle means a population growth into the next century. In Latin America, population pressure on resources is rapidly becoming acute. Because of climate, topography, and resources, neither industrialization nor land reform is likely to solve the overconcentration of people in some areas and their comparative absence in others. Rapid growth is not an entirely recent phenomenon, but spurts in the past resulted more from immigration. In both instances, the growth shifted from immigration to natural increase, and later and more gradually in Argentina. Now the Americas depend almost exclusively on the natural increase for population growth (Chant, 38)
In spite of these changes, gender relations have a great impact on Latin women and men. During the 1960s-1970s, gender roles, which reflected the traditional instrumental, expressive axis, remained relatively intact, except for the more vibrant urban areas (Cubitt, 51). Still, during the process of industrialization and urbanization, role patterns have been modified. Instrumental options were redefined with the changes in mobility channels and occupational outlets.
Also, expansion of education, however short of its goals, has not only offered upward mobility but has also transformed societal norms and values, whether through new definitions of Catholicism, the spread of Pentecostalism, exposure to new technologies, exploding mass media, and the varied contacts the urban setting offers (Cubitt, 59).
Access to education and healthcare, the political sphere, and the economy support women and bring unexpected opportunities. Thus, Latin males suffer setbacks caused by slow economic growth and political activity. During the 1960s-1970s, Latin women have deprived of a chance to receive a good education and start their own careers. The new industrial elites are more sensitive to intellectual and social influences from abroad (Banuri 41). Their sons more often than not receive a diversified modern education, turning to the newer curricula rather than the more traditional faculties of medicine, law, and humanities. Also, Latin women are likely to attend foreign universities, many continuing into the postgraduate study (Bethell 11). Finally, Latin women continue to change.
In contrast, the position of Latin men in society has not changed greatly. Slow economic growth and political instability in some countries have not brought changes in their life. To some extent, they remain in the same stage of development as 50 years ago having access to education and healthcare. Modern Latin women emphasize stability and yet have a sense of mobility and the importance of education as a means of realizing their goals. As compared to the Latin men, they are more reactive than proactive. They have a vested interest in the status quo and yet are responsive to change. The women, as elsewhere, conform more to societal norms, especially when these are interpreted as a means of upward mobility (Wiarda and Kline 66).
The 1960s -1970s were marked by high death rates and high fertility rates. Gender relations did not have a great impact on healthcare services, but rather a class position and social location. Today, education operates as a deterrent to fertility. In a cross-continental study, the effect of education in reducing the birthrate was more evident among Latin Americans than among Africans and Middle Easterners. The wife’s education is more predictive than the husband’s.
According to Thorp (1998), this relationship exists for both the number of children desired and those actually born. Further, education appears to have a stronger effect in the city than in the country. As compared to urban areas, the consensual union is more prevalent and stable in the rural areas; also, children are more desired. A survey of Costa Rican fertility trends suggests that male dominance in rural areas may be one cause of the higher birth rate (Thorp, 39).
The principal causes of death contrast acutely with those of the advanced nations. Even allowing for inadequate reporting, gastric and intestinal disorders and pulmonary infections lead the list. Most women of Latin America do not live long enough to enjoy the distinction of dying from circulatory disorders or cancer. However, the data are not clear. The causes for many illnesses are unknown; consequently, cardiac disorders, among others, may be underrepresented (Wiarda and Kline 41).
Breastfeeding appears more often among women who attend educational programs about health care and family planning, again indicating the interlocking of variables affecting the prevention of conception. In addition, a negative correlation is found between breastfeeding and infant mortality (Wiarda and Kline 29). Moreover, for most of Latin America, the rural birthrate is one-third higher than the urban. Better medical facilities and disease prevention tend to lower maternal and infant mortality. A wider distribution of these programs could reduce somewhat the urban-rural differential (Wiarda and Kline 43).
Religion played a crucial role for Latin women during the 1960s -1970s. In the long run, the Church had limited success in converting natives; at best Christian rituals and beliefs were fused with indigenous practices. Whatever the idealism of the Church fathers, efforts of the colonists to enlist the natives in the working of the mines and plantations contradicted the purposes of the Church in its tolerance toward Indians. In regard to Afro-Americans, during the early colonial period the Church was not convinced that they had souls, but by the early seventeenth century conceded that they did (Wiarda and Kline 87).
On the whole, the Roman Catholic Church seemed to be more concerned with the welfare of the nonwhite than were Protestants in the U.S. South, possibly because of the greater economic dependency of Latin Americans, both lay and clerical, on Indians and Afro-Americans. The heightened missionary zeal on the part of the Catholics may also explain the difference, but in North America, the attitude resulted more from the Calvinist orientation to the Old Testament doctrine of ethnic superiority. Because of a lack of centralized authority, the Protestants were more sensitive to the policy of the local church community (Wiarda and Kline 76).
On the whole, British America was more of a racist society than was the Latin world. Today, even the Church has subtle effects on the status of Latin women. Since overt discriminatory practices became inappropriate, it is doubtful today that Church officials would let their private beliefs enter into relations with clergy or lay members of their parish or diocese. Church approves new gender roles for women and their professional development and careers (Thorp 19; Stephen 87).
The main similarity between the 1960s-197-s and modern men and women is that the relationship of social class to color remains fundamental. In a study of university students, upper — more than lower-class subjects were inclined to have negative stereotypes but were more tolerant in their social norms and reported behavior — possibly a reflection of paternalism in the upper class and competitiveness in the lower class. Yet middle-class have generally appeared to be more psychologically threatened when equality is granted to blacks in schools, professions, clubs, and other domains not traditionally open to them (Thorp 76).
Neither the city council nor the Union of Housekeepers has been successful in ending the practice. In much of Brazil, factors of social status, appearance, and demeanor are probably more important than skin color. Similarly, in rural areas, social class is intertwined with race (Abel and Lewis 65). Even in the Peruvian Amazon men and women cannot escape one’s ethnic origins with upward occupational mobility (Thorp 88).
In some instances, it is difficult to determine what is cause and effect, as in several villages where the indigenous members of the population occupy lower status, one more example of self-fulfilling prophecy. Status differentials seem to be at the core of prejudice and discrimination. Status and accompanying power give the individual access to more options in the economic and other relevant markets. However, there is disagreement about the relevance of status attainment as an explanation of racial prejudice (Abel and Lewis 87).
The main changes occur in the lifestyle of Latin women. During the 1060s-1970s, most of them were housewives or occupied low-paid clerical jobs. More women than men flee to the city from the countryside. They also tend to be younger than the men. The specific pattern differs from the locality. Service-oriented cities attract more females, but industrialized areas appeal to male migrants (Thorp 88). Although migration to the city is predominantly by women, it is the men who go to the coffee plantations of the South, the irrigation projects and pioneer settlements of the West, and the construction sites of the trans-Amazon highway (Green, 54).
For instance, in Brazil, three times as many men as women are involved in migration, which is primarily to agricultural areas (Green, 56). Cityward migration is rising but is more likely a second-generation event. Migration involves primarily the young and unmarried. In 1970 migration to rural areas accounted for 36 percent of the total migration in the country and primarily attracted males. However, as mobility for the above-average educated male is meager in rural areas, he finds his best opportunities in the city. As work for women is limited in the country, they are drawn to the city. Whether male or female, the migrant’s educational level may be less than the average of the host city, yet income differences are partially equalized within a few years (Green, 28).
Since women are attracted to the city for domestic service and to a lesser extent for clerical positions, cities have a lower ratio of males. Men tend to remain with agriculture and extractive industries. The low sex ratio of the city corresponds to the situation in Europe and North America but in contrast to Africa and Asia, where migration to the city is a male phenomenon (Gilbert, 36). In the African city, jobs are largely confined to commerce, construction, and industry.
In contrast to Latin America, there is almost no middle class to support servants, nor is female employment prevalent (Gilbert, 76). Women’s lifestyle, which is determined by social rank, in turn, creates the meaning of that rank or, in more professional jargon, socioeconomic class. In some instances, marriage into the newer upper-class staves off financial ruin and at the same time provides the arriviste with appropriate credentials.
It is often necessary to find new recruits for the upper class by admitting through marriage attractive and university-educated young men from the middle class. The growth of secondary and tertiary types of employment at the expense of the primary sector means new job classifications and different degrees of involvement for migrants from rural areas. Migrants often remain peripheral to industrial employment (Gilbert, 54).
Many in the lower class are found in this “no man’s land” between the rural transitional and the urban-service-industrial. The lower class consequently is diffused, unorganized, and fluid. Except for a socialist regime like Cuba, marginality, both economically and politically, best describes the situation of the lower class. Changes in communication and transportation have made for more differentiation in the rural lower class and middle class throughout Latin America. Also, in many communities, the distinction between the lower and middle class rests on the boundary of Indian and mestizo (Abel and Lewis 98; Stephen 54).
Consequently, upward mobility is easier for the male than for the female. In several countries, notably Brazil, the landed gentry is seeking marriages with the industrial and banking elite. At the same time, 60 percent of the upper class marry endogamous, nearly one-third choosing members of the professions.
The middle-class lifestyle is revealed in friendship and kinship patterns (Abel and Lewis 165). Although the frequency of social interaction varies between national cultures, visiting with friends and relatives is consistently higher in the middle class. The expense of entertainment is probably the most important reason for infrequent social activity, along with distance and other complexities of city living. In keeping with Latin American tradition, ties with relatives have priority over those with friends. Besides, members of the lower class are cut off from their relatives as they migrate to the city (Abel and Lewis 76).
In contrast to many women from the 1970s, the modern market entrepreneur is usually a woman, who aside from her economic motives finds the market serving social and recreational functions. Despite a slim volume of trade, many women sit by their wares the entire day. Bargaining usually becomes more flexible toward the end of the day; the client may obtain her or his item at a lower price, sometimes with a bit of by-play in the negotiation (Abel and Lewis 95).
The economic universe of the peasant still reflects a background of a more primitive system of barter and at the same time a desire for independence. Money exchange is gradually evolving, but it is conditioned by the degree of politicization that exists and by the peasants’ reluctance to simply exchange their serf-like position for one of being a wage proletarian. Most important, a monetary system has less symbolic value for them than for the urbanite (Abel and Lewis 98).
There is a great difference between the values and traditions of the two historical groups under analysis. During the 1960s-1970s, values and traditions were influenced by gender roles and the impact of church and religion on a common person. Latin women valued family and children, followed religious traditions and cultural ceremonies (Thorp, 1998). In contrast, for modern Latin women competition for jobs leads many to consider work a value in itself. Second, although not explicitly admitted by Latin males, women are a major value, especially for the lower class, since they are responsible for the survival and integrity of the family.
With no dependable male support, at least in most consensual unions, the female household head must provide the economic, physical, and psychological support of the family. Third, the land is a salient concern of Campesinos (Abel and Lewis 55).. Land ownership may bring prestige to the upper class, but the value of land is much more than symbolic for those who are directly dependent on it for their survival. Among the value clusters of the lower class are fatalism and resignation, and at the same time a need for escape. Many lower-class individuals accept the inevitability and differential rewards even though the number who protest the status quo is increasing (Abel and Lewis 87).
In sum, there is a great difference between Latin men and women and their role in society. In contrast to the 1970s, modem Latin women receive more opportunities than men to become independent and achieve professional success. Because cities offer more opportunities for employment of women than do rural areas, where a preference for male occupations predominates, women disproportionately migrate to the cities. However, as Latin America is broadening the nature of its tertiary employment, the sex ratio is becoming more equalized, but, as with most of the world, women are paid less than men for their labor.
Today, the movement away from traditionalism also permits the confronting of a larger range of options in residence, occupational choice, and lifestyle. The individual is introduced to more varied activities, in which mobility, urban location, and contractual relationships are the order. The inescapable result will be regional differences and the tentativeness of predicting future population trends. Government can play a critical role in stimulating health and housing. Unemployment or underemployment of the male household head forces most women to find whatever work they can.
Works Cited
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