Introduction
Legislators have for a long time traded favors when it comes to the safe passage of bills and policies that affect their districts and personal interests. Parties which could be least affected or slightly negatively affected by a certain bill will vote in support of the bill. In return, a party will have movers of the passed bill to support another bill introduced by the party so that both parties have both bills pass almost unchallenged through congress; this is also known as political logrolling.
The term logrolling was originally used to mean neighbors helping each other to move logs and eventually neighbors helping each other to accomplish a given task where each would benefit. The first legislator to mention the term logrolling on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives was Congressman Davy Crockett, and that was in 1835. Ever since, logrolling has been used to mean political favors shared among parties with a mutual interest.
Discussion
Logrolling is the term used in the House of Representatives and the Senate to mean an informal pact between members to vote for each other’s priorities. It is viewed as the trading of political power, support or votes among legislators and politicians in general to achieve the desired goal of the passing of bills, laws and policies that are of collective interest to the parties involved.
Logrolling entails arriving at a compromise involving two or more issues at a given time. Politicians are required to maintain their preferences on some political or legislative issues against their preferences on others; sacrificing their preferences for others since it is impossible to acquire both. A concession may be made to a party on a low impact issue on their agenda in exchange for the other party’s support on a highly critical issue on the agenda of the approaching party.
The latter party can then offer its support on the former’s party agenda when the time comes (Vallve, 2009). In addition, legislative parties need to undertake the supplementary role of accommodating and compensating nonconformists. The conventional party does so by providing means to smoothen the progress of internal negotiations among its members (Miller, 1999).
Influence is disseminated inexplicably between the parties in support of the majority party and within the majority party; the political influence being strewn extensively among all subgroups. This provides the members of the majority party with control in the bargaining process that paves way to the floor of the House or Congress and helps them have power over legislative results that are largely satisfactory within the involved parties even before the voting process begins.
Politicians certainly do often engage in logrolling, though they rarely tend to talk about it. Considering different involved parties have different priorities, logrolling is a tool that is often used to advance the interests of all the parties involved (Miller, 1999). Basically, the involved parties merge temporarily to form a coalition with a myriad of powers to either advance or delay bills in the legislative process. For example, two opposing parties may be pushing for two different bills at the same time.
Party A may be pushing for cuts in energy prices while party B might be supporting tax cuts. In order to pass both bills, party A will approach party B for support on their energy bill which is of importance to party A districts but inconsequential to party B, in return, party A will support party B’s tax bill which to party A is of low impact. At the end of the day, both parties will have enormous support for both their bills which are eventually passed in Congress.
Examples of political logrolling
The party with the majority in U.S. Congress maintains almost complete monopoly over the passing of bills that come to the floor of the house and this is evident in many other legislatures as well. This means that the party can influence the agenda so that the bills opposed by the party with the majority would not survive on the floor vote.
One example is the Congressional amendments of the 1985 Farm Bill. Here, there was a Coalition of legislators who were in favor of the sugar, tobacco, dairy and peanut bills, but opposed to the wheat bill. The legislators who were in support of the dairy and wheat bills were the ones with the highest number of votes.
The peanut bill was then introduced but legislators in support of the peanut bill were not involved in the voting of the dairy bill (Miller, 1999). Surprisingly, the legislators that voted for the dairy bill were also involved in the voting in support of the peanut bill. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the dairy and the wheat bills were the most costly and hence generated much more interest than the other bills.
The legislators in support of the dairy bill had gathered surmountable support for the bill and therefore tried to block another bill that would undercut the implementation of the bill. In this case, the wheat bill was the most expensive one relative to the dairy bill, and so necessary action was required to prevent the wheat bill from being approved. The accumulative support of the peanut bill was therefore a premeditated logrolling move that was dedicated at preventing the wheat bill from gaining approval.
From the above example, it is evident that facilitation of intraparty bargaining is in particular what underscores the clout of the party with the majority. The legislative assembly room can therefore be considered as consisting of an intricate compilation of sanction points, designed to impose political charge along the legislative process.
The power over such veto points is a dispensation set aside for members of the majority party who consequently have most influence over the legislative process (Miller, 1999). Such veto points are not necessarily unconditional; rather they require that recognition and rewards be honored to them in order for the majority party legislators to allow the proposed bills to safely pass through the house (Miller, 1999).
In so doing, the majority party gains the advantage of numbers and this is reflected through the sanction points. Members of the majority party are endowed with reparation for costs that might have been incurred as a consequence due to the party’s intentional or unintentional dealings (Vallve, 2009). There is also the promise for a constant income or future benefits that the party members can look forward to their build up after a sustained period of dedication and service to the party.
A good example of the negative impact of logrolling can be observed in the South American state of Brazil. In 1995 the former Finance Secretary Fernando Henrique Cardoso became the president of South American state of Brazil.
His main agenda and mantra for the country through out the campaign period was that the country’s social, trade and industry development goals would only be achieved with intense reforms in the Brazilian financial and monetary configuration (Carvalho, 2006). Among the first actions Cardoso undertook as president was to propose to the Congress a string of constitutional modifications that would pave way for the structural changes that he had planned and mentioned during his campaign.
In Brazil, a constitutional revision is first voted on by the House of Representatives where 3/5 of the members are required to approve the amendment. If approved by the members in two roll call votes, then it goes to the Senate for approval in a similar procedure. If the amendment is approved by both the House of Representatives and senate, it becomes entrenched into the Constitution.
The constitutional amendments received considerable party support when they were initially introduced in Congress because they were viewed as the stepping stone to social and economic progress. Political analysts and critics were however not convinced and a deeper scrutiny of the amendments revealed that a number of the amendments would alter and consequently eliminate a variety of public benefit, institutions and laws such as the Brazilian social security fund (Carvalho, 2006).
The amendments also proposed the privatization some governmental institutions, risking unemployment due to retrenchment, cost cutting and newer methods of management by private proprietors. The amendments there after started losing Congressional members’ support in upcoming elections.
Present in the House of Representatives at that time were 20 political parties each party ranging in composition with some having few members whereas others had up to 110 members (Carvalho, 2006). 308 votes from the total of 513 representatives who were eligible to vote were necessary in order to approve a constitutional amendment.
However, the representatives were free to vote as they wanted without formal penalties and considering the subdivisions which were inherent in each of the parties, the votes cast in support and against the constitutional amendments were basically attributed to each of the representative’s preferences. Further opposing dynamics against the amendments were the large number of political parties in Congress and the lack of party fidelity that had strong influence against the amendments.
The president was thus faced with a series of veto points that obstructed the approval of the amendments. Even though most of the amendments were passed, the votes in favor and against the presidential amendments moved back and forth to a large extent during the voting process, giving strong implications of the existence of a legislative coalition that did not have an invariable quantity of supporters (Carvalho, 2006).
If the legislative coalition supporting the amendments had had the 308 required votes to approve the amendments, the fluctuation in the number of votes would have taken lower amplitude, indicating a lack of consistent support for the government (Carvalho, 2006).
Therefore, during the four years through which the voting process for the amendments took place, representatives joined the president’s coalition and voted in support of the government depending on the settlement that they could take out from the government’s legislative coalition (Miller, 1999).
The oscillation of legislators in support and against the propositions by the governmental coalition gave strong indications that logrolling was extensively used by the government and the opposition in order to influence the number of the required 2/3 votes to give safe passage to the constitutional amendments proposed by the president. The period between 1995 and 1998, members of the Brazilian House of Representatives could have been divided into three distinctive clusters.
A constant presidential coalition that did not have sufficient votes to approve the constitutional amendments on its own, the opposition that would always vote against the amendments floored by government and a number of legislators that would support either the government or the opposition, depending on the benefits that the legislators could logroll with the government or opposition on any given voting process (Carvalho, 2006).
Consequently, the ultimate magnitude of the opposing faction and that of governmental coalition’s clout would be composed of the core of representatives of each group, plus the members of the fluctuating legislative group which would conveniently unite with either one of the groups.
In addition, there were members of the governmental and opposing factions that would at times vote against their group, depending on how best they personally understood and thought an amendment would work for or against their interests (Carvalho, 2006).
The unsuccessful attempts by the government to form a consistent legislative coalition that was powerful and influential in matters pertaining to the projected modifications of the Constitution resulted in a ferocious cycle of logrolling within the representatives.
The end result was that the government brought upon itself unforeseen elevated expenditure in the costs of running the government and payments executed in the logrolling process. Eventually, these costs became too high that soon they began to affect the citizens with introduction of new taxes, raised taxes and inflation (Steinberg. N.d).
Other examples include the involvement of single-issue parties and lobby groups in the U.S congress. These groups are well known in logrolling circles and are reimbursed for their voter support on legislative issues that are of low impact to them.
Advantages and disadvantages of logrolling
The effects of logrolling are certainly wide and diverse simply because they not only affect the legislators involved in the process, but also the citizens of a nation or district where a bill is to be implemented. Keeping in mind that the legislators are the initial benefactors of logrolling, subsequently, it is important to consider how logrolling has an impact on these individuals.
The population of a district or nation is however the most affected by the passage of a bill, for after implementation, the long term effect of the Congress decision is imposed on the population (Scoppe, 2007). Like any other process, logrolling has those that benefit from it and those who lose. There are a number of advantages in this respect and below are some of the benefits of logrolling;
Pros of logrolling
To begin with, logrolling is of immense advantage to the party with the majority. The legislators belonging to the majority party are in effect the ones who decide whether a bill will pass through congress or not. Due to this fact, any minority party wishing to introduce a bill has to go through the legislators of the majority party.
Now at this juncture, a quid-pro-quo arrangement is arrived at, and the benefactors of this bargain are obviously the members of the majority party (Steinberg. N.d). In the real essence, these legislators have done nothing to deserve a reward, but just by the mere fact that their vote is essential and they belong to a larger group, their interests are therefore addressed.
The minority party will also benefit from logrolling in that the bill they propose will not face rather harsh opposition if they engage in vote trading. In the political arena, there will always be two or more opposing groups that differ in ideology and implementation of state resources.
These groups will always be at loggerheads trying to deter each other from advancing their party’s interests (Vallve, 2009). Even though a bill might not have any effect on another opposing party, it may face stiff opposition and the risk of being thrown out of congress if no bargaining takes place. Therefore, logrolling is vital for the minority group if it hopes to push through any critical bill (Miller, 1999).
In addition, the minority party tends to tremendously benefit from logrolling in case where a legislative assembly is divided into two or more majority groupings. This is entirely so with single issue parties and lobby groups which for one reason or the other are not entirely interested in the majority of bills passed through the legislative assembly (Miller, 1999).
Such minority groups will therefore oscillate between the major antagonizing parties, their votes being reflected in support of the party that offers the most benefits. This is common in legislative assemblies where there are an almost equal number of government and opposition legislators.
Through logrolling, a number of crucial bills of national interest will pass through congress without any stiff antagonism. If both parties agree to aid each other in increasing their vote count, any bill introduced by either party will definitely sail through congress with minimum resistance.
Legislators will therefore engage in logrolling to lock in votes for bills that will bring forth considerable benefits on their own home districts and at the same time be in a position to spread a large amount of the expenditure to the taxpayers in the rest of the country (Scoppe, 2007).
The district occupants together with interest groups under the legislators involved in logrolling will also surely benefit from the logrolling process. If the occupants and other interest groups have an agenda that requires a bill to be passed through the floor of the House of Representatives, all they have to do is approach their representative and state their requirements.
The legislator will then draft a bill with the aid of his or her party and engage in vote trading. Once the deal has been sealed outside the House, it will then be presented to the House floor and voted in due to logrolling. Consequently, the population under the governance of a legislator acquires their benefits with the help of logrolling.
If we are to consider the time factor, logrolling decreases the period through which a bill will be debated upon once presented to the floor of the house (Miller, 1999). Logrolling usually takes place before the bill is introduced to the House, and if all parties engaged come to a consensus, the outstanding step is the voting process. Therefore, through logrolling, time is saved thus allowing for a larger number of bills and amendments to sail through congress consequently aiding in the utilization of congress time.
Cons of logrolling
Even though logrolling has considerable benefits to all involved parties, there are some hidden disadvantages that over the long term can take a toll on the country’s economic and legislative structures, consequently leading to either social, economic or government breakdown (Vallve, 2009). In such an event, logrolling is often left unchecked for a long time, paving way for corruption and selfish interests over the common good of the House and the public in general.
To begin, logrolling encourages disruptive politics where by political differences are highly regarded over the general welfare of the country. This is to mean that political scores are settled on the floor of the house with total disregard of the outcome of the decision (Miller, 1999).
For example, if a party wishes to pass a bill that will liberate some specific social hardships, but an opposing party which wishes to settle a political grudge, what this party will do is to logroll against the specific bill, not as a matter of principle rather of personal gratification.
Without seriously weighing the benefits of the bill, the opposing party will have the bill rejected to the detriment of the society. Consequently, the trickle down effect is shed upon the population which will continually endure sustained hardships whether economically or politically due to the hasty decisions of a few legislators with a political message they wish to convey.
Another side effect of logrolling is that it leads to an over bloated government if left unchecked. This is because one political party might require an immense number of votes to pass a certain bill which is critical to them. To do this, they will have to approach another party which might ask for cabinet position or another post in government (Miller, 1999). To fulfill this need, the ruling party will have to create a post for the other party, and consequently this brings about a bloated government in place.
In the long term, logrolling is an expensive venture for the party that seeks support for a bill, and in most cases it is the minority party that suffers. If there are no political favors the party usually ends up offering financial incentives to members of the majority party for their support. Gradually, the incentives will rise depending on the significance of the bill they propose to floor and the amount of expenses incurred through logrolling can be insurmountable at the end of the political year.
Logrolling will also involve the appropriation of public funds by Congress and other legislative assemblies for projects that are of vital importance to a lesser percentage of legislators and individuals since they are in a position to channel external taxpayers’ funds and national income into their local districts.
However, these are ventures that do not serve the welfare of the larger percentage of a country’s population. The major aim of such logrolling is to get the legislators re-elected by their constituents, but at a loss of the rest of the country’s welfare (Scoppe, 2007).
An example of such kind of logrolling which is also known as pork-barrel legislation, include legislation intended to stop the shutting down of out of date or superfluous VA hospitals and military camps in a district so that the local population can benefit from the funds directed towards these projects. The long term effect is that the government ends up channeling a large amount of money to the obstinate but unproductive projects that are of benefit to only a particular few.
Legislators involved in logrolling will at times go over their heads in that each member of the legislator will introduce strategic protective measures for projects in their home district, without considering the costs that will be inflicted on the rest of the citizenry.
Each member will vote in support of similar favor projected by other members to gain support for his protection and also in fear of retribution if they were to vote against such projects. Retribution could include the retaliation of other members who would introduce an amendment to pull out the protection generously granted to the defector’s district (Steinberg. N.d).
If such unrestrained logrolling continues for an indefinite period, the benefits granted to the districts would be excessive, in a sense corrupting the legislators and at the same time denationalizing government projects (Vallve, 2009). This would weave an intricate web of interdependence within the districts, consequently leading to inflation and inferior cross district trade relations.
In most cases, log roll voting in the U.S. House has always been characterized by considerable dissention among both the Democratic and Republican parties’ ranks. Currently, party solidity has risen even past previously high echelons, yet still intraparty divisions occur frequently.
For example The 105th Congress, set the defection rate higher than ten per cent among the majority Republicans in all non-unanimous ultimate passage votes. This carried on to the 109th Congress, where yet again, the Republican Party found itself constantly at odds on matters such as Amtrak, construction of the Dubai Port World deal, and stem cell research among other issues(Miller, 1999).
Historically, the sum of defections was of a greater number in comparison, but still the current rate of defection is evident of intense logrolling. Democrats more often than not also found themselves at odds through most of the postwar sessions in congress. For example, the Conservative Coalition formed due to the habitual friction between the liberal and conservative factions within the Democratic Party was at often times involved in logrolling through out the postwar Congress (Miller, 1999).
This brings into light another negative impact of logrolling that has to do with the divisions witnessed in political parties. As much as logrolling can be attributed to the cohesive bonding of a political party, the flip side is that logrolling can in a very real way lead to the dissemination of political parties (Vallve, 2009).
The impact of logrolling on the government budget
One of the major negative effects of logrolling is that it creates unnecessary dents on the government’s financial arrangements and therefore ends up expanding on the total annual expenses a government incurs. This point is of vital importance for it reflects on the overall performance of any given government after its ruling term comes to an end (Vallve, 2009).
There are of course several implications of logrolling on the government’s annual budget, and some once accrued over a long period of time and can have catastrophic consequences on the social, economic, justice and governing order of a country (Miller, 1999).
Apart from this, logrolling if unchecked will lead to either a weakened or partisan government where most of the checks and balances necessary for maintaining legislative order are missing. This will pave way for the mismanagement of authority and government funds, and eventually lead to deteriorating international trade relations and internal dispute. We shall now ponder on some of the effects of logrolling on the government budget in general.
To begin with, logrolling has the potential to lead to an oversize government that does not serve its intended purpose rather ends up exceeding the national budget. This point is brought forth because logrolling will always require favors to be returned and so hypothetically and also practically, it is possible for a government to exceed its size due to logrolling (Scoppe, 2007).
Consider the government side as a party which at present urgently requires passing through a crucial bill. Faced with stiff opposition, the government approaches a minority party for their voter support in ensuring the safe passage of the said bill. In return, the party proposes that it will appoint one or a number of its members or affiliates as cabinet officials or granted any other post in government.
Since the bill is of utmost importance to the government, they will be compelled to agree and sooner or later, new posts are created either in the cabinet, judiciary or public service (Steinberg. N.d).These new appointments will require their own staff offices and resources thus in the long run additional expenses will be incurred. This scenario is especially experienced in third world countries and in semi democratic countries.
Another impact of logrolling on the government budget is the expenses incurred during side payment of legislators for their voter support in ensuring the passage of bills through a legislative assembly. In some instances, a government may find itself in a position where it has no other option of returning a favor apart from providing financial incentive for support rendered after logrolling.
In this case, the government will offer monetary perks to members of the parties that provided voter support for a bill introduced by the government (Vallve, 2009). The benefits are usually procured from the coffer’s reserves and these deficits that are created are usually transferred to the taxpayers. If logrolling of this nature is sustained for a long period of time, it can be of a major blow to the government’s budget since the expenses incurred will be too high and conspicuous.
In addition to the above, logrolling is also liable for centralization of government projects to specific districts through bargaining of exclusive rights by legislators.
This is enacted when legislators support each other through protection of industries and other infrastructure, limiting them to a specific district hence denying the rest of the country an opportunity to engage in similar ventures (Scoppe, 2007). What this does is through logrolling, the rest of the country is denied an opportunity to compete in the national business industry, in a sense monopolizing the industry to a specific district.
The population of the district will therefore benefit from the exclusive infrastructure and trade unfairly through monopoly. The government therefore will be forced to stretch its budget and step in to initiate different project that will ensure that development is evenly distributed (Miller, 1999). This could be by setting up different industries to complement other monopolized industries or by setting up development project to sustain the welfare of the occupants of a given district.
Logrolling can also ensure that certain federal funded projects are kept running in a given district, even though these projects have become obsolete and are of no use to the citizenry of a nation. However, the local population in the given district will continue to benefit by receiving funds aimed at maintaining these projects. Initiatives such as military camps in a specific district may run out of date, but through logrolling, these camps are kept active though they lack military presence (Miller, 1999).
The pure aim of such camps is therefore to receive funds from the government for their maintenance, yet these funds in the actual sense are channeled to other projects within the district. Hence, as the government continues to sink funds into redundant projects, the cost implication on the government’s budget becomes even higher. This simple analogy can be attributed to logrolling and the cost repercussions on a wide scale are enormous.
Examples of government budgetary expenditure through logrolling
Governments worldwide have in one way or the other indulged in caustic logrolling that has led to serious budgetary implications. Through economic and social study, logrolling has been shown to harness a country’s financial stability to a point where the impact is felt through out the country. We shall examine in detail two case studies that have revealed the negative impact of logrolling on a government’s financial stability:
The Brazilian paradox (1995-1998)
When the former Finance Secretary Fernando Henrique Cardoso became the president of Brazil in 1995, his first priority was to reform the country’s social and economic status. President Cardoso’s saw it best to amend the constitution in order to facilitate the reforms. He proposed to the Congress a series of constitutional revisions that would facilitate better monetary policy (Carvalho, 2006).
The constitutional review required a 3/5 majority through two roll call votes in the house of representatives before being taken to the floor of the Senate for approval. The proposed amendments were granted party support after being proposed and introduced in Congress but critics exposed a few amendments that would alter or privatize a number of social structures (Carvalho, 2006).
Support for the amendments soon started to waver and the government started facing serious opposition against the approval of to the amendments (Vallve, 2009). After that, most of the bills that passed through did so mainly through logrolling, and the government had to stretch its finances and the cabinet to accommodate the benefits the other parties required to be bestowed on them(Carvalho, 2006).
The vacillation of legislators in support and against the propositions by the governmental coalition implies that logrolling was extensively the tool of choice preferred by the government in order to safeguard the number of majority votes required to ensure the safe passage of the constitutional amendments through the senate and the House of Representatives (Carvalho, 2006).
This led to a fierce cycle of logrolling within the legislators (Steinberg. N.d). The outcome was witnessed in the government‘s excessive spending articulated in the costs of running the government and side payments carried out in the logrolling process (Steinberg. N.d).These expenses became too high since the cabinet was bloated with unnecessary departments being formed, unwarranted appointments and miscellaneous expenses that totaled to millions, all because of logrolling.
By the end of 1998, the country had almost returned to its previous state, with high taxes and induced inflation to cater for budgetary deficits attributed to logrolling (Steinberg. N.d).Such a case is an important example of the ills of logrolling if unchecked and its grand effect on the government’s budget.
The Republican agenda (1929-1930)
Another example of just how logrolling can affect the government’s budget can be amplified using the action of legislators in congress during the commencement sessions of Herbert Hoover’s term as president. Early January 1929 after the Republican Party won in the 1928 elections, the party with majority members in the Ways and Means Committee was the most influential when it came to determining the tariff in the House.
The Republican members on the committee who were the majority at the time draft a bill which they presented to the minority Democratic Party committee members for scrutiny before presenting it to the whole House(Tavares, 2003).
On May 9, 1929, the bill was introduced to the floor of the House of Representatives, though no amendments or debate were raised over the bill. The Republican conference agreed on a special arrangement to consider the amendments issued by the Ways and Means Committee on May 23(Tavares, 2003).
Surprisingly, on May 24, The House passed a rule after only a short period of debate asserting that general debate on the bill is closed but Committee amendments to the bill shall always be considered until May 28 when a vote on all amendments of the bill would take place. This was a tactical logrolling strategy that guaranteed that the Ways and Means Committee had a fundamentally secured to themselves any changes to the bill, effectively shutting out the Democrats from having any say over the bill(Tavares, 2003).
Through logrolling, political arrangements had secretly been made among the Republican Party members securing the passage of the bill as a party affair. On May 28, 1929, the Hawley bill was passed by a vote count of 264, with 244 being Republicans votes and 20 Democrat votes. Opposing the bill was a 147 vote count from 12 Republicans, 134 Democrats and 1 Farmer Labor.
Through customary procedure, the Hawley bill was passed on to the Senate Finance Committee, which had the power to amend any bill presented to it from the House. On the sidelines, representatives for the farmers’ welfare were frustrated by the House’s move to raise tariffs on industrial goods to a higher level than agricultural tariffs (Tavares, 2003).
This was seen as a move aimed to undermine agriculture which was a strong economic pillar. So, on June 17, 1929, the Senate voted on a proposal that was aimed at limiting the Finance Committee to revising only the agricultural tariff, by this means maintaining industrial tariff rates at their current level.
This proposal was rejected by 39 votes, 32 being Republicans and 7 from Democrats (Tavares, 2003). The supporters of the proposal garnered 38 votes, 13 from Republicans and 25 from Democrats. Agricultural interests were thus better represented in the senate rather than the house since industrial districts were largely represented in the house (Vallve, 2009).
From May all the way to September 1929 the Senate Finance committee thoroughly scrutinized, openly debated and amended the Hawley bill to ensure it abridged more tariffs. For a number of months the Senate deliberated over the administrative sections of the agricultural tariff then went on later to consider the tariff rate schedules in the bill (Tavares, 2003).
The senators involved in supporting the proposal aimed at protecting agricultural interests further persisted for the lowering of the non-agricultural tariffs reported by the Finance committee, yet the tariffs were lower than those in the Hawley bill (Steinberg. N.d).
The agricultural coalition finally succeeded in lowering the industrial tariffs in late November, 1929 through a succession of roll-call votes in the Senate (Tavares, 2003). On March 4, 1930, the Senate completed deliberation of the bill in a committee of the whole and took the bill to the Senate floor for further debate before they voted for its passage.
Senator continued to recommend amendments and ask for new votes on good- specific tariff rates on the Senate floor, even if the exact same issue had been voted upon during the committee process (Tavares, 2003). Supporters of the increase of the industrial tariffs recommended new amendments on the Senate floor and through logrolling a new coalition of voting emerged, based on vote-trading among isolated spheres (Miller, 1999).
This coalition eventually accomplished their goal of reversing several of the tariff cutbacks that had been voted upon in the committee of the whole. By January 16, 1930, the Senate had reduced the tariff on sugar to the 1922 rate on sugar by a vote count of 48 votes, through 18 Republicans, 29 Democrats and one Farmer Labor (Tavares, 2003). The opposition gathered 38 votes, 34 from Republicans and 4 votes Democrats camp (Steinberg. N.d).
On March 4, 1930, the Senate took the bill from the committee and was once more in a position to deliberate on the sugar concern. They opted to increase the tariff on sugar even though the rate was not high enough to match the one proposed by the House (Tavares, 2003). The Senate voted in support with a 47 vote count of 38 Republicans and 9 Democrats, while the opposers garnered 39 votes, 13 from the Republicans and 26 from the Democrats side.
The proposed House bill was set to increase tariffs across most of the goods and the House’s proposal primarily targeted 845 increases to 82 decreases in tariff rates as compared to the 1922 Tariff Act (Tavares, 2003).
However, the Senate Finance Committee was responsible for restraining a good number of the industrial tariff increases in the House bill without extensively shielding agricultural product because most of the tariffs took the form of fixed customs duties. Thus, any changes in the market price of the import goods could have a large impact on the physical equivalent tariff rate.
Therefore from the above example, it is easy to see how logrolling could have easily changed the price of commodities at the point of sale through tariff fluctuations.
The effect of this is that prices of industrial and agricultural commodities were changing over and over again as long as the debate lasted. Bearing in mind that agriculture and industrial activities are some of the key pillars of the American economy, the government was therefore often required to step in to avert a situation where by inflation or deflation would be experienced (Steinberg. N.d).
To do this, the government was required to regulate the amount of money in circulation either by pumping in more money or by reducing the money. Eventually, the oscillating decisions expressed by the senate had to stretch the government’s financial capacity, consequently affecting the budget of the fiscal year (Miller, 1999). Logrolling is also a major factor to be considered when budgetary decisions are made because for one, unchecked logrolling had the potential of obstructing the whole planned budget of a given sector.
For example, by frequently changing the tariffs of the agricultural sector, the senate was exposing the whole sector to collapse since the funds available to the sector could at some point reflect a deficit, hence affecting the sector and the farmers (Steinberg. N.d).
Secondly, the logrolling that was taking place in the senate had the potential to make the government incur greater losses through loss of revenue and a decrease in exports by farmers (Miller, 1999). This would negatively implode on the country’s monetary system, considering most of the sectors that were affected by logrolling were key pillars to the economy.
Conclusion
Logrolling is a strategy used to secure votes in most of the democratic legislative assemblies through out the world. Countries with multi party systems of governance have in one time or the other engaged in logrolling without any formal knowledge of the citizenry. Logrolling comes with a great number of advantages, but the disadvantages by far outweigh the necessity.
Though it is of vital importance if any beneficial bill is to be passed, logrolling also has a flip side if not carefully monitored. In most cases, the major beneficiaries of vote trading are the occupants of a given district since their legislator is the one that is engaged in the practice.
Most legislators will go for deals that will be of utmost benefits to the population they govern, and their main aim is usually for re-election. Interest groups such as farmers also benefit from logrolling, but the outcome in the broader sense leaves the rest of the citizenry out in the cold. For this reason, countries such as the U.S and U.K have strict policies that monitor vote trading and ensure that the process is just and of eventual benefit to the citizens.
References
Carvalho, Márcio. André (2006). How logrolling can explain the failure of the government coalition in Brazil. New York: state university of New York.
Miller, R. Nicholas (1999). Logrolling. Maryland, Baltimore: Maryland: University of Maryland.
Scoppe, Cindi. Ross (2007). Logrolling, local meddling, creative lawyering at the State House. Web.
Steinberg, David (n.d). Capture or compromise? Logrolling and the political economy of exchange rate overvaluation in developing countries. Pennsylvania: university of Pennsylvania.
Tavares, Samia Costa. (2003). Which country sets the tariffs? Web.
Vallve, Rafael. Hortala (2009). Generous legislators? A description of vote trading arrangements. London: London school of economics.