Potential Effects of the division of USCYBERCOM and NSA
From an intelligence management perspective, the division of USCYBERCOM and NSA does not impair mission effectiveness yet divides the limited resources. First, it is important to consider that the NSA and Cyber Command have separate mission sets and operate under distinct legal authorities (INSA’s Cyber Council, 2018). While NSA is responsible for intelligence collection conduct, cyber surveillance against foreign powers, and espionage, Cyber Command has authority for offensive cyber operations. The close bond and cooperation of the two organizations established and maintained historically does not remain critical currently (INSA’s Cyber Council, 2018). Keeping cyber collectors and warriors under the same leadership may appear as ineffective and limiting to the autonomous mission of each. Earlier Cyber Command heavily relied on the NSA’s resources, yet the organization matured both in manpower and operations, exhibiting a greater degree of functional independence.
While there is little doubt that the two organizations can fulfill most of their missions effectively, the question regarding their adequate resource allocation is still to be answered. Shared personnel, tools, equipment, and knowledge base ensured proper execution of command and control systems used to deconflict cyber operations (US Department of Defense, 2018). Holistic training of the employees and common objectives in mutually achievable missions prevented the jeopardization of the country’s defense. Therefore, potential split of USCYBERCOM and NSA will likely result in the division of limited resources, such as highly qualified labor force, technical equipment, and tools enforcing cyber security of the nation (DoD, 2018). To prevent an insufficient distribution of resources, careful preparatory measures should be taken to ensure gradual separation of the two organizations. Though the initial call made by Obama’s administration failed to advance in Congress, potential division of USCYBERCOM and NSA can occur soon.
Risks to Ending the Dual-Hat Leadership Arrangement
The debate in regard to dual-hat leadership arrangement is ongoing and multifaceted. Ending the dual-hat leadership agreement comes with its own challenges and risks; thus, the decision has to be carried out with the utmost attention to detail and risk assessment. To start with, termination of the arrangement may lead to the unfair prioritization of support requests (Machiavelli, 2018). Special attention, accompanied with unfair treatment, can be given to the organization or mission based on the individual favor or preference of the commander (INM 660). For example, partiality for the collection of signals intelligence over the cyber operation execution can lead to the advancement of NSA’s cause over Cyber Command’s mission. Another risk to consider is an overly broad span of control, resulting in the decay of effective leadership (Machiavelli, 2018). It can be inefficient for a single commander to oversee two large independent organizations, having a detrimental impact on management.
Ending the dual-hat leadership arrangement might also contribute to the increased potential for exposure of NSA operations. Enabled sharing of resources does not guarantee its adequate allocation and violates the secrecy of the cyber tools (DoD, 2018). As the agreement ends, the tension between the staff of two organizations might accelerate. Strained relationship is harmful for the military tasks and intelligence operations in the mutually achievable missions. The tight bond between NSA and Cyber Command also has an impact on the Cyber Command’s culture and operational development (DoD, 2018). To manage the risk in the future, equities should be reconciled, and resources should be allocated as per the collective decision of the personnel. Proper balance should also be found between the war fighting and intelligence missions.
References
INM 600. (n.d.). Lecture week 11 – Leadership perspective: Managing cyber & intelligence operations [Lecture notes]. Print.
INSA’s Cyber Council. (2018). A framework for cyber indications and warning. INS
Machiavelli, E. (2018). Breaking up the dual-hat leadership of National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command: The central debate in the United States Cyber Community. Maggio
US Department of Defense. (2018). Department of Defense cyber strategy. DoD