Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini individual perceptions were largely based on the Napoleonic wars and Prussian military policies. Jomini just like Clausewitz saw the battle of the French Revolution and the various activities that shaped historical events at the time of the Napoleonic era. Jomini started the work of strategic study while he was in the military through help from General Ney, a counselor and prominent leader in the French Army. Clausewitz was also able to get lessons from Gerhard von Scharnhorst an influential Prussian Army Commander. They both were able to be appointed generals in their earlier career in the military. (Paret, Craig, & Gilbert 1986, p.694)
Jomini is remembered for his writings on Grand Military Operations and Precise of the Art of War. These are analysis of the Napoleonic period. In his writing, it is clear that he wanted to explain the ideologies of what he thought led to Napoleon’s exceptional victory. Jomini argues that simplicity and precision are important strategy in a war. He states that the idea of gathering large group of soldiers and attacking makes one to have crucial victories. He further says that the attacks should occur in areas that are weak from the side of the enemy defense. Jomini referred to this strategy as depending on the principle of the line of operation. This means that in order to succeed, the army has to make out the crucial area and then strike. The army should be gathered in large group and then push the enemy away or destroy them completely. He also said they should then be able to capture the cities so that they can have victory. (Clausewitz 1976)
Jomini classified military actions into three classes namely; strategy, impressive policies and logistics. He believed in staging the operation to achieve the required results. Jomini did not believe that political propositions are important. He argued that the government role is to appoint the appropriate army commander to go to war. The government should then leave the commander to do his job without any interference by following the scientific guidelines. Critics feel that Jomini’s strategies are very simplified and they are not flexible. For Jomini, when an experimental proof was not lining with his theory he did away with it. He was not clear on the significance of a genius and at the same time he contradicted himself on certain issues. (Paret, Craig, & Gilbert 1986, p.696)
Jomini’s book Summary of the Art of War became very influential in the mid 1840s. The military force came to use his ideas and tactics in the time of the Mexican War which happened in 1846 to 1848. His ideologies were also used in the American Civil war between 1861 and 1865. General Henry Wager Halleck used Jomini’s ideas on his military students in West Point Academy in 1846. Halleck’s analysis of Jomini’s writings was the ones that were later used in the two sides of the American Civil war. His idea of destroying the enemy totally led to many deaths and hence stretched the civil war. (Sun 2003)
Clausewitz is well known for his Thesis on War, which differed from Jomini’s, believes. Clausewitz felt that strategic plans and tactical methods were not very important. He believed that being able to point out permanent essentials of the war and being able to realize how they work was crucial. He felt that leaders ought to be well learned on the abstract understanding of the war and ensure that the assumptions have to be really flexible. The major concept that leaders should understand is that they have to be prepared to make adjustments in cases where modern weapons come up. He further argues they should be flexible and ready to change with time. He stresses the significance of a war genius where he feels that a weapon can change the results of the war. (Sun 2003)
Clausewitz unlike Jomini argued that war was a major and accepted expansion of political principals, a critical instrument to peacemaking. He said that war is just but extension of policy through other ways. He felt that a war could be both complete and incomplete. He further felt that war was a huge trinity that involved cruelty and obsession, improbability, chance as well as probability. It also involved political intentions and outcomes. Resistance involving a genius to him could make a difference in the result of a conflict that comprises of the same sides in terms of strength. (Paret, Craig, & Gilbert 1986, p.702)
Critics of Clausewitz argue that he did not address well the moral concerns of the war. He argued that moral values are political issues and not things that are important in the art of war. He did not also address the issue of sea power that Jomini had talked about an issue. His theories however, are mainly compliant with the complete force idea of sea, land and air. His Thesis on War has a lot of weight on the political importance and objectives of fighting. He talks about destroying the enemy and acquiring of territory as the main benefits of the war. These strategies and ways used today are as essential as they were in Clausewitz’s era. For instance, the Persian Gulf War shows how force was employed as a vital diplomacy. The strategy was made in the national rank and significant action followed, leading to a great victory. The Vietnam War as well as the Gulf War collaborate Clausewitz and even the victory of the Cold war. (Clausewitz 1976)
Although Jomini and Clausewitz differed in many ways, they have a number of similarities. Some intellectuals accuse them of maintaining desperate obsession with the large wars. Their careers were alike in that they both received strategy education and they depended on experimental facts to create their ideas. They both got assistance from significant mentors who nurtured their ideologies. They also achieved generalships and later they felt dissatisfied with their positions and had to take positions in the Russian Army. They also had an agreement in the fact that armies can wholly win when they use complete attack. (Clausewitz 1976)
The Clausewitz and Jomini’s theories have created a great impact on the military work even to the modern day. Their various works have received great criticisms from military intellectual but they have also received approval from many. Their works despite being very old are very influential even today. Their views vary in many different ways and many scholars feel they have no similarities. The similarities are few but their general work is exceptional. The two men spend their lives writing tactics to use in order to be able to achieve victory in battle. Their writings have been adapted in a number of wars. Their works will be remembered even in years to come.
References
Clausewitz, C.1976, rev.1984, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paret, P, Craig, G, & Gilbert, F.1986, Makers of modern strategy: from Machiavelli to the nuclear age, Ed, Oxford University Press, pp.687-941.
Sun, T.2003, The Art of War, New York City: Barnes & Noble Books.