In this article uses game theory is used to illustrate how the Iraqi Conflict may become more dangerous for U.S. & Alled forces. How does game theory help us understand and prehaps predict solidarity among ISF and DI forces? Do you think this is accurate?
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In the article, the game theory has been specifically used to assist us in understanding and even predicting solidarity between indigenous security forces (ISFs) and domestic insurgents (DIs) in the Iraqi conflict. This has been achieved by demonstrating how ISFs and DIs, the two players within the simple form games (SFGs) of the model, will cease from attacking each other due to failure to achieve Pareto optimal positions and instead seek cooperative relationships referred to as Pareto improved positions. According to the game theory, both ISFs and DIs will be pushed to start cooperating not only due to their ever constricting expectations in the Iraqi conflict but also because of the destabilizing influence initiated by strange attractors led by the United States (US) and coalition forces.
To avoid losing everything in the Iraqi conflict and upon the realization that neither ISFs nor DIs have the capacity to achieve optimal outcomes from the conflict, it is predicted that the two major players will commence cooperation at a greater level as they reach a point of mathematical corruption, effectively making the US and coalition forces to suffer casualties at a mounting rate the longer they remain engaged in the Iraqi conflict. Consequently, as the two players become increasingly frustrated and as the US-led strange attractors continue to preempt any effort by the two players to achieve the preferred equilibrium, the Nash response between ISFs and DIs will be hastened to ensure that the two players gain more outcomes by conspiring rather than attempting to combat each other. In my opinion, it seems that the prediction of solidarity between the ISFs and DIs is accurate due to the realities on the ground, whereby there is increased cooperation between Iraq police officers and insurgents to defeat the coalition forces (Brightman 36-41).
According to this article, why are U.S. and coalition forces considered ‘strange attractors”? Do you agree or disagree?Although this shows a creative application of game theory to resolve a decision, Do you see any possible flaw in the application of game theory to resolving this issue? Explain.
According to this article, the US and coalition forces are considered strange attractors because they do not affect the SFGs model, and their only predominant role relates to accelerating the model towards equilibrium (Brightman 39). In my opinion, the US and coalition forces qualify to be called strange attractors because their role is not in any way related to any of the possible outcomes sought after by the ISFs and DIs. On the contrary, they are responsible for causing continuous instability in the effort to achieve Pareto optimal position and hence consciously or unconsciously assist the two competing players in moving towards a Pareto improvement position, also known as cooperative bargaining.
This observation is consistent with the view of the article’s author, who suggests that “the presence of strange attractors such as the US and coalition forces, foreign-terrorist entities, and other third-party interests may serve to hasten this process in an increasingly bifurcating model” (Brightman 39). Lastly, there are some flaws in the application of the game theory to resolving the Iraqi conflict, as a critical appraisal of the article demonstrates that the author does not convincingly explain what could happen if both ISFs and DIs stick to their expectations or demands to avoid the famous Nash equilibrium. Additionally, in my opinion, the author fails to provide reasons why the two players react the way they do in the face of the continuing instability. In my considered observation, it is inherently impossible to rule out a scenario whereby neither of the main players may want to enter a compromise.
Brightman, Hank J. “Nash in Najaf: Game theory and its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict.” Air & Space Journal. 21.3 (2007): 35-41. Print.