The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) has strict policies regarding bribery of foreign officials. Paulus and Michalikova (2016) note that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is one of the critical elements of battling the corruption on a worldwide level. However, several issues affect the implementation of the policies by the countries. As Jensen and Malesky (2018) stated in present day, there is little evidence suggesting that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was effective in battling corruption worldwide. Further research is required to determine aspects that are hindering sanctioning against people involved in bribery.
Liu (2018) argues that an essential aspect of the anti-bribery policies is the approach people take when interpreting the convention. This, in return, has a direct impact on the development of strategies. The author recommends procedures for a better understanding of the aspect of fighting corruption (Liu, 2018). One of them is “rational choice” which focuses on the issues with enforcing the policies. Liu (2018) argues that the approach is essential to understand the impossibility to monitor the anti-bribery policies in a centralized way. The second approach is institutional, which focuses on the “unconscious enforcement” (Liu, 2018, p. 615)
In most cases, the focus of the policies against bribery is on the actions of the state. However, those are not the only participants that need to be considered. Jensen and Malesky (2018) emphasize the de facto determinants that influence the implementation of OECD anti-bribery policies. Firstly, individuals, companies, and non-governmental organizations are the typical subjects of bribery of foreign officials. When examining the policies only with regard to the state actors many important factors can be lost. Secondly, the OECD convention was signed by the wealthy democratic states, leaving out a significant part of the countries (Jensen & Malesky, 2018). It can be argued that this leads to a bias attitude from these states when evaluating the levels of corruption. As Jensen and Malesky (2018) stated: “the agreement not only reduces investors’ willingness to bribe but also their willingness to honestly answer survey questions regarding their engagement in the activity” (p. 34).
Paulus and Michalikova (2016) argue that the inability to enforce the anti-bribery policies is connected to the heterogeneous environment of the European Union (EU). In addition, the EU is utilizing the convention as a guide to creating their policies. A significant problem with this is the fact that the Convention lacks direct recommendation on the enforcement. The lack of specific recommendation results in countries being able to decide on their own how to implement the anti-bribery laws. Considering the heterogeneous environment of the EU, this can enhance the issue with implementation. The authors examine the probability of countries opposing the enforcement, noting that the East European countries are more likely to be against the policies due to internal factors. As Brewster stated, only half of the countries that signed the agreement have prosecuted a person according to the Convention (as cited in Paulus and Michalikova, 2016).
Overall, the OECD’s policies regarding bribery are an effort to fight corruption on the international level. However, there are significant flaws in the document that results in issues with implementation and enforcement. The policies are subjected to different interpretations. An additional problem is lack of direct recommendations on how to enforce the Convention. Finally, the document does not consider nonstate actors – companies and individuals that participate in the corruption.
References
Jensen, N. M., & Malesky, E. J. (2018). Nonstate actors and compliance with international agreements: An empirical analysis of the OECD anti-bribery convention. International Organization, 72(1), 33–69. Web.
Liu, L. (2018). The dynamic of general compliance with the OECD anti-bribery convention: Two interpretative approaches. Crime, Law and Social Change, 69(5), 615–656. Web.
Paulus, M., & Michalikova, E. (2016). OECD anti-bribery policy and structural differences inside the EU.IES Working Paper, 23. Web.