Post-Cold War Era and Covert Activity Coursework

Outline

This paper examines three questions namely with the varying threats of the post-Cold War era, how should the United States realign the Intelligence Community?; Do covert operations offer short-term or long-term solutions?; and how has covert action been used by various U.S. Presidents as a means to avert regional threats?

The hypothesis of the first issue states that despite a complete review of the intelligence community post 9/11, the intelligence community still requires realignment. After an analysis of the varying threats and issues, it is opined that realignment is required in command and control structures, responsibility and accountability, Turf warfare, Cold War mindset, protection for whistleblowers, fear of failure, degraded human intelligence capability and insufficient monitoring of domestic groups.

The hypothesis of the second issue states that more often than not, covert operations mounted by the United States have provided short term benefits and long term headaches. An analysis of all long and short term successes provide the opinion that covert operations provide greater short term benefits rather than long term solutions.

The hypothesis of the third issue states that since 1947, all U.S. presidents have used covert action to avert regional threats. Analysis of decisions taken by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations provides the final opinion that all Presidents since 1947 irrespective whether they were Republican or Democrats have never shied away from using covert action to safeguard American national interests.

Final Discussion

With the varying threats of the post-Cold War era, how should the United States realign the Intelligence Community?

Hypothesis

The present security environment is fraught with uncertainty with growing threat from non-state actors, global terrorism, internecine conflicts, sectarian divides, WMD proliferation, piracy and drug trafficking. Post 9/11, a review of the entire intelligence structure of the US was undertaken and all 16 intelligence agencies were placed under the central coordination of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). While the 16 agencies ostensibly look after the entire spectrum of domestic and foreign intelligence gathering, there are many weak areas that require attention.

Analysis of Issues

Despite the restructuring, systemic and organizational difficulties abound. ‘Turf Wars’ still persist¹ which does not help in the overall cause. The restructuring in 2004 left many gray areas in ‘command and control’ that have now surfaced publicly as an open spat between Dennis Blair, Director DNI and Leon Panetta, Director CIA. The dispute points to the prevalence of ‘Cold War mindset’ in the CIA and the agency’s apparent refusal to accept changes² to its powers after the restructuring. Thus further structural reforms are necessary to clearly demarcate the definitive parameters of overall command and control, limits to authority, responsibility and accountability of each intelligence agency giving a clear cut hierarchy. Whistle Blowers from within the ranks of the community still do not get the level of protection they deserve. In fact, the Obama administration is seeking to limit the protection to whistle blowers³, a move that is likely to become counterproductive as the ‘checks and balances’ in the system would be removed leading to higher degree of corruption and unaccountability in the intelligence community which would not augur well for the country.

Intelligence failures leading to the 9/11 attacks as well as the Iraqi WMD dossier points to gaping weaknesses in the American intelligence gathering networks. The main failure has been of human intelligence. The technicalization of the Intelligence Community under the stewardship of Admiral Turner vastly increased the agencies ability to remotely eavesdrop on the global community but downplayed HUMINT leading to glaring weaknesses in intelligence collection in the field that led to the bombings of American embassies in Kenya, Uganda and the 9/11 attacks. As a result, the US intelligence community had fewer intelligence operatives in the hotspots and hence has to rely on secondary sources who often feed false information leading to faulty analysis. In the Iraqi dossier case, it was a well known fact that evidence was never clinching or satisfactory and at least one CIA analyst had reported his doubt on the genuineness of the operative ‘Curveball’ on whose information a large part of the dossier was built up. However, neither the CIA director nor the Secretary of State at that time was aware of this fact⁴ pointing to a possible suppression of facts. The dangerous art of US citizens going deep undercover into enemy lands needs to be resurrected as local recruits may turn out to be double agents. After the false Iraqi WMD dossier fiasco, intelligence agencies are tending to ‘hedge’ their analyses which can prove to be counter-productive. Therefore, the leadership needs to encourage honest assessments and remove the fear of retribution from its intelligence operatives if the overall aim of gathering credible intelligence is to be achieved.

Domestic intelligence gathering has focused more on racial profiling and gathering intelligence on suspect communities. However, extreme right wing groups and emerging ‘white’ sympathizers for extremist causes have not received adequate attention. The possible nexus between drug traffickers and extremist organizations operating from the U.S. soil also seems to be a weak area for which the intelligence agencies charged with domestic intelligence need augmentation. While the Nation of Islam has not yet shown propensity to emulate Middle Eastern terror groups, possibility exists. Domestic intelligence agencies therefore need to widen their intelligence networks significantly so that future ‘Timothy McVeighs’ do not happen⁵.

Opinion

In conclusion, this author opines that the principle weaknesses include systemic problems of clearly defined command and control structures, responsibility and accountability, Turf warfare, persistence of a Cold War mindset, weak protection for whistleblowers, fear of failure, degraded human intelligence capability and insufficient monitoring of domestic groups are the areas that require realignment by the intelligence community.

Do covert operations offer short-term or long-term solutions?

Hypothesis

Covert operations are launched to protect national interests in the shortest possible time as they allow the leadership means to employ tactics outside the pale of domestic and international law. More often than not, covert operations mounted by the United States have provided short term benefits and long term headaches.

Analysis of Issues

Some of the covert operations have provided long term benefits. For example, the support initiated by CIA operative Major General Edward Lansdale in 1950 to Philippine leader, Ramon Magsaysay helped stave off spread of communism in Philippines⁶. This act has proved to be a long term success as to date Philippines has remained a democratic country and a firm U.S. ally. The greatest long term success that covert operations by the U.S. achieved was in winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Covert operations spanning the entire globe over four decades finally achieved the stated aim- the defeat of the Soviet Union and the retreat of Communism as an ideology world wide.

Some of the Cold War covert operations in themselves were a failure. Covert operations in Indo-China and Vietnam proved to be disastrous. In the short term, the CIA aid to the French Forces in their fight against Communist forces, by providing air logistics and troop supply through the CIA run Civil Air Transport (CAT) company⁷ did provide succor to the beleaguered French troops but ultimately led to their defeat and withdrawal. CIA support of Ngo Din Diem as the leader of South Vietnam to help shore up their fight against Communist North Vietnam failed. The so called Laotian ‘domino’ that acted as a CIA base during the Vietnam war nonetheless failed to defeat communist forces in Vietnam and in the long term left a region devastated by war and anti-Americanism which has taken over three decades to partially rectify.

In 1953, the government of Dr Muhammed Mossadeq of Iran was overthrown by an armed coup with covert US assistance to install Reza Pehalavi as their puppet⁸. The short term benefit for resorting to this act was to regain control over Iranian oil which Mossadeq had threatened by throwing out American oil companies from the region. In the short term, this covert operation succeeded in its aim of ensuring American oil interests in Iran but in the long term proved to be disastrous. Reza Pehalavi resorted to an autocratic corrupt rule and tried to westernize a deeply religious Islamic society which resulted in his overthrow by Ayatollah Khomeini. With the Iranian revolution, America not only lost its oil interests in Iran but also leverage with the Iranian government. Hence the long term effects of instituting a puppet regime proved to be counterproductive.

In Iraq too, US intelligence services recruited in 1959, Saddam Hussein to take part in assassination of Iraqi Prime minister Qasim who was poised to hurt American oil interests in Iraq. The act installed a cruel Baathist dictatorship in Iraq. In the short term, the operation worked and Saddam did provide American oil companies sufficient royalties in Iraqi fields. But later, Saddam became tyrannical, persecuting his own populace that was compounded by his megalomaniacal attempt to seize Kuwait leading to Gulf War I. In the aftermath, American oil companies lost their lucrative contracts and were the most probable cause of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Under Saddam, Iraq was committed to a secular, nationalist ideology”⁹.Iraq at least had stable governance, now the country is fragmented beyond redemption and there appears no end in sight for the cessation of internecine conflict. Thus the short term benefit has turned into a long term headache for the U.S.

After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA launched a massive covert operation funnelling in millions of dollars and arms into the region to the Mujahidin, Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. The CIA used the ISI, Pakistani secret service as the main conduit. In the short term, the American planners achieved their aim, of defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and ensuring their retreat. But in the long term they left a region armed to teeth, with funds being diverted by the ISI to fuel their proxy war in Kashmir with arch rival India and an Islamic fundamentalist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The same Osama Bin Laden who was a hero in the Afghanistan war became the main architect of 9/11 attacks resulting in the current U.S. deployment in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Thus the short benefit turned into a long term headache yet again for America.

Opinion

The author of this paper opines that while there have been some instances where covert operations have provided long term benefits, these have been more due to chance rather than design. Thus it can be emphatically stated that covert operations provide greater short term benefits rather than long term solutions.

How has covert action been used by various U.S. Presidents as a means to avert regional threats?

Hypothesis

Since the establishment of the intelligence community by the National Security Act of 1947, all U.S. presidents have used covert action to avert regional threat and safeguard American national interests.

Analysis of Issues

The regional threat to American oil interests in the Persian Gulf were first posed by Dr Muhammed Mossadeq of Iran who had thrown out American oil companies from Iran. In 1953, President Eisenhower used the CIA to engineer a coup to overthrow Mossadeq and install Reza Pehalavi as the President. In Guatemala, 1954, President Eisenhower enlisted the CIA to overthrow the socialist President Jacobo Arbenz that led to the installing of the Chief of the Armed Forces General Enrique Diaz¹⁰ in power. The presence of a communist ruled Cuba right at its doorstep was a thorn in the American planners’ side. In 1961, the Kennedy administration empowered the CIA to infiltrate U.S. trained Cuban rebels into Southern Cuba at Bay of Pigs with the express aim of overthrowing the Castro regime which ended in failure.

The Marxist presidency of Allende in Chile threatened to spread communism across much of Latin America. To counter that threat President Nixon used the CIA in 1973 to first aid the assassination of Chile’s armed forces chief and then overthrow Allende, backing Augusto Pinochet to take over as the military dictator of Chile¹¹. The operation worked, Pinochet ruled Chile with an iron hand till 1990 and communism was checked in Chile. In the mid 1970s, Angola became the ideological battleground between communism and democracy. The Soviet Union backed one of the factional groups, MPLA¹² who wished to establish a communist state in Angola. Cuba too decided to aid the Marxist cause by declaring its intentions to send Cuban troops to the strife torn country. President Gerald Ford, realizing the danger of a major oil producing African nation coming under communist sway, ordered the CIA to carry out covert operations in Angola. From 1975 onwards, the CIA entered the Angolan civil war training pro-west UNITA rebels and employing mercenaries where required.

During the Carter administration in 1980, the threat posed by Iran galvanized Carter to employ CIA in carrying out covert action firstly to rescue American hostages in Tehran under Operation Eagle Claw which was a spectacular failure¹³. In the Reagan years 1981-1989, covert operations took the centre stage for countering regional threats across the globe. In Nicaragua, Reagan authorized the CIA to oust the unfriendly Sandinista government¹⁴ that was considered as a regional threat since it had supported left oriented rebel movement in neighboring El Salvador. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a direct threat to American oil interests in the Persian Gulf. Since direct conflict with the Soviet Union would have triggered World War III, President Reagan chose to unleash the CIA who were given a free hand to arm the Mujahidin with not only small arms, ammunition and money but also stinger missiles and secret training in camps for the Mujahidin in Pakistan¹⁵. The operation was a stupendous success that ultimately broke the back of Soviet power leading to its ultimate demise.

After the First Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s policies started posing direct challenge to American influence in the Persian Gulf already affected by a hostile Iran. The idea of regime change was officially promulgated by the Clinton administration through the signing into law the Iraq Liberation Act on October 31, 1998¹⁶ under Republican pressure that called for the American administration to support dissident Iraqi community’s efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein and institute a democracy in Iraq. Here too the CIA led the way providing arms, money and training to Iraqi dissidents which were stepped up under George W Bush that was backed up by a conventional attack that finally deposed Saddam Hussein. The CIA under the Bush administration carried out many clandestine operations including the now cancelled secret assassination plot¹⁷ to avert regional threats posed by Islamic fundamentalists.

The current Obama administration too has not shied away from using covert operations to avert regional threats as is evident from their continued use of CIA drones and operators in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to counter the terrorist organizations.

Opinion

Though Republican Presidents have shown more alacrity and propensity of using the intelligence community to carry out covert action to avert regional threats, the Democratic Presidents too have not shied away from using covert action whenever American national interests had to be safeguarded.

Bibliography

Cashman, Greg, and Leonard C Robinson. Introduction to the Causes of War. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion, 2001. NY: Penguin, 2005.

Kressel, Neil Jeffrey. Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror. Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002.

Lewis, Bernard. Islam and the West. NY: Oxford University Press, 1993.

LoBianco, Tom. “Obama-backed Bill Worries FBI Whistleblowers.”The Washington Times. 2009.

Mazetti, Mark. “Turf Battles on Intelligence Pose Test for Spy Chiefs.”The New York Times. 2009.

Nashel, Jonathan. Edward Lansdale’s Cold War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005.

Paul, James A. “Oil Companies in Iraq.” Global Policy Forum. Web.

Prados, John. President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II. NY: William-Morrows, 1986.

Rubin, Barry M. Crisis in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. NY: Routledge, 2002.

Theoharis, Athan G, and Richard H Immerman. The Central Intelligence Agency Under Scrutiny. Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2006.

Warrick, Joby. “CIA Assasin Program Was Nearing New Phase.” The Washington Post. 2009. Web.

Footnotes

1. Mark Mazetti, “Turf Battles on Intelligence Pose Test for Spy Chief”, The New York Times,2009. Web.
2. Ibid, ¶9.
3. Tom LoBianco, “Obama-backed Bill Worries FBI Whistleblowers”, Washington Times, 2009. Web, ¶7.
4. Greg Cashman and Leonard C Robinson, Introduction to the Causes of War, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 324.
5. Neil Jeffrey Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002),220.
6. Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War, (Amherst: Univ of Massachusetts Press, 2005),1.
7. Athan Theoharris and Richard Immerman, The Central Intelligence Agency Under Scrutiny, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2006), 164
8. James A Paul, “Oil Companies in Iraq”, Global Policy Forum. Web. 14.
9. Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West,(NY: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152.
10. Theoharis and Immerman, 27.
11. Ibid, 323.
12. Ibid, 178.
13. John Prados, President’s Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War, (NY; William-Morrows, 1986), 352-353.
14. Theoharis and Immerman, 180.
15. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion, 2001, (NY:Penguin, 2005), 55.
16. Barry M Rubin, Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, (NY: Routledge, 2002), 185.
17. Joby Warrick, “CIA Assasin Program Was Nearing New Phase”, The Washington Post, 2009. Web, ¶2.