Relevance of Building Democratic Institutions in Russia Essay

Introduction

Civil liberties have eroded after the collapse of the former USSR. The rising authoritarianism has placed democratic institutions and civil society in jeopardy. Although Russia has assumed a leadership role in both the Group of Eight (G8) and the Council of Europe, two institutions defined by their members’ economic strength and democratic values Russia’s prominent role in these two important intergovernmental organizations has brought its continuing violations of human rights, disrespect for the rule of law, and undermining of democratic institutions into the spotlight. Reddaway and Dmitr (2004)

By response, President Putin’s government justified its tightening of restrictions on critics of Russian policies in Chechnya as important in the fight against terrorism. But with time, the Russian government has continued to carry concerted efforts in weakening and controlling all independent organizations involved in promoting democracy and human rights throughout the country.

The need for strong institutions

The civil society

The civil society in Russia has been grossly undermined by the current regime. For example, in his May 2004 address president, Putin attacked the civil by saying it was working with NGOs with foreign interests and against the interests of Russia and its citizens. This in essence added to the suggestions of academics Igor Sutyagin and Valentin Danilov on fabricated charges of espionage the development of an extensive civil society is a real chance that can help the development of many NGOs.

Political parties

In 2004 Putin’s party in the Duma had two-thirds of all seats. Such a majority was far enough to enact legislation of any kind and to change the constitution to suit the President. Indeed December 12, 2004, Putin was able to sign into law a bill that ended the election of regional governors. This gave the President the right to appoint Governors, thereby eliminating the possibility of any parliamentary or regional opposition.

According to Human Rights Watch, opposition parties have been either decimated or eliminated altogether, in part due to the much-flawed elections of December 2003I An a truly growing or democratic society the need for vibrant and independent political parties which can contest elections is indispensable. In addition, there is a need for strong opposition Parliament with the ability to give alternative policies and serve as a training ground for future governance.

Growth of a business community

The destruction of the business community started with the destruction of the Yukos and the ultimate seizure of its assets. The Kremlin has made it clear that Russia claims all oil and gas reserves in the former Soviet Union in addition to the ownership of the pipelines which transit the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The outflow of investment from Russia over the past year and a half confirms that the business base which could support alternative political views inside Russia is shrinking rapidly. The elimination of a politically active business community was precisely what President Putin intended to bring about by the arrest and subsequent show trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Thus there is the need for the growth of a business community that can support the opposition financially and provide checks and balances to the regime’s use of government resources and corrupt business allies (, Shevstova; 2004)

Independence of the media

After ascending to power Putin and his government took control of Russia’s last independent national television networks and silenced the editorial teams at several national newspapers and weeklies. Freedom House recently downgraded Russia’s freedom of the press ranking to ”not free.” IREX, which recently published its second annual Media Sustainability Index for Europe and Eurasia, reported that Russia had witnessed serious backsliding in freedom of speech, the ability of its citizens to receive a variety of independent news sources, and the quality of news and information its citizens receive. Reporters without Borders, which just published their first worldwide freedom of the press index, ranked Russia 121st out of 139 countries assessed one of the worst performers in the post-communist world even below Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. When asked at Columbia University last week about recent state suppression of independent media, Putin cynically responded that his government could not repress independent media in Russia because Russia has never had any independent media to repress

The U.S.-funded independent media program in Russia has helped raise the quality of print and broadcast journalism and contributed to Russia’s movement toward an independent, self-sustaining local television network. USAID’s Internews project, USIA’s grant to the

Russian-American Press Information Center (RAPIC) and a number of small grants awarded to Russian nongovernmental media organizations by NED and the Eurasia Foundation have strengthened independent media by donating equipment and broadcast materials to hundreds of local television stations, teaching reporting skills to print and broadcast journalists, and providing training in business and marketing to media managers.

According to the State Department, the growth of independent media in Russia began in 1990 during the Soviet era with the official abolition of press censorship. The new openness created a conducive environment for independent news reporting, as print and broadcast

media, both still largely state-owned at the time, frequently aired views highly critical of the Communist government. Currently, print and broadcast media in Russia represent a wide range of opinions. Most operate unhindered from the Russian government and many are Privately owned. (World Bank; 2004)

Russian and U.S. officials said that the principal threat to media independence in Russia today is the weak economy. For many media organizations, advertising revenues are insufficient for continued survival, forcing them into bankruptcy or joining larger affiliates,

thereby curtailing their independence and capacity to produce their own programs. According to the U.S. and other observers, many print and broadcast outlets also face pressure from local political authorities or from organized crime, in large part due to their dire financial situations. Yuri Fedorov, (20003)

An independent media with the capability to distribute printed materials and with access to at least one independent television station is of great need to Russia but this is one major area where the government has seriously suppressed democracy. It has been most comprehensive and ruthless in its attack on independent media. The major television and radio stations are now under state control. The editor-in-chief of Izvestia was fired for attempting to cover the tragic terrorist attack on the school children of Beslan, and two journalists attempting to travel to Beslan appear to have been drugged by security services.

The state of journalism is one of fear. According to Amnesty International, the security services are target independent journalists for harassment, disappearances, and killing. It should surprise no one that the distinguished Committee to Protect Journalists lists Russia as one of the World’s Worst Places to Be a Journalist in its annual survey.

Control of the military

Civilian control of the military and security services is essential to ensure that armed force will not be used to suppress civil dissent. International assistance like the US assistance projects intended to strengthen civilian control of the Russian military, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and a USAID-funded Atlantic Council project, had not made much progress due to a lack of interest by the Russian government

According to DOD, the IMET program is a long-term initiative that aims at influencing the younger, promising officers of foreign militaries who will rise to positions of prominence during their careers. But available evidence showed that there is little progress achieved in identifying and selecting these officers due to the Russian government’s unwillingness to cooperate with fully use the IMET program.

Since the Russian military retains firm control of its operations little has been made to exert greater civilian control. Uniformed officials are also predominant at the Russian Ministry of Defense and that political circumstances in Russia make the implementation of a U.S. Civil-military program in Russia very difficult

There is also apathy towards Western assistance from government departments as it is widely suspected that civil-military assistance is made to weaken Russia militarily. In addition, deep cuts in defense spending have made making civilian control in the Ministry of Defense more complex, as significant hiring of civilian employees is unlikely, especially with the large numbers of currently unemployed military officials.

Independence of the judiciary and rule of law

The strength of the law and legal institutions impacts the development of economic institutions and democratic practices. Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger (2004), A region’s constitution is a good and the most logical starting point. The Komi’s and Bashkortostan’s constitutions provide the executive to maintain and extend power in his own region. After their enactment, the laws and legal system of each republic have always been used for manipulation of political executives who ignore judicial rulings. Thus important laws and constitutional guidelines do not have relevancy, a key characteristic of democratic societies.

On the international scene, the serious problem of rule of law is that Komi’s and Bashkortostan’s laws often violate federal laws. There has been the deliberate failure to implement the 1995 federal law on local self-government, despite numerous regional (in the case of Komi) and federal court rulings requiring its implementation

For example, in June 2000 a federal prosecutor identified 24 violations of the Russian Constitution in the Komi Constitution. These violations may not soon be corrected; however, as the Komi administration has frequently given the Komi Constitution priority over the federal constitution.67 Bashkortostan’s situation is quite similar. For example, the exclusion of opposition candidates from the 1998 presidential elections included two national State Duma deputies. Even an urgent Russian Supreme Court ruling requiring registration for Deputy Aleksandr Arinin and political veteran Marat Mirgaziamov was ignored. After the election, Russia’s Supreme Court ruled that their exclusion had been illegal.

Over the years there have been several legal cases against human rights defenders in Russia which have served to prove the gagging of the judiciary by the political influence signaling deterioration in respect for the rule of law in Russia in order to advance the political goals of the government and silence the voices of independent Critics.

The U.S.-funded rule of law activities conducted under the Democratic has contributed to incremental improvements in transforming forming Russia’s legal and judicial institutions. They are also assisting in building a grassroots constituency for legal reform.

Political Society

The development of the Russian political society has been limited, poorly developed in the regions, and with little development in regionalMost of political parties have a small representation limited funding, and low popular interest

Conclusion

According to opinion surveys from the 1990s, there is widespread support for democratic Russian society and which has remained stable over the post-Soviet decade. People need a political system where they can live and democratic systems over more authoritarian-type systems. (Zakaria; 2004)

Polls that measure support for specific democratic values and institutions — such as an independent press and free elections indicate widespread societal support while those that measure Russian’s support for political institutions considered critical in the West to a vibrant democracy such as the existence of a robust political opposition to current leaders and a balance of power among the executive and other branches of government — show solid support for distribution of political power rather than its concentration in a single institution or individual. All in all Russian citizens are prepared to support stronger democratic institutions in Russia and to expand democratic liberties.

References

1. Experiment with a People, Service (2003) Russia
2. Zakaria (2004). the Future of Freedom
3. Shevstova (2004). Putin’s Russia
4. Zweynert Joachim (2004). How the history of economic contributes to an understanding of institutional change’, article submitted to the journal of the History of Economic Thought.
5. Russian Economic Reports, World Bank; 2004
6. Reddaway and Dmitr (2004) Russian Social Science Review.
7. Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger (2004), British Journal of Yuri
8. Fedorov, (2003) “Democratization and Globalization: The Case of Russia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
9. USIA sponsored polls. “Russian Public Still Wrestling with Democracy
10. December 2000. John F. Kennedy School of Government