Introduction
In international politics, if a country has lemons, it must make lemonade. It is important to note that the world has always been anarchic by nature, meaning that the strongest must prevail, not as a preference. However, only a select few have the privilege and resources to reach the highest levels of hegemony.
Survival and security trump any ideology or value system – the latter comes after the former to justify the measures utilized to ensure safety. Hence, Russia cares about being a great power because it offers the greatest chance of survival in an anarchic world. This fact directly shapes Russian foreign policy because it wants to make the best use of the resources and capabilities available to it.
Defining Technical Terms: Offensive Realism
To have a meaningful discussion on the subject, it is valuable to define what offensive realism means. The term is an international relations perspective that is based on the premise that the world is essentially a system of anarchy. In such a system, being the most powerful, resource-rich, and influential makes the most sense since it offers the greatest level of autonomy, sovereignty, and, most of all, security (Mearsheimer and Rosato, 2023). As a result, all nations aspire to become secure not only within their own borders but also in their regions, including their neighbors.
Ideally, one wants to “rule the planet,” but it is highly unrealistic in practical terms. This means that being a hegemon is a ‘must’ to make sure that a nation can be as secure as possible. However, not all states have the resources or capabilities to become hegemons because of the existing ones and limitations in a multitude of critical ingredients: weaponry, population, or economy. Given a chance, any rational nation-state will seize an opportunity to become a hegemon.
The current international politics is in a transitory phase from unipolarity to multipolarity. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR, the US became the sole global superpower and hegemon. However, with the emergence of China as a powerful peer competitor in this century, the world is moving into a state where China and the US will become two large global hegemons, with several regional ones on the periphery (Mearsheimer and Rosato, 2023).
A rational decision for Russia is to seize the current opportunity to establish its own hegemony to become a strong regional hegemon in Eurasia while it still has the resources and capabilities to do so. Hence, the question is not about “caring being a great power” but rather having the means and timeframe to do it. The given situation profoundly shapes Russian foreign policy on securing its influence over its neighboring post-Soviet Union states as well as close allies, such as Syria and Venezuela.
Kramer’s Article
Mark Kramer’s article, “The Soviet Legacy in Russian Foreign Policy,” offers a detailed analysis of Russia’s quest for great power status. The article highlights the Soviet legacy’s role in shaping contemporary Russian foreign policy. This legacy manifests in both tangible and intangible forms, significantly influencing Russia’s global interactions.
Kramer’s (2019) work points out that the Soviet past is not merely historical but continues to actively influence Russia’s policies and actions. The desire to reclaim the Soviet Union’s influence is evident in Putin’s policies, reflecting a deep-rooted aspiration within Russian foreign policy institutions. These institutions, passed down through generations, perpetuate the Soviet era’s geopolitical strategies and perspectives, thereby maintaining Russia’s pursuit of great power status in a complex global environment.
However, it is important to understand that Russia did not seek to rebuild the USSR because it was a communist state and it included many republics in it. The core motivation is hegemony and having a well-established sphere of influence for the purposes of security. Kramer’s (2019) analysis showcases that the legacy of the Soviet era in Russian foreign policy is not just a reflection of past glories but a living force that actively shapes current policies and actions. Whether it is a democratic, communist, or fascist Russia, the primary objective is to maximize its hegemonic impact in order to survive in an anarchic world with the best odds available to it. USSR left Russia with massive capabilities and resources to have a capacity for hegemony; hence, it will act hostile to the existing hegemon regardless of its political ideology.
Larson and Shevchenko’s Article
Larson and Shevchenko’s article, “Russia Says No,” complements the analysis of Russia’s aspiration to be a great power. Their work delves into the psychological dimensions of Russian foreign policy, particularly under Putin’s leadership. The article argues that Russia’s assertive and, at times, volatile behavior towards the West since 2003 can be explained through social psychological hypotheses relating to power, status, and emotions (Larson and Shevchenko, 2014). The denial of respect and perceived humiliation have prompted emotional responses from Russia, influencing its foreign policy decisions.
The perspective aligns with the proposed viewpoint on Russia’s foreign policy being shaped by its quest for survival and security in an anarchic world. Larson and Shevchenko’s (2014) analysis provides a deeper understanding of how Russia’s perceived loss of status and the emotional reactions to this loss, especially feelings of humiliation and anger, have been central in shaping its foreign policy, particularly in its dealings with the United States and NATO. The reading reveals that Russia cares deeply about being a great power not only because it is a rational necessity but also due to the traumatic experience of its past.
The USSR was a clear global hegemon of the twentieth century, which offered the Russian people an immense sense of security. The fall of the Soviet Union marked a dramatic downgrade from such a level of safety. The contrast between being a weak nation-state and a powerful superpower adds a psychosocial dimension that further motivates Russian leadership to seek to regain its lost hegemonic status.
Tsygankov’s Article
In Tsygankov’s article “Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia’s Foreign Policy,” the author challenges the view that Russia’s authoritarian culture and political system necessitate a reliance on the Western threat image and revisionist behavior abroad. Tsygankov (2012) critiques the theory of “authoritarian expansionism” by comparing it to realism and constructivism, arguing that this theory inadequately captures the complexity of Russia’s foreign policy. He suggests that authoritarian tendencies do not solely drive Russia’s assertive foreign policy but are also shaped by international anarchy, norms, and its historical and institutional distinctiveness. The article emphasizes the importance of considering a broader array of factors, including domestic political contestation and international relations, to understand Russia’s foreign policy direction.
Russia is assertive in its foreign policy not because it seeks to spread authoritarianism for its sake but instead because it seeks to act as any other nation would do in its position. It is far too simplistic and naïve to explain Russian moves in the international arena as the pure desire to be authoritative and go against the West. The nation essentially realizes there is an opportunity to partially reclaim its lost global hegemony as a regional hegemon, which by default means going against the current global hegemon’s interests – the US (Tsygankov, 2012). No hegemon can allow the emergence of another potential rival within its sphere of influence, and the US seeks to preserve its global dominance amid the risk posed by China. As a result, the conflict of interests is embedded in the very nature of international politics, which is anarchic.
Discussion
Offensive realism provides the most compelling explanation for why Russia seeks to become a great power and why it conducts its foreign policy as it does. The world is an anarchy; hence, the most powerful nations are the most secure ones, and security is the number one priority that trumps good relations or economics. Russia and the Soviet Union cannot be seen as completely separate entities, but rather as different phases of one group of people who experienced what it means to be a global superpower (Larson and Shevchenko, 2003). The nation and its leaders are rational actors who seek to reclaim that lost sense of security, at least partially.
There is also a psychosocial element, but it only reinforces the desire and eagerness for the goal of establishing its regional hegemony. Russia has inherited a wealth of capabilities and resources to make a solid attempt to achieve its objectives, such as a massive arsenal of weapons, nuclear warheads, and a military industry. It also has the energy, food, and material independence to withstand the harsh measures that can be thrown at it for its hegemonic aspirations.
Russia and its leaders see that it has the tools and strength to become more secure as a regional hegemon, and it also sees that the US’s global hegemony is being challenged by China. It is a perfect moment in the historical timeline for Russia to act quickly and swiftly to enjoy an elevated sense of security it can gain for the coming century, which it is doing at the moment. The twenty-first century will likely be split into three major hegemonic regions (Mearsheimer and Rosato, 2023).
China will have a tremendous influence in the Middle East, East Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Africa. The US will retain its hegemony over the Western hemisphere and Europe. Both of them will become global hegemons, whereas Russia will regain hegemony over its Eurasian sphere of influence, mostly comprising post-Soviet nations and a few allies, such as Venezuela and Syria.
Russia’s aspiration for great power recognition emerges from a historical and institutional backdrop inherited from the Soviet era. Kramer (2019) showcases that the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 left Russia with a unique status as the USSR’s legal successor. This role endowed Russia with significant assets, notably the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal.
Russia also secured a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Beyond these tangible inheritances, Russia grappled with intangible legacies: a sense of a lost empire and a perceived continuity with the Soviet superpower’s past. The entrenchment of Soviet-era institutions and mindsets has shown remarkable resilience (Larionov et al., 2021).
This is particularly evident under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. His strategic moves, such as the annexation of Crimea and the military intervention in Syria, represent efforts to reestablish Russia’s status as a formidable global power. Putin’s own statements reflect this sentiment since he has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as a significant geopolitical catastrophe. The statement indicates a motive to reverse the consequences of the Soviet Union’s dissolution.
Kramer’s analysis suggests that the Soviet legacy influences not just Russia’s strategic decisions but also its broader foreign policy approach. The institutions responsible for shaping Russian foreign policy have maintained a Soviet-style outlook – it is evident in the training and mindset of Russian foreign policy officials (Kozhanov, 2022). They receive education and guidance from institutions such as the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, which has retained a worldview akin to that of the Soviet era.
The repercussions of the Soviet legacy extend to Russia’s interactions on the international stage because its inherited borders and the expansive Russian territory present unique foreign policy challenges and opportunities. The country faces a strategic decision regarding its orientation towards Europe or Asia, and such a decision echoes dilemmas faced during the Soviet and even czarist times. The choice significantly influences the direction of Russia’s foreign policy.
Despite the passing of time and the emergence of new generations of officials, the Soviet legacy in Russian foreign policy shows signs of enduring. Even as officials from the Soviet era retire, their replacements inherit similar worldviews. These perspectives – shaped during Putin’s tenure – continue to influence young professionals in foreign policy and national security (Lewis, 2020).
The training these individuals receive reinforces outlooks shaped by the Soviet era, depicting Russia as a great power in a zero-sum struggle with the West. Consequently, the Soviet characteristics of major institutions in Russia involved in foreign policy remain prominent. Such continuity suggests that key elements of the Soviet legacy in Russian foreign policy will likely persist well into the 21st century.
The psychological impact of the Soviet legacy on the Russian populace and its leadership significantly influences Russia’s foreign policy. The fall of the Soviet Union was not just a geopolitical shift; it deeply affected the national psyche. This effect manifests as a collective yearning for a return to great-power status. Such a yearning resonates with many in Russia. President Putin garners popularity partly due to this sentiment. His foreign policy actions in regions such as Ukraine and Syria are supported from this perspective (Pisciotta, 2020).
Russia’s approach to international diplomacy and conflict bears hallmarks of Soviet-era strategies. The nation asserts its influence in areas it deems within its sphere of influence. In the post-Soviet space, Russia’s efforts to maintain significant roles often run counter to Western expansion. The situation in Ukraine exemplifies Russia’s readiness to take decisive actions to safeguard its strategic interests.
Russia’s foreign policy frequently challenges Western dominance in global affairs. The nation seeks alliances with countries like China and engages in strategic partnerships across the Middle East and Africa. These initiatives aim not just to expand influence but also to contest a world order predominantly led by the United States since the end of the Cold War.
Internal politics in Russia echo the Soviet governance style. Power centralization, dissent suppression, and media narrative control are reminiscent of Soviet-era tactics (Wohlforth, 2001). These internal dynamics bolster the foreign policy approach. A strong, centralized leadership is perceived as essential for navigating international politics and reaffirming Russia’s global position.
The Soviet legacy’s influence on Russian foreign policy extends beyond institutional continuities. It includes psychological, diplomatic, and strategic aspects. This legacy shapes Russia’s self-perception and its approach to international relations. Interactions with neighboring countries and global powers are also influenced. As Russia faces 21st-century challenges, its Soviet past remains a significant factor in its quest to regain great power status.
Conclusion
In sum, Russia, just like any other nation, understands the importance of security in an anarchic international arena; thus, it rationally seeks to maximize it by becoming a regional hegemon. It has the tools, capabilities, and resources to do so, but it does not have enough of them to aspire for global hegemony. As a result, Russia is making the best use of the inheritance that it gained from the USSR. Since it once enjoyed being a global superpower in the previous century, it has a sense of self that further drives its desire to achieve its objective. However, the core motivation remains security in an anarchic world. The ideology, political frameworks, and historical references are secondary to the aforementioned reason and primarily serve the purpose of justification rather than being the primary root causes of such decision-making.
Reference List
Kozhanov, N. (2022) Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East: new trends, old traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kramer, M. (2019) ‘The Soviet legacy in Russian foreign policy‘, Political Science Quarterly, 134(4), pp. 585–609.
Larionov, A. et al. (2021) ‘Exogenous factors of memory formation about the great soviet era in contemporary Russia‘, Linguistics and Culture Review, 5(S3), pp. 1597-1605.
Larson, D. W. and Shevchenko, A. (2003) ‘Shortcut to greatness: the new thinking and the revolution in Soviet foreign policy’, International Organization, 57(1), pp. 77-109.
Larson, D. W. and Shevchenko, A. (2014) ‘Russia says no: power, status, and emotions in foreign policy‘, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3-4), pp. 269-79.
Lewis, D. G. (2020) Russia’s new authoritarianism: Putin and the politics of order. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Mearsheimer, J. and Rosato, S. (2023) How states think: the rationality of foreign policy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pisciotta, B. (2020) ‘Russian revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria’, Italian Political Science Review, 50(1), pp. 87-106.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2012) ‘Assessing cultural and regime-based explanations of Russia’s foreign policy. “Authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit”?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 64(4), pp. 695-713.
Wohlforth, W. (2001) ‘The Russian-Soviet empire: a test of neorealism‘, Review of International Studies, 27(5), pp. 213-235.