Robert Nozick is one of the renowned libertarian thinkers of the twentieth century who proposed a variety of ideas and concepts related to the topics of individual freedom and rights. In his book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” he presented his view of the notions of self-ownership and property rights, which was considerably different from the positions previously outlined by other philosophers, including John Locke. Thus, it is essential to gain an in-depth understanding of Nozick’s theory, discuss a possible objection, and present a response to it.
Nozick’s self-ownership arguments for absolute private property rights in original acquisition partially stem from John Locke’s philosophy. Nozick contended that every individual is free and has an inherent right to be an owner of their own person, their powers, and talents. Nevertheless, people must be careful not to utilize their powers to harm others. This self-ownership principle translates into the moral right of every person to be sovereign owners of an unlimited amount of resources (Nozick, 1973, p. 155). Moreover, this means that people cannot be deprived of their property or even a small part of it by any party if they met all of the conditions required for just the acquisition of resources. Nozick’s view of self-ownership is similar to Locke’s, who believed that people were true owners of their bodies and capacities (Locke, 1988, p. 287). Yet, the primary difference between the ideas of the two philosophers is their approaches to the condition under which a person can appropriate resources. Nozick stated that a person who comes into possession of holdings must not harm other people affected by the act and has to acquire only unowned objects or resources, this is called the principle of justice in acquisition. While Locke believed that to be considered an owner of an object, an individual must mix their labor with it.
Nozick’s position is rather provoking, and it naturally invites other people to raise objections to the idea of absolute rights in original acquisition. The main objection here concerns the fairness of the process of acquisition. Cohen proposed his two-person world model, which simulates a situation when an arguably unjust distribution of resources takes place. This model implies that there are two people Grabber and Johnny-Come-Lately, who live in a world where all resources are unowned, and they ensure their existence by trapping and milking moose (Cohen, 1995, p. 79). Then, the process of appropriation occurs during which Grabber becomes an owner of all land and moose, while Johnny has no other option than to work for Grabber in exchange for access to milk. Thus, due to the acquisition, Johnny lost his freedom, and he cannot resolve this issue since Grabber’s property rights are absolute. Moreover, such distribution of resources comes into conflict with John Rawls’ difference principle, which postulates that any inequality is admissible only if it benefits the most disadvantaged people in question (Rawls, 1971, p. 66). The current unequal situation with Grabber owning all of the available resources does not align with this principle since Johnny is virtually dependent on the good will of his employer.
The aforementioned objection would be viable only if Johnny were truly hurt by the event of acquisition and would consider it an infringement on his freedom. In other words, Cohen assumes that Johnny was upset about the land and moose becoming the property of Grabber. In reality, Johnny might consider himself better off in the situation where he does not own the land and moose and instead can focus on doing his favorite job. In this case, Grabber’s property rights are viewed as absolute, and his land and moose cannot be taken away from here to install arbitrary equality. On the other hand, Nozick relies on Locke’s proviso, which states that every acquisition must be conducted with the condition that “enough and as good left in common for others” (Locke, 1999, p. 288). Therefore, were Nozick’s entitlement theory applied to the situation, the idea of all resources being conveyed to Grabber and virtually denying Johnny the status of self-ownership would fail to meet the essential Locke’s proviso (O’Keeffe, 1992, p. 2). In this case, the principle of rectification of injustice could be applied, and Johnny would have to be compensated for this suffering.
Nozick’s self-ownership arguments for absolute private property rights in original acquisition rest on the premise that all individuals are free and have a right to own themselves and their powers. Additionally, Nozick believed that every person had a right to acquire resources, holding, or objects which were unowned and only if their acquisition would not harm other interested parties. The primary objection to Nozick’s idea can be derived from situations such as one described by Cohen. In a world with unowned resources where only two people live, one can acquire all of the resources and thus reduce the second person to a mere slave and strip them of their self-ownership. In response to this situation, two possible solutions can be applied. In the case, the person who does not own anything is satisfied with their position, the property rights of the other can be viewed as absolute. Yet, on the other hand, the actions of the person who appropriated all the resources can be considered a violation of Locke’s proviso and the principle of justice in an acquisition which may lead to the utilization of the principle of rectification.
References
Cohen, G.A. (1995). Self-ownership, freedom, and equality. Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (1999). Locke: Two treatises of government. Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, R. (1973). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books.
O’Keeffe, M. (1992). World ownership is not compatible with self-ownership: A defence of Robert Nozick against G.A. Cohen. Philosophical Notes, 20, 1–11. Web.
Rawls, A. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press.