The Soviets were not ready for WWII. Nevertheless, the experienced they gained in WWI and the unique character of the Slavs turned the nation into an unbeatable force ready to fight against any enemy who was trying to take control over their lands and bring oppression to the freedom-loving people. A closer look at the soviet strategy before WWII reveals that the government has almost destroyed the ability of the people to become the army as the program of collectivism, hunger, and the increasing dissatisfaction with the central planning economy was a contribution to the social disobedience. If the threat of the occupation by Germans did not occur, the Soviet state would destroy itself from inside.
The Soviets were rather optimistic about their future as they believed in their own inspiration to beat the enemy, despite his strength and number of soldiers. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the war in 1941, the Soviet enthusiasm has significantly reduced. “Decision victory at low cost was not just a vision of the propagandists; it was the Red Army’s official goal” (Merridale, p. 27). However, the ineffective internal policy has undermined the ability of the Soviet government to mobilize its people against the German invasion.
Traditionally, Stalin, the Russian pre-WWII leader, chose militarily people to hold the high official posts with responsibilities that had nothing to do with the social or economic life of the nation. As the result, the internal strategy was devastating, ineffective, and most ideological with the elements of military oppression.
Back in 1917, the greatest promise of the new regime was national peace (Merridale, p. 29). The government distributed propaganda promising free land, free education, and happy lives. But were the Soviets satisfied with what the government offered to them? The closer analysis of internal policy suggests that they were not. While leaders talked about conciliation, harmony, and brotherhood, ordinary people were powerless and voiceless. The long-term war against capitalism deprived the Soviets of the opportunity to work for themselves, regulate their income, and explore their own skills and abilities.
In terms of preparedness for war, Merridale commented, “the prospect of a golden future and the fear that enemies were gathering to subvert it formed the carrot and stick of the Stalinist dictatorship” (p. 30). In other words, tyranny was referred to as the only way to transform human lives and to protect the nation. Even though people had almost nothing, they were afraid of the possible revolution or the prospects of another war. The older people, in particular, those who survived WWI, felt threatened by the possibility of another war, and their fears were fulfilled.
Nevertheless, the young generations grew up with a strong belief in a bright future. Their optimism was based on the opposition to the regime brought by communism and Stalin and they were not ready to give up their hopes for the sake of collective ownership. These young people were against national politics and opposed the imposed strategy. These young people were trained to work as one and yet they ignored the importance of social class, ethnicity, and even politics. It is possible to suggest that the emergence of the new ideology was the side effect of the strategy of the communistic state but this side effect gave the Soviets the chance to win WWII.
Special attention should be paid to the strategy of collectivism and the attempt of the government to create a homogenous mass of people, the ones who are similar to each other and lack the desire to be different. Merridale suggests that the key incentive behind collectivism was the belief of the government that the agricultural sector was inefficient and there was an urgent need to bring peasant farming under the communal system of planning, control, and management (p. 30). Undoubtedly, the people were not willing to accept the forced deprivation of their rights to land but they were powerless to stand up against the strong government and personality of Stalin.
Ironically, the process of collectivism was accompanied by the internal genocide of the Soviet government against the most successful members of the society. The wealthy peasants who earned their fortune in hard work and without any support from the government suddenly became the scapegoats of society. At the moment the government decided to collectivize the agricultural sector, these peasants were destined to lose everything, including their stock, homes, and frequently their lives. The countryside became the battlefield of the war between the state and the ordinary people. By 1939, the rural population has significantly declined with more than 10 million killed (Merridale, p. 31). Thus, the Soviet government has deprived itself of the most powerful force to fight against the invaders.
The process of collectivization was strictly controlled by a group of powerful people in Moscow. The decisions that affected the lives of millions were “taken in Moscow, not in some mud-locked village miles from the nearest road” (Merridale, p. 33). The Soviet state was far from democratic and the voices of peasants were quickly shut by the military force. The Soviet ruling left no space for the protest. Neither religion nor hard work gave peasants the chance to survive the oppression led by the government. Churches were closed and turned into barns, believed exiled without any hope for acceptance.
Ironically, Stalin’s regime was based on brotherhood, at least as proclaimed by propaganda, and the promise of material prosperity while in fact those people who managed to achieve any success were severe punished for their capitalistic spirit. As the result, “the population already hardened by suffering and violence learned to look for opportunities at every turn” (Merridale, p. 34). Even before the war, the Soviets proved their ability to be resourceful, hardworking, and network. They were able to satisfy their own needs but the main obstacle on their way was the government.
It is rather surprising that the Soviet government ensured free education for all Soviet children, especially taking into account that educated people would be more prone to defend their rights. By 1941, there were almost 200,000 primary schools throughout the Soviet villages and farms. More than 24 million children were enrolled in elementary schools. Many of them tried their best to study diligently to be able to join 817 colleges and universities (Merridale, p. 40).
Nevertheless, the closer analysis of the free education strategy reveals that it was used by the state to get the children accustomed to ideological brainwashing. All children were taught love for their motherland and since early childhood, they realized that love for motherhood meant preparedness for wars. While the parents were laboring on the fields, their children were trained to become soldiers if the need emerged. In this regard, the Soviet state prepared itself well for the war as the new generation of society was ready to die for the survival of communism.
While the children were ideologically prepared for the war, there was an evident failure of the state to update the military equipment (tanks, shells, guns, and radio sets). As a result, the Soviet government at the dawn of WWII ended up having young people (mostly teenagers) who were trained to defend their motherland at the price of their own life while having no equipment to win the war. From one side, the hospitals were well-equipped to treat the wounds of soldiers. On the other side, soldiers died long before they received professional medical help as they had to wait long hours for transportation to get to the nearest hospital (Merridale, p. 50).
The ideological brainwash had immediate results for the pre-WWII Soviet Union because the morale among the soldiers was strong. The outsiders thought of the Red Army as an enigma (Merridale, p. 51) and were fascinated with the courage of the Soviet soldiers who did not leave their comrades and continued fighting despite the severe winters and displayed astonishing strength and toughness. The ideological brainwash through education and deprivation of all rights turned the Soviet young people into an unbeatable army capable of defeating the strongest enemy with bare hands.
In military terms, the pre-war period was characterized by the lack of any progress made by the Soviet military generals in the improvement of the national tactics and strategy to protect the people if another war starts. As Millet suggests, “progress was uneven and planners could rarely predict what would work in the next war and what would not” (p. 21). One of the key weaknesses of the pre-war Russian military was the lack of central planning and coordination. Ironically, while the state tried to keep the control of the people centralized, the military leadership was characterized by the wide division of opinion regarding the probability of the war among the military officials.
As the result, the Soviet leaders failed to foresee the improvements in the tactics of their enemies and devoted insufficient attention to the preparation of their own Army for the next war. The Germans, on the contrary, were much better prepared for the war. Their war technology was significantly improved, the soldiers were well-trained. However, the German soldiers lacked unconditional devotion to their country. While the education of the Soviet soldiers was mostly ideological, the Germans received professional military training. Nevertheless, it did not increase their chances of success.
In 1918, the technological innovation of Germans led to the breakdown of the territorial deadlock and gave the German state an incentive to focus on the further upgrade of the military forces. As Millett notes, “Crucial to the invention of the modern war was the development of the indirect fire techniques – the use of artillery to attack and destroy enemy positions not in sight” (p. 21). It is rather unexpected that the Soviets gained victory over the Germans despite all military advances of the former.
While Germans were superior in their offensive tactics, the Soviets were prepared better in their defense tactics. The aim of the Soviet army was to disrupt the defensive scheme of the enemies through a detailed defense plan. The inter-war period was mostly uncertain for the Soviets; nevertheless, it did not prevent the Soviet leaders from supporting innovation, as discussed in the next paragraph.
“Soviet military thinkers displayed considerable imagination in pushing for innovations in the ground forces” (Millett, p. 25). In other words, they focused on the advantage of having the mass army while confidently exploring the opportunities of mechanized and advanced corps. Even though the Soviet government could afford investment into military technology, the decision was to exploit human power. The weakness of the modernized German army was its impersonal approach.
At the same time, some of the decisions made by Stalin in the late 1930s have no logical explanation. For example, Stalin ordered approximately half of his 70,000 officers to shot and liquidated 3 of 5 marshals, 14 of 16 army commanders, and 60 of 67 corps commanders (Millett, p., 26). Thus, Stalin left the Soviet army without its leaders by eliminating the most experienced military experts. On the other side, the massive liquidation of the high-ranking military officials gave Stalin confidence in the blind devotion of the remaining officers. In other words, Stalin entrusted the command of the army to those people he trusted the most. It was hardly possible to imagine a similar massacre among the European armies.
The analysis of the pre-war situation in the Soviet Union reveals several interesting points. Two of the most intriguing ones are the political ideology and the lack of focus on technology. The political ideology of Stalin was focused on the belief that the Soviet army needed devoted people, those soldiers who had no attachments to anything else except for their motherland. Consequently, children were trained to become soldiers and fight with the bear arms if the government asked them to. They were not trained to fight; they were not trained to use arms; they were not trained on tactical planning. The only thing they learned was to follow orders.
In terms of technology, it would be unreasonable to state that the Soviet Army was weak technologically as significant investments were made into the mass production of military equipment. When the Germans crossed the border of the Soviet Union for the second time, they were met with tanks that were almost invulnerable to firearms.
Apart from the strong ideology and the mass production of military equipment, the politics of Stalin was aimed at destroying the will and even resistance of people. Collectivism of the agricultural sector resulted in poverty and hunger. People were educated but poor.
They worked hard but could hardly feed their family. They were voiceless and any disobedience was punished with life-long imprisonment or death. It would be logical to expect that eventually, the Soviet people would stand up against the internal genocide but in turn, they directed their strength and anger toward the enemy. The Germans had no chance to win the war because they lacked understanding of the Soviet character and could not accept that the Soviet soldier was ready to die to protect his motherland.
Finally, the pre-WWII Soviet Union was weakened with the social disturbances, dissatisfaction of peasants, economic crisis, and other outcomes of WWI. Nevertheless, it did not prevent the Soviet government from preparing a strong army comprising of poorly-trained, low-skilled, and yet committed soldiers. At the dawn of World War II, the major part of the Soviet army included young people, almost teens who saw their participation in the war as a matter of honor and necessary to protect their families and, of course, motherland. Equipped with the most effective weapon, the people, the Soviets gained an unbeatable advantage over the Germans.
In conclusion, the pre-war Soviet Union was absolutely unprepared for WWII as it was weak in terms of military equipment and lack of centralized strategy. At the same time, the Soviet army had one key advantage over the Germans: the Soviet people were devoted to their motherland and were ready to die for their country, even though the government did everything possible to destroy their devotion. Since early childhood, the Soviet people were trained to become soldiers if another war started.
The experience in WWI taught the Soviets the invaluable lesson: being ready for the war is the most effective strategy. Consequently, enormous efforts were invested by the government to kill the will of people for freedom (through collectivism) and to make them ready to die for the motherland (through education). Thus, the pre-war Soviet Union was both weak and strong and this unique combination allowed the allied forces to stop the German occupation on the Soviet land.
Works Cited
Merridale, Catherine. Ivan’s War. Metropolitan Books, 2006.
Millett, Allan. A War to Be Won. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.