Introduction
In the present world, democracies have been facing grievous predicaments when challenging violent behaviors which come under the rubric of terrorism. The connection between terrorism and democracy is a primary worry for the global society. Even though counterterrorism attempts have significantly increased the profile of democracy as a policy subject, the matter is yet to be elucidated. Democracies come in several forms and sizes, and in diverging scales of development and performance, all of which merges to effect concerns of autonomous governance and counterterrorism attempts on one another in several ways. Flourishing contemporary democracies work to reach equilibrium of the double responsibilities of maintaining safe and lenient environments for their citizens (Li and Schaub, 2004). When confronted with external coercion like global terrorism, democracies react like a pendulum by first of all providing security and then vacillating back in the direction of moderation, the quest of lenience, and the encouragement of policies that are equivalent to the inclinations of the middle supporter in the public (Wilkinson, 2001). Comprehending this conduct assist in explaining the change in United States security policies after the 9/11 attacks. This paper attempts to analyze the effect of democracy on terrorism, if it encourages terrorism or reduces the same.
Democracy and Advancement of Terrorism
The majority of the observed proof but not all holds the conception that democracy promotes international terrorism. In their paper, Eubank and Weinberg (1994) examined whether egalitarian or totalitarian government host more terrorist groupings. According to their examination, they found out that autonomous societies had more terrorist organizations than autocrat societies. They summarized that political and social autonomies are extremely linked with political terrorism. Egalitarian promotes terrorism. This is supported by the argument that democracies give bigger social freedoms. Through permitting social liberties, democratic system gives room for terrorists to plan themselves and contrive without difficulty thus lowering the costs of carrying out terrorist activities (Ross, 1993, Eyerman, 1998). Expansion and security of such civil freedoms make it even more difficult for the legal structure in autonomous government to condemn radicals and put off or hit back against violence (Schmid, 1992). The aspiration to defend social liberties constrains security measures (Crenshaw, 1981).
The imagined impact of civil freedoms, nevertheless, engrosses dual perplexing concerns. First, civil freedoms might breed an alleviating impact on terrorism. Populaces benefiting from a great number of civil freedoms are more liable to manipulate the political procedure effectively. To the level that the social liberties lower political complaints, they might also lower terrorist actions. Hence, civil freedoms singularly do not assist in the separation of the constructive and harmful impacts of democracy, both in theory and empirically. Secondly, press freedom as part of the civil freedoms might encourage feasible terrorist occurrence through prejudiced reporting thus creating an extra motivation for terrorism. The prejudice in the informing of terrorist happenings among varied government has been largely identified (Sandler, 1995, Li and Schaub 2004, & Eubank and Weinberg, 1994). Terrorism is more possibly to be reported in democratic nations but not as much of in authoritarian countries. This happens as a result of the less limitations that democratic nations set on the media. The less held back news searching media in egalitarian system tend to provide more extensive coverage of terrorism. Contrary to the autocrat nations, reporting of such events is profoundly restricted and censored. Given that information on terrorism is collected from wide supplies, one is possibly to conclude that democratic regimes have more terrorists’ occurrences. Even though the non democratic nations have similar number of occurrences, onlookers may on no account find out, using information gathered from open sources. The reporting prejudice may erroneously make one to view an affirmative correlation between the degree of civil freedoms and the number of terrorist incidents (Atkinson et al 1987, Ross, 1993).
The reporting prejudice, nevertheless, might be truer than it appears. A terrorist organization accomplish due to its capacity to frighten. To frighten a broad audience, terrorists are in pursuit of appreciation and notice through seeking expansion of exposure and media reporting of their actions (Atkinson et al 1987, Crenshaw, 1981). Media liberties raise the chances for terrorists to be heard and observed by numerous people and thus their capability to make extensive fear. Equally, that media liberty could gratify the aspiration of terrorists for exposure creating a greater motivation for terrorism. Additionally, as a result of the value of the news of terrorist incidents, free press in most cases inform about terrorist events with extreme particulars, aiding the recruitment, teaching and training of new radicals (Schmid, 1992). Press liberty and its supposed reporting prejudice hence create a true positive impact on international terrorism. The constructive impact of civil freedoms specifically press freedom on terrorists events is epiphenomenal of a fundamental characteristic of egalitarian authority- the institution limitations on the decision making control of the administration. The enormous liberty of speech, movement, and association in democratic system terrorists make the most of its dependent character. In spite of the government type, a nation that have experienced terrorism, in most cases tries to put off prospect invasions by employing policies that demarcate the liberty of terrorists. These counterterrorism approaches nonetheless in most instances confine civil freedoms for the society at large. For instance, counterterrorism intelligence assembling breaches on individual privacy for the general public. Since the government dominates the lawful use of power, the level of civil freedom is dictated by the strength of the institution limitations on the liberty of action of the regime.
The liberty of action of non-democratic regime is mainly defined by the help of the educated (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The autonomous regime on the other hand is held responsible to the parliament and the voters through checks and balances and ballot votes. Relative to the dictatorial leader, the autonomous administration encounters a broader array of institutionalized limitations on its application of power. This institution variation between government types means that there are more rejection actors over regime policies in democratic system than in dictatorship. Such political limitations stop the democratic authority from infringing on social freedoms (Sandler, 1995). Democratic system with insufficient administrative limitations is less possible to reverence civil liberties. Hence the impact of civil freedom on terrorist’s attacks is epiphenomenal of the institution’s limitations on regime since the degree of civil freedom, specifically press liberty is essentially dictated by the power of those limitations. Institution’s limitations on the democratic governance are possibly unrelated with unconstructive impact of democratic system on terrorist’s invasion. Policies non-functioning and political stalemate in most cases happen in democracy policies due to the limitations on the policy making strength of the government. In the case where policies non-functioning and political stalemate fail to lower complaints but intensify community aggravation, government limitations do not lower but instead promote terrorism. If one deems the inference of Fearon and Laitin (2003) debate on civil war, terrorist organization are classically very insignificant clusters whose political complaints are excessively slim to be determined through democracy. Policies malfunction and political stalemate initiated by institution’s check and balances increases the complaints of such marginal group eventually pushing them to the direction of aggression.
Most significant, the institution’s limitations relevantly make the democratic system abilities weak to counter terrorist invasion. As a result of the winning alliance being large, institution’s check and balance hold egalitarian administration responsible to a wider range of the interests of the society. It is thus hard for democratic system to endorse counterterrorist approaches that are as stringent as those generally implemented by non-democratic government (Wilkinson, 2001). Endorsing authoritarianism and efficient prevention is more expensive to the administration in a spirited political scheme since it may cause destruction to the political support and make the government to go down. Contrary, the principally unlimited, authoritarian military government, for instance, can ignore civil freedoms, efficiently crushing terrorist group and reducing terrorist occurrences (Crenshaw, 1981).
Lastly but not the least, institutional limitations defiantly give strength the tactical situation of terrorists in their relations with the government. The checks and the balances permit a wide range of interests to control government policy-making and involving cautious and frequent oversight together with inquiry of government performance and policies malfunction. Eventually, the security of an enormous number of populace becomes the apprehension of the democracy. Making a general terrorist threat that impacts most populace is possibly to be efficient in democratic nations (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Democracy and Reduction of Terrorism
One argument in the democracy terrorism findings conceives that the elements of democracy reduce terrorism. In non-democratic communities, the absence of chances for political involvement encourages political complaints and disappointment among nonconformists stimulating terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). In comparison, in autonomous society, free and just voting guarantee that leaders can be eliminated and that sought-after social transformation can be brought by electorate reducing the need to resort to violence (Schmid, 1992). Egalitarian leadership allows non-violent resolution of political inconsistency. Democracies consent the nonconformists to articulate their policies partiality and search for remedy (Ross 1993). Varied social clusters have the means to be involved in the political procedures to advance their significance through nonviolent and serene means, for instance appointment and formation of political parties (Eubank & Weinberg 1994, 2001). Given that democracy reduces the cost of realizing their political aspirations through officially permitted ways, parties find costly prohibited terrorist undertaking less appealing (Eyerman, 1998 & Ross, 1993)
Open democratic involvement has valuable outcomes that hang about mainly unseen in the literature. To the point that democratic involvement raises political effectiveness of populace, terrorism will be less effective especially in the new members’ recruitment process in democratic system than in tyranny. Within the frame work of international terrorism, open autonomous participation facilitates the reduction of motivations of home groups to take on terrorist actions in opposition to alien targets in a nation. When the populace has complaints against alien targets, bigger political contribution under autonomous structure permits them to put forth more pressure on their own administration such that they can ask for better policies modification or reimbursement more productively (Li and Schaub, 2004). Hooking up with terrorist organization and invading the alien target is thus a less attractive alternative. Autonomous participation result in public forbearance of counterterrorism attempts thus making a democratic regime to be more efficient in preventing a range of terrorist invasions counting those by home terrorists not in favor of foreign country and also those executed by alien terrorists in their nation.
Conclusion
Autonomous systems are heterogeneous and have varied electoral structure. As these systems combine inclinations variedly, they affect public satisfaction and political complaints variedly, giving birth to incongruent impacts on the motivations to embark in terrorist activities (Schmid, 1992). Democratic system does not have exceptionally positive impact on terrorist events as is mostly asserted and established. Through improvement of public contentment, electoral involvement, and political efficiency, democratic regimes could lower the number of terrorism within their boundaries. Constraining civil freedom does not also result to the anticipated reduction in terrorism as it has been debated. Controlling the liberties of media, freedom of movement organization does not lower the number of international terrorist events. Strategic terrorism minimally chooses option means to engage in aggression as observed by (Sandler, 1995). We might just have to admit and agree to the truth that features of egalitarian polity are linked with more terrorism. Institution’s limitations over the administration and the majoritarian structure lean towards bringing with them more terrorist events, but these institution aspects are unattractive, hard to transform or even both. Populace under such institutional arrangements should be aware of the intrinsic threats, specifically in the world of growing insecurity.
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