Introduction
The war between Israel and the Arab region in 1967 has come e to be known by many names. Sometimes, it is referred to as the ‘six days in June,’ while in other cases, it is simply ‘the war in June.’
Importantly, the 1967 War between Israel and the Arab neighbors was just a reflection of the Cold War tensions that posed a series of proxy wars in territories far away from the major antagonists, which were the USA and the USSR. A range of factors, including a lack of strategy, late response, and underestimations occasioned the defeat of the Arabs by the Israelis.
False Military Intelligence
Researchers have argued that states go to war for various reasons, one being nationalistic jingoism. Egypt fell for a false intelligence that Israel was mobilizing to attack. The mere fact that a false intelligence with serious implications for not only the Egyptian government and public but also the region as a whole could spark a war is a clear indication that there was a level of unpreparedness.
Self overestimation
Professor Hans J. Morgenthau argued that a nation seeking to go to war should first analyze its potential in the light of power actually or potentially available both to itself and to the opponent. The Arabs, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the icon of the region, failed to analyze their ability to sanction Israel competently in a war.
Their egos, supported with the public opinion in the streets of Cairo and other regional capitals, led to blind spots in the strategic military decisions they made at the time. A case under the study is Egypt’s mobilization of the artillery and the tanks toward Sinai without taking into account Israel’s air force might use that could have easily smitten them.
Israel’s preemptive attack
Sun Tzu averred that a good general was one who had his armies on the battlefield before his enemies. Even with the stakes high in the region, Egyptian forces had not substantially mobilized for war in two weeks. The Israeli bombings of military runways on June 5, 1967, caught Egyptians, who were the de facto leaders of the Arabs, by surprise. Indeed, by the time the Egyptians called for retreat most of their tanks were destroyed and the air force almost fully decimated.
No joint action
If the war in June were an Arab Israel war, as it has indeed been called, then it ought to have strategies that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan could use to attack simultaneously to destroy Israel’s potential for response. As such, even though the Arab leaders conferred on the developments in the region at the time, they failed to plan a pre-emptive attack against Israel. By the time Jordan attacked Jerusalem, Egypt’s air force was crippled, and Israel’s military was able to focus on other issues elsewhere.
Poor Planning
Just a day before the war began, Egypt’s intelligence systems had been reviewed, and systems had been changed with no clear liaises with the partners. A coded signal from Jordan over the Israeli jets seen approaching the Sinai desert could have been decoded, and actions could have been taken to arrest the implications of the attack. As such, Egypt’s lost its fleet of fighter jets in no time.
Command Bureaucracy
The command structure of the Arab armies was majorly dependent on the information relayed through a long chain of command to the respective generals. While the Israel fighter jets were destroying the runways and the Egyptian jets, Nasser and one of his trusted generals were still arguing over what their next action could have been. As a result, the retreat strategy led to thousands of deaths as Israel pursued the Egyptians who began retreating without cover. Furthermore, the artillery that had been left on the battlefield was also destroyed.
No Action by the Soviet
Although the war was sparked by false Soviet intelligence, the insistence by the Soviets that Egypt ought not to have attacked first so as not to be seen as the aggressor greatly decimated the ability of the Arabs to win the war. Two weeks after Abdel Nasser had announced the blockade of the Strait of Tehran and Sharm El-Sheik, the Egyptians military actions were strained by the negotiations and counter negotiations with the Soviets over what the next course of action should have been.
My Opinion
In my opinion, the 1967 War was an incident that should not have happened. It was a result of the paranoia caused by the Cold War. Indeed, the cause of the war was, and to date, could not be considered among the universal causes of the war.
Although national jingoism came to the fore, as was the case of Egypt, the hegemony of the Arab world, the war was borne out of the Soviet’s speculation that the conflict in the region could have shifted the balance of power in the Middle East to the Soviet’s favor. However, it did not. The Arabs went to war for no reasons related to their national interests.
Conclusion
To sum up, Israel won the ‘war in June’ not because it was militarily more powerful than the Arabs, but essentially because of errors of commission and omission. Due to the public hate for Israel, the decision-makers, commander in chiefs and their generals could not find their way and avoid the war that should not have happened.