Introduction
Critical Infrastructures are the material goods, structures, and set of connections, whether physical or virtual, of the essence to the US that their crippling or obliteration would lead to a devastating effect on the country’s security, economic security, and public health (Spencer, 2012). Key resources are the capital vital for the least operation of the country’s financial system and administration. These resources include public and privately resources.
At present, critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) is the most valued and sensitive assets in the US. CIKR are known to be terrorist targets. The safety and protection of these assets have been a main worry for the US government over the last decades. In the past decades, infrastructure attention was centered on the nation’s public works functionalities. In this regard, its mandate was to oversee infrastructures such as roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, airports, ports, and public buildings (Spencer, 2012).
Part I
During the late 20th century, infrastructure safety became state security as threats from terrorists, accidents, and natural disasters increased (Wright, 2012). Following the increase in these threats, the US government embarked on a mission to identify its critical infrastructures to enhance their security.
As such, agriculture and food, banking and finance, chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, government facilities, and many other resources are recognized by the department of homeland securities as important resources.
As a result, the department of homeland securities is mandated to ensure the safety of these resources is met. This article focuses on the defense industrial base, provides a thorough understanding of the sector, and a historical incident that affected the sector.
Defense industrial base
The regulatory instruments that determine the standards and procedures of the sector
As a vital security sector in the US, the defense industrial base operates under the department of defense. Every subdivision in the defense industrial base is run by a Sector-Specific-Agency. Sector-Specific-Agency operates under the directions of the department of homeland securities.
The structure and function defense industrial base sector
The defense industrial base is a collection of private and public bodies mandated to maintain the national defense system for the US (Watts, 2008). In accordance with the department of homeland security, the defense industrial base comprises of the department of defense, the US government, and the private sector worldwide industrial complex with capacities to carry out investigations and expansion, plan, create, distribute, and uphold martial weapon systems, machinery, or components to satisfy military necessities.
Based on the above definition, the defense industrial base may comprise of various national and international bodies and their service providers working under the department of defense and related federal subdivision and organizations. The services and products provided by this sector provide, notify, rally, position, and maintain armed forces carrying out military operations worldwide (Watts, 2008). In the past, the department of homeland securities invested number resources trying to identify the crucial parts of the DIB.
Hypothetically, the above meaning can be practical for every organization in America. Owing to this controversy, the department of homeland securities maintains that DIB excludes profitable infrastructures that offer power, communication, transportation, and other functions that relevant to the department of defense and related organizations (Watts, 2008).
The policies that direct and guide the defense industrial base sector
The defense industrial base policy states that its main aim is to enhance strong, safe, resilient, and groundbreaking industrial potentials to enable the department of defense to accomplish its war fighter’s prerequisites. The department acknowledges the inherent connection between delivering the desired operations effects to the battlefield and developing innovative, leading edge-technologies for the defense systems.
About its policy, the DIB is continually developing new strategies aimed at challenging the project managers to plan and encourage industrial base innovation throughout a program’s lifecycle (Watts, 2008). Maintaining the US war fighting advantage requires continuous innovation of operational capabilities. In this regard, DIB carries out incessant researches on factors driving innovation and competition in their related fields.
Vulnerabilities of the sector and the potential threats against it
With each passing year, new spots of increased risk for the US defense industry emerge. These stem from larger trends where China is a symptom more than a cause.
These larger trends are the ongoing international economic integration recognized as globalization, the related issue of the diffusion of scientific and technological capabilities around the world, and the general decline in demand for advanced conventional weapons. The effect of these trends is that if the United States relies solely on the policies and practices that made it strong in the 1980s and 1990s, it is likely to face an increased risk to national security (Watts, 2008).
Concerns including US-Sino relations, globalization, and weapons development each signify a strong advantage area available to most affirmatives. Any specific solvency advocate, modification of the research, development, manufacture, or deployment of virtually any weapons system deemed critical to national security should be analyzed critically to identify their intended usage.
Teams that are interested in cutting-edge science might find unique affirmative ideas currently scheduled through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The DIB also includes a sizable literature base focusing on critical arguments.
The development and deployment of various munitions such as depleted uranium is a topic that proved its argumentative viability during last years’ topic. A resolution that included a call for modifying the current DIB is sure to offer unique possibilities to the debate community throughout the entirety of the season.
Also, there is also some concern that new risks to security could result from increased U.S. dependence on an international rather than the national manufacturing base. Western Europe and Japan have provided core-manufacturing capabilities for many years, but the U.S could find itself having to rely on suppliers, like China, who are not allies. Foreign dependency does not make the US innately more vulnerable.
U-boats are not going to blockade the Pacific Coast nor cut the global supply chain. The long-term risk lies in the erosion of the US high tech industrial base as foreign high tech companies enter and compete in the market. US regulations and policies contribute to this erosion. Many aspects of our export control system fail utterly to keep advanced technology out of foreign hands, yet put US companies at a competitive disadvantage.
The net effect is to reduce the number of US defense and high tech suppliers. The availability of off-case arguments such as these is reassuring but is merely supplemental to the already sizable amount of negative arguments that will be available against specific plans, depending on which areas of DIB are affected (Watts, 2008).
Furthermore, much of the public sector literature that references the DIB identifies the contractors, agencies, and operations of this area as the key components of the Military Industrial Complex. Here, negatives can engage in a discussion of US hegemony in both a policy and a critical framework.
When voting for a resolution area, each debate squad should remember that many other topic proposals could be discussed through a C.I. resolution. For instance, teams interested in discussing space-based weaponry can do so VIA a DIB plan focusing on space assets. The broad umbrella of DIB policies ensures that debaters would be able to develop new arguments throughout the season, in opposed to having to rehash old strategies in the spring (Watts, 2008).
Part II
The following part focuses on a historical incident that affected the industrial base sector. Through this, the incident and its impact on the sector, lessons from the incident that have implications for infrastructure protection and resiliency are highlighted. In the last part of this section, recommendations have been highlighted concerning all of the analysis, data, and information resulting from the research, discussions, and conclusions.
A historical incident that affected the sector
Ever since World War II, the Pentagon has been considered as a representation of the US supremacy and influence in the state and the world. In the last 50 years, it had been the command center for the defense industrial base sector. On September 9 in the year 2001, terrorists identified as belonging to the al Qaeda attacked the Pentagon Centre.
On the same day, two other targets known to the world as prominent infrastructures of American power and prestige were attacked. These infrastructures were the twin towers of the world trade center and the White House, which escaped attack when the plane planed to attack it crashed in Pennsylvania. Some few years before the attacks, al Qaeda agents entered the US and planned for the attacks.
These agents choose the most fatal and practical means of achieving their goals. They selected large cargo planes as their target weapons as they contained large amounts of explosive fuels. Fourteen months before the attack, the agents went through intensive flight training courses in preparation for the attack. By September that year, the terrorist was ready to launch their attack.
On the morning of 9/11, the agents seized four airliners. These airliners were from Boston Logan International Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, and Washington Dulles International Airport. It was estimated that the subsequent hijacking of the four planes took place in 43 minutes allowing the US air forces little time to counteract. Three out of the four hijacked planes were crashed into US infrastructures several minutes after takeoff. Two planes were crashed into the twin towers, while the other was crashed into the Pentagon.
Effects of the attack on defense industrial base
After one of the planes crashed into one side of the Pentagon, balls of fire exploded damaging a section of the building, injured, and killed several individuals. In the building, the tragedy claimed the lives of 125 individuals. The dead included 70 civilians and 55 military personnel. According to the military reports, 106 individuals were injured in the incident and were taken to the area hospitals. In the plane, 64 passengers and the crew together with the five hijackers died instantly when the plane crashed into the building.
After the attacks, the department of homeland security was formed, and several changes were initiated at the defense industrial base (Gerstein, 2005). Currently, the department is run by more than 180, 000 employees — the department functions under the instructions from the White House.
Equally, during the period a bill was passed to allow the US defense forces to counterattack terrorists. Before the attacks, military spending had dropped significantly from the cold war eras. However, during the aftermath of September 11, military spending rose drastically (Atkinson, 2003).
In the wake of these attacks, the defense industrial base shifted its spending priorities with an emphasis on information technology, intelligence, surveillance, communications, and other related technologies requiring high levels of security.
Equally, additional amendments have been carried out at subcontractor level to satisfy anti-terrorism and homeland security’s requirements. Over the last ten years, the defense industrial base has significantly enhanced its capability to maintain national departments and organizations that help the US vigilance against terrorism and natural disasters.
The two years after the attacks marked a bellwether period for the defense industrial base and national security agencies (Atkinson, 2003). These years witnessed a new administration focusing on the military competition with a rising Chinese state. After the year 2003, the defense industrial base had changed its focus to fighting challenges emanating from the troubled Muslim countries.
New defense strategies and policies were formulated to allow appropriate environment within which the US could defend its people, interests, and positions. In general, the changes witnessed in the defense industrial base after September 11 demanded fundamental new responses.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be noted that critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) is the most valued and sensitive assets in the US. CIKR are known to be terrorist targets. The safety and protection of these assets have been a main worry for the US government over the last decades. In the article, several sectors under CIKR were mentioned. The defense industrial base was focused on with more analysis on its structure, functions, threats, and changes in post-September 11 attacks.
In accordance with the Department of Homeland Security, the defense industrial base comprises of the department of defense, the US government, and the private sector worldwide industrial complex with capacities to carry out investigations and expansion, plan, create, distribute, and uphold martial weapon systems, machinery, or components to satisfy military necessities.
As such, the sector is mandated to provide, notify, rally, position, and maintain armed forces carrying out military operations worldwide. Its policy states that its main aim is to enhance strong, safe, resilient, and groundbreaking industrial potentials to enable the department of defense to accomplish its war fighter’s prerequisites. With each passing year, new spots of increased risk for the US defense industry emerge.
The sector is under threat from internal terrorist groups, external terrorist groups, and natural disasters. For instance, on September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked its control center at the Pentagon. Ever since the attacks, the sector has tremendously changed with the introduction of new strategies and policies aimed at taming international terrorism.
During the aftermath of September 11, military spending rose drastically. In the wake of these attacks, the defense industrial base shifted its spending priorities with an emphasis on information technology, intelligence, surveillance, communications, and other related technologies requiring high levels of security.
Recommendations
Based on the above analysis, I believe that the defense industrial base sector should be enhanced to match up with the current changes in terrorism technology. I think that previous efforts focusing on the military competition with the rising Chinese state should not be completely abandoned in favor of fighting terrorism.
In my view, the defense industrial base sector should be weary of rising countries, which have in the past threatened or attacked the American interests. This does not imply that the war against terrorism should be stopped. I believe that the war against terrorism will be won if we adopt relevant policies and strategies.
Given the fact that we are in the early ages of information technology, the defense industrial base sector should recognize the challenges and the opportunities that will present itself to our nation, our policies and to our enemies. In regards to policies and strategies implemented after the 9/11 attacks, I believe that more work needs to be undertaken to safeguard the security of our citizens, resources, and enhance a future global environment that is friendly to our nation and our endeavors.
I believe that the defense industrial base sector has taken small steps in the right path towards the achievement of these. All the security efforts should be combined into a comprehensive national security and defense strategy with the necessary organizations, process, policies, and procedures to meet the wide overarching goals and objectives of our new strategies and policies.
To end all the global terrorist networks targeting the US interests, the US defense forces most adopt a two-front strategy (Bartholomees, 2012). Therefore, the US Department of defense should prioritize both the policing and the gathering of intelligence information. Therefore, al Qaida members spread across Europe, Africa, and Asia should be tracked down and arrested.
This strategy will only be effective if the defense industrial base works for hand in hand with the abroad organizations as the CIA, FBI, and their cooperation with local police agencies. In the second strategy, the defense industrial base should utilize local military forces in fighting terrorist groups outside the US, especially in the Muslim world.
It is a fact that local military forces frequently have more legitimacy to operate than our forces in their localities. Therefore, indigenous capacity for fighting terrorism should be enhanced (Bartholomees, 2012).
Equally, the fight against terrorism should be conducted in a manner that respects individual rights. In their quest to end networks of terrorists abroad, the US should ensure that human rights of the victims and the terrorists are upheld. In the same manner, Americans should not only be concerned with threats posed against them but also risks posed against their rivals. Equally, western scholars focused on the humanities field should familiarize themselves with Islamic teachings.
This would not only aid in appreciating Islamic teachings but also help in incorporating Muslim learning as never before. Through this endeavor, genuine Islamic scholarships should be supported. If the above efforts are supported, I believe that our ignorance about Islamic laws and teachings will be reduced, leading to a better understanding and appreciation about our religious differences.
References
Atkinson, T. A. (2003). Skipping a generation of weapons system technology the impact on the Department of Defense and the defense industrial base . Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School.
Bartholomees, J. B. (2012). U.S. Army War College guide to national security issues. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Gerstein, D. M. (2005). Securing America’s future: national strategy in the information age . Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International.
Spencer, R. A. (2012). Putting CIKR sites on the map. Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy.
Watts, B. D. (2008). The US defense industrial base: past, present and future. Washington, DC : Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Wright, S. T. (2012). Critical infrastructure and key resource information for South Kitsap Fire and Rescue . Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy.