Introduction
Jorg Muth explores various approaches that were used by the German Armed Forces and the United States Army in his book Command Culture during World War II. Despite the fact that this is a relatively balanced, direct and simple book, the author confronts an emotionally charged and controversial issue that has ever existed in military history.
He compares the two countries based on various performances such as how they selected, educated, operated, and promoted their officers before and during this war. In the book, Muth introduces the concept of Command Culture and how it was effective in assisting the German Soldiers during the war.
He further demonstrates the simplicity of the concept, but laments that the United States failed to incorporate it into their military system. This concept of Command Culture, the writer says, was a key determinant in the various paths that the United States and Germany armies took during this particular war.
There are various interpretations that support or decline Muth’s ideas, but it all depends on the perspective one chooses when reading the book. However, a majority of readers argue that Muth shows a lot of contempt for the United States Army and the tactical approaches they used during this period in several ways.
Muth’s Contempt for the United States Army
To begin with, the title of his book, Command Culture, or Auftragstaktik as it is known in German, is the centre around which he rotates his criticism. The first of such condescension concerns the translation of the word itself into English. Here, he portrays the Germans as very elusive people. In fact, this German word cannot be translated into any other language and still maintain its original meaning.
As such, it is only the Germans who understand its meaning and philosophies, and hence, anybody outside German is prepared from the onset of the book not to expect anything within boundaries of comprehension. Muth proceeds to inform the reader about the origin of Auftragstaktik.
Meanwhile, he introduces another bright German by the name Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, whom he calls a genius in his own capacity. Moltke, having witnessed the 1858 general staff war games, was pissed off by the way it was run. It is at this particular point that the writer yet again criticizes the United States Army.
He refers the detailed orders and paperwork that was so characteristic of the U.S. Army as nonsense, and this, the writer says, forced Moltke to devise the concept of Command Culture.
Moltke faced a lot of objection while crusading about Auftragstaktik even in Germany at first, but by the time he had been promoted to the leader of the German Army and was retiring in 1888, this concept had already gained popularity inside the Prussian Army (Muth, 2011).
The writer’s contemptuous attitude towards the U.S. Army is further exhibited when he ridicules their ignorance during the 19th century. Moltke asserts that hundreds of U.S. observers regularly observed the ever fighting European armies, but unfortunately missed everything about Auftragstaktik.
He continues to scoff at them that instead of understanding the most discussed revolutionary topic by that time, they concentrated on drill manuals, saddle straps, and belt buckles (Muth, 2011). However, this he attributes to their narrow-minded education regarding military. He says in German, cadet schools, or Kadettenschulen, had a better system of education than that in the US.
This was because in German, officers were trained by their high-profile leaders to be responsible, self-confident and independent. Besides, the system of seniority was scratched off and all cadets were given equal chances to prove themselves.
To demonstrate on this point, he writes on how successful the Germans were when they attacked Kurt Zeitzler, the France Colonel. Unfortunately, the United States Army was very disappointed when it landed in North Africa. This was because of the most obvious reasons, as the writer ridicules, their laxity in embracing Auftragstaktik.
Moreover, Muth depicts the United States Army as one that lacked audacity. This deficit, he says, was even amongst highly ranked officers. The writer goes on to point out that inasmuch as the German soldiers came from an authoritarian society, they still had a better initiative than their counterparts who came from the most democratic nation by then (Muth, 2011).
Therefore, according to the writer, it is logical that German soldiers believed everything was possible in war. Consequently, they crossed boundaries that were really hard to. Such audacious and self-initiated moves are demonstrated by the writer using a sample of popular German commands.
For instance, Muth highlights the “ticket to the last station” command where the German troops moved with remarkable progress inside France. A critical analysis of Muth’s argument could be interpreted that the United States Army was pusillanimous, and that their democracy without self initiative is futile. In addition, Muth proceeds to recap on the intelligence of the U.S. Army and their tactical levels during World War II.
Here, he notes that even young German lieutenants were allowed with great success to command battalions while at the forefront. Unlike them, U.S. lieutenants commanded wars while observing them from behind, or even from miles away. This explains the huge number of German Generals who died while leading the war. This far, it is unrivalled that Germans were the better side during World War II.
However, there is one problem; they did not win this war. It may be that Muth is creating an impression that was never there in the first place, or he himself does not understand what it takes to win wars. Nevertheless, he understands best why he had to write such a daring book.
Conclusion
Overall, Muth’s Command Culture gets a big blow when the reader learns that German did not win World War II. There were several reasons which explain why this had to happen, but the most obvious reason was that operational concepts such as Auftragstaktik did not give German any strategic advantage over its enemy.
This fact is evidenced by those countries that never embraced Command Culture, and the general progress they made was similar to that of German. It is a fact that the American Army may have missed out on the tactics, but at least they were not as arrogant as the writer seems to be or his nation’s Generals during World War II.
It would be interesting to see how Muth explains the confrontation between Franz Halder and Adolf Hitler that led to the nullification of Auftragstaktik in 1942. Whether the writer wants to be patriotic or be whatever he wants to be for his own reasons, he does not appreciate that German had its own serious flaws during this war.
Reference List
Muth, J. (2011). Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901 – 1940, and the Consequences for World War II. Texas: University of North Texas Press.