Introduction
The Vietnam War was a devastating event in American military history owing to its divisive outcomes. Despite their superior military strength and technological advances, the US struggled to actualize its objectives in Vietnam due to various underlying factors. One of the critical reasons for this failure was the unyielding nature of the US operation, which failed to adapt to the demands of war. Although inspired by victorious strategies in other previous wars, the inflexible US doctrine limited tactical effectiveness, resulting in strategic futility.
Main Points Argument
Over-Dependence on Conventional Tactics Was Outdated
The military doctrine of America, which mainly depended on conventional warfare, was out of date and could not help win the war against Vietnam. The theory did not apply to the Vietnam War since it was based on cautious operations. This notion arose from the experience of the US fighting a conventional war against a coalition opponent during World War II (Summers 4).
For Americans, though, the Vietnam War was a different war. The adversary is a guerilla force that employs unusual tactics like ambushes. Since conventional US strategies are not designed to deal with the specific problems posed by guerrilla warfare, they are useless against these enemies (Summers 4). As a result, the American doctrine could not match the Vietnamese enemy’s methods.
One of the causes of the defeat in Vietnam was the US military’s concentration on conventional strategy. The Viet Cong’s hit-and-run strategy allowed them to quickly shift to new spots and hide from American forces, whereas Vietnam’s extensive jungles provided adequate cover and hiding spots (Krepinevich 167). Furthermore, the enemy’s ability to blend in with the local population made it hard for American troops to differentiate between friend and foe. The dependence of the US military on outdated techniques resulted in a large number of civilian losses, which bolstered local populist sympathy for the Viet Cong (Krepinevich 169). Therefore, the US military’s large-scale bombing and ground attacks aggravated the local community and resulted in US fatalities.
The Absence of a Unified Strategy Among the Military Branches
Another aspect that stifled US strategic influence in Vietnam was the absence of a unified approach among the various military branches. Military units had different attitudes to war and focused on different aspects of it (Krepinevich, 204). The US Army primarily centers on ground combat, while the Air Force is more concerned with air strikes. This confusion leads to a lack of coordination between different departments, making it difficult to work effectively together. This leads to situations where one unit initiates operations without the support of other units, resulting in inefficiencies and waste of resources (Summers 9). As a result, Army units cannot work together and coordinate their actions, resulting in incoherent and ineffective strategies.
Moreover, the absence of unified tactics made it difficult for the US to accomplish its goals in the Vietnam War. Each arm pursues its own goals, which regularly conflict with the other (Krepinevich 204). This resulted in a lack of focus and organization, resulting in no progress on the war’s central tenets. This confusion made it difficult to adapt to changing local environments. In addition, the different branches did not jointly assess the situation and develop a joint action plan. Therefore, the shortage of cohesion and coordination among the various branches of the military was a significant factor in the failure of the United States to achieve its goals in Vietnam.
The Use of Air Power as The Main Means of Combat
The US military’s defeat in Vietnam was due to its reliance on the air force as its primary combat weapon. Despite having the most advanced air force in the world, the US failed to realize that it could not defeat the Viet Cong on its own (Krepinevich 204). The American strategy is predicated on the idea that having better technology and weaponry will give it a distinct edge.
Viet Cong guerilla tactics, however, were particularly successful against the US Air Force because they could conceal themselves in the jungle and tunnels, making them hard to find and attack (Clodfelter 179). Thus, due to the explosion’s considerable collateral damage, which included the deaths of innocent individuals and the destruction of communities, the Vietnamese people began to harbor animosity toward the US.
The American military’s failure to understand the psychological impact of air power on the Vietnamese people was a significant misstep in its war effort. The relentless bombings and air strikes caused the Vietnamese immense fear and anxiety, amplifying their insecurity and driving them to side with the Viet Cong (Krepinevich 205).
For example, this fear caused a decrease in support from the South Vietnamese, who had previously been supportive of the US. This made it harder for the US to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, as its population was increasingly unified against foreign intervention (Clodfelter 183). As such, the US military’s lack of understanding of the psychological effects of air power on the local communities proved to be a significant contributing factor to its eventual defeat in the Vietnam War.
The Body Count Technique
For the US military during the Vietnam War, using body counts as a measure of success was a faulty strategy. The approach ignored the essence of the struggle even though it was predicated on the idea that eliminating the adversary would ultimately lead to victory (Lewy 80). The Viet Cong adopted a guerilla warfare strategy, which required them to stay away from military encounters with the US military and instead rely on hit-and-run techniques.
In addition, the Viet Cong could quickly vanish into the bush after an attack, making it challenging to calculate enemy deaths (Lewy 79) precisely. Thus, the body count method ignored that the Viet Cong were fighting for a cause and that killing them would only reinforce their resolve to continue the fight.
Moreover, the US military’s morale suffered due to the emphasis on body numbers. The majority of the soldiers were demoralized by the notion that they were being ordered to put their lives in danger to add to the death toll rather than to accomplish a specific goal (Krepinevich 204). The body count strategy resulted in several abuse situations, such as soldiers falsifying the number of enemy losses to hit quotas or get promoted. Since the Vietnamese people were frequently caught in the crossfire, this further damaged the US military’s reputation and made it challenging to win their support (Lewy 79). Therefore, the reliance on body counts as a measure of success was a misguided approach that failed to consider the nature of the conflict and hurt the morale of US soldiers.
Counter-Arguments
The Failure Was Due to Political and Negative Public Attitudes
The failure of the US in the Vietnam War was the result of a combination of many factors. Politically, the US government failed to secure the full support of the South Vietnamese government and the American people for the war effort (Krepinevich 213). President Johnson’s decision to intercede and escalate the war and the inability to clearly define tenets were crucial factors in the war’s eventual failure.
Additionally, the US failed to utilize sufficient forces or resources to adequately counter North Vietnamese forces, resulting in a prolonged and costly war (Krepinevich 211). The US did not have a coherent strategy to defeat North Vietnam and Vietnamese forces, leading to a lack of progression and further eroding public support. Therefore, the US government’s policy mistakes were one of the aspects that led to the failure.
The American public attitudes toward the war played a significant role in America’s defeat in the Vietnam War. Primarily, the people in the US supported the war effort in Vietnam. However, public opinion changed as the war dragged on (Krepinevich 213). The mounting death toll and lack of visible progress in the fighting meant that public opinion was growing weary of the conflict, making it increasingly difficult for the US government to continue the war.
This shift in public opinion, coupled with the rising cost of the war, eventually forced the US military to retreat and concede defeat in the Vietnam War. Public attitudes toward the war affected the morale of American soldiers. This further weakened the US war effort and ultimately led to US defeat in the Vietnam conflict.
The US Doctrinal Was Used to Disrupt the Enemy’s Operations
The US military’s use of a traditional approach against Vietnam was effective since it accomplished the core uninvolved of disrupting enemy operations. One of the approaches used during the war was air raids (Clodfelter 178). The attack targets were enemy bases, supply lines, and troop staging areas. Air strikes are often used with ground forces, enabling the US to gain an advantage over its enemies.
In addition, US soldiers conducted extensive search-and-destroy missions, which included sending troops into enemy territory to locate and eliminate them (Krepinevich 167). The US engaged in psychological warfare to demoralize its enemies and break the will of communist forces. As a result, the US adopted a strategy of attrition designed to weaken enemy forces and deplete their resources.
The US military used conventional tactics to achieve strategic objectives during the Vietnam War. This included search and destroy missions to limit enemy attacks and heavy bombardment to disrupt enemy movements and isolate troops (Krepinevich 167). Control of crucial regions and infrastructure provided the US with significant advantages and long-term success. Effective use of conventional tactics has proven critical to military strategy as it assisted the US in gaining the upper hand in conflicts and ultimately achieving desired outcomes (Krepinevich 169). Thus, the approach enabled the US to gain psychological leverage over the enemy, capable of intimidating them with superior firepower while demoralizing them by wrecking their resources.
Rebuttal
One of the arguments is that the US military doctrine, which relies primarily on conventional strategy, is outdated to succeed in the Vietnam conflict. While the US military may have been unprepared for these unique problems, it must be noted that the Army has adjusted its strategy over time (Krepinevich 210). For example, the American military is less dependent on large-scale ground operations and is focusing more on counterinsurgency tactics. This change was repeated in the initiative to formulate and counteract the Viet Cong leadership structure (Krepinevich 209). Therefore, although the initiative is controversial and poses some challenges, it demonstrates that the American military can adapt its tactics to changing circumstances.
Despite the notable dissensions among different Army units during the Vietnam War, it is essential to comprehend that this was not the solitary constraint that impeded US efforts. The US military experienced hindrances due to a lack of synchronization and collaboration with South Vietnamese governance and military (Krepinevich 204). This issue became more precarious during the initial years of the conflict when American troops were striving to establish their foothold in Vietnam. In addition, persuading Vietnamese citizens and winning their trust posed severe challenges. Therefore, the inability to have local support proved pivotal to the United States’ ill-fated efforts in Vietnam.
Although the reliance on air power was deemed a mistake by the US military in Vietnam, it is crucial to acknowledge that there was potential for change towards a more ground-oriented tactic (Krepinevich 210). Confronted with the limitations of air power in guerrilla warfare, the US military transitioned towards counterinsurgency-focused strategies. This alteration materialized by creating the Combined Action Program, an initiative entailing embedding US soldiers within Vietnamese villages to provide security and support (Scarpaci 8). While the Combined Action initiative faced specific challenges, it demonstrated the US military’s ability to adapt its tactics according to varying circumstances.
Despite popular belief suggesting that counting bodies was the critical method used by the US military in assessing success during their involvement in the Vietnam War, this perception is flawed. Although valuable data could be extracted through such charts and numbers-based analysis techniques employed by military strategists at that time (Krepinevich 204), substantial evidence indicates that several other parameters determined battlefield outcomes from both armed forces’ perspectives. Among these objectives were safeguarding important infrastructure points and capturing hostile personnel outposts behind enemy lines. Therefore, whereas it may be true that body counts were emphasized more than they should have been, the reasoning should not be used to suggest that they were the primary measure of success.
Conclusion
The idea that the American armed services’ doctrinal position prevented strategic efficiency is oversimplified, even though the Vietnam War was a brutal fight for the US military. Even though mistakes were made along the way, it is inaccurate to say that the doctrine itself was the issue, given that the US military had to deal with an exceptional enemy and a novel style of warfare (Lewy 79). The Vietnam War continues to serve as a lesson in the dangers of underestimating one’s foe and failing to adjust to shifting circumstances. One can better comprehend the factors that led to the US failures in Vietnam and derive crucial lessons for future conflicts by adopting a more nuanced and comprehensive picture of the conflict.
Bibliography
Clodfelter, Mark, The Limits of Air Power. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, (2006). 177-202.
Krepinevich, Andrew F., The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, (1986). 164-93.
Lewy, Guenter, America in Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1978). 43-126.
Scarpaci, Beta. “Martial Brilliance or Marine Corps Propaganda? The Combined Action Platoon in the Vietnam War.” Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History 9, no. 2 (2019): 8. Web.
Summers, Harry, “Defense without Purpose,” Society, 21, no. 1 (1983). 4-17. Web.