The National Intelligence Program (NIP) covers a wide range of activities, projects, and budgets that support the goals and decisions of the Intelligence Community (IC). Currently, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) manages thirteen key NIP programs. The present arrangement is that budgetary allocations for non-NPI intelligence are controlled and monitored separately using a process called planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE). According to Mamandi and Yari (2014), such a framework results in a complementary budgetary procedure that is incapable of supporting or improving the effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The outstanding weakness is that the DNI and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security should collaborate to ensure that both military and national intelligence programs complement each other. Although this strategy supports the targeted security objectives, a number of challenges continue to affect the objectives pursued by the IC. The proposed idea is that funding for non-NIP intelligence projects within the DHS should be transferred to the NIP (Irons & Lallie, 2014). This decision will empower the DNI to manage such activities and combine them with the current NIP programs, including Justice NIP, Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP), Special Reconnaissance Program (SRP), and General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).
Since the major intelligence activities pursued by the Department of Homeland Security are not funded by the NIP, it becomes impossible to have a common procedure for prioritizing, pursuing, or completing specific programs depending on their projected benefits. This is also the same case with the missions undertaken by local and state governments across the United States. Marion, Cronin, and Oliver (2015) believe that the existing gap makes it impossible for those involved to make superior decisions that can support the nation’s security goals.
The management of DOD NIP programs is undertaken in such a way that positive results are recorded within a short time. The presented recommendation will ensure that funding procedures for both NPI and non-NPI intelligence activities are combined to mitigate potential weaknesses. Such a move is also expected to have a bifurcating effect, thereby streamlining the management authority over all components of DHS. This change will also ensure that a seamless budgetary procedure is available or utilized for every activity pursued within the DHS. The DNI will be in a better position to manage all programs’ budget using the Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation System (IPPBE) intended for all IC components.
The projected bifurcating effect will support every DHS agenda and eventually protect American citizens. A uniform resource management approach will also ensure that timely, relevant, innovative, and informed decisions are made. The management authority over all DHS components will tackle emerging challenges, monitor timelines, and maximize performance (Zamora, 2014). Such a strategy will also be put in place to prioritize the most appropriate intelligence activities in the country. Consequently, both DOD NIP and non-NIP programs will emerge successful. The proposal can also be a powerful opportunity for reducing wastes, restructuring agency-specific requirements, prioritizing activities, and managing available resources.
In conclusion, there is a need for different policymakers within the IC to consider the importance of moving all non-NIP DHS component (and other intelligence-related) funding to the NIP. Such a decision will have the effect of bifurcating as it is the case with all DOD NIP programs (Philpott, 2015). The outstanding outcome is that the country will achieve its intelligence objectives and protect every American citizen.
References
Irons, A., & Lallie, H. S. (2014). Digital forensics to intelligent forensics. Future Internet, 6(3), 584-596. Web.
Mamandi, K., & Yari, S. (2014). A global perspective on cybercrime. Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(2), 33-37. Web.
Marion, N. E., Cronin, K., & Oliver, W. M. (2015). Homeland security: Policy and politics. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
Philpott, D. (2015). Understanding the Department of Homeland Security. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press.
Zamora, M. F. (2014). Intelligence failures: Matters of homeland and national security. Journal of Homeland and National Security Perspectives, 1(1), 1-12.