The Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict and Outcome Case Study

Introduction

Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region in the South Caucasus that has been recognized as the main cause of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the last several decades. A dispute about the territory began in 1988 when Armenians proclaimed it to be their property and demanded all the Azerbaijanis leave Karabakh. Within a short period, the events in the Soviet Union, Perestroika, and the intentions to take control influenced the lives of people in different ways, causing the progress of the war and the inability to gain peace. The Nagorno-Karabakh security conflict began in 1988 and remains to be open today. Many researchers and historians call it one of the famous original “frozen” conflicts in Eurasia that included certain territorial and ethnic questions to be solved.¹ The use of heavy weapons, a number of attacks at the beginning of the 1990s, and the support of neighborhood countries made the conflict not only a local problem but an international concern. This paper aims at analyzing the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the security of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as its wider outcomes and the challenge of international relationships.

The Essence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict

Upon the establishment of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1900s, the relationships between the Armenian and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics were friendly and peaceful as equal constituents. However, Azerbaijani instabilities in oil and gas made its people consider additional resources that could be available to them. The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh of around 1,700 square miles was a perfect transit zone for both countries and the establishment of stable trade-economic relationships between the Caucasus and Europe.² After the Revolution in 1917, despite the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh was mostly the area where Armenians lived (about 80%), the Soviet Union imposed the initial power over the region on Azerbaijan.³ In 1923, the current ruler of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, approved the creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) under Azerbaijan jurisdiction where the majority of Armenians lived, leaving the possibility of provoking dissent between the nations opened.⁴ Such a step made the Soviet Union protected against the revolts of the nations because Armenia and Azerbaijan had to be focused on the control of their people and powers.

After the death of Stalin, the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region began changing. New concerns and old unresolved problems were under discussion again. Instead of staying neutral and giving enough space for the two nations to divide their powers, Moscow interrupted the process. The position to support Azerbaijan was chosen first, accusing Armenia of a violation of article 78 of the Soviet Constitution and explaining its military activities against the separatists.⁵ However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of the independent Russian Federation, Armenians were openly supported by Moscow, including the possibility to share their weapons and professional soldiers. In other words, instead of being over in 1991, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was strengthened, causing new deaths, destructions, and discourses.

The initial intentions of the Armenians were to promote the unification between the citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh and the population of Armenia. Still, in several years of unclear and purposeless negotiations, a full-scale war on territorial and ethnic grounds was provoked. It included the pogroms in Sumgait and Kirovabad, Black January (when Gorbachev, the General Secretary, sent troops to Baku), the Khojaly attacks on Azerbaijan in 1992, and migration of the population.⁶ Between 1988 and 1994, more than 30,000 civilian and military people were killed from both sides. ⁷ Armenia was able to keep control of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the parties came to a ceasefire agreement. Still, occasional shootings happened at the beginning of the 21st century. The area remains de facto-independent but unrecognized at the international level. Being frozen, this conflict bothers the representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan and challenges the security of the Russian Federation, as well as other nations that could be intentionally or unintentionally involved.

Impact on Armenia and Azerbaijan

Nowadays, the South Caucasus continues its development in different directions, but the outcomes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict influence its security and human rights issues. The major threat of this conflict is that despite its length and the number of taken lives, it remains poorly recognized in the world with its “no peace – no war” situation.⁸ Its parties, Armenia and Azerbaijan, experience certain difficulties in developing national and international relationships and solving their transportation, energetic, and economic conditions.

Taking into consideration the fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not been solved yet, both countries experience certain limits and concerns in the question of their security and law. For example, the migration of the population is still out of regular control and definite regulations. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 300,000 Armenians who lived in Azerbaijan were deported under governmental regulations, and more than 20,000 Azerbaijanis who lived in Armenia were expelled.⁹ As soon as the Union collapsed, new republics that gained independence began introducing their own policies, approve their rules, and spread their attitudes.

To control the unresolved conflict and defined negotiation efforts, the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was established. Several resolutions were offered to the conflicting parties in terms of which the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh was defined, self-determination of Azerbaijan was discussed, military activities were stopped, and the security of Nagorno-Karabakh was guaranteed.¹⁰ Armenia rejected this idea of “peaceful” negotiations as it did not want to lose the already gained positions. Therefore, another proposal was introduced in 1997 to end hostilities, promote the territorial integrity of the republics, and define the status of the territory with a buffer zone for Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan. During the next several years, all the parties of the conflict found some reasons to reject resolutions of the peace treaty and accuse each other of breaking the terms of the agreements.

Particularly, in Armenia, the security of the country was challenged by mass disobedience campaigns against the current parliamentary leaders who controlled political and economic relationships and wanted to develop special relationships with Russia. Richard Mills, a former US ambassador to Armenia, admitted that the status quo could provoke new concerns in the country because of the lack of materials and human resources and the growth of corruption.¹¹ He explained such security threats exist not because of wrong people in power but because of the impossibility to open new borders and expand its economy. As a result, Armenia is trapped between the necessity to develop international affairs and the obligation to create a fair domestic legislature. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues destroying the achievements made by the country at the moment, including its victory in the war and becoming a part of the Russian-led Eurasian Union and Collective Treaty Organization (CSTO).¹² New confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) were offered to increase the number of OSCE observers and investigators of incidents.¹³ These steps may strengthen the security of Armenia regardless of the negative impact of the conflict.

Azerbaijan, in its turn, developed another position after the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War and during the frozen security conflict. One of the distinctive features of the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region is the necessity to combine security and political aspects of the future of the country with mutual concessions being addressed.¹⁴ The core issue in negotiations that lasted several years was the preservation of the territorial integrity of the area as a part of Azerbaijan. The reasons for these intentions are closely related to energy and gas resources “in which Georgia became the key transit route for Azerbaijan” to West.¹⁵ As soon as Armenia decides to withdraw these relationships, Azerbaijan could lose its major partner and be dependent on other nations. Compared to Armenia, Azerbaijan is not a rich and strong country and is in need of support from Turkey in a security issue. Therefore, the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the security of Azerbaijan is more serious than the one in Armenia.

Nowadays, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is divided between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the latter owns a smaller part compared to the former. The interest of the Azerbaijan government at the end of the conflict remains unstable and unclear. On the one hand, no military activities could promote peace and security stability, and, on the other hand, Azerbaijan is still in the minority, and there is a need to take revenge on their losses during the war.

Wider Impact on Nations

In the modern world, the idea of separatist conflicts turns out to be a serious threat for many nations in terms of their security, economy, politics, and other spheres. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict touched the communities of the South Caucasus and changed the lives of citizens in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the representatives of the western world do not find this conflict as a serious problem because of its location and the existing ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, a wider impact of the conflict and the agreement is not only about certain economic or political challenges but about human losses, community turmoil, and displacements based on ethnic grounds. The quality of diplomatic relations was decreased, and not many countries wanted to be involved in the development of a new solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh situation.

One of the major motivations for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be solved is the presence of natural resources on the territory that is still not divided between the nations. Gold and petroleum deposits cannot be utilized either by Armenia or Azerbaijan in order to improve and stabilize their economies.¹⁶ Armenia has the poor infrastructure to pay enough for mining and other methods of utilizing natural resources. In addition, there is a need to focus on military goals in the region and control the situation on the borders. Azerbaijan, in its turn, is obsessed with the creation of a new irrigation system because when Karabakh cut of its agricultural production, Azerbaijanis faced a serious food crisis.¹⁷ Instead of using the already available resources, the countries import gold from other regions and spend unnecessary money to cover losses.

Finally, the development of the migration crisis cannot be ignored in South Caucuses. People left their native homes to live in places where their populations dominated. Human rights were violated for both Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The governments and political leaders were not able to solve these humanitarian problems and ethnic concerns but stay involved in military affairs. Someone may think that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a challenge for ordinary citizens only, but local politicians and leaders also faced numerous concerns. To meet the expectations of the populations, they had to deal with increased urbanization and the necessity to overcome the consequences of the frozen conflict.

Impact on International Relationship

In addition to a number of local changes and the internal significance of the conflict, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh touched the participants at the international level. One of the countries that contributed to the development and regulation of the conflict between the nations was Russia. Its influence in the South Caucasus remains significant because of the possibility of selling weapons for both sides.¹⁸ It seems that Russia benefits from the conflict being in the state of a frozen one because until the post-Soviet nations fight against each other, they can hardly show their demands to Russia.

During the last several years, the politicians of the United States have become interested in the conflict of the region and offered several possible solutions. The American government expects that Armenian leaders would be ready to take more serious and rational steps toward resolving the conflict and defining the nature of the relationships with and dependence on Russia.¹⁹ The format of negotiations between the nations has to be changed because the same steps and decisions have not led to any positive outcomes and changes. Internationally, it was attempted to find out who was actually responsible for the development of the conflict, and no clear and properly evidenced answer was given. In some countries, the attempts of Russia to support Azerbaijan and Armenia are considered as the necessary protective means against its own security. Some populations do not believe in the worthiness of American recommendations. Therefore, the most dangerous aspect of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the inability to come to common conclusions and choose one solution. The only hope is that Azerbaijan and Armenian ethnic groups could agree once again and replace the already signed ceasefire agreement with another definite regulation.

Conclusion

In general, the long-lasting relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan create a number of problems and uncertainties that are usually explained as the outcomes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In their intentions to divide the territory that is about 1,700 square miles in length, the leaders of both nations cannot come to the same conclusion during the last several decades. Their military activities attract the attention of other countries in the global arena and make them give their subjective recommendations and help. The impact of the conflict on the security of Armenia and Azerbaijan is dramatic because both nations are not able to stabilize their economic and political relationships. Instead of developing and using their resources and taking care of the population, the governments continue strengthening their military powers to control the borders. At this moment, there are no certain positive prospects to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Armenians, as well as Azerbaijani, are at risk of facing new problems and an unclear future.

Bibliography

Chiragov, Fuad. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict Is Destroying Armenia.”The National Interest, 2019. Web.

Cornell, Svante E. “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict and European Security.” In The International Politics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: The Original “Frozen Conflict” and European Security, edited by Svante E. Cornell, 1-21. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Gadimova, Khayala. “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Regional Prosperity of the South Caucasus.”New Eastern Europe, 2018. Web.

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“Nagorno-Karabakh: Azeri-Armenian Ceasefire Agreed.”BBC News, 2016. Web.

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Popjanevski, Johanna. “International Law and the Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict.” In The International Politics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: The Original “Frozen Conflict” and European Security, edited by Svante E. Cornell, 23-47. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Footnotes

1. Svante E. Cornell, “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict and European Security,” in The International Politics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: The Original “Frozen Conflict” and European Security, ed. Svante E. Cornell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 1.
2. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Azeri-Armenian Ceasefire Agreed,” BBC News, Web.
3. Elena Pokalova, “Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts: Timing in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 11 (2014): 72.
4. Ibid.
5. Johanna Popjanevski, “International Law and the Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict,” In The International Politics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: The Original “Frozen Conflict” and European Security, ed. Svante E. Cornell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 31.
6. Pokalova, “Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts,” 72-73.
7. Cornell, “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict and European Security,” 1.
8. Pokalova, “Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts,” 74.
9. Khayala Gadimova, “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Regional Prosperity of the South Caucasus,” New Eastern Europe, Web.
10. Pokalova, “Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts,” 68.
11. Fuad Chicago, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict Is Destroying Armenia,” The National Interest, Web.
12. Cornell, “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict and European Security,” 19.
13. Magdalena Grono, “Politics and Security Hold Each Other Hostage in Nagorno-Karabakh,” International Crisis Group, Web.
14. Grono, “Politics and Security Hold Each Other Hostage in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Web.
15. Cornell, “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict and European Security,” 11.
16. Gadimova, “The Impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on the Regional Prosperity of the South Caucasus,” Web.
17. Ibid.
18. Popjanevski, “International Law and the Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict,” 31.
19. Chicago, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Security Conflict Is Destroying Armenia,” Web.