Introduction
Citizenry is a core aspect in understanding operations of different regions all over the world. It is becoming increasingly vital in focusing on political, philosophical, social, legal and even humanity studies. It also affects aspects of life for people in all countries in form of legal requirements to operate within or without these countries. It reflects on their ability to receive, or otherwise legal citizenry documents for those born within the countries or those that would wish to operate within these countries.
It affects the rights to education, social benefits, rights to education, rights to acquisition of stipulated redress in courts of justice, rights to given political decisions, and to some extent -and this is unfortunate- the enjoyment of basic universal rights.
In understanding the rights to be a citizen to a given country of countries, there is a strong argument for and against its relation and relevance to the basic theories of justice. It must be said that, subject to existing facts, the right to citizenry does not guarantee fairness, justice, equality economic well-being the respect of public officials or pledge of loyalty, or even still the right to economic well-being. This can be vividly observed in disparities in resource distributions within a particular country to which citizenry is, as claimed, equally enjoyed. This is the basis of argument in this philosophical paper.
The writer will to describe the premise of justice as postulated by different theorists, all the aspects and variations in the most relevant arguments in this context and various criticisms (philosophy is about criticism) in their relevance to citizenry. The writer will then try to reconcile different approaches in defining citizenship and related theories. What will flow is the argument for or about whether theory of justice really “needs” the theory of citizenship and if so, or otherwise, then why. It must be mentioned here that all deductions after arguments will be the writers understanding of this relationship. The relationship borrows from justice and citizenry in the context or past and working laws of Australia.
Theory of Justice
The term “theory of justice” may not be relevant until all theories affronted in the subject of justice and judicial and/or legal equality are mentioned and analyzed alongside each other. Justice compete for explanation in the understanding of the Marxists, feminists, utilitarian and libertarians, proponents of individualism and even political pluralists with diverge interests. Reconciling the different views on the theories of justice is a cause of disagreement since some of them are complete opposites of the other and compete for the only avenue of justifying their relevance to justice itself.
John Rawls champions for the solution of distributive justice problems in his initial call for using social contract that he wishes should have bound all in society in the spirit of justice and fairness. He wished that in providing for justice and liberties, there existed a sense of an original position not influenced by history, altruism or egoistic feelings. This provision of justice would come as a result of cooperation to benefit the least privileged in the circumstances. Rawls said:
“no one in the rank he occupies in the society, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence,… The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance”. -Rawls, p.53.
He said that in a society, one would have to maximize his strategies in the best service of the least well-off since he did not know what awaited him. This was quite hypothetical and with the assumption that these acts were not historic. His first principle envisaged equal rights as those of any others such as in voting, standing for an elective post in ones country. This can be kept in practice but has the potential of generating conflict on the basis of lack of perfect equality.
He further argued for the rearrangement of social and economic inequalities to reflect the benefit of the most unprivileged in society at any given instance and for open contest for offices, which provided for equal representation. He argued that social class, economic or tribal differences should not deter us from getting the best opportunities for enjoying universal justice and equality.
Opponents of Rawls’ became his friends and colleagues. Robert Nozick (Norman, 1968.) urged for the minimal states that bestowed only the minimum powers to the state to control exploitation of citizens from citizens by protecting against the use of force, theft, fraud and adherence to contracts signed by parties in an agreement. If these rights were violated, the state would use its machinery to arbitrate. This view emphasizes least state intervention beyond which the state would be depriving citizens of some rights and would be seen to have an invisible hand.
Michael Walzer (Martin, 2005) opposed individualism and embraced communitarism, which he described as the need for citizens to advocate for the strengthening of the civil society and balance individual rights with the cohesion of society. Advocates of individualism, on the contrary, insisted that one is shaped by the society and should be allowed to freely do what is best for self. This, they said gave autonomy for persons and prevented exploitation by “busy bodies” within societies.
Proponents of maximin reasoning such as Robert Paul Wolff urged that Rawls was only apologizing for the status quo in clarification of his theories. They say the best of things will happen and that optimism plays a greater role in choice.
Feminists also criticized him on the basis of familial relations that continue to carry injustices. They urged that personalizing justice makes it political and that there exist injustices in social relations and that labor discriminations even in status of citizenship and ownership of property through gender biases. Rawls thus assumed intuitive argument to claim justice. The theory of justice should thus enclave the aspects so discusses in balancing proportions to ensure most needed ingredients of equality and equitability in service of all who subscribe to the status of citizenship.
Theory of Citizenship
Citizenship entails legitimacy to a state, responsibility and the right to enjoyment of the state resources as may be provided from time to time in the state constitution. It comes with legal stature and a sense of being answerable with liability to repercussions incase of violations of state laws.
Several theories advance the status of citizenship. The Marshall’s Liberal theory outlines the possession of three forms of rights. These are: basic or civil rights in which there is the freedom of speech, ownership of property, worship and equality of justice to all citizens; rights to political alienations such as freedom to vote and stand for office in elected posts and social liberties such as social protection associated with economic hardships, educational needs and good housing.
The challenge comes in when forms of economies are in play. Reconciling capitalism with the ethos associated with equality, for example, becomes quite difficult. This instance challenges the equality yearned for by equal citizenry. In his economic theories, Marx was able to recognize the contradiction in relationship that exists between the abstract equality of citizens and that of civil society. In his argument, the state has a reflection of class differences in civil life- the state is a ruling class while real equality could only result from revolutionary change, save for expansion of rights to vote.
Democracy to him did not extend to offices or factories. Marshall while arguing on the import of increased social activity, welfare development after 1945 also brought increases social security, public education and increased healthcare. Marshall failed to discuss the effects of social change on citizenship rights. Turner on the role of ethnicity said that in developed countries the state immigration policy discriminates on race favoring whites and that social movement in civil society shaped citizenship.
The communitarian theory championed by Etzioni faults the liberal theory on sense of duty to state or community, ignorance on responsibilities, lack of association in society and neglect on the social being in its explanation of citizenry. The suggestions he put forward were withdrawal of government from private ventures while encouraging self responsibility, family life and greater moral dialogue. This theory, however, underestimates the effect of economic dimensions in social problems, lack of cultural dimensions, privilege given to some groups based on race, class and color such as in the case here in Australia and lack of substantive rights enjoyed by the minority such as women who need to engage in social sphere to get noticed even though they have formal rights of citizenship.
Studies by Kyamlika (Tomasi, 1995) on the relationship between justice and citizenship enable an understanding of how they influence each other. Comparing Marx and the communitarians’ arguments on capitalism, he says that the value of a community lies in the liberation of citizens from social responsibilities. This is in contrast to the argument sustained by the communitarians who believe are bases for personal identity and moral deliberations. In as much as communitarians are in tandem with Marx on liberty- depriving roles within the community, fault his argument about freedom of people.
They say that this is done by interpreting and strengthening the community nature of these roles. Distribution of labor, for example, qualifies to be an activity forced on man. This has been defined as fixation of social activity and is ended, according to Marx, by combining what people produce into objective power. Someone in a community setting can do what is in his capability at any time in accordance to the provisions of the society such as beliefs and norms without adopting the social identity tag. This is communism and it to some extent supported by the liberals.
Kymlicka supports psychoanalytic theory on identity, and by extension, citizenship but faults him when the definition fails to describe the adult identity for which citizenship is valid. The association between social life and self-conception in Erickson’s definition is seminal. He says that we have identity in identifying with figures or representations made available to us. In the country context, this would perfectly be through the most patriotic of leaders.
This argument has a linkage with subjectivity from a non-citizen or non-communist’s point of view or in social life context. A person, he argues, has a tag of a social identity formation for which the moral dimension of the relationship between self and society our identities are formed. He concludes that freedom is a central value of modernity. Political liberalism means freedom of individuals.
Arguments fronted by Ross (1999) supports citizenry as a state where there is a minimum threat on freedom from other people’s actions. He stresses that such kinds of affront on personal freedom may come from quarters such as the ruling class. In the Australian setting, the case of citizenry has changed such that apart from being the in the Australian Citizenship Act Queens subjects in the stipulation of the (or formerly National Citizenship Act) up to 1948, the act alienated all. The aborigines and the Torres Strait Islanders were only recognized as citizens in the Royal Assent of 2007. In this regard, they did not have the freedom of choice, or of they had, the provision for individual security from infringement was not fully guaranteed.
In older democracies, freedom was synonymous to citizenship. However, today citizen was free, not slaves, the concept of a citizen does not express a pre-given sense of belonging nor political responsibility, but rather a capacity to have a choice between a range of alternatives, the right make up ones mind on achievements and freedom to act and live as one wishes.
Sandel (1982) stresses the determination for government criticism that is upheld by the libertarians. The control has a strong bearing on the people power and as been championed largely by the less favored in society. He says that citizens have a fundamental right to liberty and the things we have and which we should use to serve ourselves liberally. He argues further is that no liberties of others should be violated. The government plays a minor role in preventing the violation of liberties and should also be indispensable. In this argument, citizenship suffers from a justifiable inequality since implementing such laws are against the liberty of self or others as in the redistribution which may be argued to make one slave to the majority.
If the argument for liberalism should be true to all circumstances, then all should be done to enable the less privileged and the ruling class alike to enjoy the same liberal rights. However, under the said context, personal safety laws should pass for a bother or infringement to a personal liberty. One would be expected to suffer alone and suffer without the penalty of the state. The redistribution practice of most governments would also be expected not vanquish since in directing taxation to one who does not enjoy the fruits of his labor in this circumstance is tantamount to infringing the liberties for a citizen.
Young, commenting about political theorists, for instance, Michel Foucault and Hebermas, arguing that rights are rights and based on differences associated with geography, race, ethnicity, or creed and the influence of citizenry on application of justice remains enormously biased. The tie of deprived justice even in states purporting to provide equality of citizenship is a challenge that needs a revolutionary approach.
Tomasi (1995) qualms the association between culture and deprived justice. Equality, he says, suffers at the mercy of citizenship while there remains disparities associated with deeply rooted cultural practices. Citizenship can therefore not be a clear bargaining ground for fair justice, save for when these practices are recognized and laid bare as causing deprivation of this equality and appropriate measures put in place to apply rational law in each special circumstance.
From the foregoing, a theoretical and normative form of citizenry needs to be engaged in all aspects that befit it such as democratization for clear advocacy. This is in light of the fact that the understanding of justice needs clear insight into what citizenship holds. The arguments on theories of justice not only confines justice to the description of the law but also restrict it to the interpretation of the same. Justice will be denied if the interpretation of citizenship within the law is unfavorable. For one seeking equality of citizenship based on universal liberty, the law should confine itself to describing a citizen as a liberal.
On communitarian grounds, the citizen’s wish should direct him or her to being a subscriber to communal interests while personal interests are at their minimal. This move fails towards addressing grievances of capitalistic thoughts within communalists and puts the two theoretical perspectives at even greater loggerheads.
In describing a citizen on capitalistic grounds, the argument champions a just case based on the maximizing on advancement of individual interest but within the law. This is largely, an aspect development of individualism. It portends the biggest bias in considering the disparity in the modern democratic economies. All theories of citizenship are safely within the fundamental rights of individuals and are therefore greatly supplementary to all possible considered theories of justice. It should also be noted that theories of justice fall short of describing the provisions of a just citizenry except with the help of the accepted description of citizenry.
Treating these two related subjects with due caution is necessary since application of equality related to justice finds explanation in laws which may after all be interpreted to favor only those in classes or the ruling elite at the expense of those who need justice most, eventually depriving them of the much needed provisions of equality in citizenship. It is thus safe to conclude that theory of justice badly need theory of citizenship all for the good or bad of each other since they are part of each.
References
Martin, O. H., (2005). Introduction: Changing Citizenship Theory. Comparative Perspectives in Democratic Framework. PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 38, pp 667-671.
Norman, S. (1968). Theory of Action, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 285-6.
Ross, P. (1999).”Multiculturalism, Aboriginal rights and the nation” Nation & Identity, pg 114-142.
Robinson, Dave & Groves, Judy (2003). Introducing Political Philosophy. Icon Books.
Sandel, M, J. (1982). “Jjusttice and the Good” Liberalism and the Limits of Jjusttice (Part 1), pg. 133-153.
Sterba, J. (1995) Contemporary Social and Political Philosophy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
Tomasi, J., (1995). “Kymlicka, Liberalism and Respect for Cultural Minorities”. Ethics, Vol. 105, pg 580-603.
Young, I. M., (1989). “Pollitty and Group Difference: A Critique of Universal Citizenship.” Ethics, Vol. 99: Issue No 2, pg 250-274.