The United States has always been a prominent actor in the global political scene throughout history. However, political successes are often of a wave-like nature, and the 20th century became a time of power decline for America. Therefore, the strategy of the U.S., represented by striving to keep a balance between foreign and domestic policies and attempting to expand its influence, did not manage to end the Cold War.
Whether America was frightened by the rapid expansion of the Socialist influence is one of the main questions related to the period of the Cold War. The first statement at the beginning of the chapter is that the Vietnam War is a consequence of the Cold War. Vietnam became a Southeast Asian hot spot long before American troops arrived. China, the Soviet Union, and other communist allies supported the North Vietnamese army. As Lindon Johnson said in his address, Communist China had “the deepening shadow” that made Asian realities an American concern (Chafe et al., 137). In contrast, the United States, the Philippines, and other anti-communist states supported the South Vietnamese army. Given the size of the territories of the two main Communist countries, one can assume that the U.S. seemed to fear the loss of control in the political arena.
Another essential question is whether it was possible for the U.S. to find a strategy that could prevent millions of deaths. Thus, the Vietnam War is considered one of the “indirect” battles of the Cold War before the intervention. The year 1965 was the time when America intervened in “obscure and distant Vietnam”, as Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway recalled (Chafe et al., 141). The Communists fought to subjugate the entire country to their power. However, propaganda portrayed the conflict as a war “against the colonizers,” a continuation of the Indochina War against France. In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy saw the intervention as a way to prevent the communist takeover of South Vietnam, part of a “containment policy” to stop the spread of communism for “any price” and “any burden” (Chafe et al., 133). However, the survey in 1971 showed that 61 percent of American citizens saw the U.S. invasion to Vietnam as a “mistake” (Chafe et al., 134). Thus, this U.S. policy showed its shortcomings precisely through the Vietnam War.
In the Korean War, the leading world powers — the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union — were drawn into the conflict. This conflict is the first large-scale clash between the capitalist countries and the socialist camp states in the Cold War era. On April 50, Truman, believing that enough nuclear weapons had already been made to support “national security,” decided to tighten the policy toward the Soviet Union, which involved taking a position of force. This decision is better known as NSC Directive 68 or the “Acheson Memorandum.” These moves convincingly illustrated the gap between U.S. diplomacy’s goals and real objectives. Truman pressed the government and Congress with increasing determination, finally achieving additional investment in military companies. It also enabled an increase in the atomic arms race.
To conclude, the discussed issues are important for work this semester because they help to trace the mistakes made by the American authorities and reflect on the possible developments in the U.S. in the future. Although this giant country remains one of the leaders in the modern world, this fact cannot insure it against potentially inappropriate decisions. In view of the decisions of the former presidents and their administrations, the observed problems provide an implication regarding American society and whom it elects to follow.
Works Cited
Chafe, William H., Sitkoff, Harvard, and Bailey Beth, editors. A History of Our Time: Readings on Postwar America. 8th ed., Oxford University Press, 2011.