World War II had a great impact on social order and international relations between the nations and continents. A major influence on international policies was the relations between the two opposite camps, the Allies and the Axis, and the views each held of the other. The Allies and the Axis were reluctant to follow any line that risked running into the antagonism of the other for fear of alienating their ally and therefore endangering one of the precepts of their distant policies (Gordon 32). In an epoch of growing international anxiety and doubt, Germany remained one of the few relatively sure supports upon which they could depend on. Certainly, in the formulation and conduct of international war policy the significance attached to the views and position of the other was considerable, indeed the contacts and discussions between them were often decisive. The history of World War II suggests that the greatest impact this war had in African and Asian countries was through the processes of decolonization and modernization coming to these geographical regions.
World War II changed the landscape of North Africa and opened new opportunities for independence. The countries became independent immediately after the end of the war, but the war changed the national consciousness and self-determination of the nations. For either to be successful the cooperation of their partner across North Africa was considered imperative. Neither the Allies nor the Axis was prepared to take any initiative alone: among diplomatic, military and political circles there was a refusal to act either against Italian hostility in North Africa or German treaty violations in Europe without the guaranteed support of their partner (Hargreaves 65). This perceived incapability to operate without the backing of the other extended at several vital junctures to the point where the Allies and the Axis allowed the other, possibly willingly so, to determine their own policies (Gordon 65).
The main African countries involved in World War II were under Italian rule and included the Italian North Africa, the Italian east Africa. Also, such Asian Middle East countries as Iran, Syria and Lebanon were involved. The outcome this emphasis placed on the other’s strategy was to strengthen the case for appeasing Italy and Germany. Each was depressed from taking a firm posture by the belief that the other was not committed to a policy of confrontation. During the first months of World War II, the countries recognized that, whatever their public statements, the British were not committed to a hard line over Italian hostility (Hargreaves 77). Later, following the reoccupation of the Africa, a similar sight was held in London of French attitudes. Equally important, each knew, indeed it was explicitly stated, that their ally would not act without them and without having first received a formal promise of their support. The Allies and the Axis pacification policies were further reinforced by the denial to accept a trade-off by which support for a policy of resistance against one fascist aggressor would be exchanged for the promise of support against the other (McGowen 87). The only result of these political maneuvers was to further damage their relations, with each berating the other for failing to provide the necessary support. In fact, these often hurtful exchanges had more to do with seeking to place the onus for (in)action onto their ally’s shoulders than with any wish to adopt a policy of resistance towards fascist hostility (Gordon 63). “Between Cairo and Cape Town operational activities were at first confined to a few ports and airfields. Freetown, an important staging-post and assembly-point for naval convoys, was quickly affected” (Hargreaves 51). The outcomes drawn from these common considerations, firstly, that it was impossible to act without the backing of their ally and, secondly, that their union was no more than half- hearted in its desire to oppose Italy or Germany (and also that they lacked the means even if they had desired to accept such a policy), accentuated their already unsure policies, impeded any firm answer, and acted as a further impetus to the policies of appeasement.
When considering the African and Asian responses to Italian hostility in East Africa, a contrast has been made between ‘the complicated “game” and the determination of the English Government; of a strong-willed British administration wanting to do all it could to halt Italy and defend the League but being held back by the cynical policies of the French (Hargreaves 66). The obvious contradiction with France’s traditional record of determination in upholding the settlement and the League, and with Great Britain’s previous half-hearted and flexible approach towards both, is explained away by a supposed dual volte-face in which each at the same time assumed the mantle of the other. This actually rapid and total about-turn in policy simply cannot explain the complexity of the Allies and the Axis policies. For both there were numerous issues to be taken into account, some pushing towards opposition to the Axis ambitions and defense, others towards maintaining Italian friendship through acceptance of her expansion at Africa’s expense. Although these were not felt equally, there were strong cases made on either side of the dispute in both countries (McGowen 34). In their respective parliaments, governments and public views the war crisis produced widely divergent, and often contradictory, opinions towards the Axis. The result was that neither was firmly attached either to opposing or conniving at Italian hostility. For the Allies and the Axis leaders the importance of the Africa crisis, coming at a critical time in international affairs, lay in its repercussions beyond Africa – in the Mediterranean, in Europe, and above all in their future relations with Germany (Gordon 49). Not surprisingly, their opinion turned as much towards Berlin as towards Rome, Addis Ababa or Geneva throughout the whole affair. Faced with growing evils in Europe, complicated by an expansionist Japan in the Far East, the significance of Italy greatly increased. With Germany rearming and clearly seeking to expand to the African and Asian continents and east the value of Italian support could not be overlooked. The result was an effort, led by the French but closely followed and supported by London, to tie Italy more closely to the western camp. “Political doctrines apart, all France’s African subjects suffered new hardships in consequence of the interruption of peacetime patterns of production and trade, and of increased demands by their rulers” (Hargreaves 53).
Not only was there a concern not to estrange their union and to keep as close to them as possible but both the Allies and the Axis also considered that their own policy could not be successful without the fuIl and active participation of each other. This refusal to operate outside a joint Allies approach acted throughout the crisis as a restraint on the policy initiatives that emerged from the Allies and the Axis whether they were for greater concessions or stronger coercive measures. Although for Great Britain the issue was less one of dependence there was still a great emphasis placed on Paris (McGowen 65). This was certainly much in evidence when consideration was given to the issue of sanctions. The issue of French military support should Italy attack the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean in some ‘mad dog’ attack was repeatedly raised. Equally, there was a general insistence that France should prepare fuIl-scale armed operations against Italy before sanctions could even be considered, and any policy of opposing Italian ambitions was simply considered impossible without the full military and diplomatic support of the French (Gordon 69). The war in Asia took place between Japanese and communist Chinese armies aimed to protect their national interest and became independent.
Time and again the Allies pointed to failure to provide this as a reason for their own unwillingness to consider sanctions. At the same time they insisted on the necessity of keeping in step with France and made this principle of their policy clear to all involved. British statements that they had no understanding with African countries, their demands that before sanctions were apprised upon France must be prepared to undertake large-scale military operations (in fact, take the brunt of these as well as from any Italian retaliation) and their refusal to offer in exchange for French support over Africa a guarantee of British support for future sanctions against Germany, only added to the general suspicion in Paris (Hargreaves 74). British demands that a sanctions policy be adopted, and moreover that it be led by France, met with little support (McGowen 48). French leaders, aware of British silence on this issue, saw no reason to do anything other than drag their heels – certainly they often argued that London would be only too pleased if sanctions were avoided.
Similar to Africa, Asia was intestinally involved in the war with poor military resources and colonial state power. It has been argued that the crisis posed a straightforward, if awkward, choice for the Allies and the Axis between resistance and appeasement, between threats (backed up if necessary by collective action) and sufficient concessions to Italy to prevent her from resorting to arms combined with pressure on the Asians to concede. In this the choice that confronted Paris and London over Asian nations reflected the wider and longer-term choice over policy towards the fascist powers. The choice was not, though, so simple. The recognized pattern of appeasing Mussolini and the desire to preserve the advantages of Italian friendship pushed them in one way; concern for the League and for the widespread public support it enjoyed pushed them in another (McGowen 65). Neither Government, though, saw the option in such stark terms. For both it was an issue of attempting to balance the many demands placed on them. Nor were conciliation and coercion considered as being equally exclusive but rather as two paths to be followed simultaneously. Both the Allies and the Axis were pushed towards what were often incompatible options by conflicting advice and concerns. The understandable inclination was to seek to avoid these alternatives, to preserve both Italian co-operation in Europe and the prestige and force of the League; neither France nor Great Britain accepted that by attempting to keep both they would fall between two stools (Gordon 77). The World War II led to formation of Asian states including the Republic of China (under Communist regime,) The North and South Korea, the Taiwan, and Vietnam. The decolonization process touched Indochina, Algeria, Indonesia and Madagascar, the dominion of India and Pakistan. Such states as Israel and Palestine were created in the Middle East.
The story of the Allies and the Axis policies towards the African and Asian countries is in large part that of how the Governments sought to come to terms with this dilemma. Neither saw a simple choice between coercion and conciliation and in neither country was the eventual outcome of the debate a clear decision either to resist or to cede to Italian demands. When faced with the threat and then the fact of Italian hostility against a fellow member of the League both France and Great Britain worked fervently to find a diplomatic solution (Hock 101). The central, seemingly insoluble, problem remained how this could satisfy both the League and Italy; how Italian needs could be sufficiently fulfilled to keep her in the anti-German camp while not delivering a fatal blow to the League and to the system of collective security. Such hopes proved to be based on an unfounded optimism or, more probably, on an irresolution characteristic of both countries’ leaderships. At the heart of British and French policies lay what were to prove intractable problems arising from inherent inconsistencies (McGowen 51). Furthermore, however understandable the policies pursued, they were always poorly adapted to the nature of Mussolini’s power. Given this, it is not surprising that their open rejection of effectual sanctions and their public acceptance of Italy’s need to expand did little to convince Mussolini of the need to accept anything less than the complete annihilation of North Africa. This gulf between fascist Italy and the democracies always worked against a successful resolution of the crisis along the lines envisaged in the Allies and the Axis. The weaknesses inherent in such an approach and the basic incompatibility of the two halves of the dual-line were never fully accepted by the Allies and the Axis policy-makers (Gordon 88).
Pushed in often opposite directions by various international and domestic considerations, the Allies and the Axis policies in Asia and Africa were equally ambivalent. The first inclination for both was to temporize, to leave the problem to others, to urge conciliation all round and to attempt to avoid the awkward dilemma posed by Italy’s hostility (Hock 103). Driven by conflicting advice, interests and considerations, weakened in their formulation by the absence of decisive leadership and in their application both by material weaknesses and the lack of Anglo-French solidarity, ended in failure: the League was ruined as an instrument of peace-keeping, the Italian alliance permanently damaged and mutual relations strained almost to breaking point. “The secretary of state entered 1941 certain that he wanted no confrontation with Japan over China or Southeast Asia until the situation in Europe had improved” (Lee 14).
Having unsuccessfully turned to each other for a lead, ministers and their military advisers looked to Great Britain for a way out of their predicament. Safe in the knowledge that British opposition would rule out any military response, the new direction was instructed to open talks under the auspices of the League. The crisis was, however, far from over (Hock 107). The importance of Asian theater was that for the Allies, all hopes of improving relations with Germany were dependent on one thing – the support of France. Everything turned on first neutralizing any French demands for action and then winning her over to the appeasement of Europe. For the Government in London the present dangers, and future possibilities, all revolved around an agreement with Paris. Both approached the events from this same sense of weakness (McGowen 38). Attempts to look to other allies (in the case of France to Poland, the Little Entente, the Soviet Union and Italy; for Great Britain to her Dominions) never got off the ground. Faced with growing threats in Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa, Great Britain had to abandon her inclination to be the arbiter of Europe (Hock 106).
Their immediate reactions, however, were often to condemn their partner as much as the aggressor. The French attacked what they regarded as Great Britain’s lack of solidarity, their failure to provide adequate commitments to the defense of Western Europe, and for playing too much to a German tune. They also questioned the inconsistency with which the British sought to apply the Covenant against Italy while denying its value in Europe. In London French intransigence was blamed for the long-lasting failure to reach a settlement with Germany (McGowen 23). The inherent issues in relations between Britain and France in Asia were heightened by the fact that before either reached a policy decision the other’s attitude was solicited and, despite a pronounced lack of confidence, their support made an essential precondition for any diplomatic move (Kelly 81). Throughout both crises each constantly referred to the attitudes of other actors. In turn, the League, the United States, France’s Eastern European allies, British Dominions, and numerous other states as far apart as Turkey and Japan, were considered in policy deliberations. What really mattered, however, was the attitude of their partner across the Channel. Beyond the limitations imposed by material resources and the broad outlook and aims of the two leaderships, it was these considerations that each gave to the other’s position that was the major determinant of international policy (McGowen 87).
In Asia and Africa, the Allies relations were marked by requests and refusals for action against international hostility: British attempts to halt Italian ambitions in Ethiopia were blocked by French unwillingness to follow their lead; over the Asia the roles were apparently reversed, with Great Britain’s non-co-operation holding back the French. In both cases there is much in this that is simply myth. The myth, however, both at the time and since, proved to be remarkably useful. Consequently it took deep root (McGowen 47). That the Allies tensions were added to by these diplomatic exchanges is evident. Over the crisis the British disapproval of the French failure to stand by them was strongly voiced. In return, Paris attacked what many there considered to be Great Britain’s willingness to raise the stakes to dangerous levels.
Those successes offered twin rescue to a beleaguered Imperial Army. First, the colossal drain of the China “incident” might at last be ended by an occupation of French Indochina that would nearly sever the remaining flow of Western aid to Chiang Kai-shek. It was a perversion of the “total war” officers’ original attempt to achieve autarky (Lee 16).
In both cases these connections had a direct and lasting collision. In large part these divergences make clear the failure to overcome either crisis successfully (McGowen 54; McGowen 66).
In sum, African countries and Asian nations were the stronger partners is beyond doubt. The greater reliance of the Allies on ally was shown in the frequent use made of the unequal relations. None the less, the Allies retained a clear edge of political maneuver and took its own part in the policy of pacification. The direct insinuation of their recognized interdependence was a refusal to maneuver in the political arena outside the boundaries of what was jointly agreed and applied. World War II proposed great opportunities for Asian and African nations to become independent but it also ruined their cultural and social achievements. Their interdependence also meant that the world’s powers chose to bow to the other’s position. Critics told that the world’s powers would adjust their position to that of dependent nations. This is a mistaken impression and expression. The debate constantly placed Asian nations at the centre of their decisions and any action to resolve the war crisis, either along the path of further concessions or greater pressure on the Axis, was based on winning co-operation.
Works Cited
Gordon, J. W. The Other Desert War: British Special Forces in North Africa, 1940-1943 Greenwood Press, 1987.
Hargreaves, J.D. Decolonization in Africa; Longman, 1996.
Hock, D. Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.
Kelly, O. Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia. Wiley, 2002.
Lee, L.E. World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the War’s aftermath, with General Themes: A Handbook of Literature and Research. Greenwood Press, 1998.
McGowen, T. World War II. Childrens Press, 2002.