Introduction
National intelligence refers to the act of conducting activities, which are perceived to be essential for the conduct of both national security as well as foreign relations of a given country. In the United States, a cooperative federation consisted of approximately sixteen governmental agencies have been put in place to conduct these activities.
Further, these agencies work separately during the preliminary stage but join hands in the pronounced stages of these activities. Among these intelligence activities includes; collection as well as production of domestic intelligence, military planning in addition to espionage performance (Loch 23).
The cooperative federation put in place is commonly referred to as United States Intelligence Community. In a research conducted by Loch, it was found out that the United States Intelligence history is dominated by certain strategic themes, which relate to the intelligence’s reform catalysts (Loch 23).
Vaart notes that it depends with the perception of an individual in assessing whether the United States’ Intelligence reforms have been reactive in an effort towards dealing with past events or they have been proactive as well as forward-looking with the point of dealing with the future trends in addition to patterns in national security (Vaart 39).
Thesis Statement
This article will focus on establishing the recurring themes considering the United States’ Intelligence history, which seem relevant to the significant reform catalysts. In addition to this, the paper will also establish whether these reforms have been reactive in trying to deal with past events or whether the reforms are forward-looking and proactive with the point of dealing with future trends and patterns in national security.
Discussion
Recurring Strategic themes in the U.S Intelligence History
In order to understand this, it is necessary that the difference between strategic themes as well as reform themselves be comprehensively understood. Consider the following example; in the early 1880s, the Naval Intelligence office was established by the then President of the United States and this was considered by world wide political analysts as an intelligence reform.
What drove the nation into establishing this reform was the international crisis. As such, it was when the powerful United States captured a flagged ship owned by the British at the time the civil war was cropping up. Another catalyst for this reform was the inability of the United States’ marine force to track ships belonging to Britain during this international crisis.
The strategic theme that gave rise to this reform was represented by the expansion of the presence of the United States navy in many international oceans in addition to the increment of the United State’s maritime trade with international trade partners (Vaart 39).
From this perspective, one strategic theme that is majorly recurring in the history of the U.S Intelligence is the need for a director of national intelligence. Indeed, this had been outlined in 1971 by Schlesinger. 20 years after Dulles report was written and presented to the United States Government, James R. Schlesinger, then an official in the office of Management and budget, was asked by the president as well as the National Security Council to make a review of the Intelligence community (Vaart 42).
He found out that, considering the past decade, the intelligence cost had shot up yet the intelligence community had not achieved what he termed as a commensurate improvement with regards to the coverage in addition to the aggregate quantity of the intelligence products.
He advocated for an immediate appointment of a manager to be mandated with the responsibility of planning as well as rationalizing the intelligence collection and the evaluation of the intelligence products not only within the intelligence community but also within the defense department.
He indicated that there would be a new position established for the manager from a white house coordinator to Director of national Intelligence, who is fully pledged and who would be responsible for control of budgets of the intelligence community.
Another recurring theme in the history of the United States’ intelligence can be traced in 1882. During this time, the Naval Intelligence office was put in place and as such, it was supposed to reform the United States’ intelligence. The global community was experiencing trade hardships. Many industrial analysts described it as an international trade crisis.
This reform occurred immediately after the powerful United States captured a flagged ship belonging to the Great Britain during when civil war had taken effect in addition to the inability of the United States’ marine force to track ships belonging to Britain during this global trade hardships period.
The United States government opted to expand the operations of the marine military wing into major internationally shared oceans such as the pacific. In addition to this, the government saw it necessary to increase its maritime trade with international trade partners. This, according to the findings of Vaart is the strategic theme that led to the naval intelligence office (Loch 29).
Thirdly, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, calls for the need to split the Director of National Intelligence duties between the chief of the intelligence community as well as director of the C.I.A were made. This surfaced to be a recurring strategic theme. The catalyst that led to the underlying reforms was the terrorist attack. This attack led to the death of a significant number of people.
As such, three passenger planes were high jacked by terrorists and they crashed the three planes into the Twin Tower buildings causing many deaths. Therefore, calls for implementation of measures to conduct high levels of investigations in addition to far reaching reforms were made.
There were many surveys examined. However, the most influential was the 9/11 commission’s report that advocated for the splitting of the Director of the National Intelligence. The president adopted this report and acted upon it guided by the report’s recommendations.
Nature of the reforms
These reforms can be identified as possessing both reactive or proactive. With regards to being reactive, the reforms are made in a bid to deal with past events. On the other hand, proactive reforms are made to deal with the trends and patterns in national security that is likely to occur going into the future.
Reactive
The reforms can be perceived as reactive if they are concerned with establishing the weaknesses subject or failures that led to a tantalizing effect and seeking ways to containing this effect. For instance, as James R. Schlesinger indicated, the intelligence cost had shot up yet the intelligence community had not achieved what he termed as a commensurate improvement with regards to the coverage in addition to the aggregate quantity of the intelligence products.
He recommended to the President the appointment of a manager who would be mandated with the responsibility of planning as well as rationalizing the intelligence collection and the evaluation of the intelligence products, not only within the intelligence community but also within the defence department. Such recommendations were aimed at correcting the past actions of the intelligence community and therefore making improvements so as to ensure that such will not be experienced in the future1.
These reforms can also be described as reactive. Considering what happened after the September 11 terrorism attack; there were calls for implementation of measures to conduct high levels of investigations in addition to far reaching reforms.
This is indeed a reactive reform as the calls necessitate looking into the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, which was a past event, and therefore making investigations. This reform, since it was the majorly recommended by surveys including the 9/11 commission’s report, was adopted by President Bush.
Proactive
A reform is identified as proactive due to its tendencies in focusing on the future events. The aforementioned reforms can be said to be proactive in addition to holding an element of reactivity. For instance, considering the findings of James R. Schlesinger about the Intelligence Community, he found the performance of the intelligence community lacking.
As such, the cost that had been incurred on intelligence activities had gone up without anything beneficial to show for it. As a result, he made a recommendation that there should be appointed a manager who would be mandated with the responsibility of planning as well as rationalizing the intelligence collection and the evaluation of the intelligence products, not only within the intelligence community but also within the defense department.
While this is seen as a worthwhile recommendation, it is proactive. The essence is the future. As such, James R. Schlesinger puts the future into focus and saw it necessary to make these recommendations in an effort towards preventing such a miss surfacing in the future2.
Another example of a reactive reform is the calls for the split of Director of National Intelligence duties between the chief of the intelligence community as well as director of C.I.A after the September 11 terrorist attacks. These reforms were advocated for since they would ensure that the intelligence community will be better prepared in the future when such an event happens.
Perhaps, the duties of the Director of National Intelligence duties was so much generalized such that some important duties such as chief of the intelligence community as well as director of C.I.A were overlooked and therefore causing a narrow scope of intelligence activities and this led to the inability of the Intelligence community to prevent the terrorist attacks. Therefore, the reform; that is splitting of duties, would guarantee that; in the future, terrorism attacks will be prevented and this evidently clear that such a reform is proactive in nature (Loch 33).
Conclusion
It has been found in this analysis that during the history of the United State’s intelligence, there have been major reforms. There are catalysts that have resulted from these reforms being made. In addition to this, there have been strategic themes that have led to the establishment of these reforms.
The analysis found out that reforms and strategic themes can be easily confused with each other. However, a closer consideration establishes that indeed, it is strategic themes that bring about the surfacing of reforms.
It was also found out that reforms can be reactive, that is, focuses on dealing with the past events. Further, they can be proactive with the point of dealing with future trends and patterns in national security. However, it depends with the perception of a person. With regard to the aforementioned reforms, it is evidently clear that some can be singly reactive while others can be perceived as both reactive as well as proactive (Vaart 39).
Works Cited
Loch, Johnson. Strategic Intelligence. Belmont: Cengage Learning, 2006. Print.
Vaart, Andres. “Studies in Intelligence,” Journal of the American Intelligence 39 (2008): 39–50.
Footnotes
1 Johnson Loch, Strategic Intelligence (Belmont: Cengage Learning, 2006), 53
2 Andres Vaart. “Studies in Intelligence,” Journal of the American Intelligence 39 (2008): 44.