This paper explores how the principles of the consequentialist ethical approach can be applied to the discussion of using animals in medical research as well as in laboratory experiments. The specific type of the consequentialist ethical approach that is applied to the topic in the paper is preference utilitarianism formulated by Richard Mervyn Hare. Preference utilitarianism is only one type among many forms of utilitarian ethics, but this particular approach needs to be applied to the topic of the research. The reason is that this ethical theory helps understand the controversy of the choice made by medical researchers and practitioners in terms of morality when they put their preferences higher than possible preferences of animals. Therefore, the paper aims to provide not only application of the theory to the study but also strengths and weaknesses in discussing animals in medical research from the perspective of this particular type of utilitarianism.
The use of animals in medical research is an issue for multiple debates because the problem can be viewed from different ethical points. One of the important ethical perspectives is the consequentialist approach. This perspective is divided into several types of utilitarianism, among which the preference utilitarianism proposed by Richard Mervyn Hare in 1981 seems to be the most actively discussed one (Foëx, 2007). While discussing the use of animals in medical research according to the consequentialist perspective, it is important to state that humans’ preferences cannot be counted higher to cause animals’ suffering; humans and animals’ preferences need to be valued equally; preferences of animals can be even counted as a priority, and the use of animals in research can be changed with alternatives.
Preference utilitarianism is based on the idea that preferences of all parties involved are equally important for the discussion. Therefore, this consequentialist ethical theory is directly related to the problem of animals in medical research because it explains how preferences of both humans and animals should be treated in the context when positive results are expected (Li, 2002, p. 590). According to Hare, all preferences can be counted as equal, but it is also possible to prioritize one’s preferences over the others (Hare, 2000). This approach allows understanding the controversy of using animals in the medical research because the preferences of both humans and non-humans need to be treated equally, but in reality, the preferences of humans for finding new medications are prioritized without stating clearly the arguments for such prioritization.
Hare’s preference utilitarianism is a strong ethical theory to explain why the choices of researchers to use animals in laboratory experiments cannot be discussed as moral. The most important aspect is the equality in the right to have preferences for both humans and animals (Irvin, 2004, p. 62; Li, 2002, p. 590). It is possible to assume that humans prefer to find out new effective medications to save more people’s lives from severe or incurable diseases. Animals, in this case, have preferences regarding being properly fed and provided with freedom. Focusing on preference utilitarianism, all these desires should be taken into account equally. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that those researchers who ignore animals’ preferences act immorally, and the issue of the priority of preference arises (Li, 2002, p. 590). As a result, this moral theory effectively demonstrates that even following the utilitarian ethics and focusing on positive consequences, it is possible to act immorally.
While applying preference utilitarianism to the research, it is important to pay attention to many weaknesses of the theory. The problem is in the fact that in spite of accentuating the role of equality in evaluating preferences, supporters of preference utilitarianism also refer to the idea of prioritized desires and interests. According to Hare, preferences can be prioritized with references to their intensity and quality (Hare, 2000). However, the possibility to compare interests of humans and animals is another moral question because such comparison seems to be inadequate (Foëx, 2007, p. 751). Still, even focusing on priorities, it is possible to propose different measures and criteria to compare preferences of humans and animals. Therefore, a person can evaluate the moral character of his or her preferences any time according to the new criterion.
It is possible to state that preference utilitarianism developed by Richard Mervyn Hare in the 1980s is one more important approach to value the morality of the choice made by researchers, who use animals in their experiments. The theory explains that humans’ preferences and interests cannot be counted as more important than animals’ preferences to cause them pain and suffering. Furthermore, preferences of humans and animals should be valued equally in cases when the moral choice is almost impossible. In addition, there are cases when preferences of animals can be even counted higher, and alternative variants should be chosen by researchers to protect the rights of animals. From this perspective, preference utilitarianism provides an effective background for the discussion of the problem of using animals in research from multiple perspectives.
References
Foëx, B. A. (2007). The ethics of animal experimentation. Emergency Medicine Journal, 24(11), 750-758.
Hare, R. M. (2000). Objective prescriptions, and other essays. New York, NY: Clarendon Press.
Irvin, S. (2004). Capacities, context and the moral status of animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21(1), 61-76.
Li, H. L. (2002). Animal research, non-vegetarianism, and the moral status of animals: Understanding the impasse of the animal rights problem. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 27(5), 589-615.