The third revolution to take place in Kyrgyzstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the one that took place in 2020. The 2005 Tulip Revolution was followed by the 2010 Blood-Red Revolution as the first two revolutions. Similar levels of unrest were seen during the 2020 revolution, and the root causes of the disturbance were the same as they had been during the previous two revolutions: a lack of political freedom, a fragile economy, and public discontent with the ruling class.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the subsequent A Blood-Red Revolution in Kyrgyzstan have been two of the most important and influential political events in the country. Since then, the two revolutions have been the focus of extensive scholarly analysis and discussions about the function of patronage politics in Eurasian regime dynamics. According to Hale (2014), a political system in which politicians prioritize their personal interests and the interests of their close friends over the interests of the entire society is described as patronage politics. Patronage politics are frequently utilized to gain riches and power as well as to instill a sense of devotion in followers. According to Hale (2014), patronage politics have played a significant role in the emergence and demise of regimes in Eurasia. The Tulip Revolution and the subsequent A Blood-Red Revolution serve as excellent illustrations of how patronage politics can result in abrupt and dramatic changes to a regime.
The 2005 Tulip Revolution was a public movement against President Askar Akayev’s autocratic rule, which had been in place since 1991. A contentious parliamentary election that had been tainted by claims of electoral fraud served as the catalyst for the revolution (Trochev, 2018). The overthrow of Akayev and his government was accomplished through a mainly nonviolent revolution. Public discontent with electoral fraud and a lack of democracy, which can be attributed to the patronage politics of the Akayev regime, was a major force behind the Tulip Revolution (Lapkin & Pantin, 2020). The Kyrgyzstani people had had enough of the regime’s election meddling in order to maintain its hold on power. People felt that they had no choice but to protest and demand change as a result of the absence of democracy. This was mostly achieved by non-violent tactics including demonstrations, protests, and civil disobedience. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, another authoritarian leader, was elected and came into power not long after that.
2010 saw the A Blood-Red Revolution, a mass revolt against Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s totalitarian rule. The Bakiyev administration was accused of corruption and political persecution, which precipitated the revolution (Lapkin & Pantin, 2020). The revolution, which succeeded in overthrowing Bakiyev and his government, was characterized by bloody skirmishes between protestors and law enforcement. A separate set of issues motivated the A Blood-Red Revolution. The Kyrgyzstani people had had enough of the Bakiyev regime’s alleged widespread corruption and political persecution (Trochev, 2018). People felt forced to protest in the streets and call for change due to the intensity of their rage and dissatisfaction. The Kyrgyzstani people’s attempt to overthrow the tyrannical Bakiyev dictatorship was mostly characterized by violent conflicts between protestors and security personnel.
Comprehending the Tulip Revolution and the A Blood-Red Revolution in Kyrgyzstan can be aided by understanding Hale’s theory of patronage politics and its function in Eurasian regime dynamics. His claims are well-backed by the facts, and they have shed important light on the significance of patronage politics in the development and collapse of governments throughout Eurasia (Trochev, 2018). It is obvious that patronage politics played a significant part in the revolutions and that diverse strategies were employed to carry them out.
The Kyrgyzstan revolution was a significant occasion that resulted in significant political changes in the nation. Economic resentments, governmental corruption, and a sense of disenfranchisement among the populace all played a role in the revolution. It is crucial to examine Henry Hale’s idea of patronal politics in order to comprehend the fundamental reasons behind the revolution. Hale describes the mechanics of patron-client relationships in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian republics in his book Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Lapkin & Pantin, 2020). He also offers a framework for comprehending the particular circumstances surrounding the 2020 revolution.
Patronal politics have been a distinctive aspect of Kyrgyzstan since the Soviet era. This system has been characterized by a blend of cronyism, nepotism, and patronage networks. Powerful patrons have been able to take use of this arrangement to solidify their control and make money off of the populace. The system has left the vast bulk of the population behind, concentrating money and power in the hands of a small minority. People now feel increasingly economically and politically disenfranchised as a result of this. Hale believed that the patronage system in Kyrgyzstan was the main cause of the issues that sparked the 2005 and 2010 revolutions. He said that the “pyramid of power” fell during these revolutions due to a shift in the expectations of the elites (oligarchs, regional leaders, and bureaucrats). On the other hand, it was observed that the stability of expectations in Kazakhstan and Belarus had strengthened these pyramids.
The Blood-Red Revolution and the Tulip Revolution were both motivated by a rejection of this patronage system. In the Tulip Revolution, demonstrators pushed for an end to the corruption and nepotism that had crept into President Askar Akayev’s administration (Hale, 2014). Contrarily, the Blood-Red Revolution was fueled by both political turmoil and economic instability as demonstrators worked to overthrow President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and his corrupt government.
Between the two revolutions, Kyrgyzstan went through a time of mostly stable politics. The Almazbek Atambayev administration, which came to power in 2011, made significant progress in resolving some of the political and economic issues that had sparked earlier revolutions (Hale, 2014). By 2020, though, the nation was once more dealing with dire economic conditions, pervasive corruption, and a growing feeling of political enfranchisement (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2019). As a result, many of the fundamental issues that had sparked the uprisings in 2005 and 2010 had not been resolved, and the populace was once more dissatisfied with the current situation.
These series of uprisings, the first of which took place in 2005 under the name “Tulip Revolution” and the second in 2010 under the name “Bloody Revolution,” culminated in the 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Prior to the revolution of 2020, Kyrgyzstan had a time of comparatively good stability (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2019). However, the patronage system, which had been in place since the end of the Soviet era, had allowed the government to keep control over the population. Through the use of material rewards and punishments, as well as through its ability to track and manage the behavior of its users, the system had allowed the government to maintain its hold on the population. Due to this, the administration has managed to hold onto power despite the lack of popular support.
By 2020, the patronage system had gotten worse and worse. This was caused by a confluence of political and economic reasons, such as increased corruption, political stalemate, and an ailing economy. The government had lost its ability to efficiently manage the patronage networks and had grown more distant from the populace. Elites’ expectations had broken down as a result, and they were growing more and more disappointed in the government and its policies (Hale, 2018). The turning point occurred in 2020 when Kyrgyzstan’s citizens had had enough and protested in the streets. As a result of the Kyrgyzstani people’s demand for a change in the government and its policies, there was a change in the balance of power. In comparison to the revolutions of 2005 and 2010, this one was more well-organized and supported by a larger portion of the population (Hale, 2014). The people of Kyrgyzstan had learned how to use their influence to bring about change, and they had done so to establish a more transparent and accountable government.
The 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan therefore supports Henry Hale’s thesis of patronal politics. As a result of shifting elite expectations and the dissolution of patronage networks, the government had lost control of the country, allowing the populace to seize the initiative and establish a more responsible and transparent government. The 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan is evidence that the theory of patronal politics is a useful tool for comprehending the political dynamics of post-Soviet nations.
There were “regime cycles” when continuity was disrupted but new patrons were able to maintain and frequently increase the “pyramid of power” because of the nominal term restrictions for presidential powers and the actual turnover of patrons. These incentives and expectations, which were established through a blend of unofficial “patronal politics” procedures and official “rules of the game,” shaped the dynamics of the 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan.
The idea of patronal politics by Henry Hale offers a crucial foundation for comprehending the setting of the 2020 revolution. Hale’s thesis sheds light on the dynamics of patron-client relationships in Kyrgyzstan and sheds light on the reasons behind the revolution and how it varied from those in 2005 and 2010 (Hale, 2018). It clarifies why the 2020 revolution was motivated by a rejection of the patronage networks that had solidified themselves inside Kyrgyzstan’s political system, as well as the systematic corruption and nepotism that had become a characteristic of the country’s politics.
In conclusion, the 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan supported Henry Hale’s thesis of patronage politics. The same concerns about a lack of political freedom, a poor economy, and discontent with the administration that sparked the revolutions in 2005 and 2010 also motivated the one in 2020. The processes through which the 2020 revolution took place, however, were unique. The main forces behind the 2020 revolution were the formal institutions that sprang from political struggles and had their own logic of operation. These institutions produced incentives and expectations that shaped the dynamics of the revolution in conjunction with unofficial patronage networks. In this way, the dynamics of the 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan were demonstrated to be consistent with Henry Hale’s theory of patronal politics.
References
Hale, H. E. (2014). Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. Web.
Hale, H. E. (2018). Timing is everything: A quantitative study of presidentialist regime dynamics in Eurasia, 1992–2016. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(5), 267-281. Web.
Junisbai, B., & Junisbai, A. (2019). Regime type versus patronal politics: A comparison of “ardent democrats” in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Post-Soviet Affairs, 35(3), 240-257. Web.
Lapkin, V. V., & Pantin, V. I. (2020). Global dynamics of political institutions in the context of the destabilizing world order (cases of the EU and Russia). Polis. Political Studies, 4(4), 55-77. Web.
Trochev, A. (2018). Patronal politics, judicial networks and collective judicial autonomy in post-Soviet Ukraine. International Political Science Review, 39(5), 662-678. Web.