The cruelty of World War I was distinctly emphasized by the massive attacks on all fronts. The Eastern front is a focus in the paper, for it corresponds to the idea of how the greatest generals were struggling for the liberation of their territories from aggressors. In this respect, the figure of General Aleksei A. Brusilov provides a scope of heroic and quite successful estimation of the features which took place in the Eastern Front of the warfare.
The main primary sources by Norman Stone Eastern Front 1914-1917 and A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914-1918 by Aleksei Brusilov are taken into consideration. The first source states the contemporary vision of war while the second incorporates trustworthy facts about the events which took place during the apogee of the war. Further still, he developed unique tactics in war, known as the Brusilov offensive.1
Norman Stone provides a scope of notes on World War I and the participation of different allies in the struggle against the main aggressors. Thus, the success of General Brusilov is seen by Norman Stone to be the most rational way to overcome the enemy despite the lack of supply and people.
The main enemy of the Russian General in the Eastern front was Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German army. This is why the main schedule of tactics against Austro-Hungarians was applied to the area in the Carpathian Mountains and across the mountain chain. Norman Stone is quite interested in his book about this event. The author indicates the advantage of Russians over Austrians: “Brusilov was told to go ahead, although, since he had not much superiority of any kind – except leadership – over the Austrians…”2 It is no wonder that Brusilov always chose the most verified and adjusted way to attack the enemy.
Thus, he was aware of everything characterizing the Austro-Hungarian way of warfare. Hence, he could have dared to brilliantly clash the powers of the enemy (though, at great cost of life). Moreover, as evidenced by Stone, the advantage in powers was more on the Austro-Hungarian part. This is why the voice of the author in the book is shaped clearly in terms of the rational approach toward tactics Brusilov had chosen in order to overcome the enemy. General Brusilov was highly experienced at the time after having gone through Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Looking at all pros and cons which were presumable in both wars, Brusilov gained the victory spirit of making changes in understanding war. In part, it was loaned from Carl von Clausewitz’s On War.3
Quite a good perception of Brusilov’s leadership on the battlefield cannot be underestimated, as Stone admits. It is a clear fact that Aleksey Brusilov always took advantage of different methods in warfare borrowed from predecessors and some contemporary generals. The thing in question is that Stone remarks the features of the war and Brusilov’s offensive, in particular, owing to the archives which he accessed having spent three years in Vienna.4
However, to scope out the main feature which was genuine of Brusilov, one should approach his manner of leading the army. Brusilov was widely considered to be very successful “soldier” general since 1914.5 Thus, he could encompass the power of the Russian army focusing on the main targets to be reached out to. The main assumption is that after two wars in which he directly participated, Brusilov had made allegations. Moreover, he had understood the significance of individual leadership skills to enforce rationality and tactic deliberateness in conditions of war. That is exactly what Stone identifies as a purely Russian approach in arranging things together.6
Stone touches upon Brusilov’s leadership through his strategically well-crafted incentives for the Eighth Army. His ability to succeed other Russian generals in planning future attacks and by taking more attention to soldiers’ training gave him grounds to come up with the way to obtain victories easily. It was stimulated by preliminary deep rumination of the General on the mistakes done by the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese war.
Nevertheless, Brusilov took notice of how to connect the traditional ways of warfare with those emerging at the very beginning of World War I. The question is that while commanding the Eighth Army, he did his first attempts toward further success. Brusilov dared align cavalry and infantry troops along with armor and aviation.7 The paradox of the Eighth Army is that it used (to a degree) Austrian-made weapons. It is when Stone notes: “Two corps of VIII Army were armed with Austrian riffles, and the Department always suspected that there were many more in existence.”8 This is why Stone correlates personal suggestions with real troubles experienced by the Russian army at the time.
The decisiveness of Aleksey Brusilov was one of his main weapons during the war. The author’s observation of the main questions in the book contemplates quite deeper insights into the way Brusilov followed his tactics. In this respect one supposes Stone being unbiased as of any of the parties discussed. The thing is that he never hesitated too long about making concrete aspects of the war comprehensive. Brusilov, however, sparks Stone’s special interest.
It was Brusilov who did stop the attack on Austro-Hungarian troops in summer 1916 while Stavka still doubted the success of the operation. Nevertheless, Brusilov usually ignored those minds aimed at competing more with him than serving the interests of the country on the whole. This patriotic evaluation of General Brusilov magnified all among his best attacks. Hence, the Eastern front could move on. The culmination is accounted for the Brusilov Offensive in 1916, of course.
Nonetheless, he never lost his chance to counterattack, even though there is a lack of provision and guns.9 It does not mean that he aimlessly tried to sacrifice the rest of the forces counting on his personal pretenses. Never! The only thing is that he had different ways to attack as well as to retire throughout the Southwestern front line. Thus, the decisiveness of Brusilov never betrayed him in leading the army.
Stone notably evaluates Brusilov as one who put trust in thoroughly designed cooperation with allies. He was not a man of rigid intentions when the case touched upon the security of humanity at large. Coping with French, Italian, and British allies, Brusilov considered their interests as being cohesive to his own tactics in war. It is no secret now, that the Brusilov offensive had been planned by the General taking into consideration an effort to relieve tension on the Western front.10
Despite the financial problems which took place in the Russian army at that time, Stone delineates a scope of expenditures and statistical survey on the armies’ potentiality for the enforcement of thrusts.11 Brusilov’s tries to find a common language with allied generals were all successful. It is even noted that the authority of General Brusilov was taken for granted among the foreign commanders, even from the side of the enemy.12
What is more, the Russian Army was in most points dependent on the strategy of Brusilov in warfare and in anticipating further perspectives with the allies. All in all, it explains the success of Brusilov over General Ivanov after the Offensive.13 Thus, the invigorating and rather witty steps which Brusilov followed in unifying the general aim to clash with the enemy were his attribute.
The main attention of Stone is grabbed to the arrangement of armies participating in war actions. This simple assumption goes ahead with the way the author selected the main themes for discussion. Thus, his viewpoint is largely taken to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of Russian, Austrian, German, French armies. It is peculiar to state that Stone moves the central ideas within each topic toward juxtaposition in similar points. Thus, he clearly depicts, perhaps, the most grandiose Brusilov Offensive. The event took place in the western regions of contemporary Ukraine, near the town of Kovel in Galicia.14
The beginning of the operation was preceded by the telephone talks between General Alekseev and General Brusilov. As has been aforementioned, Stavka was hesitating on either to postpone such a marginal operation or not. However, Brusilov could not give up at the time. He insisted on the inevitability of the preparations and tactics to serve further victory. This standpoint by Brusilov was taken into account at night. Without the consent of the tsar, the offensive started on 4 June 1916.15
The main aim was to attack German troops from the northern wing in order to distress Austrian armies and simultaneously crash it from four sides at once.16 It was a far-reaching tactic that prophesied the advance of the front line further to the west. Nonetheless, the commandment by Brusilov was enough to work out this complicated warlike “game” in favor of the Russian party and of the Eighth Army, in particular.
Launching the attack in four different places at once, Brusilov made the enemy confused about his own reserves. This was seen and felt since the very beginning of the offensive. No wonder that Brusilov could manage the main arrangement not solely of the Eighth Army but of the Eleventh, Ninth and Seventh as well. In other words, the primordially anticipated with generals the destination of these armies in delivering a thrust solely on Habsburg forces.17
Hence, the positioning of the Russian Armies varied in terms of strictly delineated tasks for each army, battalion, division, etc. The four forces which were planned to deliver an overall thrust were considered to be the four Russian armies located in the area. A special task for Brusilov’s Eighth Army was to prevent Austro-Hungarian armies from getting closer to Kovel. The main drawback was the constancy of shell fire. In this respect, the command followed the decision to rapidly strengthen the railroad near Kovel was dismantled in order to create more protected positions for the soldiers.18 It incorporated the coherence in actions adjusted to each among four armies.
The main methods implemented by Brusilov in the Austrian offensive were highly adapted to the location and awareness of the arrangement of enemy forces among fronts. In this case, Brusilov was one to suggest the wide-front attacking to reach out new frontiers in advancing the front line.19 As it has been mentioned already, the sequential thrust on the positions of the enemy emphasized the main target on the German corps. It was needful to break Austrian counterattacks near Styr.20
All in all, the idea was quite logical and full of rational observation on the particular distribution of powers at the enemy’s location. The next suggestion by Brusilov was to provide many-front attacks in the area between Volhynia and Romania. It served the interests of dissemination of the enemy’s powers among several battlefields in the Eastern front.
The arrangement of powers was done by Brusilov in order to decrease the losses of Russian soldiers. Thereupon, before the offensive, Brusilov made more emphasis on keeping guns loaded with six shells.21 There was a danger of having a disadvantage in shell fire at the very beginning. However, infantry and cavalry were well-supported with weapons. After the first weeks of the offensive, the losses were substantial on the part of Russians. Thus, when Germans had lost approximately 16,000 soldiers, Russians had lost 80,000.22
At this point, Brusilov commanded to stop two moving fronts on each wing. That was a coercive measure to recover the conditions of all four armies at Brusilov’s disposal. However, the plans of offensive employment changed not a jot. Stone sounds quite enthusiastic while commenting on this point. It was a principal measure, as Brusilov admits in his notes, not to stop two basic elements of the offensive, namely: spontaneity and dissemination of the enemy’s reserves.23
That was the idea fix of the whole operation. However, heavy criticism pounced upon Brusilov due to his persuasion in following this way of broad-front tactics. As a matter of fact, Brusilov needed some more time to break the enemy’s reserves down, beginning with the most aggressive Habsburgs troops.
Visiting battlefields in person, Brusilov could put himself into the picture about needful or extremely necessary corrections within the theatre of war operations. This quality of the General helped him to invigorate exhausted and tired soldiers in their attempts to provide breakthroughs in the enemy’s defense line. It was such an uneasy task for Brusilov to incorporate his personal vision of warfare at the moment with what he saw in reality. Thus, with less advantage in personnel (at least 132,000 men), Brusilov had the deepest interest in the success of the operation by means of dispersion of reserve troops among Germans and Austrians.24
Hence, there was no ostensive superiority in Russian troops as compared to the enemies. It only concludes the tactical wisdom of the General. Moreover, the thrusts which were delivered at each point of the front line were aimed at bewildering the main enemy’s forces. It was presumably done by Brusilov to introduce psychological decline in the camps of enemies while having raise of spirits among Russians.
Attacking from different wings, the Russian army could devastate the enemy’s forces in a month after the beginning of the offensive. It is clear that even with fewer amounts of troops at hand, Brusilov could turn German and Austrian counterattacks aback from Russian positions. Thus, it gave an opportunity to advance deeply in Galicia.25
To say more, the main attention of General was grabbed to having more Austro-Hungarian troops imprisoned or liquidated. It is amazing that at the very start and some weeks afterward 200,000 Austrian soldiers were taken prisoner.26 Moreover, the success of the operation was highlighted by the additional dispersion of the Austrian and German troops owing to the simultaneous British and Italian offensives in the Northern and in the Southern fronts.
The Brusilov’s offensive was greatly accompanied by the support of allies on other frontiers of the battlefield. However, Brusilov was highly dissatisfied that, though he showed the efficiency of his tactics, his fellow officers and generals were still criticizing him. It was the main drawback for Aleksey Brusilov, namely misunderstanding in the fighting formation.27 Moreover, he could only go ahead to achieving victory in the operation. All in all, he showed the strength of the tactics which put the enemy in peril.
The success of the Brusilov offensive was in the fact that after the first month of passage of arms Austria-Hungary was at the edge of the total crush. It goes without saying that most of the Austrian and German generals were amazed about the dissemination of attacks by Russians. It went apart from what was entirely practiced in the warfare. It also demonstrated an illogical arrangement of forces instead of accumulating the main forces at a single point. At this line starts the key prospect for the success of the Brusilov offensive.
Several thrusts just speeded up shifting the front line deeper into the main positions of the enemy. In turn, it guaranteed further collapse of the Central Powers. At least, the enemy was shaken by the tactics more than by the predicted advantage of the artillery (wherein it was wrong) and infantry.28 Therefore, Austria felt the first ostensive attributes of senseless attempts to win the war on the whole.
To make the battle even more confusing for Linsingen, Brusilov enforces the thrusts by wings, especially in the area near Lutsk. It was a correlative breakthrough aimed at enlarging the power of dissemination and surprise among primary positions of the enemy. It was also inconvenient for the enemy to prevent Russian attacks because the reserve troops were suffering from devastation within. In this area, one of the most significant roles that Brusilov outlined was that of General Kaledin. Owing to his command, Russian troops acquired additional support of 50,000 men in the northern part of the front.29 In the stretch of 48-kilometer front, this reinforce proved the supremacy of the Brusilov offensive at large.30
Furthermore, Army Group Bohm-Ermolli felt a heavy clash on the part of the Russians and, particularly, Kaledin’s command. This was a great moment for the hope that there was little time until proving the success of the whole operation.
In the middle of July 1916, there increased a need for having additional reinforcement on the part of allies. Thus, Brusilov followed this idea in order to involve so needed Romania as a new ally in the operation. Stone comments that Russia had a lack of supplies and human resources composed mainly of ordinary people. Thereupon, the author is fair to note the following fact: “The Russian army was not, like western European armies at the time, largely dominated by upper-class figures.”31
It was known that with the advancement of the long-lasting offensive the troops were highly depressed, for Russian manufactures and other facilities could not fulfill the entire needs of the army.32 Thus, provoking Romania to join the camp of allies was quite necessary for the success of the late stage of the Brusilov offensive. It was an obsession that Brusilov wanted to carry out soon. “Russia was a poor country, without that plethora of jobs in the economy that attracted the socially-mobile in more advanced countries.”33
Brusilov’s position as of it sounds quite patriotic in the book by Stone. Thus, Brusilov accompanied in opinions with Alekseev insisted on battling over the Kovel area which is known to be the “Kovel Pit.”34 The aims were clearly stated, and the reasons were comprehensive as well. There should be an additional source for giving the armies a “fresh breath” to advance the line of resistance in terms of newly delineated borders of the Eastern front.
Brusilov’s offense was crucial for the enemy to realize the inevitable loss of Romania. In this respect it is no secret that conquering new territories step by step, Russians make their target closer, even though they were at the edge of lack of the resources and ammunition. In fact, Brusilov was that persuaded in the positive idea of anticipation with Romania which belonged to the Central Powers, that he did not even deprive the rest of armies of needful units.35
That was a sincere step toward Russian hope for Romania, as an ally. This step further proved its significance and reliability. The enemy could not restrict Romania anymore, for the southern parts of the front on both banks of the Dniester the Central Powers could not take Brusilov’s methods as a given.36
That was an essential prerogative of the whole offensive. Thus, Brusilov saw no obstacle for joining Romania in line with the members of the Entente. By contrast, Russian troops were amplified with more units of infantry. It was a measure to make sure Romania was out of the menace from the Central Powers. All in all, even with little causeways to deliver additional thrust to the enemy’s positions southern line of the front followed unprecedented Brusilov tactics despite requests of the majority of generals in the headquarters.
Romania joined Entente in August 1916 ensuring the needed reinforcement for the Russian army. This fact was another collapse for the Central Powers. Rumination which Stone provides on that point is subtly strict but persuasive in emphasizing mistakes by German and Austrian armies. “Ludendorf, as the correspondence of Conrad’s liaison officer shows had doubts as to the Carpathian offensive, but suppressed them, no doubt in order to convince Falkenhayn that his own East Prussian scheme was a necessary complement to Conrad’s.”37
Brusilov was at his height in terms of the inevitable success of the operation. However, Stone embodies a sort of personal ravishment by contrasting Brusilov as opposed to Austrian and German generals. In this feature, one can understand Stone in his little sympathy for the genius of the Russian General. This could not fail to reflect on his persistence in breaking down the last strongholds of Austrian and German troops. Romania was that necessary partner to point out the entire advantage of Russian thrusts from all wings. Along with Romania being intervened in the warfare, Brusilov aimed his main forces at the southern parts of the battlefield. Here, the situation was emphasized by the worries of the enemy to lose Bulgaria as well.38
General Brusilov could not stop going ahead. However, he did it along with quite firm, though, scantily gathered armies. Hence, the many-front tactic with long lines of front shifted Austrian Fourth, First, Second, and Seventh along with German Süd Armies aback toward Kovel and Halicz.39 Such an arrangement of the main forces took place due September 1916. Hence, Romania was a necessary ally for making the front line even more turned into the enemy’s back land. That was the point to shape Brusilov’s methods in pursuing the tactics ahead.
The way in which General Brusilov comments on the offensive of his entire life is quite critical and full of reasonable objectives as even shown in Stone’s survey. The main impulses which are seen in the memoirs of General Brusilov are those concerning misunderstanding on the part of the tsar, Alekseev, and the rest of fellow generals and officers as well.40 That was his personal cry for getting no significant support from the Stavka, but the senseless provision of what to do. Of course, it was out of Brusilov’s personal vision of the success in the operation. Consequently, Norman Stone recognizes the pressure which was made on Brusilov to be of a significant obstacle, particularly, in forcing southern part of the front.41
Historians shape the figure of General Brusilov as a self-critical person who could not forgive the lack of infantry and cavalry units at his disposal when they were so needful. This case along with others usually served for Brusilov to be the elements of so-called stimulation to get the victory at all hazards. Hence, General Brusilov gained special appreciation and place on the pages of world history as an irrepressible commander who always had his own opinion on how to reach the victory in Brusilov Offensive.
Bibliography
Brusilov, Aleksei A. A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914-1918. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1971.
Dowling, Timothy C. The Brusilov offensive. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.
Stone, Norman. Eastern Front 1914-1917. 2. London: Penguin Global, 2004.
Strachan, Hew. The Oxford illustrated the history of the First World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Footnotes
- Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914-1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1971), 32.
- Norman Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917 (London: Penguin Global, 2004), 235.
- Hew Strachan, The Oxford illustrated history of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 204.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 8.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 218.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 9.
- Timothy C. Dowling, The Brusilov offensive (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press), 1.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 149.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 211.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 37.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 18.
- Strachan, The Oxford illustrated history, 318.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 225.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 240.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 62.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 137.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 62.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 52.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 250.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 250.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 30
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 245.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 183.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 223.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 178.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 98.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 115.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 237.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 65.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 65.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 20.
- Strachan, The Oxford illustrated history, 202.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 20.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 144.
- Dowling, The Brusilov offensive, 144.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 250.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 314.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 253.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 265.
- Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 113.
- Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 235.